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EXISTENTIALIST CRIMINOLOGY

EDITED BY
RONNIE LIPPENS AND DON CREWE

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and Don Crewe

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Contents

Introduction

Existentialism – freedom, being and crime

Don Crewe and Ronnie Lippens

Existentialism

The term existentialism has come to apply to a disparate range of human endeavour in the past half-century. Works of cinema such as Bergman's *The Seventh Seal* (1957) or of literature, such as the work of Kerouac[1] (*On the Road* 1957) or Borroughs[2] (*The Naked Lunch* 1959) were contemporary with the flowering of existentialism in philosophy. The term has also been applied to works such as Kundera's[3] *The Unbearable Lightness of Being* (1984), in that it deals with the apparent insignificance, lightness, nothingness of human 'being'.[4] Historically some have suggested that existentialism has been with us since the ancient Greeks, suggesting that Socrates was the first existentialist for his belief that his life was what he made it. We might suggest that Nietzsche's 'death of God' is rooted in the birth of modernity and Copernican heliocentrism, in that man, and not God, has become the measure of Man, or a similar idea expressed in Kant. Certainly there are strong traces of existentialist-like thought in Blaise Pascal's nihilist sentiments. Moreover, far from existentialist thought having become a minor backwater, many recent writers make use of existentialist ideas.

However, in recent times the term has also come to apply to any work that expresses profound nihilism – particularly contemporarily in the face of the end of the benign Holocene – the hopelessness of the human condition, or indeed, merely ennui. This dissipation of the precision of the term has lead some to suggest that existentialism is no more than a historical cultural affectation. A similar kind of affectation was fashionable in the seventeenth century when melancholy was a privileged emotion in the arts and in 'cultured' discourse – '*Semper Dowland Semper Dolens*'.[5] Indeed, it is suggested by some that both are cultural sentiments whose time is past.

The view that existentialism may be such a dissipated term stands in stark contrast to the claim that Sartre and only Sartre should be considered existentialist. This claim suggests that there is no place within the scope of

existentialism for the merely literary (Dostoevsky, de Beauvoir or Camus, for example), that Heidegger rejected the term, and that those said to be the progenitors of the field, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, were working before the term was coined. Neither position is tenable as a description of the nature of existentialism. In essence, existentialism is a field of human enquiry that has at its root a philosophical position that says that neither scientific nor moral inquiry are adequate to reveal questions concerning the nature of human being. Existentialism is that form of inquiry about the nature of human being that locates the essential quality of being human in the notions of freedom and authenticity. In the face of the impossibility of absolute reason, in the face of the impossibility of a universal morality, the traditional philosophical questions concerning, for example, how we should live must be found in the 'authentic' behaviour of the individual human: in the choices made about an individual life project. This is bound up with the question of human freedom; not merely to ask what is 'the nature of human freedom, but to experience freedom and to practise it ... to learn that ... the sense of freedom which we have is justified; and moreover that, in some sense, causation is an illusion'.[6]

The most fundamental theme addressed by existentialism is the question of being. Whilst Heidegger rejected the label 'existentialist', it is within his work that this theme receives its most telling exploration: the establishment of the idea that existence precedes essence. For Heidegger, earlier philosophers haven't really been asking about being at all, or have dismissed the question of being – what it is for humans to have being or to be – as meaningless (see Crewe, this volume); thus, he famously begins by renaming this aspect of humanity 'Dasein' or 'there-being'. For Heidegger, Dasein is being-in-the-world, an idea which is at odds with Cartesian dualism. The foundation for Dasein's engagement with the world, Heidegger claimed, lay with Husserl's phenomenological account of intentionality – we possess states of mind that are directed to some object which we represent to ourselves – that is, we are conscious of the objects in the world towards which our states of mind are directed, and we are able to experience having those states of mind 'phenomenally'. This, for Heidegger, means that we are that creature who, uniquely, can inquire into the nature of his own being. Furthermore, since phenomenological inquiry is into the constitution of the meaning of things, inquiry into our being must be into the constitution of the meaning of being for us: what it means for me to be. When we make this inquiry, we are capable of seeing ourselves as being in a world of others like us.

For both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, the true meaningfulness of life is revealed in one's relationship with God – for Nietzsche when there is no God, and for Kierkegaard when we reject God's moral codes. For both, this reveals the necessity for an individual voluntaristic search for one's own ethic. For Heidegger, drawing on both these ideas, finding ourselves

in a world of like others reveals to us the necessity to transcend other-driven inauthentic behaviour to find the authentic individual life project. The problem arises, however, that if we are to seek an individual ethic 'beyond good and evil', then what standard have we by which we may judge the meaningful and good life? For Kierkegaard in *Fear and Trembling*, Abraham's abrogation of his ethical duty to his son is not an instinctive, unthinking (libidinal) act, indeed, it is his ethical conscience – to care for his son, and which he overrides – that is his instinctive desire. Kierkegaard claims that conventional philosophies cannot comprehend this and thus are led to condemn Abraham's behaviour as being unethical. Kierkegaard claims that because of the unethical command that He gave to Abraham, God's law cannot be seen as a universal law governing all people. Instead, it must be seen as addressing Abraham as an isolated individual. What this means for Kierkegaard is that if Abraham's life is to have meaning, then it must mean that the individual is greater than the universal: that individual freedom can transcend, ethically, the limitations of a universal morality. Thus, for Kierkegaard, life has meaning when we truly 'know' ourselves and act with passion and freedom to be that person that truly lies within us as individuals.

In contrast to Kierkegaard, who, as a devout Christian, articulated his thought through the relationship of man and his faith in God, Nietzsche, in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, responding to the growing natural sciences and particularly to Darwinism, asks the question: where does our ethic come from in the face of 'the death of God' that it was thought at the time Darwinism brought about? Nietzsche sees in Christianity a stultifying life-denying morality: a 'herd morality' that penalises genuinely life-affirming freedom in humans. As in Kierkegaard, where 'the crowd is untruth', the herd morality in Christianity represents the resentment felt by the weak towards the strong: it represents the weak's 'will to power' and their inability to possess it in the life-affirming way that the powerful do. Any universal morality is no more than the merely normal. In contrast to this, as in Kierkegaard, Nietzsche finds the root of human truth in individual freedom, in an individual ethic, rather than universal morals. As science shows its truth that there can be no God, so the universal morality of Christianity evaporates. In the face of this realisation, the weak falls into despair at his realisation that life has no meaning. That is, should we agree with Hegel that a human's life is made meaningful by adherence to universal laws, 'the death of God' removes the possibility for a life to have any intrinsic meaning. However, for the strong, this *tragedy* gives them freedom and therefore the opportunity to take responsibility for their own actions. This person, then, is the *Übermensch*, the person who has realised that any ethic arises in the understanding that this very tragedy is the death of morals and the birth of the life-affirming potential of an autonomous ethic.

For some the only true existentialist, Sartre drew heavily on these themes, particularly on Nietzsche, but also on Heidegger. The relevant Heideggerian ideas are dealt with in Don Crewe's contribution to this book, so we won't rehearse them here. However, the significant point for this brief discussion has to do with history – *Being and Time*. For Heidegger, acting is always acting in a world of others, and in a world with a past. The *facticity* of this past and present (its thrownness) permits our authentic choices, which we 'project' into the future. However, whereas in Heidegger, and Nietzsche, we are *called*, normatively, to be free, for Sartre, we cannot choose to be free, we are 'condemned to be free'. First, for Sartre, there are no real things in the world; there are only our perceptions. The appearance of an object is absolute; the 'noumenon' – the thing itself – simply isn't there. This is important because it has ramifications for the way in which humans perceive themselves (for want of a better term). For Sartre, it is necessary to distinguish between 'being-in-itself' and 'being-for-itself'. Being-in-itself is concrete, unchanging and unaware; being-for-itself is conscious of its own consciousness. Because, as in Heidegger, existence precedes essence, the for-itself must generate its own essence from nothingness, by engagement in the world. Sartre next asserts that the for-itself is only given meaning through its engagement with the future; that is, it is not what it is essentially now but what it will become. Actually, man has no essence at all because everything that he has been, is and will become is the result of contingency and choice. This absence of essence apprehended through the difference between the in-itself and the for-itself, where the for-itself is conscious that it is not itself as represented by the in-itself, shows the for-itself that it is a nothingness, *tabula rasa*, on which it must create its own being. Thus, the for-itself is defined by its realisation that it is axiomatically separated from the in-itself, and we know this because the for-itself can perceive the in-itself and can see that it is different – it is present-to the in-itself, not identical to it. Following from this, Sartre believes that the nature of intersubjectivity stems from the 'look' of the other that defines me in terms of his difference from me. That is, I am taken away from that state of being that is meaningful for *me* (the subject-position) and cast as that which is meaningful for the *other*: I am objectified. As Sartre puts it, he is cast as French through the loathing of a German, or as Jewish through another's anti-Semitism. This means that whereas the phenomenological position of Heidegger, say, from Husserl, has it that we have self-identity – we are that entity that can represent itself to itself as an object; for Sartre, the capacity to take a perspective on ourselves, or however others might objectify us, means that we are different to ourselves. That is, we are free precisely because we are not selves but are a presence-to-self – the nihilation of self. We are thus free, as we are free of ourselves and our situation. Freedom is the very nature of man: we have no choice other than to be free.

The power to appropriate the 'subject-position' lay, for Sartre, not only in intersubjective relations but in our relations with institutions or social structures. This idea, it may be said, derives from his engagement with the proto-existentialist Marxism of Alexandre Kojève. Indeed, Sartre considered existentialism a mere moment within Marxism. Such inequalities as racism or poverty, created through the appropriation of the 'subject-position', are restricting of freedom, and thus engagement with the idea of freedom is political.

For Sartre, history represented the facticity out of which the project of self-making occurs. This led him to abandon the project of establishing the nature of human freedom through transcendental argument and to claim instead that the writer should always *engage* on the side of freedom, imagining paths to overturn injustice. Thus, philosophy must be made material through engagement: ivory tower theorising is otiose. This of course presupposes the freedom of the reader to respond, establishing through the praxis of political engagement the ultimate value: freedom as self-making.

This insistence on existence preceding essence and on freedom (normative and ontological) in existentialism has resonated strongly in the social sciences more recently, providing tools for critical engagement with the ideas that Tiryakian[7] has called 'sociologism' – the idea that freedom is unimportant in the face of *sui generis* social reality. More recently, Douglas and Johnson[8] have stressed the relative freedom of social actors, emphasising interpretation, social construction, will and emotion for the determining of social behaviour. Empirical studies by Espeland,[9] Johnson and Ferraro,[10] Ebaugh,[11] Kotarba and Bentley,[12] or Messinger and Warren[13] have concentrated very much on the existential freedom of humans to construct their own identities and life projects within social structures. Furthermore, forms of writing or expressing existential ideas have continued to make use of literary or poetic forms, performances, films or essays, leaving existentialist engagement in the social sciences as an engagement with freedom and, as Nisbet would have it 'an expression of movement, of becoming, and, in short, life'.[14]

Existentialism and criminology

No systematic attempt has hitherto been made, within the broader criminological community, to apply existential thought to problems of crime and crime control, or to put it to use in the expansion or further development of criminological theory. An existentialist thinker such as Sartre himself was quick to take the insights which he had developed in his massive *Being and Nothingness* (1942) into the criminological domain with his follow-up book *Saint Genet* (1952), an existentialist biographical analysis of the extraordinary self-creative life of Jean Genet: foundling, thief, prostitute, poet, novelist and journalist. In *Saint Genet*

Sartre applied the more fundamental insights from *Being and Nothingness* to a painstaking and minute analysis of Genet's multiple reinventions of self. Whilst existentialist thought *did* have some impact on psychiatry and forensic psychiatry, most criminological literature remained largely unaffected by this emerging strand of theory. Certainly, authors such as David Matza did refer to, and indeed were inspired by, Sartre's *Saint Genet.* In his ground-breaking *Becoming Deviant*, published in 1969, Matza made a conscious effort to tap into Sartre's existentialist thought. However, the book seems to have appeared too late for it to be able to generate much momentum at a time when French structuralism had, in Europe at least, managed to capture academic audiences, including criminological ones. Across the Atlantic, symbolic interactionism had emerged and was already to a quite considerable extent structuring research agendas. There are many connexions to be made between interactionism, George Herbert Mead's in particular, and, for example, Sartre's existentialist thought. Both, for example, focus on the dialogical self and its internal deliberations and conversations. But such overlap never led to any systematic exploration of and application of existentialism within the criminological community, apart, that is, from Matza's undertaking. This is all the more surprising in view of the fact that the late 1960s might perhaps be looked upon as an 'existential' moment in history, i.e. an age when critical self-reflexivity was at its peak. A certain 'scientistic' bent in criminology has furthermore tended to close off meaningful engagement with notions of freedom, self constitution, morality, and authenticity – all experiences of 'human being' addressed very much by existentialists. In sociology more generally, existentialism re-surfaced – albeit not all too conspicuously – around the early 1980s, at another one of those historical existential moments, i.e. the onset of what later would become known as hyper-reflexive, indeterminate, indeed chaotic post-modernity. A small number of essay collections have since appeared, the most important of which, arguably, are those by Joseph Kotarba.[15] However, such work did not focus primarily on issues and problems of crime, deviance, and crime control.

But having said that, we should of course acknowledge a number of strands within current criminological scholarship which it might be argued have some connexions with the broader existential domain. First, there is the strand of peacemaking criminology which can be related to the work of writers such as Richard Quinney, Hal Pepinsky, Kevin Anderson, Gregg Barak, Bruce Arrigo, Larry Tifft and Dennis Sullivan, and others. This work however does not always engage extensively with existentialism proper (by that we mean the ideas and concepts expounded in works by authors such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, and others), although the impact of related sources of inspiration (e.g. Erich Fromm's work) is notable.

Second, there is also the strand of scholarship which has become known as 'existential criminology', or the criminology of transgression or transgressive *becoming*. Here the work of researchers and scholars such as Jack Katz, Jeff Ferrell, Stephen Lyng, Dragan Milovanovic, Bruce Arrigo, Willem Schinkel, and others, should be noted. This work focuses on what Jack Katz, in his 1988 book *Seductions of Crime*, has called the 'foreground' factors, and on the situational contingencies therein, of 'criminal' events and what others have called 'edgework'. Although many of these highly interesting works are certainly relevant to our problematic – e.g. some of this work really does make a significant effort to analyse processes of constitution of the self or the creative *becoming* of self in view of legal and moral norms and pressures – few have done so through a sustained engagement with existentialism.

Finally, there's the more recent strand of what we now know as 'cultural criminology'. Here the work of writers such as Jeff Ferrell, Mike Presdee, Keith Hayward and Jock Young, and others, should come to mind. Whilst this work focuses on the contingencies on which often quite reflexive and inventive movements of (urban) resistance thrive, again we would stress that much of this effort is done largely without a sustained critical engagement with existentialism.

This then is where we hope to be able to somehow redress the situation a little. More than two decades into this post-modern hyper-reflexive age of ours, one cannot help but notice how existentialism is now gradually being rediscovered, including by criminologists. There has been in recent years an unmistakable resurgence of existentialist thought and concepts in criminological work on crime, deviance, crime control, and criminal justice. Much, if not most, of this work has appeared in single book chapters or journal articles and/or essays.[16] Emerging scholars are beginning to explore work by earlier existentialists (e.g. Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, etc.) in doctoral theses.[17] This emerging interest in existentialist thought, one could argue, is no mere coincidence. It chimes quite harmoniously with recent and current social and cultural developments (as well as shifts in the theoretical reflection on these developments) that can be characterised as contingent, unpredictable, open to change, detraditionalising, indeed chaotically 'becoming', to use an existentialist phrase. In a way, these conditions are quite similar to those in the immediate post-war era, when existentialism itself came to full fruition. Today's conditions of existential contingency, however, have largely been analysed, within the community of critical scholars and criminological researchers, through the lens of complexity theory, post-structuralist theory, or 'post-modernism'. There is an argument to be made for the exploration and application, by critical criminologists, of existentialism, and of existentialist concepts, when trying to get to grips with current social and cultural dimensions of issues and problems of crime, deviance, crime control and,

more broadly, regulation and governance. As mentioned above, some scholars and researchers within criminology have made a start with such work. Now, we believe, is the time to build on this emerging awareness of the importance of existentialism.

There are a number of topics that lend themselves quite naturally to existentialist analysis, such as: crime and deviance as will and becoming (see, in this volume: Crewe, Pavlich, Lyng *et al.*, Ferrell); the existential openness of symbolic exchange and interaction, and in internal conversations and deliberations that take place within or around criminal justice practices (in this volume: Ferrell, Hunter, Farrall, Mackenzie); the potential for alternatives to conventional criminal-justice policies and practices that open up in the space of such existential self-reflexivity (Pavlich, Schinkel, Arrigo and Williams, Lippens); or the ineradicably contingent and finite character of *willed* critical resistance and attempts at justice (Pavlich, Schinkel, Lippens). The contributions in this volume all set out to explore such issues in quite some depth. In doing so, they connect into a hitherto largely untapped neo-Nietzschean reservoir of critical potential. Indeed, most existentialist concepts and ideas have, to some extent, roots in Nietzsche's work. This tapping into the 'existential Nietzsche', the Nietzsche of *becoming*, of potential and of change, of creative affirmation, is, in itself, already a worthwhile exercise. It is at this point, then, in trying to address this relative lack of existentialism-inspired criminological work, where we hope to be able to contribute in some measure, however small.

The contributions[18]

In his chapter on the 'will to self-consummation', Don Crewe engages with the work of Heidegger and with notions of becoming to establish how humans come to view themselves as objects of the future. In so doing, he develops and subsequently applies his notion of *will to self-consummation* to a critique of David Matza's concept, 'The will to crime', and concludes that such a will is not possible, but that problematic behaviour may result from a *will* to transgress.

George Pavlich shows how Nietzsche's thought enables us to grasp criminality not as essential being, but as complex becoming. For Nietzsche, description and evaluation are not distinct; rather the will, the choice, to classify being in this way is already an ethical statement, and one to which we are always responsible, despite evasive, 'bad faith', 'inauthentic' attempts to suppress this. Pavlich asks the question of how, in light of Nietzsche's contributions to existential thought, responsibility is implied by the all-too-common events that create criminals as objective elements against which to define a given order.

Based on Husserl's phenomenology and Heidegger's ontology, Willem Schinkel fleshes out an ontological definition of violence as reduction of

being. Reduction of being is an ontological process that always happens the moment persons enter into interaction. Violence is hence a productive reduction of an ontological horizon grounding the conventional legitimate order. Seen from this perspective, aprioristic negative attitudes towards violence could then be called a form of biaphobia, which is a negation of the active force of life which Nietzsche called 'denial of life'. Schinkel shows how the dominant, biaphobic notion of violence procures the difference between legitimate violence (as *potestas*) and illegitimate violence (*violentia*) that founds the modern state, avoiding questions of legitimation in the process. Abandoning commonsensical and biaphobic conceptions of violence for an ontological one, Schinkel opens up space for a reflexive critique of moral and legal order.

Illustrating their thesis with empirical evidence on Ultimate Fighting, Stephen Lyng, Rick Matthews, and William Miller examine the intersections between existentialist thought and the 'edgework' approach to risk agency. The examination of Ultimate Fighting allows them to explore the critical connections between discipline, domination, the contingent body, and experiential transcendence in violent encounters that are both non-criminal and criminal in nature. Demonstrating the relevance of existentialist ideas to the increasing structural uncertainty and reflexivity of the risk society and the emergence of edgework as an expression of risk agency in this social context, Lyng and his colleagues also underline the importance of incorporating the body into the existentialist analysis of risk structure and agency.

In his contribution, Jeff Ferrell recounts his own experiences as a scrounger. Inspired by Situationism, he develops what he calls an 'existential ethnography' whereby he describes how the experience of marginal time (Zen time) and marginal space (the spaces of the scrounger) does not just write and invent an illicit map of the city, but also transforms the latter, as well as the self as it roams and meanders at a slowed-down pace, in the everyday at the margins. This urban experience of *detournement* and *derive* in back alleys and abandoned urban spaces, and the existential freedom that goes with it, Ferrell argues, are ultimately about creative revaluation and creative (self-)transformation.

Ben Hunter draws upon existential literature to provide an understanding of the reactions of white-collar offenders to their treatment at the hands of the criminal justice system and their resettlement in the wake of punishment. Data was gathered from published autobiographical accounts whereby white-collar offenders discuss their offences and punishment. The concerns that white-collar offenders have speak to an awareness of how one is situated within the world and the threat that one's sense of self may be subjected to by their offending. Detection of their offences puts what may have been a previously assumed future in jeopardy. The aftermath of punishment is likely to represent a search to determine who they are in the

'legitimate' world, a world they used to be part of but must now renegotiate their place within.

Stephen Farrall similarly analyses existential reflexivity. His chapter seeks to analyse resettlement experiences of those who, wrongfully convicted, are then released. He focuses upon the existential aspects of the experiences of one such released prisoner, Angela Cannings, in particular. The loss of their 'assumptive world', as well as other existential dilemmas faced by the wrongfully convicted inevitably raise issues which mainstream work on resettlement has overlooked, but which Farrall seeks here to explore.

In his chapter, Simon Mackenzie considers a phenomenology of exchange, as it may be relevant for the production of civility and the prevention of criminality and anti-social behaviour. Building on a philosophy of social contribution and social reciprocity Mackenzie contemplates ways which would satisfy the crime-reductive desires of the current political interest in community activation. It is here, he argues, that a phenomenology of exchange might really come into its own: as a means to understand certain elements of social engagement and its breakdown as experiential aspects of being in the world encountered by wrongdoers.

In their contribution, Bruce Arrigo and Christopher Williams build on a number of critical theories, including Erich Fromm's work on negative freedom, displaced spontaneity, and mechanisms of escape, in order to critically examine the contours of what they call the 'criminology of the shadow'. Adding a critique of evidence-based criminal justice, actuarial penology, and the policing of risk (which all work to eradicate the distinction between the subject *of* crime, i.e. transgression, and the subject *in* crime, i.e. transgressors), Arrigo and Williams go on to specify the existentialist dilemma for sustaining a criminology of the stranger.

And finally, Ronnie Lippens introduces and expands on the thesis that critical criminology may be able to re-invent itself through Sartre's existentialism. Beginning with an extensive analysis of critical criminology's post-war history, Lippens goes on to offer new 'guiding images' (most notably, existential hybridization) which, it is suggested, might be able to provide critical criminology with a renewed sense of purpose.

Notes

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2 W.S. Burroughs, *The Naked Lunch*, London: Flamingo, 1993.
3 M. Kundera, *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*, trans. M.H. Heim, London: Faber & Faber, 1985.
4 See F. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. J. Nauckhoff, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 §341.
5 The title of a collection of lute music by seventeenth-century English composer John Dowland.

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10 J. Johnson, and K. Ferraro, 'The Victimised Self: The Case of Battered Women', in J. Kotarba and A. Fontana, eds, *The Existential Self in Society*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
11 H. Ebaugh, 'Leaving the Convent: The Experiences of Role Exit and Self-Transformation', J. Kotarba and A. Fontana, eds, *The Existential Self in Society*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
12 J. Kotarba and P. Bentley, 'Workplace Wellbeing and the Existential Self', *Social Science and Medicine*, 1988, 26/5: 551–558.
13 S. Messinger and C. Warren, 'The Homosexual Self and the Organization of Experience: The Case of Kate White', in J. Kotarba and A. Fontana, eds, *The Existential Self in Society*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
14 R. Nisbet, *Sociology as an Art Form*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 94. Cited in J. Kotarba and J. Johnson, eds, *Postmodern Existential Sociology*, Walnut Creek: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 9.
15 J. Kotarba and A. Fontana, eds, *The Existential Self in Society*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984; and later, after decades of 'postmodernism': J. Kotarba and J. Johnson, eds, *Postmodern Existential Sociology*, Walnut Creek: Altamira, 2002.
16 W. Morrison, 'Crime and the Existentialist Dilemma', in *Theoretical Criminology: From Modernity to Post-Modernism*, London: Cavendish, 1995, pp. 349–382; B. Arrigo, 'Critical Criminology, Existential Humanism, and Social Justice: Exploring the Contours of Conceptual Integration', *Critical Criminology*, 2001, 2, 83–95; S. Farrall, 'On the Existential Aspects of Desistance from Crime', *Symbolic Interaction*, 2005, 3, 367–386; S. Mackenzie, 'Situationally Edited Empathy: An Effect of Socio-Economic Structure on Individual Choice', *Critical Criminology*, 2006, 3, 365–385; C. Williams 'Engaging Freedom: Toward an Ethics of Crime and Deviance', in B. Arrigo and C. Williams, eds, *Philosophy, Crime, and Criminology*, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006, pp. 167–196; R. Lippens, 'Whither Critical Criminology? A Contemplation on Existential Hybridization', *Critical Criminology*, 2008, 2, 145–156.
17 W. Schinkel, *Aspects of Violence*, Rotterdam: Erasmus University, 2005; D. Crewe, *Will, Power, Constraint & Change: Prologomena to a Study of Self and the Emergence of Structure in a Young Offender Institution*, Keele: Keele University, 2007.
18 The editors are grateful to all contributors.