

CASE LAW IN ROMAN,  
ANGLOSAXON AND  
CONTINENTAL LAW

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MARÍA JOSÉ FALCÓN Y TELLA

# Case Law in Roman, Anglosaxon and Continental Law

*by*

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*Translation into English, from*

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
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## Preface

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If, from the viewpoint of continental legal systems, one can define case law as a common interpretation of legal regulations, with those regulations leading to a convergent series of judicial decisions, then to a large extent the phenomenon of case law may be seen as a paradox.

On the one hand, case law can effectively seem to be entirely integrated into the legal regulations whose meanings it interprets. From this point of view, case law apparently fulfills a purely declarative role, thereby running the risk of being viewed as merely an accessory to the legal regulations it describes.

Nonetheless, one cannot ignore the fact that identifying and properly understanding legal norms requires a careful study of case law. In this respect, and from a more realistic standpoint, it can be accepted that case law – partially, at least – helps to establish the scope of the norms that may be in play.

Bearing in mind the uncertainties outlined above, it is understandable that the role and rules of case law itself have taken their place among the problems which the science of law seeks to research and analyse, whether in relation to the inherent principles of a specific legal system or to the properties of law in general. The questions of whether case law has a creative or merely declarative function, in addition to whether – and under what conditions – case law can be considered to be a source of law, represent key problems upon which to reflect.

These issues have indeed been the object of debate since at least the nineteenth century, as much in terms of General Theory of Law as in the doctrinal study of the various national legal systems. In this sense, the understanding of the role performed by the judge, insofar as it derived from certain interpretations of the principle of separation of powers and taking into account the prestige that the judiciary enjoyed in the majority of European legal systems, has driven numerous jurists to consider in depth the question of the proper role and scope of case law.

In any case, it is worth highlighting that, at the present time, the outlined issue has an even greater importance. In effect, certain aspects of the contemporary evolution of European legal systems are contribut-

ing towards making questions concerning role and scope of case law ever more difficult to resolve. These aspects include the increase in written law, in addition to the strengthening of the judicial role in general – a strengthening shown clearly, among other things, by the extension of jurisdictional control of constitutionality of laws in various States, or the growing influence of supranational jurisdictions in areas such as European Union law, or applicable rules in the field of human rights. These are among the factors which have taken the case law phenomenon to a new level of significance. In this regard, and beyond their traditional theoretical and legal dimensions, problems relating to the role and rules of case law demand an in-depth reflection, taking into account the context of the modern day.

The preceding observations alone would justify our interest in this new work by María José Falcón y Tella dedicated to case law. This study, in fact, offers readers an outstanding study of the case law phenomenon.

The reflections offered by the author are concerned with the specific scope of case law in Continental legal systems. This definition derives from a methodological comparison concerning both the meaning of the term *iurisprudentia* in Roman law, and the practice of case law that characterises common law systems (English law particularly being considered with regard to the latter).

Following this first stage, María José Falcón y Tella analyzes, in the light of the Spanish model, the role performed by the various jurisprudential institutions in the formation of case law, and similarly the conditions on which its existence depends. Later, having identified the various functions of case law, the author reviews in detail the arguments advanced in favour of and against the role of case law as a source of law. This is specifically considered with relation to the case law emanating from the Spanish Supreme Court (*Tribunal Supremo*).

The immense interest that the author's work holds is particularly evident in its digressions on Theory of Law, which supplement the arguments made in the work and allow the reader to recognize their scope. These analyses deal not only with the notion of a source of law, but also with the varying understandings of the role played by the judge which have been outlined by the contemporary mainstream of Theory of Law.

The reader will be able to benefit from clarifying analyses provided by the author regarding changes in case law, in addition to considerations of the role it performs in different national legal systems.

The historical focus of the issues, the use of methodology from the perspective of comparative law and of doctrinal studies of positive law, as with the use of resources offered by general Theory of Law, together con-

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stitute some of the elements which enrich this work by María José Falcón y Tella and confer real scientific value on the work. Hence, as with previous works of real value written by the author in the field of Theory of Law,<sup>1</sup> this essential study of case law carried out by María José Falcón y Tella will occupy, without a shadow of a doubt, a key position among the more significant reference works dedicated to this form of manifestation of law.

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<sup>1</sup> See, among others, M.J. FALCÓN Y TELLA, *El argumento analógico en el Derecho*, Preface by J. ITURMENDI MORALES, Madrid, Civitas, 1991. *Id*, *Concepto y fundamento de la validez del Derecho*, Preface by F. OST, Madrid, Civitas, 1994. *Id*, *La desobediencia civil*, Preface by F. GARRIDO FALLA, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2000. *Id*, *Equidad, Derecho y Justicia*, Preface by J. IGARTUA SALAVERRÍA, Madrid, Editorial Universitaria Ramón Areces, 2005. *Id* – F. FALCÓN Y TELLA, *Fundamento y finalidad de la sanción: ¿un derecho a castigar?*, Preface by A. GARCÍA PABLOS, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2005.

# Table of Contents

---

<b>Preface</b>	<b>xv</b>
<b>Chapter 1      Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Chapter 2      Roman <i>Iurisprudentia</i> as <i>Prudentia Iuris</i></b>	<b>7</b>
1.      Introduction to Roman Law, Especially Classical Law	7
2.      Roman <i>Iurisprudentia</i> as Science of Law, as Distinct from its Modern Conception as <i>Jurisprudenz</i> in German and <i>Jurisprudence</i> in Anglosaxon Authors	9
3.      Priority of <i>Iurisprudentia</i> over Law in Roman Law	10
4.      Etymology of the Term <i>Iurisprudentia</i> as <i>prudentia</i> Applied to Law in a Practical Manner; Cognitive and Scientific Differences Regarding <i>Scientia</i> and <i>Sapientia</i>	10
5.      Decisive Creative Role in Roman <i>Iurisprudentia</i> – Neither via Legislator Nor Judge – of Two Bodies: Jurisconsults and <i>Praetor</i>	11
6.      Origin of Roman <i>Iurisprudentia</i> in the College of Pontiffs, as a "Secret" Concept, and Subsequent Conversion into "Lay" and "Public" Jurisprudence	12
7.      Value of <i>Iurisprudentia</i> and <i>Ius Publicae Respondendi</i> : Original Scope and Reduction by Augustus	12
8.      Grandeur of Roman <i>Iurisprudentia</i> , Owing to Casuistics, Inductiveness and Intuitiveness; Value of Science of Law Today as a Theoretical-Doctrinal Concept	14
9.      Value of <i>Iurisprudentia</i> in Roman Law: The Source of Law?	15
10.     Why <i>Iurisprudentia</i> and not <i>Iurisscientia</i> ?	16
11.     Roman <i>Prudentia</i>	18
<b>Chapter 3      The Anglosaxon Precedent</b>	<b>19</b>
1.      The Anglosaxon System of Sources	19
1.1.     The Term "Anglosaxon" compared with "English" or "British"	19
1.2.     The English System of Sources	22
1.2.1.    List and Hierarchy of English Sources of Law	24
A.      Judge-made Law	24
B.      Statute Law	27
1.2.2.    The <i>Stare Decisis</i>	31
1.2.3.    Distinctions	33
1.2.4.    The <i>Ratio Decidendi</i>	34

1.2.5.	Declarative and Constitutive Theories of the Nature of Common Law	36
1.2.6.	Types of Precedent	37
1.2.7.	Hierarchy of Courts	38
1.2.8.	Publication of Precedents; The Law Reporting System	39
1.3.	The North American System of Sources	40
1.4.	The Scottish System of Sources	43
2.	Distinction between "Jurisprudence" – Science of Law – and "Case Law" – a Judicial Phenomenon	44
3.	Differences between Common Law and Continental Legal Systems	45
3.1.	The Distinct Influence of Roman Law	47
3.2.	The Influence of Legal Codes on the Continent compared with Case Law Character of the Anglosaxon System	48
3.3.	The Rationalist, Rule-based and Formalistic Conception of the Continental Systems Compared with Anglosaxon Realism and Empiricism	49
3.4.	The Evolution of and Respect for Tradition in the Anglosaxon System Compared with the Continental Revolutions	50
3.5.	A "Procedural" Law compared with a Law of "Rules"	50
3.6.	A Social Organisation Model Based on Individual Initiative and Free Enterprise Compared with the Interventionist and State-centred Continental Model	50
3.7.	An Open and Incomplete Law Compared with the Plenitude, Completeness and Closed Nature of the Continental Systems	51
3.8.	A Casuistic System Compared with the Pre-established and Preconceived <i>a Priori</i> Ideas of the Continental Systems; An Inorganic Doctrine without Codes; The Case Method	51
3.9.	Disregard of the Separation between Public and Private Law – a Key Issue in Continental Law	52
4.	Main Differences between Anglosaxon Precedent and Continental Case Law	52
4.1.	Provenance of Precedent from any Jurisdictional Body regardless of Hierarchical Rank	52
4.2.	One Single Ruling sufficient for Judicial Precedent	53
4.3.	Precedent as the Main Source of Anglosaxon Law	53
4.4.	The System of Dispersed Jurisdiction Compared with Concentrated Jurisdiction	53
5.	Current Harmonisation of Statute Law and Case Law Systems	54
<b>Chapter 4      Continental Case Law</b>		57
1.	Concept and Main Requirements of Case Law in the Spanish Legal System	57
1.1.	The Provenance of Case Law	57

---

1.1.1.	The Supreme Court; Appeal to the Highest Instance (Appeal for Cassation)	60
A.	History of the Supreme Court and Appeal to the Highest Instance (Appeal for Cassation)	60
B.	Main Purpose of Cassation	61
C.	The Various Chambers of the Supreme Court	61
D.	Evolution of Concept of "Legal Doctrine" as a Basis for Cassation; Effect of the Reform of the Rules of Civil Procedure of 2000	61
1.1.2.	The Constitutional Court – Main Functions	64
A.	Introduction: the North American Model of Dispersed Jurisdiction Compared with the Austrian Model of Concentrated Jurisdiction	64
B.	Nature of the Spanish Constitutional Court	67
a.	Jurisdictional Nature	67
b.	Political Nature	68
c.	"Mixed", Special, <i>Sui Generis</i> and Complex Nature	68
C.	Relations between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court and other Judicial Authorities: A Question of Hierarchy or Jurisdiction?	69
D.	Place Occupied by Case Law Established by Constitutional Court Rulings and Orders	70
1.1.3.	The Higher Courts of Justice of the Autonomous Communities; Territorial Jurisdiction	74
1.1.4.	The European Courts	77
A.	The European Court of Human Rights of Strasbourg	77
B.	The European Court of Justice of Luxembourg	78
C.	The International Criminal Court	79
1.1.5.	Value of Rulings by the General Department of Registers and Notaries Public	81
1.2.	Reiteration of Rulings	82
1.3.	<i>Ratio Decidendi</i> Compared with <i>Obiter Dicta</i> ; The <i>Ratio</i> and Similar Concepts in Law	82
1.3.1.	The <i>De Facto</i> Assumption, Legal Consequence and <i>Ratio</i> as Elements of the Law; Historical Development of the Concept of <i>Ratio</i>	83
A.	The Greek Logos	85
B.	Appearance of the Term <i>Ratio</i> in Roman Law with a Different Meaning: The Arithmetical and Geometrical <i>Ratio</i> of Mathematical Content – Proportionality	85
C.	The Middle Ages	85

	a.	The Glossators and Devotion to the Letter and Literal Interpretation	86															
	b.	The Post-glossators or Commentators and Use of Logical Interpretation in Search of the <i>Ratio</i>	86															
1.3.2.		The <i>Causa Legis</i> in Transactions compared with the <i>Ratio Legis</i> in Law	87															
1.3.3.		The <i>Ocassio Legis</i> Compared with the <i>Ratio Legis</i>	87															
1.3.4.		The <i>Anima Legis</i> Compared with the <i>Animus</i>	87															
1.3.5.		The <i>Ratio Legis</i> Compared with the <i>Ratio Legislatori</i>	88															
1.3.6.		The "Historical <i>Ratio</i> " Compared with the "Presumed or Hypothetical <i>Ratio</i> "	90															
1.3.7.		The <i>Corpus</i> Compared with the <i>Ratio</i> and the "Criteria for Interpretation"	91															
1.3.8.		The <i>Opinio Iuris</i> in Custom	91															
1.3.9.		The <i>Ratio</i> in Legal Argumentation; Types <table> <tr> <td>A.</td> <td>The <i>Eadem Ratio</i> in Analogy</td> <td>98</td> </tr> <tr> <td>B.</td> <td>The Major Ratio in the <i>A Fortiori</i> Argument</td> <td>98</td> </tr> <tr> <td>C.</td> <td>The Minor or Contrary <i>Ratio</i> in the <i>A Contrario</i> Argument</td> <td>99</td> </tr> </table>	A.	The <i>Eadem Ratio</i> in Analogy	98	B.	The Major Ratio in the <i>A Fortiori</i> Argument	98	C.	The Minor or Contrary <i>Ratio</i> in the <i>A Contrario</i> Argument	99	97						
A.	The <i>Eadem Ratio</i> in Analogy	98																
B.	The Major Ratio in the <i>A Fortiori</i> Argument	98																
C.	The Minor or Contrary <i>Ratio</i> in the <i>A Contrario</i> Argument	99																
1.3.10.		The <i>Ratio Decidendi</i> of the Judgement Compared with the <i>Obiter Dicta</i> ; Fundamental Points of Law	99															
2.		The Functions of Case Law	100															
2.1.		The Interpretation of Law	100															
2.2.		The Application of Law	101															
2.3.		The Integration of Law	102															
2.4.		The "Limited" and "Derived" Creative Function of Case Law	103															
2.5.		Other Functions <table> <tr> <td>2.5.1.</td> <td>The Function of Decantation and Application of the General Principles of Law</td> <td>104</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2.5.2.</td> <td>The Updating Function of Law</td> <td>105</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2.5.3.</td> <td>The Function of Forming and Creating Legal Concepts</td> <td>105</td> </tr> </table>	2.5.1.	The Function of Decantation and Application of the General Principles of Law	104	2.5.2.	The Updating Function of Law	105	2.5.3.	The Function of Forming and Creating Legal Concepts	105	104						
2.5.1.	The Function of Decantation and Application of the General Principles of Law	104																
2.5.2.	The Updating Function of Law	105																
2.5.3.	The Function of Forming and Creating Legal Concepts	105																
3.		Is Case Law, Especially that of the Supreme Court, a Source of Law in the Spanish Legal System?	105															
3.1.		Arguments in Favour of it Being a Source <table> <tr> <td>3.1.1.</td> <td>The Evolution of the Principle of Separation of Powers</td> <td>107</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3.1.2.</td> <td>Kelsen's "Stufenbau" Theory and Hart's "Open Texture" Theory; Problems Resolving the Improvement of Strict Legal Positivism and the Conception of Law as a Legal System</td> <td>107</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3.1.3.</td> <td>The Infringement of Case Law as Grounds for Appeal to the Highest Instance (Appeal for Cassation)</td> <td>108</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3.1.4.</td> <td>Association of Case Law with Other Sources of Law           <table> <tr> <td>A.</td> <td>Association with Custom, i.e. Judicial Practice – <i>Usus Fori</i></td> <td>109</td> </tr> </table> </td> <td>108</td> </tr> </table>	3.1.1.	The Evolution of the Principle of Separation of Powers	107	3.1.2.	Kelsen's "Stufenbau" Theory and Hart's "Open Texture" Theory; Problems Resolving the Improvement of Strict Legal Positivism and the Conception of Law as a Legal System	107	3.1.3.	The Infringement of Case Law as Grounds for Appeal to the Highest Instance (Appeal for Cassation)	108	3.1.4.	Association of Case Law with Other Sources of Law <table> <tr> <td>A.</td> <td>Association with Custom, i.e. Judicial Practice – <i>Usus Fori</i></td> <td>109</td> </tr> </table>	A.	Association with Custom, i.e. Judicial Practice – <i>Usus Fori</i>	109	108	107
3.1.1.	The Evolution of the Principle of Separation of Powers	107																
3.1.2.	Kelsen's "Stufenbau" Theory and Hart's "Open Texture" Theory; Problems Resolving the Improvement of Strict Legal Positivism and the Conception of Law as a Legal System	107																
3.1.3.	The Infringement of Case Law as Grounds for Appeal to the Highest Instance (Appeal for Cassation)	108																
3.1.4.	Association of Case Law with Other Sources of Law <table> <tr> <td>A.</td> <td>Association with Custom, i.e. Judicial Practice – <i>Usus Fori</i></td> <td>109</td> </tr> </table>	A.	Association with Custom, i.e. Judicial Practice – <i>Usus Fori</i>	109	108													
A.	Association with Custom, i.e. Judicial Practice – <i>Usus Fori</i>	109																

---

B.	Association with the General Principles of Law, as a Source of Said Principles	110
C.	Association with Legislation	110
a.	Case Law as "Special", "Individual" or "Specific" Law	111
b.	The Legislator's Tacit Approval via <i>a posteriori</i> "Reception" or Prior "Delegation" of the Case Law Rule	112
c.	The Legislator's Express Approval in the Additional Provisions of the Civil Code, by reference to the <i>Comisión de</i> <i>Codificación</i> (Council of Law Reporting)	112
3.1.5.	The New Value of Case Law due to Progressive Importance of "Agreements Adopted by the Non- jurisdictional Meetings of the Supreme Court"	113
3.2.	Arguments against it Being a Source	115
3.2.1.	A Strict Interpretation of the Principle of the Separation of Powers and the Judge's Position	115
3.2.2.	The General and Abstract Nature of Statute Law and the Specific Area of Case Law Maxims for Isolated Cases	117
3.2.3.	The Imperative Nature of Statute Law as a Source of Law compared with the Merely Persuasive, Non- binding and Merely Authoritative Value of Case Law	118
3.2.4.	Inclination of Legislation in Principle towards Permanence, Stability and Coherence compared with Freedom to Vary Doctrine and Contradiction in Case Law	118
3.2.5.	The Presumption of <i>Res Judicata</i> Compared with the Merely Exemplary Value of Case Law for all Cases Comparable with the One at Issue	119
3.2.6.	The Creation of Objective Law by Legislation Compared with the Award of Subjective Rights by Case Law	120
3.2.7.	The Requirements of Legal Certainty	120
3.2.8.	The Originating Value of Legislation Compared with the Borrowing Nature of Case Law	121
3.2.9.	The Creative Nature of Legislation Compared with the Function of Mere Interpretation, Application and Integration of Case Law	121
3.3.	Case Law and Equity	122
3.4.	Analogy and Resultant Maxims of Decision	131
3.5.	The Consideration of Case Law as an Improper, Material Source or Source of Knowledge of Law: "Legislation Reigns and Case Law Governs"	134

3.6.	The "Sources-Argument" Theory	136
3.6.1.	The <i>Ab Exemplo</i> Argument	137
3.6.2.	The Authority Argument	137
3.6.3.	The Principle of Formal Justice in Coordination with the Principle of Inertia	140
3.6.4.	Respect for Tradition	141
3.6.5.	The Pragmatic Argument	141
3.7.	The Models of Judge: Hercules, Jupiter and Hermes	141
3.8.	Formalism and the Anti-formalist Revolt, with Particular Reference to Case Law	143
3.8.1.	French Legal Anti-Formalism	145
A.	The French Scientific School of François Gény	145
B.	The French Sociological School of Leon Duguit	146
3.8.2.	German Conceptual Anti-Formalism	147
A.	The Jurisprudence of Interests of Ihering and Philipp Heck	147
B.	The Free School of Law of Hermann Kantorowicz and Eugen Ehrlich	150
3.8.3.	Jurisprudential Anti-formalism: The North American Sociological Jurisprudence of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound and Benjamin Cardozo; North American Realism	151
3.8.4.	Other Anti-formalist Trends	153
4.	Changes in Case Law, Especially by the Supreme Court	157
4.1.	Can Case Law Be Changed?	157
4.2.	Is it Advisable to Change Case Law?	157
4.3.	If there Is a Change of Case Law, Which Prevails?	158
4.3.1.	The Oldest Case Law	158
4.3.2.	The Most Recent Case Law	159
4.3.3.	A Third, Distinct Line of Case Law	159
5.	Main Rules on the Sources of Law and Case Law in the Spanish Legal System	160
5.1.	The Pre-1978 Situation	160
5.1.1.	The Civil Code	160
A.	Pre-reform of the Preliminary Title of 31 May 1974, article 6	160
B.	Post-reform of the Preliminary Title of 31 May 1974, article 1.6	161
a.	The Systematic Argument or <i>Sedes Materiae</i>	163
b.	The Literal Argument and the Exhaustive List of article 1.1 of the Civil Code	163

c.	Case Law "Complements" but does not "Complete" the Legal System	163
d.	The Expression "Certain Legal Transcendence" in Reference to Case Law in the Preamble of the 1974 Reform of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code	164
e.	The Express Recognition of "Analogy" Post-reform of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code	165
	5.1.2. The Rules of Civil Procedure; the Reform of 2000	165
5.2.	The Post-1978 Situation	166
	5.2.1. Spanish Constitution of 1978 and its Main New Contributions on the Matter	167
	5.2.2. The Organic Law regarding the Judiciary	169
6.	Case Law in Other Continental Legal Systems	170
6.1.	German Law	170
6.2.	The Swiss Civil Code and the Legislator Judge	172
	<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>173</b>
	<b>Index</b>	<b>211</b>

# **Chapter 1**

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## **Introduction**

Case law is a widely studied field.<sup>2</sup> It creates various questions, the first of which being how it should be defined, as case law cannot be given a single meaning. There is no universal sense of the term “case law”, but rather a plurality of meanings depending on the historical era (temporal variant), and the place or legal system in question (geographical variant). In this sense, the old Roman law concept of *iurisprudentia*, referring to a concept comparable to Science of law, does not carry the same meaning as the current idea of case law.<sup>3</sup> While in Anglosaxon legal systems the idea of case law is one in which judicial precedents form the principal source of law, jurists in Continental systems continue to debate whether case law may be considered at most a source of definition of subjective rights, or also a source for creation of objective law.<sup>4</sup>

- 2 F. M. CALVO VIDAL, *La jurisprudencia ¿Fuente del Derecho?*, Valladolid, Lex Nova, 1992, pp. 23-26. F. C. DE DIEGO, *La jurisprudencia como fuente del Derecho*, Madrid, 1925, pp. 105-106.
- 3 J. H. VON KIRCHMANN, *La jurisprudencia no es ciencia*, translation into Spanish and Introduction by A. TRUYOL SERRA, Madrid, 1949.
- 4 See, on jurisprudence, H. J. ABRAHAM, *The Judicial Process*, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986. J. ADAME GODDARD, “Jurisprudencia”, in *Diccionario Jurídico Mexicano*, V, México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, UNAM, 1984, p. 289. M. ALBALADEJO GARCÍA, “La jurisprudencia”, in *Revista de Derecho Privado*, 54, 1970. *Id*, *Curso de Derecho Civil español*, I, *Introducción y Parte General*, 3rd. ed., Barcelona, Bosch, 1983. *Id*, *Derecho civil*, I, *Introducción y Parte General*, vol. I, *Introducción y Derecho de la Persona*, 12nd. ed., Zaragoza, 1991. N. ALCALÁ ZAMORA Y CASTILLO, *Jueces. Jurisdicción, Jurisprudencia. (Estudios de Derecho procesal)*, Madrid, 1934, pp. 303-326. N. ALCALÁ ZAMORA Y TORRES, *La jurisprudencia y la vida del Derecho*. Discurso leído en el acto de recepción. Contestación de Rafael de Ureña y Smenaud el día 22 de febrero de 1920, Madrid, Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas, 1920. L. ALEXANDER, “Precedent”, in D. PATTERSON, *A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1996. A. ANZON, *Il valore del precedente nel giudizio sulle leggi*, Milano, Giuffrè, 1995. ARCHIVES DE PHI-

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