Revolution & Political Change in the Third World

EDITED BY
Barry M. Schutz
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Preface

This project represents the confluence of long-term reflection by the editors and the opportunities presented for bringing together an international group of renowned scholars of Third World revolution and political change. The groundwork began in late 1987 with a concept for a conference encompassing theories and case studies of Third World revolutions. Papers were commissioned according to a preliminary conceptual framework developed by the editors. During the more than eighteen months that ensued between the presentation of conference papers in June 1988 and the completion of the manuscript for this book, extensive substantive revisions were made both in the essays of the contributing authors and the development of the editors' theories.

Contemporaneous with our revisions, events have unfolded transforming the shape of the international system. Conditions in Central and Eastern Europe, and in the People's Republic of China, reflect the impact of revolutionary challenges to existing Marxist political systems. While these changes reveal the importance of legitimacy (or lack thereof) to regime survival, the anti-Marxist orientation of these events has not yet affected the ideological nature of revolutionary movements in the Third World.

We are intellectually indebted to a number of individuals who provided inspiration and help for this endeavor. For both of us, General Eugene Tighe (former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency) has been invaluable as a major proponent for open dialogue between U.S. government defense analysts and academic specialists on critical Third World issues. Bob DeGross, provost of the Defense Intelligence College, supported and defended the program that allowed us to produce the book.

We would also like to acknowledge the influence of Robert C. Tucker, David C. Rapoport, and the late James S. Coleman, who provided conceptual and personal motivation for our focus, and Nick Onuf, whose attentive concern and intellectual guidance led to an acute appreciation for the role of theory in knowledge building.

We owe a debt to the authors for their willingness to undertake major and timely revisions of their essays based both on comments of the editors and on the extensive discussion that took place during and after the conference. We would also like to acknowledge the endless energies of the staff at the Defense Intelligence College, particularly Ed Collier, Steve Dorr, and Pat Lanzara, and to thank Max Gross and Mark Kauppi, teachers at the Defense Intelligence College, for their stimulating contributions to the development of the conference agenda.

Finally, we owe a personal debt to Lynne Rienner for accepting our proposal, encouraging our effort, and providing sage advice at important points along the way.

Barry M. Schutz
Robert O. Slater

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PART ONE

APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING THIRD WORLD REVOLUTIONS

CHAPTER ONE

A Framework for Analysis

BARRY M. SCHUTZ
ROBERT O. SLATER

> The revolutions and ideologies likely to be most important in the second half of the twentieth century are those of the underdeveloped countries. This proposition does not denigrate the obviously great continuing importance of the Communist revolutions of the first half of the century or of the Marxist ideology. They will go on working themselves out. But the new revolutions, having altered the terms on which the senior revolutionary ideologies can continue to be influential, may be regarded as the critical new factor in the problems of revolution and ideology of the next several decades.
>
> —C. B. MACPHERSON

More than any other political phenomenon of the twentieth century, revolution has aroused the awe and curiosity of scholar and layman alike. And with the proliferation of new states reshaping the international system after World War II, the number of revolutionary events has increased exponentially. Revolutionary phenomena have been most characteristic in the Third World; and these revolutions have been richly varied in their social contexts, ideology, type of leadership, and organizational composition.

Despite the diversity of Third World social and political contexts, revolutionary movements in the developing countries all tend to be motivated by a common perception of regime illegitimacy. This perceived illegitimacy—causing deprivation of economic equality, opportunity, and civil rights to the mass of the population—combines with a burgeoning sense of national identity to promote one or more groups bent on seizing power. More often than not, the movement for change is imbued with an ideological message of economic equality—either prescriptive Marxism-Leninism or some form of eclectic socialism.

The critical element in all revolutionary movements is legitimacy: a concept fundamental to the existence of the state, to all political systems (traditional or modern), and to other social and cultural organizations subordinate to and beyond the state. The traditional political science literature defines *legitimacy* to make it coincide with the rule of constitution and law.

The heightened awareness of diverse traditional political systems and the concomitant burgeoning of new states in the international system after World War II generated a broadening of the study of politics and created the need for a more inclusive definition of *legitimacy* that would encompass a people's sense of the good, rightness, or acceptability of the authority over them. While this sense of legitimate authority had its roots in the social constructs of Max Weber, it did not really pervade the formal study of politics until the late 1950s. Some political scientists from the old legalist school distinguished legalist legitimacy from normative legitimacy (Oppenheimer, 1975). In this view a type of de facto legitimacy was defined as distinct from the more rigid de jure notion that characterized traditional Western-oriented political concepts. Oppenheimer cites Hanna Pitkin's apt reference to this more normative connotation: "Legitimate authority is precisely that which *ought* to be obeyed" (Oppenheimer, 1975: 321–322). M. G. Smith, in his conceptualization of plural societies, further elaborates this distinction between political legality and political legitimacy.

> Legality connotes conformity to the law, the quality of lawfulness; while legitimacy refers to a wider order of norms and principles, and ultimately to the traditional moral system, not all the elements of which are adequately represented in the law. That which is legal is normally legitimate also, but all that is regarded as legitimate may not have legal sanction. *Whereas law circumscribes legality, legitimacy is often invoked to sanction and justify actions contrary to existing law.* Such processes suggest that where these two sets of norms conflict, certain principles or values are on occasion held by different groups to possess a moral authority superior to that of the law; and it is in terms of this superior moral authority that legal codes and procedures are evaluated and judged to be more or less satisfactory according to their correspondence with the system of values and rules which together form the basis of legitimacy within the society. (Smith, 1960: 20; emphasis ours)

The legalist perspective tended to eschew the dynamic impulse of legitimacy within revolutionary regimes and movements to the conceptual trash bin of totalitarianism and authoritarianism. Indeed, such revolutionary movements would not emerge if the existing government were perceived as legitimate, that is, as possessing consensus among the body politic. In fact, revolutionary movements spring from a publicly emerging or intruding lack of government legitimacy. The movement lays claim to that legitimacy, but at first only among its followers. If successful, a revolutionary regime must ultimately institutionalize both its program and, even more significantly, the means of transmitting its policies to a successor government in an orderly, predictable way.

Although the development of "surrogate" measures of legitimacy has

been a major focus in the study of comparative political behavior, we prefer to view the concept in broader structural terms because of the difficulty in adapting the legal-institutional concept of legitimacy to Third World contexts. Indeed, most of the attempts to measure legitimacy as an aspect of political behavior have been focused on developed, Western polities. Much of the comparative politics literature reviews the concept within the context of Western democratic values and investigates its operational impact inside these systems with ongoing democratic myths, values, and institutions. Our effort focuses more on Third World political contexts, where legitimacy has never been ensconced in a modern form and traditional elements of legitimacy did not comprehend the modern nation-state.[1]

In those more recently established states, legitimacy inheres in the expectation of political and economic development. To the extent that these regimes fail to "deliver the goods," that is, allocate expected political and economic resources, legitimacy dissipates or, more likely, never achieves institutionalized form. Thus, if no public consensus believes in or accepts the government's right to rule (possesses authority), the probability increases for the formation of a revolutionary movement. Other causes must also exist for such a movement to form, but the perceived illegitimacy of the sitting regime remains necessary.

Following the moral-normative suasion in the interpretation and delineation of political legitimacy, we utilize an analytic framework identifying specific political contexts that revolutionary movements react to and interact with. This framework is implied in a theoretical overview of the dynamics, perspectives, and factors characterizing revolutionary change in the Third World—from inside the unit itself to regional and global levels.[2] Further, such an overview also suggests the impact of time, seeing such developments in changing historical perspective. Secondly we organize various contemporary case studies according to a typology defined by the context of regime legitimacy in the country (or countries) under analysis.

THIRD WORLD REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL CHANGE

Major works have tended to focus on revolutions as history-transforming events. Great revolutions have been the focus on Crane Brinton's *Anatomy of a Revolution* (1965), Barrington Moore's *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966), and Theda Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions* (1979). However, great revolutions take place in established states with traditional, consensual forms of legitimacy. Samuel Huntington's oft-cited definition of *revolution* as "a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies" (1968: 264) underscores the point that revolutions, that is, great revolutions, occur

in states that are *also* societies where a legitimate form of government has existed. Skocpol adds to the definition of *revolution* the Leninist dimension that revolutions are "festivals of the oppressed and the exploited. At no other time are the masses of the people in a position to come forward so actively as creators of a new social order" (1986: 69). These two dimensions of structural transformation and class breakthrough from below effectively define and circumscribe revolution as "great revolution." For Theda Skocpol—and probably for Huntington as well—France in 1789, Russia in 1917, and China in 1911–1949 (in two stages) stand out as salient examples of successful social revolutions. Other theoretical inquiries into the causes of revolution are either social-systemic, like Chalmers Johnson's *Revolutionary Change* (1982), or social psychological, like Ted Gurr's *Why Men Rebel* (1970), or fall under the rubric of interest group theory, like Charles Tilly's *From Mobilization to Revolution* (1978). None of these theoretical inquiries, however, makes any conceptual distinction between revolutionary change in societies with established forms of legitimacy and those where such "values, myths, and political institutions" have not yet taken root.

Social scientists have not altogether ignored Third World revolutions. Even Huntington, in his classic *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968), offers a protomodel with his distinction between "Western-type" and "Eastern-type" revolutions. "Western-type" revolutions incline more to the classic great revolution with its initial regime collapse occurring from above, that is, at the center; whereas "Eastern-type" revolutions resonate more clearly with the emerging Third World pattern, in which contesting groups push up from below to challenge the sovereignty and legitimacy of the existing regime.[3] In the early 1970s some scholarly focus on unfolding Third World revolutions began to appear, John Dunn's *Modern Revolutions* (1972) being the most theoretical and comprehensive. Gerard Chaliand's 1977 landmark *Revolution in the The Third World: Myths and Prospects* (rev. ed. 1988) demonstrated a comparative, in-depth understanding of the phenomenon resulting from the author's extensive field inquiry into such Third World movements as the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front and the Guinea-Bissau African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) under the leadership of Amilcar Cabral. Chaliand discerns the ideological dominance of nationalism, borrowed from the Western experience, as well as the unique staying qualities of the sinicized Asian movements. But scholarly discomfort with the appellation *revolution* applied to the Third World was manifest in Claude Welch's *Anatomy of Rebellion* (1980) and John Walton's *Reluctant Rebels* (1984). Walton's exegesis of revolution in its Third World context leads him to prefer *national revolt* as a more accurate description of the variegated group movements toward, and achievement of, regime control.

The term *revolt* suggests, however, a resistance to a regime without any necessary political change or completion. *Rebellion* is even less applicable to

the phenomenon of Third World revolutionary movements. The *Concise Oxford Dictionary* defines *revolution* as "complete change, turning upside down, great reversal of conditions, fundamental reconstruction, especially forcible substitution by subjects of new ruler or polity for the old." Since movements with revolutionary intent either engender revolution or some other significant political change, directly or indirectly, we are content to stay with the term and concept of revolution in its "pure," dictionary definition with the full proviso that revolutionary impact, especially in its Third World context, can vary depending on the context of the specific body politic on which it is impinging.

REVOLUTION AND LEGITIMACY

Every revolution or revolutionary movement emerges out of a crisis of legitimacy for the regime in question. In the established states of Europe these crises arose when traditional principles of legitimacy collapsed or were challenged by new revolutionary ideas. The late Italian historian Guglielmo Ferrero poignantly describes this crisis in its Western historical context:

> Principles of legitimacy are born, grow up, age, and die; sometimes they come into collision and clash. Their life cycles and their clashes are the invisible foundations of history. Invisible because it is extremely difficult for mankind, though perforce submitted to them, to understand these cycles and clashes, which take place in the obscure depths of society. . . . They seem inexplicable because they originate in the struggle between the hereditary, aristocratic, and monarchic principle of legitimacy and the elective and democratic principle of legitimacy—a dark and mysterious struggle, with its roots in the dim past, that for two centuries has caused men to fight each other without knowing exactly why. (1942: 49)

However, Ferrero's astute retrospective on legitimacy and revolutions does not comprehend the peculiar problem that the newly independent Third World state has in establishing a principle of legitimacy, nor does it appear to accord a decisive role to the unique revolutionary principle of legitimacy.[4]

In order to locate this decisive role for the process of revolutionary legitimization, particularly as it might apply in Third World settings, we turn to Max Weber. Weber's ideal types of legitimate authority insert the *charismatic* basis of legitimacy between the *traditional* type (Ferrero's monarchical-aristocratic-hereditary principle) and the *legal-rational* type (Ferrero's elective-democratic principle). Historically, this charismatic basis derives from the supramundane; but in the contemporary Third World context it takes a more secular, ideological form.[5]

While the Weberian typology might apply to a state that is undergoing a

revolutionary crisis and transition, it is difficult to apply the model to a newly independent Third World state. David Apter's attempt to apply the Weberian schema to Ghana was at best a partial theoretical explanation of Ghana's movement to independence. The application of the charismatic type to the Ghanaian independence movement did not fit, because (1) power was handed down from the colonial metropole, Great Britain, to Ghana without revolutionary conflict and (2) Ghana did not possess the rudiments of nation statehood that would allow it to have a traditional type of legitimate authority (Apter, 1963).

In the Third World, therefore, the problem of legitimacy is fundamentally bound up with the manifestation of nationalism and more clearly represents an attempt to establish a new national order internally and a greater sovereignty internationally. Revolutionary mass movements in the Third World are fixed on either establishing a new nation-state,[6] expressing the national will more purely or asserting national identity over perceived alien or minority rule. Shaping this emergent nationalism are a variety of unique forces and perspectives deriving from the mass of the population: perceptions of economic dependency on, and exploitation by, the landlords or national bourgeoisie; colonial status; perceived settler, foreign, or minority domination; and weakness of the state within the international system.

This need to establish the fundamental elements of nationalism and to construct an operational state with internal legitimacy from these elements precludes the capacity to generate a revolutionary challenge to existing political legitimacy. In many new Third World states the term *state* refers to legitimacy within the international community, not domestic legitimacy (Jackson and Rosberg, 1986: 51–55). Laidi (see Chapter 3), Zolberg (1966), and others have pointed to the legitimizing function of the single-party system in these new states. Ferrero's notion of "conditional" prelegitimacy in the new, nineteenth-century states of Germany and Italy provides a useful paradigm for the conditions existing in newly independent Third World states. During this prelegitimate period the new regime has an opportunity to forge the nation-state and to convince the population that the regime is indeed the manifestation of that new nation-state: "Every government began by being a government that had not yet won, but was attempting to win, universal acceptance and had a good chance of succeeding; it became legitimate the day it succeeded in conciliating the opposition aroused by its advent" (Ferrero, 1942: 139).

However, the tendency for most prelegitimate Third World regimes has been to succumb to military intrusion into government, leading to the consequent illegitimization of that government. But some military coups have attempted to acquire legitimacy through revolution from above (Trimberger, 1978; and see Chapter 5). But this dynamic is driven by specific groups or individuals within government with no preexisting links to a popular revolutionary movement. Revolutions from above can also be "second-

stage," that is, they can be the second stage of prior revolutions from below. Stalin's collectivization campaign in the Soviet Union was a revolution from above piggybacked on the initial Bolshevik Revolution led by Lenin. In Cuba, Castro's Marxist-Leninist revolution from above derived from his prior populist, nationalist, not-obviously-Marxist revolution from below.

Regimes with revolutionary legitimacy must inevitably confront the waning of the charismatic foundation of that legitimacy. Either that base of legitimacy must be routinized, that is, converted to a legal-rational, elective-democratic base, or the regime will have to rely on pure coercion. Illegitimacy will then ensue, as the regime can no longer rule with a revolutionary rationale. Indeed, some revolutionary regimes never develop any sense of obligation to win universal acceptance from the population. Achieving power through the application of force, revolutionary regimes often try to sustain themselves and the revolutionary belief in their rule by that same force and by propaganda. Never trusting the conciliatory process of legitimizing their newly acquired rule, revolutionary regimes proclaim their commitment to democracy as sufficient through being revolutionary and nationalist. While Mexico might serve as an example of a revolutionary regime that faced up to a process of legitimization (if only a partial one), Ethiopia stands as an example of a revolutionary regime that has not yet made the slightest pretense toward such a process.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON REVOLUTIONARY LEGITIMACY

Huntington's distinction between "Western" and "Eastern" types is a neat conceptual point of departure for a legitimacy-based typology of Third World revolutions. Huntington's "Western" type of revolutionary movement and process, derived from the French Revolution prototype, is especially vulnerable to the problems of first establishing revolutionary legitimacy and later routinizing the charismatic legitimacy of the revolution toward an elective-democratic basis. In these highly bureaucratized ancien régimes, the collapse of legitimacy is at the center, thus creating a massive political void that needs to be filled as quickly and as fully as possible. In these circumstances, revolutionary movements rush in to replace the discredited despotisms without feeling the need or having the time to establish the conditions for prelegitimacy. Having stood for values opposed to the prior aristomonarchical principles of legitimacy, the new revolutionary regime resists the imperative of respecting or inculcating a new, elective set of rules for institutional government. Edmond Keller's case study of Ethiopia and John Voll and Fred von der Mehden's jointly authored analysis of resurgent Islam emanating from Iran provide some perspective on this process and condition.

The Huntington "Eastern" type, identified with the Maoist phase of the

Chinese Revolution, in which the authority of existing regimes is challenged by revolutionary movements usually based in the countryside, presents a process more likely to lead to a transition toward prelegitimacy once the movement gains power. Having been confronted with the necessity of winning the allegiance, or at least acceptance, of the inhabitants in its areas of operation, the "Eastern-type" movement already has a leg up in the process of proving itself legitimate. Prelegitimacy is not a guaranteed development once such a movement achieves power; but the examples of Cuba, Vietnam, and Nicaragua suggest that those regimes, whatever their missteps and excesses, are viewed by their populations as attempting to prove themselves legitimate by their own institutions, policies, and, most importantly, mechanisms of succession. William LeoGrande's analysis of revolutionary change in Central America, Henry Dietz's assessment of Sendero Luminoso in Peru, and David Rosenberg's essay on movements and change in the Philippines contribute to our understanding of this type of process while such movements are in train.

Huntington's "Eastern" type also includes revolutionary movements where national identity is denied by a foreign, minority, settler-colonial regime (Rhodesia); an immigrant society imposing its own national ideology (Israel); or an ethnically defined communal minority (South Africa). In each of these cases, the ethnically distinct indigenous population defines its own national rights and identity and proceeds to challenge the dominant regime. Here we see an ongoing struggle between competing legitimacies where the regime-dominating group attaches *only* its own ethnopolitical authority and legitimacy to the state. Variations on this type are covered in the essays by Stephen Davis on the African National Congress in South Africa and As'ad AbuKhalil on the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel.

Huntington's dichotomy suffers, however, from vague labels and the fact that the occurrence of Third World revolutions since the publication of his essay (1965) has introduced new cases not easily comprehended by the original Huntington framework. For example, Iran's revolution contains elements of each type: the Mujahadeen a priori challenged the shah's claim to legitimate authority, thus resembling Huntington's "Eastern" type; while the final collapse of the shah's rule mirrored his "Western" type. Consequently, we have been informed by another conceptual indicator, which focuses on the context of *legitimacy*. In the first two cases, Ethiopia and Iran, legitimacy collapsed at the center, bringing forth an urgent need to fill the void of legitimate authority. In the remaining cases—Peru, the Central American states, the Philippines, South Africa, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the anti-Marxist regime operations in Angola and Mozambique—the question centers around groups outside the locus of formal government power that challenge the government's claims of legitimacy.

Chapters 2 and 3 of our volume focus on historical, theoretical, and international factors in Third World revolutionary change. Four different