



From CAPE to CONGO

Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges

edited by

Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg

A Project of the International Peace Academy

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Foreword

DAVID M. MALONE
PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY

It is with great pride and pleasure that the International Peace Academy (IPA) presents this volume, written primarily by African scholars of the highest order, joined by several leading non-African practitioners and academics.

The IPA's Africa Program—initiated by my predecessor, Olara Otunnu, and by Margaret Vogt, both eminent African activists and scholars—has for many years focused on means of enhancing African capacity to reduce the continent's tensions, resolve its conflicts, and prevent violence.

During the 1990s, the IPA worked with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to encourage more frequent and convincing resort to the OAU's conflict-resolution organs and processes. Africa is a vast and diverse continent. For this reason, subregional security initiatives are more likely to prove substantive and substantial than are those at the mercy of continent-wide consensus. Subregional organizations are a source of considerable hope, if not yet always current satisfaction, in Africa. IPA scholars have studied intensively all of the deployments of ECOMOG, the military arm of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and held a seminar with ECOWAS in Abuja, Nigeria, in September 2001 to determine how the need for such deployments can best be averted and, when inevitable, managed. We looked at eastern Africa and its security needs in 2002. In all of this activity, we have involved impressive African civil society actors. Indeed, a priority of the IPA Africa Program has been to highlight the important role civil society can play in conflict prevention and resolution continent-wide.

In 2000, we focused extensively on southern Africa's evolving security architecture, convening a meeting in Gaborone, Botswana, to discuss achievements in the subregion to date and improvements required. This volume reflects discussions at the Gaborone seminar. It makes clear how diverse, deep, and daunting are the challenges facing the Southern African

Development Community in moving beyond rhetoric to action on subregional security. But these are early days still, and many of the authors display considerable optimism. We hope their views will be widely read.

We are grateful to the funders of the IPA's Africa Program: the governments of Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development. Without their financial and moral support, my colleagues within the program could tackle none of the fascinating challenges they have been exploring for some time and will be addressing in years to come.

This unique volume is intended for policymakers, activists, and scholars, both within and outside Africa. We hope that this exciting scholarly contribution will encourage meaningful steps toward subregionally designed and implemented security in southern Africa and beyond.

Acknowledgments

We would first like to thank David M. Malone and Adekeye Adebajo of the International Peace Academy (IPA) in New York for affording us an opportunity to produce this volume, which we hope will make a modest contribution to the discourse and debates about challenges faced by southern Africa. We would particularly like to thank Dr. Adebajo and his very able IPA Africa Program team, especially Aida Mengistu and Angela Muvumba, for their managerial and logistical efficiency and for keeping the flow of communication among New York, Dar es Salaam, Harare, and Johannesburg open. The leadership and intellectual guidance of friend and colleague Dr. Adebajo, and his weird and wonderful sense of humor, served as a constant source of inspiration.

We must also thank other colleagues who took the time to read through early drafts of various chapters and offered many insightful comments and suggestions that helped to sharpen the analysis. These individuals include John Hirsch, senior fellow at the IPA; Monica Juma, formerly with the IPA's Africa Program; John Stremlau, Francis Kornegay, and David Monyae of the Centre for Africa's International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand; Shaun Mackay of the Centre for Policy Studies in Johannesburg; and Norman Mlambo, Jenifer Chiriga, and Viola Chidembe of the Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies (SARIPS) in Harare, Zimbabwe. We would also like to acknowledge the brilliant copy-editing skills of Sara Lodge. IPA associate, Dorina Bekoe, ably assisted in the final stages of proofreading.

Karin Wermester, senior program officer at the IPA, served as a crucial interface among the editors, the IPA, and Lynne Rienner Publishers. She was ably assisted by Cyrus Samii, also at the IPA. Mpho Mashaba and Simon Marobe, two young students in the Department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, provided great assistance in compiling the bibliography for the book.

Finally, the idea for this volume grew out of the IPA's Africa Program, and in particular the December 2000 seminar, "Southern Africa's Regional Security Architecture: Problems and Prospects," held in Gaborone, Botswana. The seminar was hosted by the IPA, in partnership with the Department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, the African Renaissance Institute in Gaborone, and SARIPS. The editors and the IPA Africa Program therefore gratefully acknowledge the support of the governments of Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands, as well as the United Kingdom's Department for International Development, for funding the seminar as well as the IPA's Africa Program.

—*Mwesiga Baregu,*
Christopher Landsberg

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Introduction

CHRISTOPHER LANDSBERG AND MWESIGA BAREGU

During the apartheid years in South Africa and the Cold War period, especially during the 1970s and 1980s, southern Africa was defined by a realist paradigm of war, destabilization, and mistrust. Toward the latter part of the 1980s, after the end of the Cold War, Namibia's independence in 1990, the defeat of Kenneth Kaunda by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy's Frederick Chiluba in Zambia in October 1991, Mozambique's transition from civil war to multiparty politics in 1992, Bakili Muluzi's defeat of Kamuzu Banda in Malawi's 1994 presidential election, and the erosion of apartheid rule in South Africa, the region appeared to be moving toward a cooperative architecture. Such an architecture held the promise of giving due regard to human security and broader social justice in the region.¹

With the trends in regional democratization and the negotiated settlement in South Africa, southern Africa was widely acclaimed as an emerging political, economic, and security role model for Africa, a "pivotal" region that provided a good test case for applying such a paradigm shift.

But grand proclamations depicting southern Africa's "miraculous" experience or touting the region as a continental role model have yet to be tested. It is still unclear, for instance, whether the newly democratized South Africa will provide the model for democracy, stability, and promised prosperity for the rest of the continent, a model that the region and Africa as a whole can seek to emulate. Given that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is highly dependent on external donor funding, should the SADC be externally funded at all, and what implications does that funding hold? Could it still be, as T. Ohlson, S. Stedman, and R. Davies asserted in 1994, that "the new is not yet born?"² In 1996, one of the most respected Africanists, Adebayo Adedeji, referring to South Africa's emergence from decades of apartheid rule and its anticipated role in the region, also asked, "Will due attention be given to restructuring hegemonic relations with South Africa's neighbors towards more equitable, fair

and less tense ones?"³ How has the region matched up to Adedeji's expectations? Have these premonitions been fulfilled?

The Elusive Security Architecture

There is no doubt that, at the beginning of a new millennium, a different picture prevails in southern Africa from that which characterized the Cold War and apartheid eras. But what are the real features of southern Africa's evolving security architecture?

In 1969, with the proclamation of the Lusaka Manifesto, the Frontline States was formed as a special organization to aid southern African liberation struggles in tandem with the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) liberation committee. In 1979, black-ruled states agreed to create their own subcontinental integration entity, and in 1980 in Lusaka, Zambia, they established the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to promote regional integration and lessen dependence on apartheid-ruled South Africa.⁴ The founding members were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Namibia joined in 1990, shortly after gaining its independence. In January 1992, more than a decade later, the regional states signed a declaration and treaty in Windhoek, Namibia, which turned the SADCC into the SADC. Whereas the SADCC was premised on the political solidarity of majority-ruled states in the region to promote economic welfare and counter white minority-ruled South Africa, the Windhoek treaty of 1992 promoted a level of regional integration that would address the region's deep-seated political, economic, and military challenges. More specifically, the treaty defined the objectives of the regional community, the Common Agenda, as:

- development and economic growth;
- the alleviation of poverty;
- enhancement of the standard and quality of life of the peoples of southern Africa and support for the socially disadvantaged through regional integration;
- the evolution of common political values, systems, and institutions;
- the promotion and defense of peace and security, the promotion of self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the interdependence of member states;
- complementarity between national and regional strategies and programs and the promotion and maximum productive employment of the region's resources;

- sustainable use of the natural resources and effective protection of the environment; and
- the strengthening and consolidation of the long-standing historical, social, and cultural affinities and links among the people of the region.⁵

The SADC treaty appreciates the boundless link between peace and human security in southern Africa: the two streams constantly converge. The challenge to the SADC, therefore, is to articulate an integration strategy that is holistic and focuses simultaneously on the economic, political, and security dimensions.

By the time the SADC was established in 1992, some daunting challenges faced the region. Jan Isaksen and Elling N. Tjønneland, for example, asserted that, "by the mid-1990s it was becoming clear that the SADC was experiencing major difficulties and constraints. It was felt that the SADC secretariat lacked the power, authority and resources required to facilitate regional integration."⁶

A number of nonmilitary factors were already having an effect on the conflict dynamics of the region. Growth rates in almost every SADC state were not high enough to improve the living standards of the people. Even in states with high growth rates such as Botswana, which maintained an average growth rate of between 4 percent and 6 percent per annum, such a rate typically ensued from a low industrial and development base. According to Prega Ramsamy, executive secretary of the SADC, "In the last half of the 1990s real gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaged 3 percent annually. The highest GDP growth rate was attained in 1996 at 4.1 percent but was then followed by a declining trend in 1997 (2.2 percent) and 1998 (1.7 percent)."⁷ Additionally, the economic growth rates of states in the region continue to be constrained by low rates of exports, low investment rates, generally high rates of unemployment, adverse terms of trade, and HIV/AIDS, among other factors.⁸ In terms of HIV/AIDS alone, Ramsamy stressed that

the pandemic continues to escalate in our Community. Available statistics indicate that the rates of infected people in the region could be as high as one in five in some member states. At least four member states have rates higher than 400 per 100,000 population, indicating the magnitude of the problem.⁹

On the macroeconomic side, fiscal uncertainty and instability characterize the region, which continues to experience high budget deficits, high rates of inflation, high balance-of-payments deficits, high levels of external public debt, and exchange rate volatility. Southern Africa additionally

experiences what some scholars have labeled “hegemonic” economic relations, characterized by gross domestic product, trade, and investment imbalances in South Africa’s favor.

In 1997, the SADC Parliamentary Forum was established outside the SADC’s formal structures to be a consultative body without legislative powers.¹⁰ The forum seeks to strengthen the SADC’s implementation capacity by involving parliamentarians in SADC activities and facilitating the effective implementation of its policies and projects. Germane to this study on southern Africa’s security architecture is the forum’s promotion of peace, democracy, security, and stability on the basis of collective responsibility and its support for the development of permanent conflict-resolution mechanisms in the subregion.

Another consultative structure, the SADC Electoral Commissions Forum, was created in 1998—also without any executive powers—to affect electoral processes in the subregion. The idea behind the electoral forum was to strengthen cooperation among the bodies managing elections in member nations, with a view to enhancing democratic electoral processes and a democratic culture as well as developing standard electoral practices.

The link between democracy and security became more marked as democracy became an important means of conflict resolution. While the majority of the regions’ states are today formal democracies, based on a minimal definition of democracy to mean conduct of free and fair elections at regular intervals, democracy continues to face many strains and stresses. Taking this most basic view of the term, only two states, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Swaziland, would not qualify as democracies. Yet, increasing pressure for democratization and change are easily negated by continuing violent conflict in states other than these two. “Façade” or “virtual” democracies, where incumbent regimes manipulate the democratic process while pretending to be highly democratic, are the standard in southern Africa. In fact, many states are caught between democracy and authoritarianism.

Until the death of National Union for the Total Independence of Angola leader Jonas Savimbi in February 2002, government and opposition in Angola continued to interact not through parliament but through war, with hostile factions fighting for control of diamond and oil fields. In Lesotho, after a protracted period of political struggle, credible parliamentary elections finally took place in May 2002. Zambia has witnessed constitutional changes to limit the opposition’s right to contest elections and failed attempts by the president to usher in a third term of presidential rule, followed by a highly contested election in December 2001. Meanwhile, in Zimbabwe, the relationship between the opposition Movement for Democratic Change and President Robert Mugabe’s government spilled over into serious tensions and violence, even after the highly disputed elections of March 2002, in which Mugabe was accused of using legitimate

questions over land for political gain. In Namibia, the decade-old democratic consensus was threatened when President Sam Nujoma contested and won for a third presidential term. In Tanzania, the ruling party's victory at the 2000 polls triggered major violence in Zanzibar and a conflict that threatened to engulf the island part of the union and the mainland in a drawn-out battle. An agreement to normalize the political situation has since been reached between the major political parties. In Mozambique, some of the opposition parties boycotted the 1998 local government elections, and the Mozambique National Resistance Movement questioned not only the outcome of that poll but threatened that, unless a rapprochement was found between themselves and the government, there could be a reversion to full-scale civil war. In Malawi, political party competition is weak, and this has given President Bakili Muluzi of Malawi the wrong idea that he, too, should stage a bid for a third term. A national referendum has since overwhelmingly rejected the idea. In South Africa, political and economic contestation continues to run along racial lines and could easily erode the prospects for a functioning democracy. Though Botswana's democracy is typically celebrated as an "exception," that state has yet to survive the test of a governing party defeat at the polls. Even Mauritius, often hailed as probably the only consolidated democracy in the region, faces its challenges.

On the defense and security front, important initiatives in the direction of collective peace and security have appeared to be under way. During the two decades that preceded the establishment of the SADC in 1992, states in the region undertook collective security arrangements through the FLS in 1970 and the SADCC in 1980. It was only with the proposed establishment of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security (OPDS) in 1996 that the subregion seemed to be moving in the direction of constructing a concrete and stable regional security architecture. The concept of an OPDS was proposed at a meeting of the SADC Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Security, held in Gaborone, Botswana, on 18 January 1996. The SADC heads of state and government then adopted and approved the concept on 28 June 1996.

The noble, if ambitious, functions and objectives of the SADC OPDS included:

- protecting the people and safeguarding the development of the region against instability arising from a breakdown of law and order and interstate conflict;
- promoting political cooperation among member states and evolving common political value systems and institutions;
- developing a common foreign policy in areas of mutual concern and interest and lobbying as a region on issues of common interest in international forums;

- cooperating fully on regional security and defense through conflict prevention, management, and resolution;
- mediating in inter- and intrastate disputes;
- using preventive diplomacy to preempt conflict in the region, both within and between states, through an early warning system;
- using diplomatic means to end conflicts;
- promoting and enhancing the development of democratic institutions and practices within member states and encouraging them to observe universal human rights codes;
- developing a collective security capacity, concluding a mutual defense pact for responding to external threats, and building up regional peacekeeping capacity within national armies that could be called on to act within the region or elsewhere;
- developing close cooperation between the police and security services of the region with a view to addressing cross-border crime as well as promoting a community-based approach on matters of security;
- encouraging the United Nations, the OAU, and other international conventions and treaties on arms control and disarmament, human rights, and peaceful relations between states; and
- addressing conflicts outside the region that affect peace and security in southern Africa.¹¹

With the establishment of the OPDS, regional leaders hoped to put in place a consultative structure to “allow more flexibility and a timely response, at the highest level, to sensitive and potentially explosive situations.” It seems fair to state that if it had been properly operationalized, the OPDS would have brought about a revolutionary shift in peace and security thinking and practice in the region. It would have laid the foundation for a fully coherent regional security architecture in southern Africa. However, the practice since 1992 has revealed major weaknesses and pitfalls, and the hopes that accompanied the establishment of the OPDS have yet to be fulfilled. Thus, although Article 4 of the SADC treaty embraces the principles of “solidarity, peace and security” and Article 5 commits member states to “defend and promote peace and security,” the consolidation of a coherent and stable regional security architecture has been negatively affected by tensions and conflicts.

By 1998—two years after the OPDS was established and military interventions had occurred in Lesotho and Zaire—intraregional relations were under greater stress, and power struggles had become part of the regional character of southern Africa. South Africa and Botswana spearheaded the military intervention in Lesotho, ostensibly under the auspices of the SADC. Zaire became the DRC, obtained considerable military backing from Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, and acquired SADC member-