Realism with a Human Face

Hilary Putnam

edited and introduced by James Conant

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Be patient toward all that is unsolved in your heart and try to love the *questions themselves* like locked rooms and like books that are written in a very foreign tongue . . . *Live* the questions now. Perhaps you will then gradually, without noticing it, live along some distant day into the answer.

—Rainer Maria Rilke,
Letters to a Young Poet

Let us be human.

—Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Culture and Value

Preface

The essays that James Conant has selected for this volume represent a central part of the thinking I have been doing since I drew my now well-known (some would say "notorious") distinction between two kinds of realism ("metaphysical" and "internal") in a presidential address to the American Philosophical Association in 1976. Although they do not in any sense represent a giving up of the position I called "internal realism," I have chosen to emphasize a somewhat different aspect of that position than the one I emphasized in *Reason, Truth, and History.*

In *Reason, Truth, and History* I was primarily concerned to present a *conception of truth* alternative to both the classical metaphysical realist conception (truth as correspondence to "mind independent objects") and to relativist/positivist views. (My reasons for treating relativism and positivism as two sides of a single coin are discussed in "Why Is a Philosopher," Chapter 7 of the present volume.) According to my conception, to claim of any statement that it is true, that is, that it is true in its place, in its context, in its conceptual scheme, is, roughly, to claim that *it could be justified were epistemic conditions good enough.* If we allow ourselves the fiction of "ideal" epistemic conditions (as one allows oneself the fiction of frictionless planes in physics), one can express this by saying that a true statement is one that could be justified were epistemic conditions ideal. But this has opened me to a misunderstanding which I very much regret, and which Chapter 2 ("A Defense of Internal Realism") tries to set straight.

Many people have thought that my idealization was the same as Peirce's, that what the figure of a "frictionless plane" corresponds to is a situation ("finished science") in which the community would be in a position to justify *every* true statement (and to disconfirm every

false one). People have attributed to me the idea that we can sensibly imagine conditions which are *simultaneously ideal* for the ascertainment of any truth whatsoever, or simultaneously ideal for answering any question whatsoever. I have never thought such a thing, and I was, indeed, so far from ever thinking such a thing that it never occurred to me even to warn against this misunderstanding when I wrote *Reason, Truth, and History,* although I did warn against it in the volume I published after that, *Realism and Reason.* But let me repeat the warning: There are some statements which we can only verify by failing to verify other statements. This is so as a matter of logic (for example, if we verify "in the limit of inquiry" that *no one ever will verify or falsify p,* where *p* is any statement which has a truth value, then we cannot decide the truth of *p* itself, even in "the limit of inquiry"), but there are more interesting ways in which quantum mechanics suggests that this is the case, such as the celebrated Case of Schrödinger's Cat. Thus, I do not by any means *ever* mean to use the notion of an "ideal epistemic situation" in this fantastic (or utopian) Peircean sense. By an ideal epistemic situation I mean something like this: If I say "There is a chair in my study," an ideal epistemic situation would be to be in my study with the lights on or with daylight streaming through the window, with nothing wrong with my eyesight, with an unconfused mind, without having taken drugs or been subjected to hypnosis, and so forth, and to look and see if there is a chair there. Or, to drop the notion of "ideal" altogether, since that is only a metaphor, I think there are *better and worse* epistemic situations *with respect to particular statements.* What I just described is a very good epistemic situation with respect to the statement "There is a chair in my study." It should be noted that the description of that epistemic situation itself uses material object language: I am "in my study," "looking," "the light is on," and so on. I am *not* making the claim that truth is a matter of what "sense data" we would have if we did such and such. Internal realism is not phenomenalism all over again. Even if what I were offering were a definition of truth (and, for a variety of reasons, it isn't), the point that it makes about truth operates *within* whatever type of language we are talking about; one cannot say what are good or better or worse epistemic conditions in quantum mechanics without using the language of quantum mechanics; one cannot say what are good or better or worse epistemic situations in moral discourse without using moral language; one cannot say what are good or better or worse epistemic situations in com-

monsense material object discourse without using commonsense material object language. There is no reductionism in my position; I am simply denying that we have in any of these areas a notion of truth that totally *outruns* the possibility of justification. What bothered me about statements of the sort I rejected, for example, "There *really are* (or 'really aren't') numbers," or "There *really are* (or 'really aren't') space-time points," is that they outrun the possibility of verification in a way which is utterly different from the way in which the statement that, say, there was a dinosaur in North America less than a million years ago might outrun the possibility of actual verification. These former statements are such that we cannot imagine how *any* creature with, in Kant's phrase, "a rational and a sensible nature" could ascertain their truth or falsity under *any* conditions.

Is this positivism? Am I not saying that statements that are "unverifiable in principle" are cognitively meaningless? What keeps this from being positivism is that I refuse to *limit in advance* what means of verification may become available to human beings. There is no restriction (in my concept of verification) to mathematical deduction plus scientific experimentation. If some people want to claim that even metaphysical statements are verifiable, and that there is, after all, a method of "metaphysical verification" by which we can determine that numbers "really exist," well and good; let them exhibit that method and convince us that it works. The difference between "verificationism" in *this* sense and "verificationism" in the positivist sense is precisely the difference between the generous and open-minded attitude that William James called "pragmatism" and science worship.

Although my view has points of agreement with some of the views Richard Rorty has defended, I do not share his skepticism about the very existence of a substantial notion of truth. In the Kant Lectures that constitute Chapter 1 of this volume, I try to explain not only how the metaphysical realist perspective has broken down in science itself, but also how Rortian relativism cum pragmatism fails as an alternative to metaphysical realism. Rorty's present "position" is not so much a position as the illusion or mirage of a position; in this respect it resembles solipsism, which looks like a possible (if unbelievable) position from a distance, but which disappears into thin air when closely examined. Indeed, Rorty's view is just solipsism with a "we" instead of an "I."

If some readers of my work have been worried about how I can distinguish my views from Rorty's, others have asked why we *should*

give up metaphysical realism. One school, represented by such "physicalist" philosophers as Richard Boyd, Michael Devitt, and Clark Glymour, has suggested that there is no problem about how words "hook on to the world"; the glue is just "causal connection," they say. In Chapter 5 I reply to this suggestion by trying to show that the notion of "causality" on which these philosophers rely is not a physicalist notion at all, but a cognitive one. Fundamentally, they are offering an account of reference in terms of *explanation,* and explanation is as much a cognitive (or "intentional") notion as reference itself. Another school, represented perhaps by Daniel Dennett, agrees that intentional notions cannot be reduced to physicalist ones but contends that we need only give up metaphysical realism with respect to the intentional realm; we can still be hard-line metaphysical realists with respect to physics. Still other philosophers (for instance, David Lewis) contend that we should be metaphysical realists about both the intentional realm and about physics; we just need to recognize the need for at least one primitive notion not drawn from physics itself for the description of intentional phenomena (for example, Lewis's notion of a "natural" class).

What is wrong with these views, besides the inability of their metaphysical realism to do justice to the most fundamental physical theory we have (quantum mechanics), is that they all fail to do justice to a pervasive phenomenon that I call "conceptual relativity"; and if there is any feature of my thought that is stressed throughout all the parts of this book, it is the importance of conceptual relativity. The doctrine of conceptual relativity, in brief, is that while there is an aspect of conventionality and an aspect of fact in everything we say that is true, we fall into hopeless philosophical error if we commit a "fallacy of division" and conclude that there must be a part of the truth that is the "conventional part" and a part that is the "factual part." A corollary of my conceptual relativity—and a controversial one—is the doctrine that two statements which are incompatible at face value can sometimes both be true (and the incompatibility cannot be explained away by saying that the statements have "a different meaning" in the schemes to which they respectively belong). I defend this controversial corollary against Donald Davidson's objections in Chapter 6; but examples of conceptual relativity occur in every part of this volume. Indeed, it might be said that the difference between the present volume and my work prior to *The Many Faces of Realism* is a shift in

emphasis: a shift from emphasizing model-theoretic arguments against metaphysical realism to emphasizing conceptual relativity.

For me the importance of the debate about realism, relativism, positivism, and materialism has always been that one's position in metaphysics largely determines one's position about the nature and status of "values," and in our time the most popular versions of all these traditional positions have been used to support a "fact/value dichotomy." The essays in Part II of this volume concern ethics and aesthetics. They are largely, though not entirely, metaphilosophical in character; their aim is to show that the fact/value dichotomy is no longer tenable. This is argued in greatest detail in Chapter 11, "Objectivity and the Science/Ethics Distinction," but all of these essays except Chapter 14 are concerned to show that internal realism provides not just a more theoretically tenable but a more human way to view ethical and aesthetic disagreement. If the criticism of metaphysical error did not lead to a more human and a more sensible way to think about the issues that matter most in our lives, taking a stand on such hopelessly abstract issues would hardly have a point, in my view.

All of these ideas—that the fact/value dichotomy is untenable, that the fact/convention dichotomy is also untenable, that truth and justification of ideas are closely connected, that the alternative to metaphysical realism is not any form of skepticism, that philosophy is an attempt to achieve the good—are ideas that have been long associated with the American pragmatist tradition. Realizing this has led me (sometimes with the assistance of Ruth Anna Putnam) to make the effort to better understand that tradition from Peirce right up to Quine and Goodman. That effort is represented by the essays in Part III, many of which represent work that is still in progress. Both James Conant and I felt it was important to include this work in the present volume, because it represents the direction in which my interests are presently turning and also because we want the most significant tradition in American philosophy to be more widely understood in all its manifold expressions.

Hilary Putnam

Introduction by James Conant

The title of this volume, *Realism with a Human Face,* alludes to Alexander Dubcek's slogan "Socialism with a Human Face," which was the rallying cry of the Prague Spring of 1968. "Socialism" originally stood as the name for a dream of realizing some of humanity's most cherished aspirations. Yet somehow in the course of its development, Dubcek felt, what was called socialism in his country had turned into the enemy of everything it once stood for. The title Hilary Putnam has chosen for this volume proposes that the history of philosophical realism represents a parallel development. Having originally stood for the dream of realizing our natural human aspirations to knowledge and objectivity, "philosophical realism" now names an intellectual current that ultimately serves only to corrode our conviction in the possibility of attaining either. Putnam draws a distinction in the title essay of this volume between what he calls "Realism with a capital 'R'" (the currently regnant metaphysical image of the world in analytic philosophy) and "realism with a small 'r'" (our commonsense image of the world). He proceeds to argue that while claiming to serve as its representative, the former gives up on everything in which the latter believes. The Realist begins by offering to rescue us from the threat of philosophical skepticism and to vindicate our commonsense belief in the reality of the external world and the possibility of objectivity and truth, and ends by giving us back a world in which common sense no longer has a home; thus he begins by promising to save the world and ends by dehumanizing it. The essays collected in this volume argue that the cognitive values of objectivity and truth are only able to retain their sense within the framework of an overarching ideal of human flourishing. Hence, in attempting to wrench certain cognitive ideals from our overall conception of human flourishing, philosophical realism ends by undermining itself (and precipitating a

backlash of philosophical skepticism). In order to fulfill the philosophical program of providing an accurate and coherent account of the nature of knowledge and objectivity, our image of knowledge and objectivity must wear a human face.

In calling for "socialism with a human face," Dubcek's hope was to rehumanize the movement in Czechoslovakia by confronting it with the fact that it had betrayed its original motivations. In giving a similar name to his philosophical program, Putnam is evidently also calling for reform. The suggestion would appear to be that the time has come to rehumanize philosophy, to call upon the prevailing currents within this field of activity to attend to the gap between the present condition of the subject and the human aspirations that philosophy should (and once claimed to) represent. Like Dubcek's before it, Putnam's call for reform will no doubt strike some people as out of touch with reality—just another instance of starry-eyed idealism rather than a serious program. Hence the allusion might also appear to be an unfortunate one in that Dubcek's attempted revolution is famous for having ended in disaster. As I write, however, momentous changes are taking place: enormous crowds are assembling in the streets and public squares of Prague, brandishing placards that call for, among other things, "a time when people can begin to live as human beings"; the Berlin Wall has come down—a structure that was once the single most concrete symbol in our contemporary world of human aspiration divided against itself. The spark of Dubcek's vision is therefore not only being rekindled in Czechoslovakia but has caught fire and is presently spreading like a blaze across all of Eastern Europe. In the light of these developments, it would appear that Putnam's title is an apposite one.[1]

I came to know Putnam first as a teacher of philosophy. I attended his classes at Harvard and was repeatedly struck by the following peculiar feature of his pedagogic practice: he would usually motivate the approach he wished to take to a contemporary philosophical issue through a discussion of the work of some philosopher whom he admired. One's first fleeting impression would therefore perhaps be of someone unable to arrive at ideas of his own—an impression, however, that would vanish as one came to realize that Putnam's readings of philosophers tended to be no less idiosyncratic than his own approach to philosophical problems. The lectures for any given course that Putnam gave were peppered with numerous, though often puzzling, references to his current philosophical hero(es). An index of

how his readings of philosophical texts would tend to parallel developments in his own personal philosophical views is afforded by the following remark he made in one such course: "I find that as I keep getting clearer about these issues, Aristotle keeps getting clearer about them, too." Nonetheless, each decisive shift in Putnam's thought is generally accompanied by the concomitant abandonment of some (previous) philosophical hero and the inauguration of a new one—sometimes a thinker whom he had previously (and sometimes even famously) denounced. Thus the membership of Putnam's constellation of heroes, not unlike his own substantive philosophical views, tends to exist in a condition of perpetual flux; at any given point in his career, one has only to glance at the current membership of this constellation to ascertain the general philosophical direction in which he is (often quite rapidly) moving.

The present stage in Putnam's intellectual trajectory does not constitute an exception to this general rule of thumb. Scattered throughout the essays collected in the present volume, one finds the names of four philosophers in particular who are of interest in this connection: Immanuel Kant, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Stanley Cavell, and William James. Each of them is invoked at a critical juncture in the book; each functions as an exemplar of a particular aspect of the philosophical calling to which Putnam wishes to remain faithful. My aim in this introduction is to say something about what it is that Putnam admires about each of these philosophers. This endeavor has already been partially preempted by Putnam himself, since two of the essays collected here are devoted primarily to exploring the extent to which contemporary philosophers can still learn from the work of William James; therefore I have confined myself to a consideration of Putnam's relation to the other three of these figures. My aim in doing so is to say something of a general nature about the ways in which the work collected in the present volume represents a departure from Putnam's earlier work. I have tried, in particular, to shed light on the present character of Putnam's overall conception of philosophy and on what he (at least for the time being) thinks philosophy may reasonably hope to achieve.

Putnam's Kantianism

It should come as no surprise to readers familiar with Putnam's recent work that the pair of lectures that constitute the title chapter of this

volume are dedicated to Kant. Still, some readers may be surprised by just how strong a claim Putnam is prepared to make for the contemporary relevance of Kant's work. Indeed, this volume opens with the following remark: "I hope it will become clear that my indebtedness to Kant is very large . . . For me, at least, almost all the problems of philosophy attain the form in which they are of real interest only with the work of Kant." This remark is as striking as it is sweeping—especially in view of the fact that in Putnam's first two volumes of philosophical papers there is no sustained discussion of Kant's work. At that stage Kant does not appear to constitute a significant influence on Putnam's own philosophical outlook; although his name makes an occasional appearance, it almost always stands for the figure that analytic philosophy was, in those years, forever distancing itself from: a deplorably influential dead German philosopher who held misguided views about the synthetic *a priori* nature of geometry and arithmetic. It is only in Putnam's last three books that Kant's name begins to stand for a figure from whom contemporary analytic philosophy still has much to learn. In the first of these books, Kant's attack on the correspondence theory of truth is identified as a pivotal chapter in the history of metaphysics;[2] the second book takes its bearings from the role of the concept of autonomy in Kant's moral philosophy;[3] and the third praises Kant's delicate treatment of the mind/body problem.[4] What happens in these books is not that Putnam undergoes a conversion to Kantianism; rather, his entire picture of Kant's achievement and its position in the history of philosophy is transformed. As Putnam's own philosophical views develop, his philosophical agenda increasingly comes to resemble the one he finds in Kant. The result is both an increasing interest in Kant and a deepening appreciation of the extent to which he succeeded in grasping and defining the problems that continue to plague contemporary philosophy. Kant's achievement, on this view, lies not primarily in the answers he provided but rather in the manner in which he pressed the questions. The aim throughout this volume is therefore not so much to defend or rehabilitate any specific solutions to standing problems that Kant himself tried to tackle, as to recapture an overall perspective on the character, structure, and interrelationship of the basic problems that have preoccupied modern philosophy.

In the first of the three books mentioned above, *Reason, Truth, and History,* Putnam credits Kant with being the first philosopher clearly to point the way toward the position in metaphysics[5] that Putnam

himself seems now to favor: "Although Kant never quite says that this is what he is doing, Kant is best read as proposing for the first time, what I have called the 'internalist' or 'internal realist' view of truth."[6] The significance of Kant's example for Putnam in this regard is perhaps best summarized by saying that Kant offers the first serious attempt in the history of philosophy to explicate the concept of genuinely objective knowledge in a fashion that does not presuppose the coherence of the notion of an "absolute conception" of the world—the notion that there is some conception of the world that captures the way the world (already) is, in and of itself, independent of our particular (human) conceptions of it.[7] This Kantian quest for a coherent conception of what is "objective humanly speaking"[8]—a conception that avoids the twin perils of a relativism that denies the possibility of objective knowledge and of a metaphysical absolutism that transcends the limits of what is coherently conceivable—has emerged as perhaps the single most pervasive theme in Putnam's recent work. The essays collected in the present volume subserve this ideal in different ways. Those in Part I are concerned specifically with diagnosing the various sources of the traditional metaphysical picture of objectivity and showing that the abandonment of that picture does not require that we give up on the notion of objectivity itself. The essays in Part II argue that our everyday means of adjudicating practical disputes on matters of ethical and aesthetic controversy often represent what may be properly termed "objective resolutions of problematical situations"—and that *that* is "objectivity enough."[9] Thus the argument of the essays in Part II depends on the argument of those in Part I. The overarching claim is that the ways in which philosophers have attacked the possibility of genuine ethical or aesthetic knowledge have generally turned on their allegiance to a false (metaphysical) conception of objectivity. It is the burden of the essays in Part I to advance a critique of this traditional conception of objectivity. Putnam's so-called internal realism—or, as he prefers to call it here, "realism with a small 'r'"—aims to set forth a conception of objectivity that is more faithful to our actual (both everyday and scientific) practices of adjudicating conflicting knowledge-claims and achieving forms of rational consensus.

The doctrine of "internal realism" (of which Putnam discerns a version in Kant's work) has been summarized by Putnam in several different places and in a number of different ways. Many of the essays in this volume represent further attempts at its formulation from a

variety of complementary perspectives. One such formulation sheds light on the relationship between Putnam's views and those of Kant:

> My own view is that the success of science cannot be anything but a puzzle as long as we view concepts and objects as radically independent; that is, as long as we think of "the world" as an entity that has a fixed nature, determined once and for all, independently of our framework of concepts . . . If we do shift our way of thinking to the extent of regarding "the world" as partly constituted by the representing mind, then many things in our popular philosophy (and even in technical philosophy) must be reexamined. To mention just two of them: (1) Locke held that the great metaphysical problem of realism, the problem of the relation of our concepts to their objects, would be solved by just natural scientific investigation, indefinitely continued. Kant held that Locke was wrong, and that this *philosophical* question was never going to be solved by empirical science. I am suggesting that on this subject Kant was right and Locke was wrong . . . (2) Since the birth of science thousands of years ago we have bifurcated the world into "reality"—what physical science describes—and appearance . . . I am suggesting that this is an error, and a subtle version of Locke's error. The "primary/secondary" or "reality/appearance" dichotomy is founded on and presupposes what Kant called "the transcendental illusion"—that empirical science describes (and *exhaustively* describes) a concept-independent, perspective-independent "reality."[10]

The importance of Kant's work for Putnam is connected not only to Kant's insight into the incoherence of the seductive idea of a "concept-independent, perspective-independent reality" but also to his appreciation of the ways in which certain forms of moral confusion are fueled by this species of metaphysical confusion.

In *The Many Faces of Realism,* the second of the three books alluded to previously, Putnam again looks to Kant—this time as an important source for "ideas that may be the beginning of a kind of 'internal realism' in moral philosophy."[11] Kant receives credit here for offering "a radically new way of giving content to the notion of equality"[12] through his "radical" and "deep"[13] explication of the concept of autonomy. What Putnam emphasizes most in this discussion is the intimacy of the connection revealed between ethics and metaphysics. Kant's views on moral philosophy flow naturally from his rejection of a metaphysically loaded conception of objectivity: "Kant's glory, in my eyes, is to say that the very fact that we cannot separate our own

conceptual contribution from what is 'objectively there' is not a disaster . . . Similarly, I am suggesting, Kant rejects the idea that we have something analogous to the medieval 'rational intuition' with respect to moral questions. And again here he argues that this is not a disaster, that on the contrary it is a Good Thing. The whole Kantian strategy, on this reading . . . is to *celebrate* the loss of essence."[14]

Although there is little specific discussion of Kant's views on moral philosophy in the present volume, in Chapter 13 ("Taking Rules Seriously") Putnam does take recent Anglo-American moral philosophy to task for assuming "a derogatory attitude toward rules and toward the Kantian account" of the place of rules in moral reasoning.[15] Putnam points out that Kant does allow an important role for the pursuit of happiness in his moral scheme;[16] that, rather than devaluing the significance of happiness, Kant was concerned to keep its pursuit from being "allowed to degenerate into a consequentialist ethic;"[17] and that consequently there is room for considerably more harmony between Kantian and Aristotelian ethics than has hitherto generally been acknowledged.[18] Outside of his remarks in this one essay, however, Putnam devotes no further attention to the details of Kant's own moral theory. The feature of Kant's philosophy that resonates most in the present volume is the insistence on the interconnected character of metaphysical and ethical confusion. In particular, Putnam finds in Kant a concern with the way in which the metaphysical realists' picture of scientific objectivity leads to a devaluation of the objectivity of moral judgment. The pervasive attention to the ethical implications of prevailing metaphysical assumptions—and, in particular, to the subtle mutual influences exercised by prevailing conceptions of objectivity in philosophy of science and moral philosophy—represents perhaps the most significant sense in which the essays collected here constitute an important shift in the focus of Putnam's philosophical interests. It is not that these issues receive attention here for the first time in Putnam's work. However, as his conviction in their significance for philosophy (and in their impact on our culture as a whole) has deepened, they have come to assume an unprecedented degree of centrality. In this connection, I will simply note the extent to which the essays pervasively register the pressure of the following two questions: What are the moral (or political) implications of a given philosophical view (in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, or philosophy of science)? How do our analyses in various areas of philosophy impinge on our understanding of our everyday practices of

ethical reflection and criticism? My suggestion is that the manner in which these questions haunt the pages of this volume itself forms a further significant affinity between Putnam and Kant.

In *Representation and Reality,* the third of the three books mentioned earlier, Kant's claim concerning the impossibility of giving a scientific account of "schematism"[19] is acknowledged as an antecedent version of one of Putnam's central claims: namely, the inability of a thoroughgoing physicalist or materialist view of the world to provide a coherent account of intentionality.[20] This feature of Kant's influence also surfaces in a variety of ways in Putnam's most recent work.[21] Putnam argues, for example, that Kant's thought marks a decisive break with the Cartesian tradition: "Note that Kant does not say there are two 'substances'—mind and body (as Descartes did). Kant says, instead, that there are 'dualities in our experience' (a striking phrase!) that refuse to go away. And I think Kant was, here as elsewhere, on to something of permanent significance."[22] What is of permanent significance here is Kant's idea that the relation between mind and body should not be pictured as a binary opposition, a dualism of two incommensurable kinds of entity, but rather as a *duality*: two complementary poles of a single field of activity—the field of human experience. Putnam goes on to suggest that the clock was turned back and that philosophy of mind in the Anglo-American world retreated for several decades to a pre-Kantian formulation of the mind/body problem: "It was with the decline of pragmatism and idealism and the rise of logical positivism that English-speaking philosophy reverted to its traditional, empiricist way of conceiving mind-body issues."[23] Recent developments in the philosophy of mind (in particular, the functionalism controversy), however, have had the salutary effect, in Putnam's view, of finally bringing a variety of Kantian "topics and concerns back into English-speaking analytic philosophy in a massive way."[24]

The various passages quoted above offer some indication of the magnitude of the achievement that Putnam wishes to claim for Kant's contributions to philosophy—in metaphysics, moral philosophy, and philosophy of mind—as well as the degree to which Putnam feels philosophical progress is to be attained by returning to Kant and reconsidering many of the traditional problems in the terms in which he formulated them. That one of the leading figures in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy should reach *this* conclusion is a devel-