POLITICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

COMPARING EXPERIENCES WITH DEMOCRACY

second edition

edited by **Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz,
Seymour Martin Lipset**

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Contents

1

Introduction:
What Makes for Democracy?

*Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz,
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The ten case studies in this book analyze the political development of a selection of countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East—or what we term, for lack of a better label, *developing countries.* Although these studies analyze the full sweep of regime evolution and change, we focus on a particular issue in political development that can justifiably be called the preeminent political issue of our times: the struggle for democracy. Beginning from a common theoretical agenda, we seek to explain whether, why, and to what extent democracy has evolved and taken root in the vastly different cultural and historical soils of these countries.

The larger (twenty-six–nation) comparative study from which earlier versions of these case studies were derived was undertaken at a time of tremendous democratic ferment in the developing world.[1] We began our original study in 1985, a decade after the toppling of Western Europe's last three dictatorships (in Portugal, Spain, and Greece), which launched what Samuel Huntington has called the "third wave" of global democratic expansion.[2] Moving from Southern Europe to Latin America, then to East Asia in the mid-1980s and back to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, this wave of democratic transitions finally reached sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s. Between 1990 and 1995, roughly twelve African countries initiated multiparty, constitutional regimes, most prominently South Africa. Elsewhere (as in Kenya, Gabon, and Cameroon), some political liberalization occurred, with the legalization of opposition parties and greater scope for dissent, but long-dominant parties rigged themselves back into power. Globally the number of democracies in the world has more than doubled since 1974, and during this period most of the cases in our volume experienced democratic transitions, or at least strong pressures for democratization, as part of this global phenomenon.

The 1980s also witnessed unprecedented growth in international concern for human rights—including, prominently, the rights to choose democratically the government under which one lives and to express and organize

1

around one's political principles and views. As torture, disappearances, and other grave human rights violations became more widespread but were also more systematically exposed and denounced around the world, a renewed and deeper appreciation developed for democratic institutions, which, with all their procedural messiness and sluggishness, nevertheless protect the integrity of the person and the freedoms of conscience and expression. The growth of democratic norms throughout the world was strikingly evidenced in the degree to which authoritarian regimes found it necessary to wrap themselves in the rhetoric and constitutional trappings of democracy or at least to state as their goal the eventual establishment of democracy.

The global advance of democracy in the 1980s and early 1990s was assisted by the demise of its historic ideological rivals. Fascism was destroyed as a vital force in World War II. The appeals of Marxism-Leninism withered with the harsh repressiveness, glaring economic failures, and loss of revolutionary idealism of the existing Communist regimes. More limited, quasi-socialist, or mass-mobilizational models—the Mexican, Yugoslav, and Nasserite models—also lost their aura. Almost universally, military regimes were shorn of any ideological justification and legitimacy beyond a temporary intrusion to correct political and social problems. Democracy became—partly by choice and political learning and partly by default—the only model of government in the world with any broad ideological legitimacy and appeal.

By the early 1990s, however, this ideological hegemony was increasingly under challenge from two forceful and self-confident alternatives. In that large swath of countries from Indonesia to West Africa wherein Islam is a major or the dominant religion, fundamentalist advocates of the Islamic state presented it as the only moral alternative to a "Western" liberal democratic model they denounced as decadent because of its rampant materialism and individualism. Although the radical Islamic regime had demonstrated in Iran and then Sudan its dubious efficacy and blatant disregard for human rights, it nevertheless attracted growing support, particularly among young people disgusted with the corruption, social injustice, economic stagnation, and gross abuses of power of authoritarian regimes in North Africa and the Middle East. The fact that some of these regimes claimed to be democratic only intensified the Islamist view of democracy as corrupt, elitist, and morally bankrupt. Even in Pakistan and, most surprisingly, Turkey, with its distinctive twentieth-century legacy of separation between state and mosque, Islamic parties gained political and ideological ground in the early 1990s.

In East Asia, economically dynamic elites, led by former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad, rejected the Western emphasis on individual rights as culturally inappropriate and conducive to economic and social decline. However, this

defense of a much more constrained, illiberal democracy was challenged by other prominent Asians who found important democratic currents in Asian tradition and culture and who dismissed the denunciations of liberalism as mere self-serving rationalization for authoritarianism.[3]

Even with these regional challenges to democracy's legitimacy, it is a sign of how much the world has changed, both politically and intellectually, that the normative question that stirred such intense debate in the 1960s and 1970s—Why study democracy?—is rarely raised today. Indeed, over the past decade no subject in comparative politics has received more scholarly attention than have the causes, conditions, and challenges of democratic transition and consolidation. Nevertheless, previous historical cycles warn that the 1990s may bring setbacks and even a renewed crisis of confidence in democracy. Recent years have witnessed a significant erosion of democracy in several of our cases (as we indicate below) and throughout much of Latin America.[4]

Outside the West, and the Western Hemisphere, East Asian and other critiques of democracy argue that economic and social rights, and political order, should be considered to be more important than civil and political liberties, and that "enlightened" authoritarian rulers should have the right to use coercive measures, in the name of some higher good, to suppress democratic opposition. For ourselves, neither of these normative suppositions is tenable.

If many undemocratic governments (now and in the past) were committed to serving collective goals rather than the interests of the rulers and were ready to respect human rights (to refrain from torture and indiscriminate violence, to offer due process and fair trials in applying laws that, even if antiliberal, are known in advance, and to maintain humane conditions of imprisonment), we might find these questions more difficult to answer. However, it is highly unlikely that a nondemocratic regime would meet these two requirements; even those that begin with a strong ideological commitment to the collectivity and a professed sensitivity to human rights often become increasingly narrow, autocratic, and repressive.

Even when authoritarian rulers strive to serve collective goals, why should we assume that their conception of the collective good is better than that of any other group in society? Only if we were totally certain that one ideological conception is the expression of historical reason—true and necessary—would we be forced to accept such an authoritarian alternative as better than democracy. To do so, as we know, justifies any sacrifices and ultimately terrible costs in terms of freedom and human lives. Democracy— with its relativism and tolerance (so disturbing to those certain of the truth) and its "faith" in the reasonableness and intelligence of the common people, deciding freely (and with a chance to change their minds every four or five years) and without the use of force—still seems a better option.

Organization of the Study

The contributions to this book are distinctive in that they deal with the entire history of a country's experience with democracy: the establishment, break-down, re-equilibration, and consolidation of democratic government; periods of democratic persistence, crisis, authoritarianism, and renewal; and all of the ambivalences and oscillations in between. We consider each country's early cultural traditions, analyze (where relevant) the colonial experience, and consider all of its postindependence history, giving special emphasis to post–World War II developments. Whereas most other works focus on limited time spans and particular processes (breakdown, transition, crisis, or consolidation),[5] our authors explain the overall path of a country's political development.

Although it can be enormously fertile, this historical approach is not without methodological problems. In particular, it runs the risk of attributing contemporary political patterns to antecedents far removed in time without clearly demonstrating that those factors (or characteristics resulting from them) are operating at a later time and account for the failure or success of democracy. To overcome this risk, each case study author reviews the country's political history, describing its major experiences with democratic and undemocratic governments—including the structure, nature, and characteristic conflicts and tensions of each regime—and explains the fate of each regime (especially each democratic one): why it persisted, failed, or evolved as it did, and why successive regimes emerged as and when they did. Finally, each author offers a summary theoretical judgment of the most important factors in determining the country's overall degree of success or failure with democratic government and considers its prospects for democracy.

Culturally, the cases in this book encompass much of the enormous variation in the developing world: Brazil, Chile, and Mexico—Christian (largely Catholic) societies of Latin America; India with its mosaic of traditions, including the distinctive Hindu culture; two largely Islamic societies—Turkey (whose secularization has historically been linked with democratization) and Senegal; largely Buddhist Thailand; South Korea with its mixture of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Christianity; multiracial and multiethnic South Africa with its unique historical legacy of apartheid; and a major example—Nigeria—of what Ali Mazrui calls the "triple heritage" of Christianity, Islam, and traditional African religion and culture.

One of the most complex and intractable problems in our world is the tension that exists between the model of ethnically, linguistically, and culturally homogeneous societies that satisfy the ideal of the nation-state and the multiethnic, multilingual societies that face the difficult task of nation building or state building in the absence of the integration and identification we normally associate with the idea of the nation-state. Even in Europe,

before the massive and forced transfers (if not destruction) of populations, most states did not satisfy that ideal; outside of Europe, even fewer do. Virtually no African or Asian countries and only a few Latin American countries (in this book, only Chile) seem to satisfy the model. Others, such as Brazil and Mexico, include not only descendants of the conquistadores and European immigrants but also substantial populations (intermixed to varying degrees with the above) of Indians and descendants of black slaves. To the list of relatively homogeneous countries could be added South Korea. Our remaining cases confront us with the problem of democracy in ethnically and culturally divided societies, especially India, Nigeria, and South Africa.

Except for the deliberate exclusion of countries with no prior democratic or semidemocratic experience or no prospect of an opening to freedom, our study encompasses virtually every type of democratic experience in the (non-Communist) developing world. At the beginning of 1995, nine of our ten cases had the formal structure of a constitutional, multiparty democracy; only Nigeria had an explicitly authoritarian (military) regime. However, five of these nine countries (Turkey, Brazil, South Korea, Chile, and, most recently, Thailand) had experienced military rule within the previous ten to fifteen years, and South Africa only completed its transition to democracy in 1994, from the most racially exclusive political system any country has constructed in the modern era. Moreover, at the end of 1994 only three of our nine formally democratic cases were rated by Freedom House as "free"— Chile, South Korea, and South Africa.[6] In the other six cases, problems of corruption, human rights violations, and poor democratic functioning placed them beneath that threshold.

Among the new democracies of the third wave, Chile and South Korea stand out for their progress toward democratic consolidation. However, Chile's democracy remained constrained by some significant authoritarian enclaves of military prerogative entrenched in the 1989 constitution.[7] Similarly, South Korea began its new democracy with significant power still inhering in the military and intelligence apparatus, and the first post-transition president, Roh Tae Woo, was a recently retired general nominated by the ruling party of the military-dominated authoritarian regime.

Most observers also consider Brazil and India to be democratic today, but in recent years both countries have experienced serious strains that might have toppled less resilient democratic systems. Of the remaining four civilian regimes analyzed in this volume, Mexico and Senegal have long been among the classic instances of semidemocracy in the developing world, with multiparty regimes that allow for some significant freedom of expression and partial freedom of organization but without the truly free and fair electoral competition that might displace aging ruling parties from power.

Turkey and Thailand represent ambiguous regime types. Unlike the sit-

uations in Mexico and Senegal, there is genuine, relatively open and fair electoral competition, but in each country the military remains a significant political force, constraining the actual authority of elected civilian officials. Our other two African cases represent the opposite poles of promise and frustration in this, Africa's "second liberation." Nigeria had long been regarded as one of the continent's brightest hopes for democracy, with a pluralistic society, a vigorous press, independent associations, and an elite strongly committed (at least rhetorically) to multiparty democracy. All of this went up in flames during four brief years of rapacious corruption, electoral fraud, and political violence (1979–1983). When Nigeria's Second Republic was functioning during the early 1980s, South Africa seemed mired in a war of attrition between the apartheid white minority regime and the liberation forces, led by the banned African National Congress. It took the coming to power of a new, more pragmatic South African president, F. W. de Klerk, to launch the process of negotiation in 1990 by releasing Nelson Mandela from prison and legalizing the ANC. There followed over the subsequent four years one of the most complex, fascinating, and intensively negotiated democratic transitions of the third wave.

Concepts, Definitions, and Classifications

It reflects the political climate of our time that the word *democracy* is used to signify the desirable end state of so many social, economic, and political pursuits or to self-designate and thus presumably legitimate many existing structures. Hence, it is imperative to be as precise as possible about the subject of our study.

In this book, *democracy* signifies a political system, separate and apart from the economic and social systems to which it is joined. Unless the economic and social dimensions are kept conceptually distinct from the political, there is no way to analyze how variation on the political dimension is related to variation on the other dimensions. In addition, we distinguish the concept of political democracy out of a clear and frankly expressed conviction that it is worth valuing—and hence worth studying—as an end in itself.

In this book, then, democracy—or what Robert Dahl terms polyarchy—denotes a system of government that meets three essential conditions:

- Meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power through regular, free, and fair elections that exclude the use of force
- A highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, such that no major (adult) social group is prevented from exercising the rights of citizenship

- A level of civil and political liberties—freedom of thought and expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and demonstration, freedom to form and join organizations, freedom from terror and unjustified imprisonment—secured through political equality under a rule of law, sufficient to ensure that citizens (acting individually and through various associations) can develop and advocate their views and interests and contest policies and offices vigorously and autonomously.[8]

Also implicit in this definition are the notions that rulers will be held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens and their representatives and that multiple channels exist for representation of citizen interests beyond the formal political frameworks of parties, parliaments, and elections.[9]

Although this definition is relatively straightforward, it presents a number of problems in application. For one, countries that broadly satisfy these criteria nevertheless do so to different degrees (and none do so perfectly, which is why Dahl prefers to call them polyarchies). The factors that explain this variation in degrees of popular control and freedom at the democratic end of the spectrum constitute an important intellectual problem, but it is different from the one that concerns us in this book and thus is one we have largely bypassed. We seek to determine why countries do or do not evolve, consolidate, maintain, lose, and reestablish more or less democratic systems of government, and even this limited focus leaves us with conceptual problems.

As we have already suggested, the boundary between democratic and undemocratic (or "less than democratic") is often blurred and imperfect, and beyond it lies a much broader range of variation in political systems. Even if we look only at the political, legal, and constitutional structures, several of our cases appear ambiguous, and this ambiguity is greatly complicated by the constraints on free political activity, organization, and expression, or the major human rights violations, or the substantial remaining political prerogatives of military authorities, or some combination of these that may in practice make the system much less democratic than its formal structure. In all cases, we have tried to pay serious attention to actual practice in assessing and classifying regimes.

All of this underscores the importance of recognizing grades of distinction among less than democratic systems. Whereas isolated violations of civil liberties or modest and occasional vote rigging should not disqualify a country from broad classification as a democracy, we need to categorize separately those countries that allow greater political competition and freedom than would be found in a truly authoritarian regime but less than could justifiably be termed democratic. Hence, we classify as *semidemocratic* those countries in which the effective power of elected officials is so limited or

political party competition so restricted, or the freedom and fairness of elections so compromised that electoral outcomes, although competitive, do not produce true popular sovereignty and accountability, or in which civil and political liberties are so uncertain that some political orientations and interests are unable to organize and express themselves peacefully, without fear.

In different ways and to different degrees, Senegal, Mexico, Turkey, and Thailand fit this category of semidemocracy today. Singapore and Malaysia are other classic and long-standing semidemocracies, featuring regular electoral competition between competing parties under civilian, constitutional rule but with entrenched advantages for historically dominant parties and serious constraints on individual liberties and civil society.

Although formally democratic, many of the regimes in the world today (including several contemporary examples in our volume) represent what might be termed *low-quality* democracy. *Low-intensity* democracy, *poor* democracy, and *delegative* democracy are other terms that have been used—primarily in the Latin American context—to describe a system that may have fair, competitive, and open elections; authentic power for elected officials; freedom of expression and of the press (more or less); and at least some independent organizations and media, but that nevertheless lacks accountability, responsiveness, and institutional balance and effectiveness between elections.[10] Such a designation might apply not only to many of the unconsolidated democracies of the third wave, including Argentina and Brazil, but also to longer-functioning systems, such as those in India and Venezuela, that have entered a period of institutional decay and stress.

Even more restrictive is a *hegemonic party system,* in which opposition parties are legal but are denied, through pervasive electoral malpractices and frequent state coercion, any real chance to compete for power. Such a system long prevailed under the domination of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico, but the political reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s and the unprecedented gains of both right and left opposition parties since the 1988 elections justify a reclassification of the Mexican system as a semidemocracy.

Descending further on our scale of classification, authoritarian regimes permit even less pluralism, typically banning political parties (or all but the ruling party) and most forms of political organization and competition while being more repressive than liberal in their level of civil and political freedom. By paying close attention to actual behavior, one can distinguish a subset of authoritarian regimes that we call *pseudodemocracies* because the existence of formally democratic political institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, masks (often in part to legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination. Central America long endured such regimes. Africa now has several, including the regimes in Kenya, Cameroon, and Gabon. Although in some ways this regime type overlaps with the hege-

monic regime, it is less institutionalized and is typically more personalized, coercive, and unstable.

Finally are the *totalitarian* regimes, which not only repress all forms of autonomous social and political organization, denying completely even the most elementary political and civil liberties, but also demand the active commitment of citizens to the regime.[11] With the decay, collapse, or at least partial liberalization of most of the world's Communist regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it is debatable whether the totalitarian distinction remains salient. Nevertheless, the totalitarian legacy shapes in distinctive ways the possibilities and conditions for democratization even in post-totalitarian, nondemocratic regimes.

The dependent variable of our study was concerned not only with democracy but also with stability—the persistence and durability of democratic and other regimes over time, particularly through periods of unusually intense conflict, crisis, and strain. A *stable* regime is one whose institutionalization and level and breadth of popular legitimacy make it highly likely to persist, even in the face of crises and challenges. Building these foundations of regime stability is the task of democratic consolidation (which we consider in conclusion). *Partially stable* regimes are neither fully secure nor in imminent danger of collapse. Their institutions have perhaps acquired some measure of depth, flexibility, and value but not enough to ensure them safe passage through severe challenges. *Unstable* regimes are, by definition, highly vulnerable to breakdown or overthrow in periods of acute uncertainty and stress. New regimes, including those that have recently restored democratic government, tend to fall into this category.

Facilitating and Obstructing Factors for Democratic Development

Legitimacy and Performance

All governments rest on some mixture of coercion and consent, but democracies are unique in the degree to which their stability depends upon the consent of a majority of those governed. So intimately is legitimacy tied to democratic stability that it is difficult to know where definition ends and theorizing begins. Almost as a given, theories of democracy stress that democratic stability requires a widespread belief among elites and masses in the legitimacy of the democratic system: that it is the best (or the "least evil") form of government, "that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the existing political institutions are better than any others that might be established," and hence that the democratic regime is morally entitled to demand obedience—to tax and draft, to make laws and enforce them, even, "if necessary, by the use of force."[12]

Democratic legitimacy derives, when it is most stable and secure, from an intrinsic value commitment rooted in the political culture at all levels of society, but it is also shaped (particularly in the early years of a democracy) by the performance of the democratic regime, both economically and politically (through the "maintenance of civil order, personal security, adjudication and arbitration of conflicts, and a minimum of predictability in the making and implementation of decisions").[13] Historically, the more successful a regime has been in providing what people want, the greater and more deeply rooted its legitimacy has tended to be. A long record of successful performance tends to build a large reservoir of legitimacy, enabling the system better to endure crises and challenges.[14] As Valenzuela shows here in the case of Chile, however, such a long accumulation of democratic legitimacy does not confer immunity from breakdown and can be squandered with great speed by a combination of poor leadership, wrong choices, and outmoded political institutions. The democratic breakdowns in Chile and Uruguay during the 1970s, and the institutional decay and instability experienced during the 1980s and early 1990s by such long-standing democracies as India, Venezuela, and Colombia, emphasize that the legitimation and consolidation of democratic institutions are not necessarily permanent achievements but may require continuous adjustment, reform, and renewal to maintain.[15]

Regimes that lack deep legitimacy depend more precariously on current performance and are vulnerable to collapse in periods of economic and social distress.[16] This has been a particular problem for democratic (as well as undemocratic) regimes in the developing world, especially given their tendency to experience an interaction of low legitimacy and low effectiveness. Because of the combination of widespread poverty and the strains imposed by modernization, regimes that begin with low legitimacy also find it difficult to perform effectively, and regimes that lack effectiveness, especially in the area of economic growth, find it difficult to build legitimacy.

However, our own studies and many others caution against drawing too deterministic a linkage between the economic performance of democratic regimes and the probability of their survival. Spain's new democracy experienced a sharp decline of economic growth and an increase in unemployment in the decade following the transition, but it became consolidated nevertheless because of the resolute popular rejection of authoritarian alternatives and the respect for constitutional procedures and freedoms on the part of the ruling and contesting political elites.[17] The same broad distaste for a reversion to authoritarianism made possible the persistence of Latin American democracies through prolonged economic crisis during the 1980s. As Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have noted, two features of democracies tend to insulate them from the delegitimating consequences of sustained economic downturns: their claims to intrinsic legitimacy based on their democraticness, and the prospect (always at least looming on the horizon) of replacing the incumbent government and its policies constitutional-

ly, through elections.[18] Nevertheless, whereas the political response to such crises in Latin America has so far been to vote out governing parties rather than to embrace extremist ones or reject democratic legitimacy,[19] this situation masks the broad deterioration in democratic institutions and freedoms that occurred during this period.[20] More important, any blithe inference that contemporary democracies are freed from previously presumed performance constraints errs both in its projection of the recent past into the indefinite future and in its ignorance of history. In the short to medium run, perceptions of a democratic regime's socioeconomic efficacy appear "less tightly coupled" to assessments of its political legitimacy than was once assumed, but "in the long run, it erodes the accrued political capital of the regime if it is seen as completely incapable of solving major socioeconomic problems."[21]

Democracies have their peculiar vulnerabilities. One of these is the particularly corrosive effect of corruption on the legitimacy of democratic regimes, even more than on authoritarian ones. This is so in part because under conditions of freedom—with competitive elections, an independent judiciary, an opposition in parliament, and a free press—corruption is likely to be more visible than is the case under authoritarianism. Its scale and its extension to the entire democratic political class—as has repeatedly occurred in Ghana and Nigeria, for example—delegitimize the whole political system rather than disqualify a particular politician or party. Further, the prevalence of political corruption as the primary motive for the pursuit of power (because of the dominance of the state over economic life) reduces the political process to a struggle for power rather than a debate about policies and taints the electoral process while generating cynical and apathetic responses in the electorate (or at least in the bulk of it outside patronage networks). Such widespread corruption also undermines economic development and is one of the major arguments used by the military to justify its overthrow of elected governments, even though its own corruption will likely be as great or greater in time. The February 1991 coup in Thailand was a case in point (as were the unsuccessful coup attempts in the Philippines in 1989 and in Venezuela in 1992).[22]

Although they have not been immune to problems of recession, inflation, and corruption, the more successful democracies in our study have generally experienced relatively steady economic growth, which in turn has benefited their legitimacy. For a time, rapid growth can derive from the bounty of highly marketable natural resources, but as the experiences of Venezuela and Nigeria show, this can be a decidedly mixed blessing. Botswana, too, has benefited from great natural resources (and high levels of foreign aid), but underlying its strong development performance have been sound policies and effective management (which have helped attract foreign aid). State policies have not strangled producers of agricultural exports (in this case, cattle) as they did in much of the rest of tropical Africa.

Table 1.1 Selected Development Indicators

	Chile 1970	Chile 1992	Brazil 1970	Brazil 1992	Mexico 1970	Mexico 1992	Turkey 1970	Turkey 1992
Per Capita GNP, 1966 & 1992[a]	**740**	**2,730**	**280**	**2,770**	**490**	**3,470**	**310**	**1,980**
Real GDP Per Capita in PPP$, 1960 & 1991[b]	3,130	7,060	1,404	5,240	2,870	7,170	1,669	4,840
Per Capita GNP Annual Percentage Growth Rate, 1965–1980, 1980–1991	**0**	**3.7**	**6.3**	**0.4**	**3.6**	**−0.2**	**3.6**	**2.9**
Inflation Rate, 1970–1980, 1980–1992	187.1	20.5	38.6	370.2	18.1	62.4	29.4	46.3
External Debt as Percentage of GNP, 1970 & 1992	**25.8**	**48.9**	**8.2**	**31.2**	**8.7**	**34.1**	**14.7**	**47.8**
Population (in millions), 1966 & 1992	8.7	14	86.5	154	44.9	85.0	31.9	58.5
Population Annual Percentage Growth Rate, 1970–1980, 1980–1992	**1.6**	**1.7**	**2.4**	**2.0**	**2.9**	**2.0**	**2.3**	**2.3**
Projected Population (in millions), 2000 & 2025	15	19	172	224	99	136	68	92
Urban Population as Percentage of Total	**75**	**85**	**56**	**77**	**59**	**74**	**38**	**64**
Life Expectancy at Birth Male	59	69	57	64	60	67	55	65
Female	66	76	61	69	64	74	59	70
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births)	**78**	**17**	**95**	**57**	**72**	**35**	**147**	**54**
Adult Literacy Rate (in percentages)	89	94	66	82	74	89	52	82
Human Development Index[c]	**0.682**	**0.848**	**0.507**	**0.756**	**0.642**	**0.804**	**0.441**	**0.739**
Percentage of Labor Force in Agriculture, 1965 & 1990–1992	27	19	49	25	49	23	75	47
Percentage of Population in Absolute Poverty, 1980s	**—**	**n.a.**	**—**	**47**	**—**	**30**	**—**	**n.a.**
Income Share of Highest 20 Percent, 1988–1990	—	62.9	—	67.5	—	55.9	—	n.a.
Radios per 100 People, 1990	**—**	**34**	**—**	**38**	**—**	**25**	**—**	**16**