

PHILOSOPHIC PRIDE



STOICISM AND
POLITICAL THOUGHT
FROM LIPSIVS
TO ROUSSEAU



*Christopher
Brooke*

Philosophic Pride

STOICISM AND POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM
LIPSIUS TO ROUSSEAU

Christopher Brooke



PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Princeton and Oxford

Copyright © 2012 by Princeton University Press
Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street,
Princeton, New Jersey 08540
In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 6 Oxford Street,
Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1TW

press.princeton.edu

Jacket illustration: *The Four Philosophers*, c. 1611–12 (oil on panel), by Peter Paul
Rubens (1577–1640); Palazzo Pitti, Florence, Italy. Reproduced courtesy of
The Bridgeman Art Library; photo copyright Alinari

All Rights Reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Brooke, Christopher, 1973–

Philosophic pride : Stoicism and political thought from Lipsius to Rousseau / Christopher
Brooke.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 253) and index.

ISBN 978-0-691-15208-0 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Political science—Philosophy—
History. I. Title.

JA71.B757 2012

320.01—dc23

2011034498

This book has been composed in Sabon LT Std

Printed on acid-free paper. ∞

Printed in the United States of America

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Philosophic Pride

For Josephine

The Stoic last in philosophic pride,
By him called virtue, and his virtuous man,
Wise, perfect in himself, and all possessing,
Equal to God, oft shames not to prefer,
As fearing God nor man, contemning all
Wealth, pleasure, pain or torment, death and life—
Which, when he lists, he leaves, or boasts he can;
For all his tedious talk is but vain boast,
Or subtle shifts conviction to evade.
Alas! what can they teach, and not mislead,
Ignorant of themselves, of God much more,
And how the World began, and how Man fell,
Degraded by himself, on grace depending?
Much of the Soul they talk, but all awry;
And in themselves seek virtue; and to themselves
All glory arrogate, to God give none;
Rather accuse him under usual names,
Fortune and Fate, as one regardless quite
Of mortal things.

—John Milton, *Paradise Regain'd*, 4.300–318

Preface

FOR ERNST CASSIRER, writing in American exile during the Second World War, ideas drawn from Stoic philosophy played a vital role in the ‘formation of the modern mind and the modern world’. The Greek Stoics had taught that one should live in accordance with a moral law of nature, he observed, and the Roman Stoics had both championed the virtue of *humanitas*, absent from earlier Greek ethics, and argued for a cosmopolitanism that treated the whole world, gods and humans together, as fellow citizens of one great republic. In particular, Cassirer attributed to the Stoics the notion of the fundamental equality of all human beings. Stoic ideas persisted beyond the end of the Stoic school itself, Cassirer suggested, finding a place ‘in Roman jurisprudence, in the Fathers of the Church, in scholastic philosophy’. But it was only in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that these ideas took on ‘tremendous practical significance’. In the world of the Renaissance and the Reformation, the ‘unity and the inner harmony of medieval culture had been dissolved’, ‘the hierarchic chain of being that gave to everything its right, firm, unquestionable place in the general order of things was destroyed’, and the ‘heliocentric system deprived man of his privileged condition’. The prospects appeared bleak for ‘a really universal system of ethics or religion’, one ‘based upon such principles as could be admitted by every nation, every creed, and every sect’.

Stoicism alone seemed to be equal to this task. It became the foundation of a ‘natural’ religion and a system of natural laws. Stoic philosophy could not help man to solve the metaphysical riddles of the universe. But it contained a greater and more important promise: the promise to restore man to his ethical dignity. This dignity, it asserted, cannot be lost; for it does not depend on a dogmatic creed or on any outward revelation. It rests exclusively on the moral will—on the worth that man attributes to himself.¹

Cassirer thus considered seventeenth-century political philosophy to be in significant measure ‘a rejuvenation of Stoic ideas’. He highlighted the importance of works by Justus Lipsius and others, as well as the rapid passage of Neostoic ideas ‘from Italy to France; from France to the Netherlands; to England, to the American colonies’. Of the stirring opening phrases of the Declaration of Independence—‘We hold these truths to be

self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness’—Cassirer claimed that ‘When Jefferson wrote these words he was scarcely aware that he was speaking the language of Stoic philosophy’.

What, then, was that Stoic philosophy? Stoicism was one of the philosophical systems that took shape in Athens in the so-called Hellenistic period following the death of Aristotle in 322 BCE. The first Stoic was Zeno from Citium, a Phoenician city on Cyprus, who came to Athens and studied with Crates the Cynic and other philosophers there, subsequently setting up his own school around the turn of the third century. This school met in the middle of Athens at the *Stoa Poikilê*, or the Painted Stoa—a stoa being a roofed colonnade or portico—and it was this structure that gave the philosophy its name. Zeno died in 262 and was succeeded as the head of the school, or scholarch, by Cleanthes, a former boxer. But it was his successor, the third scholarch Chrysippus of Soli, leader of the school during the final decades of the third century, who did more to systematise Zeno’s doctrines than any other philosopher, and who gave the Stoic philosophy its definitive form. Stoicism flourished in Athens and spread throughout the Greek and, later, Roman worlds.

Some of the characteristic doctrines of the Stoics were these: that God and the universe are coextensive with one another—a divine fire thoroughly permeates the world of stuff—and this universe is a thoroughly rational totality. The physical world is all that exists, and all events in that world are causally determined. The goal of human existence is to live in accordance with nature, which is to live rationally or virtuously. Virtue is the only genuine good, and it is sufficient for happiness. Other things that we might conventionally call goods, such as health or wealth, are, properly speaking, only ‘preferred indifferents’. Vice is the only genuine bad. We must learn to distinguish between those things that are under our own control and those that are not, and train ourselves to be unconcerned about the latter. Most of the emotions that we experience are false judgements, and should be extirpated through Stoic therapies or spiritual exercises. If we can rid ourselves of these emotional responses, then we can live the good life in the passionless state the Stoics called *apatheia*, and to live that ideal life is to be the Stoics’ sage. But the Stoics conceded that the sage was rarer than the phoenix and might never in fact have existed. The sage was, they said, both wise and free—a true cosmopolitan, or citizen of the world—and remained happy even under torture.

Stoicism survived as an unbroken tradition in Athens until 529 CE, when the emperor Justinian closed down all of the philosophical schools. Thereafter there was little interest in or detailed knowledge of the Stoics’

arguments for about a thousand years.² But, as Cassirer indicates, there was a great revival of interest in the Stoics from the time of the Renaissance and the Reformation, when Stoic texts began to be printed and translated, whether from Greek into Latin or from either of these ancient languages into the European vernaculars. That revival of interest in and attention to the Stoic philosophers culminated in the later sixteenth century with the work of the Flemish humanist, Justus Lipsius. His Stoic dialogue *De constantia* was an international best-seller, and he also published the *Politica*, a major work of political theory, as well as an edition of the works of the Roman Stoic Seneca and two handbooks of Stoicism, the *Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam* and the *Physiologiae Stoicorum*. These last were the first modern works to begin to reconstruct Stoicism in a systematic way, paying attention to both its ethical and physical arguments. Modern scholarship has presented Lipsius as the key figure in an influential intellectual, cultural, and political movement that has been called ‘Neostoicism’.

Why has Neostoicism been held to be historically significant? I have already sketched Cassirer’s argument about the origins of much modern political philosophy in Stoicism, with the Dutch Neostoics serving as an important conduit, helping to transmit arguments from ancient philosophy to the rest of Western Europe. The German historian Gerhard Oestreich spent his career studying Lipsius and what he called ‘the Netherlands movement’, and argued extensively for the importance of Lipsius’s project for understanding modern politics organised around the centralised and bureaucratic state. ‘Lipsius proclaimed the modern state’, Oestreich wrote, ‘based on order and power, from amid the ruins caused by the religious wars’.³ More recently, Richard Tuck has proposed that the arguments of Lipsius and Michel de Montaigne, which drew on two of the Hellenistic philosophies, Stoicism and Scepticism, were the inspiration behind much of what he calls the ‘new humanism’ that spread across Europe in the early decades of the seventeenth century and which in turn formed the crucial intellectual background for the political theories of first Hugo Grotius and later Thomas Hobbes. But we ought not straightforwardly accept any of these interpretations. Cassirer provided an arresting hypothesis and a few broad-brush remarks, but not a properly fleshed-out historical argument. Oestreich’s scholarship has been strongly criticised for the extent to which it is implicated in a distinctively National Socialist historiography, and its conclusions thereby have been drawn into question. Tuck’s narrative of modern political philosophy has at its heart an interpretation of Grotius as a thinker who drew on an Epicurean understanding of self-love to fashion a reply to Scepticism, but his argument overstates the role of both Scepticism and Epicu-

reanism in Grotius's thinking and radically underplays the significance of Stoicism.

Although these historians have not provided fully persuasive accounts of the place of Stoic argumentation in the development of modern political thought, they are, it seems to me, right in their general contention that the modern engagement with Stoicism was highly significant at key moments in the philosophical story. It was also an extensive engagement, continuing far beyond the 'Neostoic' world of Lipsius and his disciples deep into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As I have just indicated, Grotius's natural jurisprudence has a distinctive foundation in what we might call Ciceronian Stoicism; Thomas Hobbes's fundamental political psychology is the product of a complex dialogue with early modern Stoicism; the ethical systems of the Earl Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson are deeply infused with Stoic ideas; and the account of human psychology that Jean-Jacques Rousseau fashioned in his most ambitious book, *Emile*, is strikingly indebted to the Stoics. The principal task of this book, therefore, is to narrate the history of this modern encounter with some of the arguments of the Stoics in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially as it concerns some of the foundational arguments in modern political philosophy. But to write that historical account also requires the writing of an intertwining narrative, which is the history of anti-Stoicism across the same period and, in particular, of a distinctively Augustinian variety of anti-Stoic criticism.

In an important interpretation of Renaissance thought offered by William J. Bouwsma in 1975, the 'two ideological poles between which Renaissance humanism oscillated may be roughly labeled "Stoicism" and "Augustinianism"'.⁴ For too long, he contended, scholars had thought of humanism as an attempt to recover an authentic classicism embodied in Plato or Aristotle, whereas it was the rival philosophies of the Stoics and Augustine that represented 'genuine alternatives for the Renaissance humanists to ponder'.⁵ The broad antagonism between Stoicism and Augustinianism had various aspects to it, but the one the Augustinians returned to again and again throughout the entirety of the early modern period concerned the problem of human pride. The core of Augustine's charge against the Stoics had been that their philosophy denied original sin—the sin of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, their disobedience to God's command that grew out of their pride. And the early modern Augustinians redeployed and amplified Augustine's arguments, contending that Stoicism was itself a philosophy for the proud, for those who drastically overestimated the abilities of fallen men and women to act in accordance with reason and virtue in the absence of divine grace.

To put the matter like this might suggest that the story of Stoicism and its Augustinian critics in early modern Europe might be told as a story of

secular versus religious ethics. But that would be much too simple. On the one hand, a number of those who engaged sympathetically with Stoicism, from Lipsius in the sixteenth century to Hutcheson in the eighteenth, were trying to produce a distinctively Christian Stoicism, one that could be defended against Augustinian objections. On the other hand, while pride was obviously a concern for religious thinkers, it also became a critically important issue for more secular political thinkers, too. It was central to Hobbes's political philosophy, for example, where it was transposed from being an offence against God to being one against the equality of our fellow human beings, so that when Hobbes explained why his book was called *Leviathan*, he quoted from the 'two last verses of the one and fortieth' chapter of the book of Job, where God calls the great sea-monster 'King of all the children of pride'.⁶ The vocabulary of pride might have changed according to time and place. Different writers talk of glory, vainglory, self-love, self-liking, honour, *amour-propre*, and so on. But the moral, social, and political anxieties that underlay these various terms were, if not always the same, then certainly possessed of enough commonalities and continuities that they can intelligibly be considered alongside one another—and as we shall see, it is in these arguments that the sharpest thinkers were often working most closely with their competing inheritances from both Stoic and Augustinian traditions.

The book is organised as follows. We begin in late antiquity with a prologue that presents a reading of book 14 of Augustine of Hippo's *De civitate Dei contra paganos* (*The City of God against the Pagans*). This is the part of his text that describes Adam and Eve's rebellion against God's command, the episode that was not only central to Augustine's theological vision as a whole but also the site of his most sustained critical engagement with the categories of Stoic ethics, through which Augustine forged the ideologically powerful link between Stoicism and the notion of original sin that would be restated by his early modern disciples. Before we pick up that modern Augustinian story in the third chapter, however, the first two chapters of the book offer more or less self-contained studies of particular topics in the interpretation of two significant political writers from the Low Countries, Justus Lipsius and Hugo Grotius, to correct distortions in the existing scholarship. The first chapter proposes a new interpretation of Lipsius's political theory through an examination of his six books of *Politica* from 1589. It argues that the significance of this work is not that it introduces Stoic content into modern political thinking so much as that it offers a partial restoration of Stoic political theory in the wake of Machiavelli's devastating attack on Senecan political thought in *The Prince*. The second chapter constitutes an intervention in the ongoing controversies concerning the philosophical foundations of Grotius's natural rights theory, and argues that to understand his system ei-

ther in terms of self-interest or in terms of sociability is to miss the point of his appeal to the Stoic argument presented by Cicero in book 3 of *De finibus*, where the distinctive Stoic concept of *oikeiosis* serves as an explanation of appropriate action, both self- and other-regarding.

Armed with these improved understandings of the Stoic content of the political theories of both Lipsius and Grotius, in chapter three I return to the Augustinian theme first stated in the prologue. The chapter starts with Lipsius, focusing not, however, on the *Politica* this time but on his popular dialogue *De constantia*, and it navigates a passage from Lipsius to Thomas Hobbes by way of William Shakespeare, Michel de Montaigne, and the contemporary ‘Tacitist’ literature. Along the way, it illuminates the ways in which the figure of what I call the ‘Stoic politician’ was often regarded in the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth century with great suspicion. It offers a new approach to Hobbes by suggesting that one of the things he was doing when he fashioned his political argument was generalising this suspicion, so that glory seeking, sedition, and hypocrisy were no longer considered to be the animating vices of a small number of Stoics at, for example, the Jacobean or Caroline courts but far more widespread and deep-seated elements of the human condition. Chapter four outlines the increasing sophistication of the Augustinian anti-Stoic polemic in seventeenth-century France, beginning with the identification of Stoicism with the Pelagian heresy made by Cornelius Jansen and Jean-François Senault and continuing on to the more incisive psychological criticisms developed by Blaise Pascal, Nicolas Malebranche, and La Rochefoucauld. These Augustinians directed their fire above all against the Stoicism to be found in Seneca’s philosophical writings, but, as I argue in the chapter’s closing section, their critique was not so potent against the Stoicism of the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius, set out in his *Meditations*. This book, then, could continue to be employed as a resource by those in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries who sought to expound a Stoicism that could be presented as friendly to the claims of Christianity.

The fifth chapter crosses back across the English Channel in order to examine some of the critical responses to Hobbes—in particular, those of three Anglican bishops, John Bramhall, Richard Cumberland, and Samuel Parker—as background for considering Shaftesbury’s fashioning of a more thoroughgoing kind of modern Stoicism in the various pieces that make up his *Characteristics of Men, Matters, Opinions, Times*. The sixth chapter considers the changing fortunes of Stoic physics in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and argues that the appearance of Benedict Spinoza’s controversial works prompted a shift in the way Stoic cosmology was classified. Previously understood as a kind of theism, however eccentric, it was thenceforth interpreted with increasing frequency (though never universally) as a variety of atheism.

The penultimate chapter shows how Stoic arguments were refashioned in the early eighteenth century by writers such as Joseph Butler and Francis Hutcheson in order to oppose what they considered to be the modern Epicureanism of Bernard Mandeville, and presents David Hume's philosophy as offering sustained resistance to this Stoicizing current in eighteenth-century British intellectual culture. The final chapter then turns to the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and argues that his thinking about human psychology is marked by a shift from a more or less Epicurean perspective in, especially, the *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* to a far more carefully theorised reworking of Stoicism presented, above all, in what he considered to be his most important book, the educational novel *Emile*. A brief epilogue brings the book to its close.

SOME REMARKS ON METHOD

Obvious problems beset any attempt to write a history of Stoicism and modern thought. 'There is no systematic account of Stoicism in the eighteenth century', Christopher J. Berry has written, 'and one good reason for that is that it would be almost impossible to write it simply because it would have to incorporate and encompass so much of what was written'.⁷ This is true, and might be thought especially problematic for this study, which has an even wider chronological range, spanning the period from Lipsius to Rousseau, or from the 1580s to the 1760s. To make my book manageable, therefore, it follows that the treatment of Stoicism is by no means comprehensive. Themes from Stoic ethics, for example, loom much larger than topics in Stoic physics and metaphysics, and even within the sphere of what we might call Stoic political thought I have concentrated above all on certain issues in moral psychology, especially those relating to the foundations of modern natural law, and have neglected (for example) Stoic arguments about cosmopolitanism, or the important question of the relationship between Stoicism and the republican tradition in political theory. Although the argument of the book moves back and forth among a number of centres of intellectual production in early modern Europe, it is also marked by significant geographic limitations. I concentrate here on England and France and, in the earlier chapters, on the Low Countries, but Germany and Scotland are comparatively neglected, and Iberia, Italy, and all of Eastern Europe, including Russia, are ignored. This focus perhaps helps explain why the book culminates in a treatment of Rousseau rather than, say, either Adam Smith or Immanuel Kant, two other major eighteenth-century philosophers whose projects can also be fruitfully interrogated through the lens provided by Stoic philosophy.

Over the last forty years or so, scholars such as A. A. Long, Brad Inwood, Julia Annas, Susanne Bobzien, Malcolm Schofield, Michael Frede, and others have done much to transform our understanding of the technicalities of Stoic philosophy. In the process, the role of Chrysippus in defining the structure and philosophical content of ancient Stoicism has been greatly emphasised. Yet this hard-won appreciation of Chrysippian Stoicism is not especially useful for exploring intellectual life in the early modern period. One reason why the reconstruction of Chrysippus's philosophy has been such a challenging task is that the 705 books he was reputed to have written have all been lost, except for fragments preserved in the reports of later, frequently hostile, authors such as Plutarch. It is thanks to several centuries of increasingly sophisticated textual scholarship, then, that scholars today have a significantly better grip on the nature and subtleties of his Stoicism than was available to anyone in early modern Europe. Nor is it merely the case that Chrysippus's thought was only imperfectly understood by, or not readily available to, early modern writers. Often enough, he was not considered central to Stoicism at all! Diogenes Laertius, the ancient compiler of the *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, presented his summary of the doctrines held by each philosophical school (or doxography) appended to his biography of its founder. The doxography of Stoicism was therefore attached to the account of the life of Zeno, and early modern writers tended to follow Diogenes Laertius in treating the founder of the school as ipso facto the chief representative of its thought.⁸ Some also displayed a marked hostility to Chrysippus, treating him more as a deviant or heterodox Stoic than as any kind of exemplar. Lipsius was one of these, charging that it was Chrysippus 'who first corrupted that grave sect of philosophers with crabbed subtleties of questions'.⁹

There's something of a historical irony here. The Stoics had a reputation in the ancient world for monolithic dogmatism. They argued that their whole philosophical system hung together as a seamless whole. Cicero reports a Stoic view that 'the removal of a single letter' would 'cause the whole edifice to come tumbling down'.¹⁰ But this monolithicity was undercut in a number of ways. The ancient Stoics modified their own doctrines over time, for example; hence the conventional and convenient distinction employed by today's scholars between the periods of the Early, Middle, and Late (or Roman) Stoas. While the school in Athens may have been the home of Stoic orthodoxy, it is an interesting fact that no text written within and for the use of the school itself has survived from antiquity in more than fragmentary form. In the chief sources for Stoic philosophy to which the early moderns had access, furthermore, the idea that Stoicism was a seamless totality is undermined by the multiple voices of the surviving texts, for works by Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, Epictetus,

and Marcus Aurelius are diverse in terms of both philosophical content and literary form.

A further difficulty standing in the way of writing a history of thinking about Stoicism in modern Europe is the lack of the right kind of institutional continuity. A history of the development of Stoic doctrine in antiquity is at least in part a history of the Stoic school itself, and vice versa. By contrast, there is no comparable institution with respect to a narrative of Stoicism in modern Europe that might be employed to provide a coherent structure and a degree of content across time. There was a distinctive ‘Neostoic’ movement associated with the life and work of Justus Lipsius, and this has been the object of detailed historical studies. Yet although the first chapter of this book considers Lipsius’s political thought, the bulk of what follows is concerned with the period after this ‘Neostoicism’, during which no particular institution—political, academic, or ecclesiastic—ever achieved any kind of recognised hegemony over the legitimate interpretation of Stoicism in Europe.

In the absence of the right kind of institutional structure, we are always in danger of running into the perennial problems associated with tracing intellectual ‘influence’. As T. J. Hochstrasser has put it, ‘When the notion of “influence” is applied to a long span of time and to a large number of writers it can easily deteriorate into nothing more than the correlation of superficially similar doctrines’.¹¹ It would clearly be a pedantic and substantially pointless exercise to wade through the corpus of early modern philosophical and political writing looking for any or every moment in which the arguments presented remind the reader of some Stoic thesis or other. Nor is it helpful to label anything that smacks of self-fashioning, self-discipline, fatalism, or imperturbability as Stoic in its inspiration, for such themes are the joint property of various philosophical schools and religious traditions, ancient and modern.¹²

In his own work, Hochstrasser has been able to address the problem of determining intellectual influence in more than an arbitrary manner through his study of ‘a range of contemporary sources which discuss self-consciously the relation of contemporary practice to past achievement’, in his case the ‘histories of morality’ that were written in, especially, Germany in the century following Pufendorf’s 1678 *De origine et progressu disciplinae juris naturalis*.¹³ No single genre of philosophical writing serves as a comparable backbone for this study, but on various occasions in what follows I pay attention to the changing understandings of Stoic philosophy in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe as these are expressed in three kinds of works. First, there are the new editions and vernacular translations of Stoic authors, which provide useful information, especially in their prefaces, about the ways in which scholars and translators were drawn to and thinking about Stoic philosophy. Second, there are the

increasingly scholarly works on the history of ancient philosophy, a discipline that develops with great rapidity over the period. These are important works, not only as stores of facts and opinions concerning ancient authors but also, as Hochstrasser himself has shown, as contributions to a long-running argument about the relationship of philosophy to its past. Third, and partially overlapping with this second category, there are the classic reference books of the age of the Enlightenment, for Pierre Bayle's *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (1697) and the *Encyclopédie* of Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert (1751–72) were for many readers basic sources concerning ancient philosophy, and so much else besides. These three kinds of works, taken together, provide a valuable contemporary framework within which, I suggest, particular lines of thinking in relation to the Stoics can be coherently elaborated.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have researched and written this book on two continents, spread over too many years, and have accumulated many debts of gratitude along the way.

Material that appears in this book has appeared previously in a number of places, and I thank the editors and publishers of those pieces for allowing republication here: 'Rousseau's Political Philosophy: Stoic and Augustinian Origins', in Patrick Riley, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); 'Stoicism and Anti-Stoicism in the Seventeenth Century', *Grotiana*, vol. 22–23 (2001–2), also published in Hans W. Blom and Laurens C. Winkel, eds., *Grotius and the Stoa* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 2004); 'How the Stoics Became Atheists', *Historical Journal*, vol. 49, no. 2 (June 2006); 'Grotius, Stoicism and *Oikeiosis*', *Grotiana*, vol. 29 (2008); and 'Rousseau's *Second Discourse*, between Epicureanism and Stoicism', in Stanley Hoffmann and Christie McDonald, eds., *Rousseau and Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Institutions that have sheltered me along the way include Harvard University's Government Department and its Center for Ethics and the Professions; the Classics Department at the University of California, Berkeley; Magdalen College, Balliol College, and the Department of Politics and International Relations in Oxford; and King's College and the Department of Politics and International Studies in Cambridge. For financial support I am grateful to the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, Harvard's Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and Program on Constitutional Government, and the U.S./UK Fulbright Commission for the award which first took me to the United States in 1995. Research has been con-

ducted in various libraries, in particular the Bodleian, the Rare Books Room of Stanford University's Green Library, the Bancroft Library at Berkeley, Harvard's Houghton Library, the British Library, the libraries at Magdalen and Balliol Colleges, the British School at Rome, and the École Française de Rome. Audiences have listened patiently to me trying to articulate what this project was all about in seminars at Berkeley, Cornell, Harvard, Penn, Oxford (including the Maison Française d'Oxford), Cambridge (including at the Wolfson Humanities Society), Bellagio, St Andrews, the American Political Science Association's 1998 meeting in Atlanta, Jena, Helsinki, and the Institute for Historical Research in London.

Many individuals—teachers, students, friends, and colleagues—have helped me along the way: Arash Abizadeh, Arthur Applbaum, Carolina Armenteros, Rhiannon Ash, Chris Bertram, Hans W. Blom, Daniel Butt, Josh Cherniss, Graham Clure, Sarah Cotterill, Michael Drolet, Michael Ferguson, Mark Fisher, Luc Foisneau, Peta Fowler, Liz Frazer, the late Ewen Green, Kinch Hoekstra, Bonnie Honig, Istvan Hont, Katherine Ibbett, Terence Irwin, Ben Jackson, Duncan Kelly, Stephen and Joy Kent, Kristy King, Nancy Kokaz, Melissa Lane, Neven Leddy, A. A. Long, Patchen Markell, Sophie Marnette, Christian Maurer, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Tamara Metz, Jon Miller, Jim Moore, Sarah Mortimer, Russ Muirhead, Sankar Muthu, Isaac Nakhimovsky, Martin O'Neill, John Michael Parrish, Raj Patel, Jennifer Pitts, Sophus Reinert, Patrick Riley, John Robertson, Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, Paul Sagar, Claudia Schaler, Malcolm Schofield, Richard Scholar, Travis Smith, Mike Sonenscher, Peter Stacey, Nick Stargardt, Sandy Stewart, Zosia Stemplowska, Benjamin Straumann, Richard Tuck, Kate Tunstall, Ralph Walker, William Whyte, Brian Young, and Sam Zeitlin, as well as anonymous referees for the *Historical Journal* and *Grotiana*.

Thanks are also owed to the excellent staff at Princeton University Press: in the early stages to Ian Malcolm; later especially to Ben Tate, Debbie Tegarden, and Marjorie Pannell; and to three anonymous readers.

Three groups that deserve particular mention for the contributions they have made to my welfare over the period during which I've been thinking about the Stoics are the inhabitants of 6 Marie Ave, no. 2, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, toward the end of the last century; the staff at Combibos, the best café in Oxford; and my two splendid cats, Andromache and the never-to-be-forgotten Enkidu (2005–9).

I owe most of all to Bidy and Henry Brooke, and to Josephine Quinn.