



Sixth Edition

American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas

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Preface

This sixth edition of *American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas* appears in a vastly changed world. Communism has collapsed throughout most of the world and the United States is the only remaining superpower, yet there remain many danger spots throughout the world. Foreign policy still deals with security issues, but economic and environmental concerns now occupy larger roles than ever before. Many would even say that economic policy is now the preeminent factor in international politics. For many citizens these changes in the international arena are an occasion to look inward, perhaps now more than ever before.

Our original purpose in writing this book was to explain the ways in which foreign policy (further subdivided into crisis and noncrisis security policies) is made differently than is domestic policy. At that time, most texts on the policy process focused on *domestic* policy making. *American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas* was written to fill the need for an introduction to the actors and elements in the foreign policy decision process and to the analytic approaches most useful in understanding and criticizing it. In the second edition, we added intermestic policy as a further category to our two types of foreign policies because of the increasing erosion of the distinction between foreign and domestic policy in this area. This threefold distinction is examined in greater detail by additional case studies.

Contemporary conflict over foreign policy demands, too, that we not only deal with the processes of foreign policy making, but also confront the question of whether the outcome of these processes can be both effective and democratic. We felt this issue critical enough that we have explained it at greater length in what we call the *three dilemmas* of democratic policy making. For this purpose, we examine the variations in the constitutional and political power of the president and Congress in both domestic and foreign policy formation. We also examine the actual access to foreign policy decision roles and various possible participants; the parts that may be played by members of Congress, political parties, and interest groups; and the impact of the media and expressions of public opinion.

The rational-actor and bureaucratic models of decision making are suggested as aids to a clearer understanding of the interaction of all these forces. The utility of the rational-actor model is demonstrated in case studies of the Cuban missile crisis and the Gulf War. The bureaucratic model elucidates policy making on the antiballistic missile system and Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative and such intermestic issues as energy, trade, agriculture, and the environment.

Among the changes in this edition are our focus on the Gulf War, an entire new chapter on public opinion (Chapter 5), and a discussion of the environment as an international issue (Chapter 9). We focus extensively on how the world has changed, but believe that our original framework stands up to the "New World Order." If anything, we may have been ahead of our time in stressing the importance of intermestic issues and domestic constraints. We rely heavily on surveys of citizens' attitudes in our chapter on public opinion. The proliferation of such surveys not only gives us more information than ever; it also forces public officials to become more attentive, some would say reactive, to the public mood.

Conflict between the president and the Congress has become endemic in foreign policy making. These conflicts arise under both divided government and single-party control of the legislative and executive branches. The Congress is now a major player in foreign policy, much to the consternation of presidents. Can a foreign policy with such a great degree of congressional and public participation be effective? Are democracy and effective policy making compatible?

These are complex issues and we do not claim to have resolved them. Our goal is more modest: to outline for the introductory student of American foreign policy how the decision-making process works and to highlight the problems we believe are most important. In any such endeavor, particularly a joint one, some arguments are bound to remain incomplete in the eyes of the specialist. Our problem was somewhat compounded by differing views on what would constitute a "good" foreign policy and on how much of a say Congress should have. Over the almost two decades since the first edition, our views have become closer. Yet, the disagreements we had—and sometimes still have—led us to produce what we hope are balanced arguments on different sides of critical issues and to examine the feasibility of proposed reforms regardless of our personal biases.

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J. S.
E. M. U.

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Foreign Policy in a Democracy

The Cold War is over. But, as after World Wars I and II, the defeat of an enemy does not mean the end of international conflict. The U.S. victory over the Soviet Union after four decades of global conflict and competition, the subsequent disintegration and disappearance of the Soviet Union, and the spread of democracy raised hopes for a more peaceful world in the post-Cold War era. Democracies were unlikely to commit aggression against other states, especially other democracies. But Iraq's seizure and annexation of Kuwait and the subsequent U.S.-led United Nations coalition war against Iraq was one early sign that the post-Cold War era might not be as peaceful as expected.

As the Cold War was ending, euphoria was widespread. The countries of Eastern Europe threw off their Soviet-imposed regimes, the Soviet army withdrew from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland and was scheduled to withdraw from what used to be called East Germany by 1994; the Berlin Wall, which had divided the city and become a symbol of the Cold War's struggle between freedom and totalitarianism, came down, and shortly thereafter the reunification of Germany followed, four decades after the American-Soviet conflict had started. The two former rivals signed two major arms-control agreements, one sharply reducing strategic nuclear weapons, the other conventional forces in Europe. And they settled various regional conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that had only recently bitterly divided their various countries.

But the removal of the Soviet Union's power and control over Eastern Europe unleashed the nationalist and ethnic passions that had plagued the area both prior to World War I and between the two world wars. Yugoslavia disintegrated into civil war. Czechoslovakia was divided into two states peacefully. Nor was the Soviet Union immune. Moscow's central command structure weakened as Mikhail Gorbachev sought to reform the Soviet Communist system, and each of the fifteen republics that composed the Soviet Union claimed that it was sover-

eign. For a while, they sought to negotiate a new, looser union in which most of the power would rest with the republics. The failure of the attempted coup in August 1991, by the old guard, to overthrow Gorbachev and prevent the flow of power from the center, however, led to a stampede, as republic after republic, distrusting Moscow and fearing a reestablishment of its authoritarian power, refused to remain part of the Soviet Union. The three Baltic republics, incorporated into the Soviet Union against their will in 1940, regained their independence as nations. The other republics, with the exception of Georgia, organized the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); its members committed themselves to cooperating on foreign affairs, defense, and, most important, economic affairs. Whether the Commonwealth will endure or fall to its own quarrels, however, remains unclear. Russia, the largest republic in size, population, and wealth of resources, however, is clearly the successor state to the former Soviet Union.

While the nations of Eastern Europe were breaking apart, the countries of Western Europe were moving, although haltingly, toward greater unity. Originally founded to create a United States of Europe in the age of continental-size superpowers, the European Community (EC) in 1992 took its last step toward full integration; originally incorporating six states, it now was composed of twelve. Eventually, it would grow even larger; for the EC, with a population of 380 million people, attracted a long line of applicants. But the critical change in Europe, besides the collapse of the Soviet Union, was the reunification of Germany. Unified initially in 1870, Germany was too strong for its neighbors. In both world wars, which she began, it took a combination of almost all the other great European states plus the United States to defeat her. Even divided among the victors after the second war, West Germany, upon recovery from defeat, was the strongest member of the North Atlantic Alliance, one of whose purposes was to restrain the former enemy and reassure her new allies and former victims. Containing West German power was also a prime motive for European integration. West Germany was no longer to control the industrial basis for its power and aggression; it was to be integrated into a European framework. Germany's reunification in 1990, creating the largest nation west of Russia, 80,000,000 in population and economically the strongest in all of Europe, therefore, made her neighbors nervous. Europeans have long historical memories. Should the EC speed up the integration process to ensure Europe's continued ability to restrain this new Germany's power? Or would Germany be able to dominate the EC? Or would the fear of Germany break up the EC and lead to a new and unstable balance of power, as in interwar Europe?

The end of the Cold War also had effects in the underdeveloped world to which the Soviet Union and the United States had extended their competition. Moscow and Washington tended to support opposing sides in the civil wars that wracked many developing countries, as well as rival states competing for regional influence, if not hegemony. Thus the superpowers' conflict was often imposed upon domestic and regional quarrels as they sought to expand their influence at one another's cost, and those competing for power internally or externally

looked to them for political support, economic assistance, and weapons. This interaction intensified what might otherwise have been only local disturbances and made them potentially quite dangerous. But the drawing in of the two superpowers also placed a lid on these conflicts, because neither wanted their confrontations to escalate into a direct clash.

The end of the American–Soviet rivalry, therefore, threatened to result in more regional rivalries that would follow their own dynamics. The reasons were several: the retrenchment of American and Soviet power, creating power vacuums that were likely to attract regional rivals no longer restrained by their patron superpowers; the rise of small, radical, potentially reckless states that sought not only to play a major regional, if not hegemonic, role but, in some instances, a larger international role; and these states' efforts to acquire, if they did not already possess, weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological) which, when placed on top of missiles, are capable of hitting targets far beyond their immediate neighbors. Thus, as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait—widely referred to as the first post-Cold War crisis—suggested, the end of the Cold War did not necessarily mean a more stable world.

The emergence of the United States as the sole superpower in the wake of the Soviet Union's disappearance, which eliminated the military threat to American security, also meant that military power would no longer play its former preeminent role. Rather, economic power and practices would occupy a more prominent place. The developing countries were still trying to develop. The eleven republics composing the new Commonwealth of Independent States sought to replace the failed centralized Communist economy with market economies, as did the former Soviet-controlled states in Eastern Europe, not only to reverse their economic decline but also to preserve their new and fragile democracies. Western Europe was moving toward a huge common market as the twelve EC members joined with the seven members of the European Free Trade Association, composed largely of states that had remained neutral during the Cold War, to form the largest trading bloc in the world. On the one hand, the EC was making what it claimed to be its "final push" toward a united Europe. Its members had committed themselves to eliminating the remaining economic barriers to a single European-wide market, a single European currency, and common social as well as foreign policies by the end of the decade. At the same time, the EC was also attracting new members in Western Europe (such as Sweden, Norway, and Austria) and being beseeched for associate status and eventual membership by countries ranging from Poland and Hungary to Turkey. And two U.S. allies, Germany and Japan, the losers in World War II, had become economic superpowers while the United States, whose economy had been the basis of its World War II and Cold War victories, was declining economically in an increasingly interdependent and competitive global market.

One U.S. industry after another—steel, textiles, shipbuilding, automobiles—was ravaged by foreign competition; other industries, to stay competitive, went overseas where workers' wages were cheaper. The result was a partial "deindustrialization" of the United States. Even high-tech industries—supercomputers,

semiconductors, machine tools, robotics, telecommunications—which were supposed to be the basis of the postindustrial U.S. economy, were experiencing difficulties in competing. The symptoms were all too evident in 1992. Pan American Airways, the first and for many years the world's number one airline, went bankrupt. IBM, for long the world's premier computer company, announced that despite having already slimmed down the number of its employees, it needed to reorganize to reenergize the company and make it more profitable in the highly competitive computer market. And General Motors, not just the world's largest motor company but the world's largest corporation, which had already lost a sizable share of the U.S. car market and had closed plants and laid off workers, announced an even more drastic set of closings and lay-offs of over 70,000 more workers. Three once-great companies, symbols of American technology, workmanship, and service, had either died or were fighting for their survival as major players.

As if this were not bad enough, it might be remembered that the color television set, the microwave oven, the VCR, and the fax machine were all invented in the United States. Not a single one of these American inventions is produced anymore in the United States. The reasons for this situation include poor business management, with short-term outlook focused on the quarterly dividend return for stockholders rather than long-term investment to ensure survival, growth, and profitability in the new *global* marketplace; insufficient nonmilitary research and development and slowness in getting those new products that were developed from the design stage to production and retail; low savings rate, as distinct from a high consumption rate, and lack of investment in technological innovation; adversarial management-labor relations and low labor-productivity growth; and an increasingly unskilled labor force (educational tests in math and science—and in geography and history—repeatedly showed American students to be last or next to last among all industrial countries, one result being the insufficient production of engineers and scientists). Indeed, during the 1980s foreign investments had bought up ever-increasing numbers of U.S. corporations, commercial real estate, and farmland, which raised questions about who would control the economy in the future.

Thus, as the security issue was declining in importance, the critical concern facing the United States—once the world's leading creditor nation, now the world's largest debtor—was economic growth. The revival of the U.S. economy became priority number one, as in the recession of the early 1990s not only blue-collar workers lost their jobs, but white-collar workers and even executive personnel were laid off. U.S. corporations, long used to having the American market largely for themselves, now had to fight for sales, if not survival, against foreign competition even in the domestic market. But the issue, to underline the point, was not just economic recovery, as in past recessions, but economic revival. And this had to be done when the country's debt was approaching \$4 trillion and the interest on the debt had become the federal government's most expensive program, ahead of Social Security and defense, let alone health, transportation, crime, drugs, etc.

On the international scene, where power had long been associated with military might, economic robustness and strength were becoming the leading indicators. No issue could have symbolized the changing and ambiguous nature of power on the international scene more than the war against Iraq in 1991. On the one hand, the United States demonstrated its military superiority with a dazzling display of high-tech weaponry; on the other hand, this country had to beg its allies, especially Japan and Germany, to pay for the war. The United States, in short, could not afford to wage the war it felt necessary to fight; in the future, it might need the permission of its more affluent friends before deciding to use force. In the post-Cold War world, reversing America's economic decline had become the primary issue. Because the consequences of economic growth for employment and rising wages—or economic decline for lower wages and unemployment—were so blatantly obvious, the clear-cut distinction between foreign and domestic policies was fading. A vital economy was not only the basis of the nation's military strength and influence in the world, it was also the basis for the nation's ability to compete economically internationally and maintain its welfare and prosperity. Thus the number one issue in foreign policy had also become the number one issue in domestic policy.

As economic issues came to the fore and the threat of nuclear war receded, Americans began to look inward. The victory over Iraq in the Gulf War was soon followed by the breakup and eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union. Yet the postwar euphoria gave way to gloom over the domestic economy. As the new republics of the Soviet Union and the formerly Communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe struggled with crumbling economies, Americans found themselves unwilling to share their decreasing bounty with citizens of the new democracies. When Yugoslavia fell apart into civil war that threatened its neighbors in 1992, even President George Bush—who had proclaimed himself defender of the free world—said that America could not become the “world's policeman.” Buffeted by a stagnant economy and a neoisolationist challenge in the Republican primaries from Pat Buchanan, Bush followed the lead of public opinion. As Thomas Friedman wrote in the *New York Times*, “Many Americans . . . are beginning to see foreign policy as a luxury they can no longer afford, even though America's economic involvement with the rest of the world has never been greater, and dangerous security issues remain.”¹ Would there be one superpower or none in the last decade of the twentieth century?

The Different Types of Policies

Security Policies

All states need a foreign policy because they all exist in an essentially anarchical world in which each state lives in fear and must seek its own security. There is no world government to protect individual states. Each must guard itself in a system

in which states tend to view each other as potential adversaries rather than friends. The analogy is the proverbial town of the “old West” where there was no “law and order” and where men lived in fear of one another and wore guns to protect themselves against those who might want to rob them, take away their land, or who were just plain ornery and mean. State A might look at its neighbor B and see it is arming itself. Is B strengthening itself to deter a possible attack (a defensive action), or is it preparing to attack (an offensive action)? State B might declare that its intentions are peaceful and that it is increasing its military power only to ensure that A or other states will not attack it. But why should A believe that statement? Once B’s capabilities have grown, it may attack; the declaration of peaceful intent may have been deceitful. Or, even if B had been sincere about its defensive intentions earlier, it can, after all, change its mind once it realizes its improved power position.

The point of this simple analogy is that, in general, states distrust one another. Even when one state extends the hand of friendship, the other wonders why. Is one state trying to deceive the other to strike later? Where their security is concerned, if not their survival, states are cautious and careful. No one guarantees them either; each is its own guardian. States, therefore, rarely take chances; the stakes are too high. The basic rule is “protect yourself.” This is fundamental since security is regarded as the prerequisite for a nation to preserve its way of life. Forgetting this basic rule is to risk endangering one’s territorial integrity and political independence.

The principal mechanism to ensure state security is in fact the balance of power. If one state matches another in strength, neither is likely to attack the other; but an imbalance may entice the stronger one to attack. Consequently, in the state system, in which each state sees an increase in power and security of another state as a loss of power and security for itself—a loss it regards as unacceptable—preserving the balance of power constitutes the heart of foreign policy. American Cold War foreign policy after World War II was largely concerned with the central balance with its principal adversary, the Soviet Union, and a series of regional balances in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and, after the 1970s, sub-Saharan Africa. Thus the United States was involved in virtually every area of the world, with many different nations as adversaries, allies, and developing countries. Military power—the threat and the actual use of force—played a major deterrent and coercive role in this foreign policy, although other instruments, such as economic aid to strengthen an ally, were also used widely.

American foreign policy was primarily concerned with assuring the nation’s security, but there were also more *specific* policies that sought to preserve the nation’s security. These included (but were not limited to) such policy areas as the defense budget (procurement and deployment of arms and personnel), arms control, limited war, alliances, arms transfers to allies and other countries, economic and technical aid, and intelligence operations against other states. Most of these policies were continuing ones because they involved long-term interests. The United States, as one of the world’s two nuclear superpowers, had

an additional interest not only in balancing Soviet military strength but in seeking to reduce the intensity of the arms competition and stabilizing the balance in an environment of rapid technological innovation in weaponry. Foreign aid programs and arms transfers went on from year to year, although the recipients and the amounts they received changed. Limited wars obviously—and fortunately—were not an everyday concern, but when they occurred, as in Korea and Vietnam, the fighting went on for periods of three to eight years and they consequently required major commitments of troops, arms, and money. And the use of force in other contingencies remained a constant possibility.

The need for security policies did not end with the disappearance of the Soviet military threat and the collapse of the Soviet Union and its replacement by the Commonwealth of Independent States, which may yet disintegrate as Russia, the Soviet Union's successor state, and Ukraine continue to squabble. The war with Iraq testifies to the different—diminished but continuing—security threats that exist. Regional shuffles and the likelihood of accelerated diffusion of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction, accompanied by the pervasion of missile technology, are but two of the more potent threats. The rapidly changing post-Cold War environment, while perhaps posing less of an immediate security threat to U.S. interests, does not promise to be more stable. The fragmentation of the Soviet Union with its huge nuclear establishment; the violent collapse of Yugoslavia and the potential disintegration of other Eastern European states, such as Czechoslovakia, testifying to the power of ethnicity and nationalism to break up formerly stable nation-states; and the potential failure of Russia, Ukraine, and other republics of the CIS, as well as Eastern European states, to make the transition to democratic and free market states—all suggest that the world remains a dangerous and unstable place.

Crisis Policies

Crisis policies are distinguished from security policies by their relative infrequency and their short duration, but they make up for the lack of numbers by their utter seriousness and atmosphere of great danger. Frequently characterized by surprise, crisis policies are even more prominently featured by the perceived threat to a nation's vital interests and the lack of time the policy makers feel they have to deal with it. If they do not act quickly, the crisis situation, which in all probability took them by surprise and is in any case seen by them as endangering the country's fundamental security, will go against them. In these circumstances, the most critical element of a crisis is that the possibility of the threat or actual use of force—which underlies much of traditional international politics—is very high. In short, the likelihood of war erupting suddenly becomes a real danger. While during Soviet–American crises the initial clash was at the level of threats or low levels of force, the possibility of escalation to a nuclear confrontation was always present. Whether in Berlin, Cuba, the Middle East, or