

EDWARD BERENSON

HEROES *of* EMPIRE


FIVE CHARISMATIC MEN AND THE CONQUEST OF AFRICA



Heroes of Empire

FIVE CHARISMATIC MEN AND THE
CONQUEST OF AFRICA

Edward Benson



甲

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
BERKELEY LOS ANGELES LONDON

University of California Press, one of the most distinguished university presses in the United States, enriches lives around the world by advancing scholarship in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. Its activities are supported by the UC Press Foundation and by philanthropic contributions from individuals and institutions. For more information, visit www.ucpress.edu.

University of California Press
Berkeley and Los Angeles, California

University of California Press, Ltd.
London, England

© 2011 by Edward Berenson

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Berenson, Edward, 1949–.

Heroes of empire : five charismatic men and the conquest of Africa / Edward Berenson.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-520-23427-7 (cloth : alk. paper)

1. Africa—Discovery and exploration—European.
2. Stanley, Henry M. (Henry Morton), 1841–1904.
3. Brazza, Pierre Savorgnan de, 1852–1905. 4. Gordon, Charles George, 1833–1885. 5. Marchand, Jean-Baptiste, 1863–1934. 6. Lyautey, Louis Hubert Gonzalve, 1854–1934. 7. Mass media—France—History—19th century.
8. Mass media—Great Britain—History—19th century.
9. Explorers—Europe—Biography. 10. Explorers—Africa—Biography. I. Title.

DT3.B467 2011

916.04'2309224—dc22

2010016819

Manufactured in the United States of America

19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

This book is printed on Cascades Enviro 100, a 100% post-consumer waste, recycled, de-inked fiber. FSC recycled certified and processed chlorine free. It is acid free, Ecologo certified, and manufactured by BioGas energy.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

IT IS A PLEASURE TO thank the many friends and colleagues who have given me vital help with this book. Four "official" readers—Alice Conklin, Stephen Howe, Mary Lewis, and Miles Taylor—offered invaluable, expert advice. So did J. P. Daughton and Ruth Harris, who took time away from their own work to comment on mine. Both read the manuscript from start to finish, and Ruth read parts of it more than once. I asked them to look at my work because I admire theirs so much. Other friends and colleagues read various chapters and, I think, made them better. For this, I thank Herrick Chapman, Julia Clancy-Smith, Annegret Fauser, Arno Mayer, Emmanuelle Saada, Jerrold Seigel, and Debora Silverman. I owe a special intellectual debt to Eva Giloi, who has taught me a great deal about Weber and charisma. The conference we organized together inspired parts of this book.

I have had the good fortune to present different chapters to very smart people in a variety of settings: the Bay Area French History Seminar at Stanford; the Annenberg Seminar in History at the University of Pennsylvania; the Center for Social Theory and Comparative History at UCLA; the Remarque Institute, Maison Française, and European History Workshop at NYU; the CUNY History Department Colloquium; the New York Intellectual and Cultural History Seminar; a Royal Holloway University seminar and Keele University colloquium; the Institut d'histoire

moderne et contemporaine at the Ecole normale supérieure; and the seminars of colleagues in several other Parisian locales. It would take far too much space to offer the specific acknowledgment that each member of these groups deserves.

A great many archivists and librarians have helped at crucial points, and I wanted to salute one person in particular, Mathilde Leduc of the Stanley Archive in Tervuren, Belgium. She organized a research visit for me on very short notice and even arranged for me to work there when it normally would have been closed. Speaking of generous acts of friendship, I want to thank Annegret Fauser and Tim Carter for their hospitality in London and Nancy Green, Pierre Bouvier, Laura Downs, and Marie Laurence and Jean Netter for their hospitality in Paris.

I'm especially grateful to the wonderful people involved on the publishing side. Sandy Dijkstra's astute readings of the original book proposal gave me a crucial, initial boost, and she and her colleagues have backed me all along the way. At the University of California Press, Sheila Levine took time away from her extensive administrative duties to oversee this project. As always, I have benefitted enormously from her sage editorial advice. I'm grateful as well to the editors I've worked with at each stage of the process: Kate Marshall, Kalicia Pivrotto, Suzanne Knott, and Steven Baker. It's hard to imagine a better, more talented group.

At New York University I'm fortunate to enjoy the unique collegiality of the Institute of French Studies, where Laure Bereni, Herrick Chapman, Yasmin Desouki, Stephane Gerson, Françoise Gramet, Romain Lecler, Jackie Simon, and Frederic Viguier—plus dozens of visiting French colleagues—make the IFS a realm of personal and intellectual pleasure.

At home, my wife Catherine Johnson, a master of nonfiction prose, is a constant source of inspiration and loving support. Our three sons, Jimmy, Andrew, and Chris, have grown up in ways that amaze me all the time. They make me immensely proud; I dedicate this book to them.

CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS / ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS / xi

Introduction / i

1. Henry Morton Stanley and the New Journalism / 22
2. Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza and the Making of
the French Third Republic / 49
3. Charles Gordon, Imperial Saint / 83
4. The "Stanley Craze" / 122
5. Jean-Baptiste Marchand, Fashoda, and the Dreyfus Affair / 166
6. Brazza and the Scandal of the Congo / 197
7. Hubert Lyautey and the French Seizure of Morocco / 228

Epilogue / 263

NOTES / 287

INDEX / 343

ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURES

1. Congolese women bowing before Brazza / 67
2. Savorgnan de Brazza / 74
3. Brazza, apostle of empire / 75
4. Brazza with two African boys / 76
5. Brazza with weapon at rest / 77
6. Brazza on top of the world / 78
7. Wax figure of Brazza in the Musée Grévin / 80
8. Gordon caricature by Ape (Pellegrini) in *Vanity Fair* / 98
9. *General Gordon's Last Stand*, by George William Joy / 119
10. Stanley leading the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition / 142
11. H. M. Stanley / 143
12. "The Return of Mr. H. M. Stanley" / 145
13. Stanley speaking in Royal Albert Hall / 147
14. Stanley's wedding / 155
15. Marchand / 175
16. La Mission Marchand / 189

17. Marchand and the Sphinx / 190
18. Parisian crowd welcomes Marchand / 194
19. Brazza on his death bed / 221
20. Assassination of Mauchamp / 244
21. Lyautey and "the Occupation of Oujda" / 247
22. Portrait of Lyautey / 248
23. Rue Lyautey, Paris / 271
24. Toppled statue of Henry M. Stanley in Kinshasa / 274
25. Brazza in Leon Poirier's 1939 film / 278
26. Brazza Mausoleum, Brazzaville / 284

MAPS

Frontispiece. Four journeys: Brazza, Stanley, Marchand, and Kitchener

1. Stanley's first journey: The search for Livingstone, 1870–71 / 36
2. Brazza's exploration of the Congo, 1877–82 / 61
3. The Emin Pasha Relief Expedition: Stanley's last African journey / 130
4. Marchand's mission / 179

Introduction

IN MARCH 1896, while France and Britain dickered over who would control Western and Central Africa, the government in Paris took a bold, if reckless, step. It sent a young army captain, Jean-Baptiste Marchand, up the Congo River and across the forbidding, malarial landscape of Central Africa, tugging a dismantled steamboat all the way. The goal was a tiny, abandoned Egyptian fort on the Upper Nile—a place called Fashoda that took him two years to reach. From there, Marchand and his band of 150 men were to claim a vast central African empire for France. They kept to this plan even when the British general Horatio Herbert Kitchener arrived on the scene with 25,000 soldiers, advanced weaponry, and an armada of gunships among the most destructive in the world. Marchand refused to back down, and his face-off with Kitchener in September 1898 brought their countries to the brink of war.

The two governments put their navies on alert, and influential British voices clamored for a fight. It mattered little that Lord Salisbury, Britain's prime minister, had privately deemed the African territory in question worthless, "wretched stuff." Had the French failed to withdraw, the nineteenth century could have ended with Europe's leading democracies at war. Fortunately for both sides, the government in Paris found itself paralyzed over the fate of Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish army officer falsely accused of treason. France's foreign minister ordered Marchand home.

Although the African traveler ended with nothing concrete to show for his three-year ordeal, his extraordinary courage, dauntless optimism, and willingness to defend French interests against overwhelming odds made him a celebrated hero, martyr, and saint. The captain was said to embody the best of what it meant to be French. Amid the divisive Dreyfus Affair, Marchand brought the right, left, and center together in endorsing an imperial mission for France.

With Marchand, four other men rank among those who figured most prominently in France and Britain's unprecedented race for Africa between 1870 and 1914. These "heroes of empire" included Charles (Chinese) Gordon, one of four "Eminent Victorians" that the Bloomsbury writer Lytton Strachey saw as archetypes of the age; Henry Morton Stanley, famous for uttering "Dr. Livingstone, I presume" and infamous for his ruthless Congolese exploits; Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza, the "pacific conqueror" who has admirers in Africa to this day; and Hubert Lyautey, the dashing soldier-scholar who conquered Morocco for France. Although all five men hoped to improve African lives—and Brazza arguably did—they all contributed, wittingly or not, to a colonial enterprise that expressed and reinforced Europe's racial stereotypes about Africa and Africans and inflicted considerable suffering in what Stanley labeled the "Dark Continent."

Today we are justly skeptical of the heroism of such men, but in the late nineteenth century, most Europeans played down, denied, or ignored the violence that colonialism wrought, preferring to see our five exemplars of empire as extraordinary men. All five earned many of their countries' highest honors and created huge public enthusiasm. They stood out among the most important and best-known figures of their times. And they achieved such distinction, often as not, despite governments lukewarm to their imperial projects and accomplishments of uncertain, often dubious value. Given these fin-de-siècle realities, so different from the ones dominant nowadays, our purpose is not to judge the racial attitudes or humanitarian sensibilities of these individuals; it is historical: to examine how their contemporaries viewed them and understood the meaning of what they did.

From 1870 to 1914, what attracted ordinary citizens in Britain and France to empire were stories by and about the charismatic individuals who gave imperialism a recognizable, human face. These heroes allowed the mass of citizens to understand overseas expansion as a series of extraordinary, personal quests. It is true, as imperial historians have traditionally argued, that the majority of people in both countries took little interest in the details of

overseas expansion—the geographical boundaries in question, the supposed economic advantages, the putative political gains, the strategic objectives involved.¹ But it does not follow, as historians once thought—although much less so nowadays—that the lion's share of British and French men and women remained indifferent to empire. The broad public in both countries may have been disinterested in the politics and economics of imperialism, even scorning them at times. But that disinterest did not extend to those who braved the scarcely imaginable dangers of unknown places and “savage” people, who revealed traits of character and personality widely admired in each society. If the political leaders and administrators who constituted what Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher called the “official mind” of imperialism focused on policy, ordinary citizens concentrated on heroes.²

In viewing imperialism this way, I am inspired not only by recent work on the culture of empire, which shows that images of empire figured prominently in British and French public life, but also by older accounts that criticized Robinson and Gallagher's magisterial study for ignoring “public opinion.”³ This term referred to the newspaper editorials and commentaries that promoted or resisted a government's foreign policies and sought to shape what elected officials and bureaucrats could do. Robinson and Gallagher maintained that policy makers operated largely independent of such external influences and made decisions based on their own values, traditions, and memories.⁴ Although the historians who challenged the two British scholars tended to mistake the views of editorialists for those of the public at large, the critics were right to question the ability of policy makers to ignore the opinions of journalists and their readers. Thanks to the late nineteenth century's explosion of newsprint and its huge new audience, the power of journalism had reached unprecedented heights; so much so, that during the Fashoda crisis of 1898, Salisbury held regular meetings with Alfred Harmsworth, owner of the mass-circulation *Daily Mail*. There was no independent, largely self-contained “official mind” capable of deciding, without undo pressure or constraint, where, when, and how to intervene overseas.⁵

Such seems equally true of the “gentlemen capitalists,” the bankers and financiers who, according to P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, played the paramount role in shaping imperial policy, especially in key places like Egypt and South Africa.⁶ Cain and Hopkins rightly linked “gentleman capitalists” to the gentlemen landowners who had long governed British society, arguing that the interests of overseas commerce dominated both

groups' official mind. But the two economic historians doubtless overestimated the ability of this genteel alliance to achieve its imperial goals. During the period 1870–1914, a cacophony of voices and multiple centers of power competed to determine what directions the British Empire would take. Although bankers and elected leaders sometimes led the way, they often had to follow, or respond to, countless others—everyone from indigenous elites in overseas territories to British explorers, officials, soldiers, missionaries, and merchants on the spot.⁷ At key moments during the late nineteenth century, no one enjoyed more imperial influence than the heroes who came to exercise an independent power of their own.

Among historians of the French Empire, the rough equivalent of the “official mind” has long been the notion that a tiny “colonial lobby,” a compact group of legislators, high civil servants, businessmen, and journalists, single-handedly directed French imperial policy. They did so, the argument goes, by skillfully steering their country into overseas interventions and land seizures, often against the wishes of political leaders and behind the back of a public largely indifferent to the imperial game.⁸ This view remained virtually impregnable until the 1990s, when it suddenly collapsed amid a welter of contemporary concerns: a xenophobic reaction against the suddenly visible presence of dark-skinned immigrants on French soil; the counterclaims of these immigrants and their descendants, now citizens of France; the controversy over Islamic headscarves in the schools; new revelations of French atrocities during the Algerian War (1954–62); and the return of repressed memories of slavery in former French colonies.⁹ At century's end, France seemed to simmer in the afterlife of empire, in the uncomfortable evidence that colonialism had strongly affected the Hexagon itself. And if empire was everywhere in *this* fin-de-siècle, the same, many now argued, must have been true a century earlier. One result of this new sensibility was a fresh attention, even a preoccupation, with the history of French colonialism and especially with the large role historians now deemed it to have played in public life.

In this sense, the new French historiography mirrored the British. The old orthodoxy emphasizing “official mind,” “colonial lobby,” and public indifference to empire gave way to a new orthodoxy that presented late Victorian Britain and fin-de-siècle France as saturated with the imagery of empire. According to the newer work, the broad public in both countries found itself bombarded with pro-colonial propaganda, egged on by a chauvinistic press, and surrounded by advertising, popular entertainment, and consumer goods all brimming with explicit and implicit colonial themes.

As a whole, this work casts doubt on the notion that British and French citizens remained indifferent to empire during the late-nineteenth-century scramble for Africa. But it generally fails to gauge to what extent and in what ways individuals received or assimilated what historians have labeled the “popular culture of imperialism.”¹⁰

One way to do just that is to examine the process of anointing heroes of empire and consider how ordinary people reacted to charismatic figures lauded in the press. What we find is an enthusiastic public response: masses of people crowding train stations and docks when their heroes returned from long African stays; equally large numbers flocking to ceremonies honoring or memorializing these heroes, especially when they were martyred to the imperial cause; stacks of adulatory letters—fan mail of sorts—written by people unknown to the men in question. Hero worship was hardly new to the late nineteenth century; its modern roots lay in the Napoleonic period, when the emperor himself seemed to become a world historical figure and when Admiral Lord Nelson died a martyr’s death in defeating the French navy at Trafalgar in 1805.¹¹ But as popular as Napoleon and Nelson became, heroism was not yet a mass phenomenon; their era’s relatively primitive state of literacy and communications limited the extent to which hagiographic material could percolate throughout society as a whole. Not until the late century did stories of heroism reach into the furthest recesses of British and French society, as millions of newspapers, illustrated magazines, children’s books, song sheets, posters, and advertisements rolled off printing presses each and every day.¹²

These media stood out as key ingredients of the new democratic practices that emerged from the British Reform Bills of 1867 and 1884 and the restoration of French republican government in the 1870s. Not only did most British and French men now enjoy the right to vote; their political participation could be informed by an explosion of printed matter itself the result of new press freedoms and public education laws that gave nearly everyone the ability to read.¹³ In this new cultural landscape, old hierarchies held less sway, and unprivileged individuals could achieve forms of status and recognition long the near-exclusive province of the wellborn. Heroes could now erupt from the middling and lower ranks of society and appear to exemplify their nations, precisely because they had come from the common stock. In a democratic age, exceptional individuals paradoxically owed a measure of their standing to being like everyone else.¹⁴ This paradox allowed them to loom above their compatriots, the better to bring them together as a unified—or, at least, more unified—whole.

The era's new democratic culture and practice put a premium on unity. Those who appeared to embody the nation as a whole, who succeeded in uniting people across the boundaries of class, region, gender, and religion, could wield considerable power, whether or not they held public office. But since politicians in democratic societies necessarily identified themselves with a particular ideology or political group, they could never achieve universal public backing. The most popular heroes faced fewer limits of this kind. Such was especially true of imperial heroes, who appeared to represent their countries in conflicts with rival European powers or prospective colonial subjects and, in doing so, helped define what it meant to be British or French.¹⁵ Magnifying the exceptional prominence of these figures was their apparent resemblance to heroes of ancient Rome, especially Caractacus and Vercingetorix, whose epic stories were well known and hugely popular in Victorian Britain and Third Republic France. Nineteenth-century writers and schoolbook authors cast Caractacus as at once a national and imperial hero, as defender of the British Isles and paragon of imperial Rome. Vercingetorix enjoyed a similar reputation except that he played a more indirect role in what were deemed the necessary successes of imperial Rome.¹⁶

The great status of the late nineteenth century's heroes of empire turned the imperialist steeplechase of these years into a powerful "heroic moment," a time when putatively great men transformed key episodes of British and French intervention overseas into high human drama and gave those episodes an emotional resonance central to their public appeal.¹⁷ By attracting a large and avid following, these heroes gained enough political power not just to represent their countries' empires but to shape the nature and objectives of imperialism itself.

Beyond these imperial interventions, several other aspects of late-nineteenth-century British and French society and politics helped make the era a heroic moment. In these years, prominent leaders and commentators in both countries found their homelands wanting in virility, energy, spirit, and above all, public commitment to national strength. For many, the antidote to these ills would come from extraordinary individuals, heroes whose exemplary lives would inspire their fellow citizens to join them in reversing their nation's putative decline. Heroes from outside established structures of authority seemed especially important during the years after 1870, partly because elected political leaders did not, with certain notable exceptions (Disraeli, Gladstone), inspire their citizens or offer much beyond

relatively orderly conservatism in government. British leaders sought to float “lazily downstream” and to guarantee, in Lord Salisbury’s words, that “as little should happen as possible.”¹⁸ Meanwhile in France, a moderate conservatism and mostly dull political leaders held sway after the twin traumas of the Franco-Prussian War and Paris Commune (1870–71).

France’s humiliating military defeat at the hands of Prussia made large numbers of people long for men who promised to restore French glory or who displayed traits and qualities deemed by tradition to have given the country its greatness and strength.¹⁹ But the leaders of the new republic installed in the late 1870s viscerally opposed the idea of having any concrete individual embody their political system or represent its ideals. They had experienced too many Bourbons and too many Napoleons to allow any particular man to incarnate the new regime. They had become so hostile to executive authority that they invented a presidency empty of power and reserved that position for nondescript politicians, for unthreatening party men. Republicans were loath even to have a prime minister, preferring instead to create a Council of Ministers chaired by a *président du conseil*—a cabinet member who was first among equals rather than a true head of government.²⁰ Even under a strong *président du conseil*, governing majorities proved so unstable that it was impossible for any individual to represent the regime. Léon Gambetta (1838–82) came closest to playing this role, but his tenure as council president lasted but three short months.

Because the new republic inaugurated in 1870 dispersed power and weakened executive authority, its very institutions worked to exclude extraordinary men and prevent leaders from adding a charismatic aura to the purely bureaucratic authority they enjoyed. French citizens had to look elsewhere for heroes who could offer solace, protection, and revitalization to members of a nation whose faith in themselves and their country had been undermined. In this context, extraordinary individuals like Brazza and Marchand, who persevered through impossible circumstances and prevailed against the odds, emerged as saviors in whom many French men and women wanted to believe.

Britain lost no European wars during this period, but its army’s performance during the Crimean War (1854–56) had been weak, and the powerful Indian rebellion of 1857, though ultimately unsuccessful, revealed the empire’s apparently fragile state. So did Jamaica’s racially charged Morant Bay disorders in 1865.²¹ When the United States and Germany threatened Britain’s economic dominance after 1870, and France appeared to challenge its imperial hegemony, a great many British commentators found the nation

vulnerable to other powers and facing a relative, even absolute, decline.²² Observers worried in particular about Prussia's crushing military victories over Austria (1866) and France (1870); Britain's small army seemed incapable of measuring up to Bismarck's fighting machine. Even the Royal Navy, which had long ruled the seas, now appeared to languish, as Admiral Sir Richard Hugh Spencer Bacon put it in 1888, at "the lowest level of efficiency . . . since the middle of the eighteenth century."²³ Fears of military weakness vis-à-vis Germany and even France produced a new genre of war-scare literature that reached its alarmist peak with H. G. Wells's *The War of the Worlds* (1898). This doomsday book built on William le Queux's *The Great War in England in 1897* (1894), which had gone through fourteen editions before Wells's novella appeared.²⁴

Adding to this sense of post-1870s foreboding was the accelerating financial slide of Britain's landed elite, the country's traditional ruling group. In the 1880s, cheap North and South American farm products flooded the British market, hastening a collapse in agricultural prices already pressured by the worldwide economic downturn of that time. The result was a precipitous drop in British landed incomes and a threat to the status and power of the aristocracy.²⁵ Their economic fortunes suffered far more quickly than their political and cultural clout, which allowed members of the traditional elite and those who sympathized with them to present their own decline as the nation's decline.²⁶

Motivated in part by these developments, Salisbury's 1883 essay, "Disintegration," published in the influential *Quarterly Review*, pointed in particular to a growing menace from below. For the future prime minister, Britain's electoral reforms announced a new age of mass politics in which the rabble would rule. "Things that have been secure for centuries," Salisbury wrote, "are secure no longer."²⁷ Such views echoed throughout the British Isles in this period, and not just among the landed elite. Like France, Great Britain threatened to become unmoored from long-standing forms of social organization and political authority. Radicals embraced these developments, but a great many others looked for salvation in heroes who appeared to possess tried and tested English virtues: "pluck," perseverance, energy, resolve, and a moral fortitude in tune with the evangelical Christianity that had swept the country in the first half of the nineteenth century.²⁸

In both Britain and France, most heroes had traditionally been military men who risked their lives to achieve lofty goals. Because Western Europe knew no wars after the Franco-Prussian conflagration of 1870 and only one other since 1815, the search for military heroes had to focus on individuals

acting abroad. Heroic virtues would be rediscovered among those who explored, conquered, and “civilized” in the arduous environments of Africa or “oriental” lands. Heroes of empire thus seemed ideally suited to provide models of character and behavior for the young and images of reassuring manliness for people yearning for certainty and unity in times when political, economic, or social developments otherwise pulled compatriots apart. Perhaps most important, these figures offered themselves as objects of veneration, though for different reasons and under different circumstances in Britain and France.

In Britain, where religious faith remained relatively strong throughout the nineteenth century, colonial heroes often appeared as Christian soldiers, as exemplars of a “muscular Christianity” who evoked worshipful responses. Charles Gordon was a paradigmatic case; he developed a charisma that retained much of the original religious meaning of the term.²⁹ In France, where a growing secularization reduced the influence, power, and legitimacy of Catholicism and the Church, emotions once directed toward religious figures now infused colonial heroes with an aura, even a spirituality, that could make them into secular saints.³⁰ As a result, our five heroes of empire all evoked strong public interest in exploring and claiming uncharted territories abroad, territories understood as arenas in which extraordinary, exemplary individuals could prove their—and the country’s—worth. Such interest not infrequently came in moments when government officials in one country or the other shied away from new imperial commitments. For this reason, the colonial heroes’ untraditional authority often pushed British and French governments further than they wanted to go, sometimes leading them into dead ends or foreign-policy disasters inexplicable but for the sway these individuals enjoyed. There was nothing rational about sending Gordon to Khartoum in 1884 or Stanley to rescue Emin Pasha three years later, or Marchand to Fashoda or even Lyautey to Morocco. The explanation for these ventures turns on the irrational enthusiasm they wrought.

Since these five men registered their feats of bravery and endurance far away from the European stage, they achieved their renown thanks to the penny papers that flew every day into millions of hands. Until midcentury, news and information, especially of distant places, had been largely reserved for a narrow elite of relatively affluent people. But in the 1860s and ’70s, advances in publishing and news-gathering technology—high-speed rotary presses, automatic paper folders, linotype machines, news photography,