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JOHN L. ESPOSITO

EDITOR IN CHIEF

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John L. Esposito

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Women's Movements–Z̤ūrkhānah

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WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS. Muslim women's participation in social movements and the emergence of women's associations, leagues, and organizations involved in nationalist, charitable, gender-centered, political, economic, or religious activities began in the nineteenth century and continued into the twenty-first. Important debates over women's status first emerged in the nineteenth century. These debates concerning the education, segregation, and full veiling of certain women expanded to other aspects of women's roles in public life, affording them greater opportunities in a gradual fashion, especially for upper-class women and in combination with state-led reforms. With the rise of Islamism, a response to the earlier modernist view of sex-role expansion and reform arose, as well as a new activism by some Islamist women. Also, women continued organized efforts to reform family, criminal, and commercial laws as well as cultural practices affecting women. With the burgeoning number of nongovernmental organizations in the 1990s, more emphasis on activities and agendas for women were included.

The Nineteenth Century. From the mid-nineteenth century onward, women and men began to discuss the need for social, educational, and political reform. Western colonialist figures had targeted Muslim women's oppression as an area requiring reform; hence, debate about women and gender relations among Muslims also rang with overtones concerning the role of the West in the Muslim world. Certain women and men questioned the legal and social restrictions on women, especially in regard to education, female seclusion (known as *purdah* in the Indian subcontinent), strict veiling of the face, polygamy, the marriage of very young women to much older men by family arrangement, women's slavery, and, in some cases, concubinage. Egyptian male reformers wrote on women's behalf, among them Aḥmad Fāris al-Shidyāq, author of *One Leg Crossed Over the Other* (1855); Rifāʿah Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭāwī (1801–1871); Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849–1905), a founder of the Salafīyah (Islamic reform) movement; Qāsim Amīn, whose book *Women's Emancipation* (1899) unleashed furious discussion; and Aḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid, publisher of *Al-jarīdah*. Turkish counterparts included Namık Kemal and Ahmet Mithat.

Educated women, such as Wardah al-Yāzijī and Wardah al-Turk in Syria and ʿĀʾishah al-Taymūrīyah in Egypt, began writing to each other in the 1860s and 1870s regarding reform for women, as women later did for women's publications. As part of a growing women's press, Hind Nawfal (1860–1920), a Syrian immigrant to Alexandria, published and edited *Al-fatāh*, a women's Arabic monthly; Zaynab Fawwāz (1860–1914), who immigrated from Tibnin to the same city, founded the newspaper *Al-Nīl* in 1891. Persian women also began

writing and publishing women's journals, the earliest being *Danesh* (1907).

In Turkey, early feminists included the well-known Halide Edib Adıvar (1883–1964) and Fatma Âliye Hanım (b. 1862), who published *Nisvani İslam* and *A Newspaper for Ladies*. In this period, women in various Muslim countries began to establish schools for girls. Somewhat earlier, some Iranian women had participated in the Bābī movement, an offshoot of Shiism; its leaders included Rustamah and the martyr Qurrat al-ʿAyn (1815–1851), who appeared unveiled and preached against polygamy and the veil. In Indonesia a famous advocate of women's education and emancipation was Raden Adjeng Kartini (1879–1904). She wrote and founded a school for daughters of Javanese officials, becoming most influential after her death.

The Effect of Nationalist Movements. Women also engaged in philanthropy and in nationalist movements. Both impulses instructed women in social mobilization and gave rise to associations run for and by women. In Iran, women took part in the Tobacco Rebellion and subsequently in the Constitutional Revolution (1908) and its aftermath, when mainly upper-class women organized separate *anjuman*s (political societies), seeking education and the right to vote.

However, leaders and reformers like Muṣṭafā Kāmil (1874–1908) and Tṣalʿat Ḥarb in Egypt opposed the end of veiling, and in 1882, Sayyid Aḥmad Khān of India felt that *purdah* should be maintained and female education postponed. As women gained the right to professional educations and entered the work force, some twentieth-century discourse characterized working women as a social drain or, where women worked with men, as a source of potential immorality. Often the primacy of the national struggle forced feminist issues onto the back burner. Examples were the later arrival of female suffrage in various countries, which all but Saudi Arabian women have now attained, and the primacy of national over gender issues in the Palestinian and Algerian national struggles. However, Palestinian women's activism provided important links to popular needs. It was paralleled by the organizing of Islamist women, especially after the Oslo peace process.

Women's participation in nationalist movements eroded the preexisting custom of female seclusion, allowing women into various public forums. Upper-class women ventured to meetings in elite salons—Eugénie Le Brun's in Egypt, and later to the literary salon of May Ziyada. Women's gatherings included lecture sessions, study groups, demonstrations, and formal associations. Individuals became well known; Hudā Shaʿrāwī (1879–1947), for example, became a symbol of feminist activism. [*See* Shaʿrāwī, Hudā.]

Philanthropic activities of elite and middle-class women actually formed the basis for the Egyptian state's social services and demonstrated women's managerial expertise. In Palestine, after the dispersal of the Palestinian people in 1948, middle-class women conducted relief efforts until the establishment of UNRWA refugee camps and facilities. In exile and at home, charitable associations formed the major focus for Palestinian women's organized activities until the 1967 war. Women's interest in social services later translated into participation in developmental programs, such as the Bangladesh Jatiyo Mahila Sangshtha (National Women's Organization), which coordinated programs under official sponsorship.

Postwar State Feminism. Nationalist movements and the new states that emerged in the post–World War I period perceived women and gender issues as crucial to social development. Atatürk of Turkey, Reza Shah of Iran, and later Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, leaders with unassailable nationalist credentials, initiated new policies to reform women's status and weaken the power base of the ʿulamāʾ. These actions were controversial, as were, in Afghanistan, Amānullāh Khan's reforms of the family code in 1921, the banning of polygamy for state employees, and the public appearance of his wife, Queen Suraya, unveiled. Turkish and Iranian reforms from above also attacked the veil (or head scarf). Later amendments in Iran, Tunisia, and Egypt addressed various areas of personal status, including divorce, child custody, women's rights to the family home, and alimony, as did the Family Law ordinance (1961) in West and East Pakistan. State-controlled education and laws provided women with at least a basic education. State policies enabled groups of women to enter the male-dominated political sphere and professions previously closed to women, although the same policies may have caused a popular and religious aversion to state intervention in gender matters. [*See* Family Law.]

Muslim women who gained most from state-advocated feminism primarily benefited as individuals. As marriage remained essential to women's status, many postponed their careers, often succeeding through strong familial connections and influence. A small group of powerful older women have dominated official political life and associations in many Muslim countries. Family connections could heighten state control over women's associations, as in Iran, where Ashraf Pahlavi headed the Higher Council of Women's Organizations. Women in political life might promote women's issues, but they and some activists were often isolated from lower-class women, who did not necessarily favor changes to current practices, such as the suggested reduction of *mahr* (bride price), or the listing of the bride's property, or the insertion of stipulations in marriage contracts, or, in Egypt, the custom of female circumcision.

Egypt. Egyptian women were accorded voting rights in 1956, in part as a consequence of long-term advocacy, but also through unprecedented public activism under Durrīyah Shafīq (1908–1975), who was later ill-regarded by the Nasser regime. Early activist women's groups included the Wafdist Women's Committee, the Egyptian Feminist Union, and the Bint al-Nīl association. Women also organized through a wing of Ḥasan al-Bannā's Muslim Brotherhood (founded in 1928) in the Association of Muslim Women established by Zaynab al-Ghazālī. These Islamist women wore the veil and eventually adopted a white *khimār* (head cover). They held that women must preserve their modesty, morals, and loyalty to their role in the home. The Muslim Brotherhood spread in the Arab world, opposing the female vote and coeducation in the 1950s, but later proposing reform of women's status in an Islamic manner.

Algeria. Women were involved in the resistance movements of North Africa. In Algeria, the FLN (National Liberation Front) incorporated women in its rebellion against French authority. The Front's conception of Algerian identity linked religion and nationalism. Its leadership was male, but so many men were imprisoned or in hiding that women served as fighters, intelligence operatives, and liaison agents, as well as in nursing and supply operations. Initially, the veil provided cover, as the French were reluctant to search women, who became increasingly involved in carrying

bombs and arms. Later, women were imprisoned and tortured, and in the process some became national heroines. However, the post-revolutionary government required the registration of their activities, and many lost benefits and recognition because they were illiterate or because, as women, they were designated "civilian" rather than "military" participants. After the revolution the linkage of *sharī'ah* with the constitution and suspicion of foreign influence meant that women were harassed in the streets, beaten, or secluded, and legal reforms such as the minimum age for marriage were not enforced. With time Islamist parties gained large followings, including women who proposed a more conservative view of gender. During the 1990s, feminists and women not wearing *ḥijāb* came under attack.

Oman and Yemen. In the Omani resistance movement, women were also empowered by the military nature of their engagement. In the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, after the revolution, various official agencies and associations were created for women, but their goal was the economic well-being of the state rather than a reform of gender inequities. Nonetheless, reforms were enacted that fostered women's education and increased their participation in the work force.

Iraq. In Iraq, prior to World War One, Jamil Sidqi al-Zahawi wrote an attack on veiling and women's treatment under *sharī'ah* that caused a scandal. A small elite group of feminists were active in King Fayṣal's era, and the Iraqi Communist Party promoted an agenda for women. Later, in both Iraq and Syria, the Ba'th Party featured women's associations. These movements were not able to translate their goals successfully or equally to all classes of society.

In post-Saddam Iraq, many international projects that aimed to provide income or other aid to women were interrupted by violence. Kidnappings and attacks on women forced many into exile, or to cease attending school, and many adopted the *ḥijāb* out of fear of attacks, when unveiled women, those driving, and some with businesses were targeted. Iraqi women successfully prevented a law that would require them to attend family courts of their own sect. A small women's movement is offset by politicians who argue for Islamist interpretations of the law.

Syria. In Syria, uniformed high-school girls serve as clean-up crews in villages and participate in youth leagues, but they are still encouraged to marry early and to enter "female" professions such as teaching. Women have been important in religious opposition groups in Syria, including the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. When urban Sunnī women adopted the *ḥijāb*, some were met by officially organized demonstrations of ʿAlawī Baʿthī women, who unsuccessfully protested the wearing of *ḥijāb* in school and work settings. [*See* Dress *and* Ḥijāb.]

Malaysia. Women's participation in student movements has been a feature of Islamic revival in Malaysia, known generally as *dakwah* (Ar., *daʿwah*). Dissension arose over the increase in veiling, particularly when universities required it. Similarly, debate continues over the appropriate level of female participation in the public sphere, ranging from sermons emphasizing a strong Muslim family life, to the complete segregation of female *dakwah* communal members, to the activism of other women such as those in the Sisters of Islam. In Malaysia the gender discussion combines with concerns of national identity, as the Malay majority coexists with other communities (Chinese, Indian, and aboriginal) who are legally free to observe their own faiths. The religious revival was propagated by several organizations, including the Islamic Youth League of Malaysia, Dar ul Arqam, and the more traditional Jemaat Tabligh. Clusters of adherents to revivalist groups had formed same-sex "family" groups (*usrah*). Islamization, including that of the laws in some areas, has continued.

Indonesia. In Indonesia the Muhammadiyah organization, begun in 1912, typifies apolitical educational and service activities. The Aisyiyah was the women's branch of this party, allowing for mobilization beyond the traditional teacher-peasant dynamic existing in Indonesia as well as Malaysia. [*See* Muhammadiyah.] After the Sukarno era, religious political parties were banned under Suharto, and the four existing Islamic parties combined into the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan). Nonetheless, religiosity has been on the rise in Indonesia, along with contemporary Islamic dress. Groups such as the Association of Islamic Students eschew militancy but view gender issues as integrally tied to Muslim identity.

Pakistan. The most important locus of Islamist activity in Pakistan, prior to the emergence of al-Qaʿida and the Taliban, was the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī and the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. Both proposed countering secularization and Western gender identity with a Muslim notion of modesty and piety. With the growth of Islamist parties and persons in politics, disputes over gender issues increased, including legal debates over whether rape victims can be prosecuted as adulteresses. Veiling and separation of the sexes have continued, though nuanced by the changing fortunes of the various political actors and parties, with al-Qaʿida supporters supporting much stricter regulations on women. The 2007 assassination of Benazir Bhutto, a turning of the political tide against the Musharraf regime, and post-9/11 concern over radicalism could portend more support for women's issues and groups supporting them.

Iran. The emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran sparked new interest in women's role in the revolution and response to the Republic's legislation of gender. Many women, Islamist and non-Islamist, had been involved in opposition to Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and had protested the Western commodification of women. However, when the government imposed Islamic dress and removed women from legal, judicial, and other offices, many Iranians fled. Nonetheless, women actively participated in the Mujāhidīn-i Khalq, an organization of Marxist-Islamic orientation not fully defeated in Iran until 1981–1982. A patrol and information division called the Zaynab Sisters and other women's associations began operating in Iran. A penal and family code revised along Islamic lines was imposed, but women, though now excluded from holding judgeships and other positions, kept alive a debate about fairer treatment of women under the law. Women parliamentarians in the Sixth Majlis challenged certain discriminatory laws, but these eleven women were banned from running for office in the Seventh Majlis, which included only conservative female figures and reversed some legal reforms. Between 2003 and 2007 an Iranian movement for women's rights reasserted itself in the One Million Signatures and the Abolish Stoning Forever campaigns.

Sudan. The Islamization of Muslim society, both organized and informal, increased in the 1980s. Women were fully involved in the process, whether by personal

choice, familial loyalties, or active recruitment. For example, in Sudan, where women had been active in one of the strongest Communist parties in the region, reversals in the public sphere have been marked. Women's issues became important to the National Islamic Front as well, and the liberal Islamist group of legal specialists, the Republican Brothers and Sisters, was suppressed.

Lebanon. In some areas, nationalist and Islamist goals interact and mobilize women, as among the Shīʿī of southern and eastern Lebanon. Necessity impelled many women to make use of political networks in the absence of their imprisoned or fighting men. Women resisted the Israeli occupiers when possible and were harassed, attacked, and arrested. Most adopted the *hijāb* and a more actively anti-Western stance in reaction to the Israeli occupation and in order to assert communal identity. In post-war Lebanon, a small reformist women's movement has campaigned unsuccessfully for an optional civil law of personal status, and successfully against a law permitting reduced sentences for honor-killings. That movement contrasts with the less-organized emphasis on public piety as "women's *jihād*" in the Shīʿī community in Beirut.

West Bank and Gaza. Women were crucial to the waging of the *intifāḍah* in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip. They participated at the grassroots level and through the four women's committees of the PLO, founded in 1981, which have sponsored economic, health, and political projects. These committees and the General Union of Palestinian Women's Associations in diaspora include both Muslim and Christian women. Much tension has arisen between these activist women and supporters of Ḥamās and Islamic Jihād, when attempts were made to impose the *hijāb* in Gaza and elsewhere. Although these attempts were reined in, Islamist women's associations and agendas have come to parallel the efforts made by non-Islamist women, though they have different aims.

International Trends. Tensions between transnational feminist goals and those of local groups, whether Islamic feminists or those who disavow a feminist agenda altogether, have continued for over a quarter-century. With global migration, large groups of Muslim women are now living outside historically Muslim lands. Some explicitly Muslim groups have begun to organize, such as the North American Association of Muslim Women (founded 1992) or the Women's Islamic Initiative in Spirituality and Equality (launched 2006), an endeavor of the American Muslim Society for Advancement. Western branches of the longstanding General Union of Palestinian Women did not deal with specifically Muslim issues but with national ones. A Muslim feminist group in France, Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Whores nor Repressed) organized to battle violence against women, obligatory *hijāb*-wearing, and forced marriage—thus, some say, enacting the French New Right's agenda.

Many women's organizations ranging from Islamic feminist to profession-oriented or human-rights groups now exist in Muslim countries. Nawal Saadawi's Arab Women's Solidarity Association was dissolved in Egypt in 1992 in response to Islamist and regime pressure, although it continued to exist outside of the country. Other issue-oriented groups, such as al-Marʾah al-Jadīdah (The New Woman), the Bint al-Arḍ (Daughter of the Earth), and the FGM Taskforce, continued to operate. Numerous conferences and events in the region display the activities of gender-oriented NGOs, among them the Turkish-based Women for Women's Human Rights working on the issue of sexual rights, which the group defines as the proper focus for women's rights. Some attention has also been given to women *mujahidāt* and *shahīdāt*, or suicide bombers, in various incidents from Iraq to Jordan to Palestine, as a social phenomenon.

[*See also* Feminism; Women and Islam; *and* Women and Social Reform.]

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SHERIFA ZUHUR

WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH.
See International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations.

WORLD ISLAMIC CALL SOCIETY.
Founded in Libya in 1972, the Islamic Call Society, known as the World Islamic Call Society (WICS) since 1982, is entrusted with the task of missionary activity. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), under the leadership of Muʿammar al-Qadhdhāfī (who on September 1, 1969 overthrew Libyan King Idrīs al-Sanūsī), has from the beginning designated the revolution as an Islamic revolution. Among the concrete measures taken to emphasize the Islamic character of the revolution, besides the prohibition of alcohol and the Latin alphabet, and the appointment of a Supreme Committee on Revision of Positive Law (September 28, 1971), were institutional interventions that strengthened the position of Islam in the state and simultaneously placed it under RCC control. These latter measures included the reorganization of religious institutions and the system of religious education, as well as the scope of the Islamic mission, whose meaning, goals, and structure were the focus of the First Conference on the Islamic Mission in Tripoli (December 1970). Through a conference resolution the RCC first entrusted the task of the Islamic mission to a Corporation for the Islamic Call, from which the World Islamic Call Society emerged. In order to implement some of the tasks set forth in the WICS statute, primarily the preparing of preachers and missionaries, the Islamic Call College, subordinate to the WICS, was created. Instruction in this faculty began in the academic year 1974–1975. Four years of study leads to the Islamic Mission License; further study may lead to a Ph.D. in Islamic Call. As of 2004, the College had graduated over 3,000 students. The students represent over 65 countries, primarily in Asia and Africa.

The WICS is directed by three organs: the Administrative Council, with at least five members, which plans and oversees all WICS activities and chooses a general secretary from among its ranks; the general secretary, who serves as the official external representative of the WICS (Shaykh Maḥmūd Ṣubḥī held this position from 1972 to 1978; since then, it has been the former education minister Dr. Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Sharīf); and the General Assembly, which meets annually and evaluates the work of the Administrative Council. The number of members on the WICS is unknown. The main financial sources for the highly endowed ICS budget are state subsidies, primarily from the Jihad Fund (created by law in 1972). The general budget for Libya does not provide for the WICS, which is exempt from all taxes and duties, is subject to no restrictions on capital transfers, and has the right to work with any organization if this furthers the spread of its Islamic message. The WICS, though an independent juristic entity with its main office in Tripoli, retains the right to found branch offices in other countries. One of the largest of these, in Paola, Malta, has been associated since early 1990 with the Islamic World Studies Center and the journal *The Future of the Islamic World*.

The Second Conference for Islamic Mission in Tripoli (August 14–19, 1982), called by Qadhdhāfī, produced a new institutional arm of the WICS when its four hundred participants created a World Council of Islamic Call (WCIC). Since its founding, Dr. Muḥammad al-Sharīf has acted as secretary *ex officio* of the thirty-six-member WCIC, which meets annually and is elected by the General Conference for the Islamic Mission, which meets once every four years. The WCIC is concerned not only with the international dimension of the impact of the WICS's role as a point of contact with the Islamic communities it supports worldwide, but also propagates Qadhdhāfī's version of Islam as an instrument of Libyan foreign policy.

Since the early 1980s, the WICS has established regional councils in an effort to foster Libya's relations with the global Muslim community and to counter the influence of the Saudi Muslim World League with a putatively progressive version of Islam. In addition to sending missionaries and medical relief caravans and granting financial aid, the WICS publishes books and brochures. It does so partly for purely missionary purposes (the brochures

include "How to Be a Muslim," "How to Pray," "Rules that Govern Fasting"), and partly to blend a political and religious message (the books include *Islam: The Religion of Unity* and *The Cultural Invasion: The Weapons of the Zionists and the Modern Crusaders*). These are supplemented by a number of periodicals. The central tenets of the religious revolution, propagated by Qadhdhāfī in May 1975, include the removal from power of the traditional religious scholars, the rejection of *sunnah* and *ḥadīth*, and the sole reliance upon the Qur'ān accompanied by the simultaneous elevated valuation of *ijtihād* and rejection of the four legal schools. The WICS has propagated this interpretation of Islam abroad. According to Article 2 of the 1972 law concerning the establishment of the WICS, the main task of the WICS is the dissemination of the official Libyan or Qadhdhāfian interpretation of Islam "all over the world by all available peaceful means." The word "peaceful" was struck from the 1980 revision of the law in reaction to the controversy with Saudi Arabia, which provoked Qadhdhāfī's call for a *jihād* for the liberation of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina and charges of heresy against Qadhdhāfī from the Saudi *ʿulamāʾ*. The 1972 law cites, among other things, the following goals: the implementation of the Islamic Call Conference's resolution of 1970; the spread of the Arabic language; the clarification of Islamic laws to make them conform to correct doctrine; the organization of courses of studies to prepare devout and cultured men of faith from the different Muslim nations; the preparation of propagators of Islam; and the reform of Muslim countries' administrative, educational, informational, and social systems so that they are in conformity with Islamic principles and their policies and proposals stem from Islam.

The orientation of the WICS to foreign countries means that it carries out only limited internal activities. Religious instruction of Libyans is the task of the Qur'ān schools and mosques; the construction of mosques is undertaken by other state organs. However, the WICS does organize Qur'ānic recitation contests and is responsible for the production of a new edition of the Qur'ān. The most important domestic activity of the WICS is proselytizing among the many non-Muslim employees and financial support to foreign Muslims in need.

[*See also* Daʿwah; Libya; *and* Qadhdhāfī, Muʿammar al-.]

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Translated from the German by Stephen R. Ingle

WORLD MUSLIM CONGRESS. The World Muslim Congress (*Muʾtamar al-ʿĀlam al-Islāmī*, or WMC), is a leading Islamic organization that aims at fostering unity in the Muslim world. It came into being at the Mecca convention of 1926 that had been convoked to find a mechanism to substitute for the caliphate, which had been abolished by Turkey's Grand National Assembly in 1924. The WMC held its second General-Conference in 1931 at Jerusalem, where it organized its administrative structure, electing a president, a secretary-general, and a twenty-five-member Executive Council. The grand *muftī* of Palestine, Amīn al-Ḥusaynī (d. 1974) became its president; Mohammad Iqbal (d. 1938), South Asian poet-philosopher, and Syed Alouba Pasha were elected vice-presidents; and Ẕiyāʾ al-Dīn Ṭabāṭabaʾī (d. 1942), former prime minister of Iran, took over as the secretary. During and immediately after World War II, the Congress remained dormant. In 1949 and 1951, the third and fourth General Conferences were held, and the WMC became active once again.

The Congress has a three-tiered structure. The Executive Council consists of twenty-five members and is the main decision-making body. The Presidency consists of a president and two vice presidents, and the secretary general looks after the head office, located in Karachi, Pakistan. By convention, these four office-bearers belong to different states. The WMC has regional offices

in Beijing, Khartoum, Kuala Lumpur, Kuwait, London, Mecca, New York, Tripoli, and Tunisia.

The General Conference of the WMC is convened periodically to determine the general direction of the WMC activities. The activities of the WMC range from the organization of Islamic conferences and publication of religious literature to political activities, such as giving input to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and arbitrating in inter-Muslim conflicts. In 1955, the WMC organized the first-ever Muslim Youth Conference at Karachi. In 1963, the first Muslim regional assembly for Asia and the Pacific regions was held in Kuala Lumpur. Since 1981, the WMC has organized a series of seminars. The first one was held in Tokyo in 1981. Since then, resource constraints have compelled the WMC to hold most of its conferences in Pakistan. The topics have ranged from themes of spiritual and political Islam to contemporary issues such as non proliferation and world peace.

The WMC has consistently supported the struggles of the Muslim peoples around the world. Beginning in 1931, it warned of the Zionist plan to establish a state. It has consistently opposed the creation of Israel and supported Palestine. Likewise, in 1950, the WMC presented a petition with one million signatures from all over the world to the then United Nations Secretary General Trygve Lie on the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir. In 1991, it presented to the United Nations a 160-page report of human-rights abuses in India-administered Kashmir. The WMC also initiated the Christian-Muslim dialogue, which has taken place in Amman, Jordan (1967), with the Catholic and Orthodox Churches of the Middle East; in Colombo, Sri Lanka (1981) with the World Council of Churches; and in the Vatican (1987) with Pope John Paul II.

Because the primary objective of the WMC is to foster unity among Muslims, it has striven for peace in the Muslim world. The first major achievement in this regard was bringing an end to the war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in 1934. During the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988), its delegations visited both countries to attempt to stop the conflict in the Gulf. In 1983, the WMC held a peace conference in Karachi among the rival Muslim leaders waging a war of independence in the southern Philippines.

The WMC has launched a number of programs for the propagation of Islam and the support of Muslims, especially in Muslim minority communities. These include publication of the Qur'ān and other Islamic books, and financial support to schools and mosques. Its major publication is the *World Muslim Gazetteer*, published every ten years from 1965. This one-volume encyclopedia gives up-to-date information on Muslim countries, communities, and organizations. Since 1963, the WMC has published a monthly newspaper, *The Muslim World*. The regional offices of the WMC also publish various monthly magazines in the regional languages. Its radio channel, *Voice of the Qur'ān*, operated from 1970 to the mid-1990s.

WMC is totally dependent on the funds provided by the Government of Pakistan for running its affairs. The Congress welcomes donations for its activities, but the voluntary contributions from the Muslim states or individuals have been negligible.

The WMC has had category "A" observer status at the United Nations—the first Muslim organization to receive this honor—since 1965. It has representatives at the UN offices in New York and Geneva and at various UN organs. In 1986, the United Nations declared the WMC a "Messenger of Peace". It was invited to the UN's Special Sessions on Disarmament (SSOD) in 1982 and 1988 to present a Muslim point of view. It was the first, among 7,000 organizations registered by the United Nations, to receive the Niwano Peace Prize, at Tokyo in 1984.

[*See also* Iqbal, Muhammad; Muslim-Christian Dialogue; *and* Organization of the Islamic Conference.]

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SAAD S. KHAN

WORLD MUSLIM CONGRESS. *See* Congresses.

WUDŪ'. *See* Salāt.

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
XINJIANG. Approximately ten million Sunnī Muslims of various ethnic groups live in China's Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region. Turkic-speaking Uighurs are the most populous, numbering 8.2 million in 1998. Other Muslim groups include 1.2 million Kazakhs, 782,000 Hui (Chinese Muslims), and smaller numbers of Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Tatars. Before 1949, Uighurs accounted for an estimated 80 percent of the region's population; by 2000, that figure dropped to less than 50 percent, largely as a result of the immigration of Chinese who now constitute 40 percent of the region's estimated eighteen million people (Toops, p. 255).

Muslims first arrived in Xinjiang via the Silk Road as early as the Tang dynasty (618–906 C.E.). The earliest record of conversion within the borders of present-day Xinjiang dates to the tenth century, when the Karakhanid ruler Satuk Bughra Khan of Kashgar accepted Islam. Following his death (circa 955 C.E.), the Karakhanid became the first Turkish khanate fully to adopt Islam. In the major towns of southern Xinjiang's Tarim Basin, Islam competed with Buddhism and Nestorianism. In the mid-1100s, power shifted to the Karakhitai (Qara-khitai), slowing the spread of Islam, but, a century later, Mongol conquest of the region brought a resurgence of Muslim traders and, with them, Ṣūfī missionaries.

The first Ṣūfīs represented the Yasavī order, but in the fourteenth century, the Naqshbandīyah displaced them as the dominant *tarīqah* (Ṣūfī order). Local histories credit the latter with the rapid spread of Islam in succeeding centuries. According to the *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, when Khiẓr Khwājah of the Central Asian Chagatayid state conquered the Xinjiang towns of Qara Khodja and Turpan in 1390, he forced their inhabitants to become Muslim (as cited in Foltz, p. 141). Voluntary conversions by Ṣūfī *shakh*s proved more enduring, and by the mid-fifteenth century, most of the population of the Tarim Basin had converted to Islam.

In the mid-eighteenth century, the Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) conquered the whole of the Xinjiang region, beginning with the nomadic lands of the north and completing their conquest of the southern Muslim oases in 1759. The new rulers allowed local religious authorities to administer Muslim law and serve as tax collectors, while the Qing held military and political power into the twentieth century.

The founding of the Republic of China in 1912 did not bring immediate changes. A succession of Chinese warlords controlled the region, suppressing local attempts to found a separate state, first in 1933 and again in 1944. Religious as well as secular leaders participated in these efforts against the Chinese, whereas other Uighurs sought an alliance with the Guomindang (Nationalist