POLICIDE

Theodore J. Lowi
Benjamin Ginsberg
Elliot J. Feldman
Gregory J. Nigosian
Jonathan Pool
Allan Rosenbaum
Carlyn Rottsolk
Margaret Stapleton
Judith Van Herik
Julia Vitullo-Martin
Thomas Vitullo-Martin

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THEODORE J. LOWI

BENJAMIN GINSBERG

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

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Preface

When the Atomic Energy Commission decided in late 1966 to locate its new accelerator in Weston, Illinois, the Weston villagers congratulated each other on a job well done. Optimism exuded from the place. Along the highway approaching Weston's main entrance the villagers constructed a billboard characterizing their home as an "atomic town," host of the largest atom smasher in the world.

The villagers' optimism was based on a pattern of illusions: (1) the illusion that governmental institutions concerned themselves with the welfare of those they governed; (2) the illusion that science was synonymous with the public good; (3) the illusion that politics on the metropolitan fringe was anything other than unconditional and total; (4) the illusion that their village would survive the coming of the accelerator.

The reality masked by the villagers' illusions was a politics of conquest. Conquest began when local interests used every governmental and political trick to rid themselves of Weston, an urban threat to their suburban way of life. Conquest ended in "poliscide," as state and county interests used the accelerator to rid themselves of the village. The villagers' illusions, in part

externally fostered to prevent them from opposing the accelerator, were themselves part of the reality of conquest.

Our book is a cluster of case studies centering upon the single problem of the coming of the accelerator. Each of our cases tells part of the same story—from the national perspective, the state perspective, the metropolitan perspective, the county perspective, the perspective of the villagers, and the perspective of the farmers included in the site area. The technique resembles that used in the classic Japanese film, *Rashomon*, in which the same crime is described several times from the standpoint of each of the persons involved.

Many aspects of the Weston story are distressing, but the most distressing part to us is the fact that scientists involved in the development, design, and location of the accelerator were unaware of the characteristics of the area and of the local issues surrounding the village and the affected farms. The scientists were, without any question, dedicated to the public good. So were virtually all of the state and county public officials, and so were the Weston village officials. It was this very sincerity and dedication—coupled with ignorance at the top and devastating manipulation at the bottom—that made the story for us such a significant one. We found ourselves facing what Reinhold Niebuhr must have meant by moral man and immoral society, because we found institutions that were virtually the enemy of individuals.

For us the larger picture has become one in which political behavior arises out of narrowly defined and formal perspectives. In the absence of a prevailing official definition to the contrary, each actor sees his own reality from the standpoint of his individual obligations, and he behaves accordingly. In the Weston story each of our role players viewed the accelerator as a means of fulfilling his own responsibilities, but because those responsibilities were defined strictly in terms of *job* responsibilities, the overall results were wasteful from a national standpoint and are disappointing to anyone who harbors hope that politics will be different in an age of sophisticated science and technology. The results of our study lead us to wonder whether this hope may not be based as much on illusion as the optimism of the Weston villagers.

Eleven authors have shared in the field research and the writ-

ing for this book. No single chapter escaped collective scrutiny, to a point where, despite some specific disagreements over interpretation, the book is a common product. The two senior authors took responsibility for the final drafts, and Elliot Feldman and Thomas Vitullo-Martin deserve special mention as project directors. In all other respects the book can be said to have eleven authors.

Singly and collectively, the authors wish to express their gratitude to the many persons and institutions that gave us support. Harvey Shapiro, John Will, and Edward Hayes participated effectively in various stages of the project but for different reasons did not stay with us until the end. Professor Jack Meltzer of the University of Chicago's Center for Urban Studies provided encouragement in a number of respects, as did his research associate, John Gardner. We would also like to thank Professor Boyd Keenan, of the University of Illinois–Circle Campus, for giving us the benefit of his extensive experience in the politics of science.

However, our heaviest debt of gratitude is to those participants who allowed themselves to be used as research sources. It would be neither useful nor fair to identify them by name. But they include over one hundred villagers; almost as many local farmers and farm families; scores of county, state, metropolitan, and national officials; and at least two dozen participating scientists. Our job could not have been done without their cooperation, and we deeply appreciate it.

There continue to be moments when we regret our critical posture; but we feel the facts warranted it and hope that the participants understand that nothing personal is intended. If there is to be any improvement in public morality, public efficiency, or public responsibility, we could expect no less of ourselves than a dedication to exhaustive analysis and thorough criticism. And we will expect no less of our readers when their opportunity comes, as surely it must, when our message reaches them.

T. J. L. and B. G.
Ithaca, New York

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Introduction to a Science Project

On December 15, 1966, Chicagoans learned they would soon be neighbors of the world's largest atom smasher. After a widely publicized, nationwide site selection competition, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had selected a 6,800-acre site 30 miles due west of Chicago's Loop. At the end of 1966, these "6,800 desirable acres" contained 71 farms and the 100 houses that composed the village of Weston, Illinois. Twenty months later, all of the farmers and all but one of the Weston families had been removed, and construction of the billion-dollar, 200 billion electron volt (bev) accelerator was in full swing. No legal trace of the village or farms remained. National Accelerator Laboratory (NAL) personnel occupied the village and farmhouses while supervising construction of the underground ring, 2 miles in diameter, in which atoms would be accelerated, shot at, and smashed.

This is neither the beginning nor the end of the story. It is the middle, the point of impact of Washington on Weston. Two points could hardly be farther apart than the community of national scientists and the rural and suburban community around Weston. Yet they are the two main points of contention in the story of the accelerator and its effects. The lines that connect the two points are multiple and roundabout. But careful observation

and assessment of the factors that brought the accelerator to that place at that time will shed a great deal of light on two forces in American life that could become central public problems of the 1970s and 1980s: the structure of federalism and the operations of big science.

Two tales need to be told. One is the history of the decision to build an enormous accelerator and to locate it in the suburbs of Chicago. Although many Chicagoans participated in this story, by and large the terrain is national and the constituencies and jurisdictions of the participants are national. It involves the national community of scientists and their accustomed arenas of operation—the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Academy of Sciences, the United States Congress and its Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the White House, and the president's science advisors.

The second history is focused almost entirely on the Chicago area, particularly DuPage County, one of America's most prosperous counties. The participants were almost entirely nonscientists who were concerned primarily with implementing Washington's decisions and using Washington to further their own interests.

The Fellowship of the Ring

Big science is essentially a post–World War II phenomenon. Governments and industries have been exceedingly generous during the past 25 years; however, the supply of research and development (R and D) monies has always been outstripped by imaginative and exciting scientific demands. An ever-expanding R and D budget made possible the avoidance of many conflicts; and many choices were among totally incommensurable things—as between new accelerators and space probes, or cancer versus molecular biology research, and so on. Although there occasionally have been heated controversies across the subdisciplines of science, the most consistent controversy probably has been within the individual subdisciplines. Within each subdiscipline, the alternatives are highly comparable, the sense of victory and defeat is easier to measure, and there is intense competition as well as fellowship. Conflicts have been intense enough to involve scientists and their political supporters in mutual suspicions, character

assassinations, loyalty and security charges, and permanent animosities. Nonetheless, there are strong fraternal bonds within each of these competitive subdisciplines.

High-energy physics is very possibly the preeminent example. The long history of competition in this field arises out of the extraordinarily successful collaboration among scientists to build the atomic bomb during World War II. Following the war, "centers of excellence" in particle physics emerged at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory on the West Coast, at Argonne National Laboratory outside Chicago, and, shortly thereafter, in the East at Brookhaven. Competitive balance was maintained among the facilities by allowing the expansion of one while the next level of expansion was being planned at another.

Equilibrium was upset during the 1950s by the shortcomings of Argonne and the clear emergence of Lawrence and Brookhaven as the favored facilities. This convinced many that the Midwest was suffering a scientific brain drain, brought on by the growing concentration of R and D on the two coasts.

The pattern of coast-to-coast logrolling was ultimately broken, and it was broken through politicization. Midwest scientists organized a professional lobby—Midwest University Research Associates (MURA). Congressional delegations, mayors, and business interests were brought in, and the activity intensified after MURA lost in its first major effort to become the third member of the logrolling cycle with its proposal for an accelerator in Madison, Wisconsin.

Despite MURA's initial failure, the cycle was broken, and the process of decision making in the area of publicly financed physics facilities was permanently altered. Political intensification meant that the AEC had to find another basis for balance and harmony among the fellowship of physical scientists. The agency sought such a balance by opening the accelerator site selection process to a public competition. Immediately the AEC was deluged with over 200 proposals from 46 states. To narrow the field in a way that appeared to be fair, the AEC contrived a two-point plan. First, it entered into an agreement with the National Academy of Sciences to set up a site selection committee. Second, the AEC enunciated several "hard criteria" according to which the NAS committee should make its decisions. These hard criteria

included such obvious requirements as a minimum parcel of geologically adequate land (3,000 acres), a minimum amount of available electric power and water, and accessibility to transportation, commercial, and industrial services. But the AEC eventually accepted a basket of additional "soft criteria." These included requirements that the site be close to communities with the proper kind of housing, cultural, and educational facilities for scientific personnel and their families. All of this introduced a considerable amount of discretion, and it also revealed a great deal about the character of the decision that would ultimately be made.

Still another influence that reveals something about the character of the decision was the political agreement at the highest levels that the prize would go to the Midwest, assuming a site could be produced there that satisfied the "hard criteria." This understanding, which involved President Lyndon Johnson, prevailed despite the fact that 3 years prior to that time a panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee had decided that the 200-bev machine ought to be built at Berkeley.

Finally, the process was further complicated by the fact that the AEC was strapped for funds. In this context the introduction of an open—or a semiopen—decision process of competitive bidding among states and metropolitan areas was an ingenious move. It accomplished several important things for the AEC and the scientists. First, it took the onus of final decision off the AEC and spread it over a process that would look eminently legitimate to the public. Second, it forced the serious contenders to offer the AEC more land and facilities at lower prices. (The final site was given over without any federal expenditure; it included more than twice the acreage called for in the original specifications, and it included housing and utilities, which lowered the AEC's vital cash outlays.) Third, it committed Congress and the president to the principle of building the accelerator; facing over 200 hopeful contenders spread across the continent, no national figure would have risked an attempt to veto the facility.

A Site to Behold—History #2

The site was simply an abstract parcel of land to the scientists and to the national and Illinois officials involved in the site

selection. But to any local observer it was as heterogeneous and improbable a combination of attributes as one could imagine; and it was populated by real people. The 3,000, then 5,000, then 6,800 acres included farmers, tenant farmers, gentlemen farmers, ordinary white-collar commuters who loved open country, blue-collar workers who could buy a cheap house, and land speculators waiting to subdivide or to be subdivided.

History #2 begins in 1959, when one such subdivision began to take place. At that time Mrs. Julia Krafft, a millionairess who some years earlier had bought a 420-acre farm for speculative purposes, found herself an appropriate buyer in one DeSoto McCabe. McCabe was convinced that the maturation of the offspring of the postwar baby boom and the convergence of appropriate transportation and services in this heretofore remote area would make it viable as a housing site for Chicago-bound commuters. The idea of the village of Weston was born.

McCabe soon learned that the biggest enemy of land development in any metropolitan area is the county government with its building code, its zoning code, and its various other protective laws. These codes are particularly strict in DuPage County. Ninety feet is minimum frontage in the area around Weston, and in the early 1960s this virtually dictated minimum new-home values near $30,000. This in turn dictated a particular social, racial, and class composition and explains the unusually high median family income (one of the top five counties in the United States) as well as the unusually low proportion of blacks residing in the county (below 1 per cent in DuPage County). But strict zoning requirements were not even the most important check against urbanization and proletarianization where the Weston development was concerned. Here the county officials made a very special case. Opposition to Weston was of three types and was mounted at three different stages in Weston's development.

First, in contrast to the usual hospitality shown to suburban developers, the county officials applied building codes with devastating severity. The county also used informal techniques of obstruction during this first stage, including efforts to close off the developers from access to Chicago financing. The result was not to kill Weston but to turn developers to less legal forms and sources of financial backing.

The second type of obstruction began after the county failed to prevent construction of the village. This was done primarily by a legal battle to prevent Weston's incorporation. Unincorporated places are governed by county zoning powers, but with incorporation these powers devolve upon the local government. With that power, the developers would be able to carve three 60-foot lots out of each original pair of 90-foot lots. It was because of this plan that the developers had been able to offer homes in Weston at prices well below the market.

Third, the county sought to block the expansion of Weston through suits against annexation and through the efforts of the Chicago Better Business Bureau to prevent the promotion of Weston homes or investment in future Weston developments. In this they were aided by the local offices of several federal agencies whose *modus operandi* has always been cooperation with local authorities. Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration officials refused to provide insured mortgages for Weston—much as they have done in urban slums.

Four and Eighty Mailboxes All in a Row

When completed, the exterior ring of houses in the village of Weston sat several hundred feet away from the county highway. At the conjunction of the county highway and the main entrance road to Weston there were stretched, during most of Weston's brief history, more than 80 rural letterboxes, one for each Weston household. Through various pretexts and powers, the county had kept the U.S. Post Office at bay. These boxes symbolized the grim determination of the county to maintain a hostile environment.

It is no wonder the village survived only with the help of crime syndicate money. It is no mystery that it failed to survive a federal atomic project involving an initial outlay of $500 million, backed by an impressive scientific purpose. It is also no mystery why the county worked so hard to eradicate Weston. What we ponder is how it was possible to enlist federal aid in pursuit of this local purpose.

There were two twins of Weston in the Chicago metropolitan area, and both had been financed and built by the same savings and loan corporations and businessmen; yet neither had been seriously opposed by the county. Why Weston? Weston was distinguished by the fact that it was a development in the middle of open country previously slated by county and regional planners for clean industry and other low-density uses. To the county officials, Weston represented a threat to their very significant power over who would pick up the options in the development of the entire metropolitan fringe. If Weston could establish itself, the pattern could spread. Even if there were no land speculators already holding certain of those tracts, the farmers themselves constituted a menace. They were already under considerable financial pressure, because the county itself had redefined that land as industrial for purposes of county taxation. There was no telling when an elderly farm couple without heirs would accept the inducements of a very large purchase price in contrast to the meager cash income they were enjoying from the operation of their farms during the twilight of their lives. The development of Weston had redefined the situation so extraordinarily that the great farming tradition itself had become part of the enemy camp in the eyes of the DuPage County suburbanites and their government.

From their perspective, the county and the state officials would have been derelict if they had not used every available power to block or, failing that, to inhibit Weston. The developers' plan to carve a third lot from each pair of lots foreshadowed an intensive land use that was deeply contrary to the goals of the DuPage County leaders. Moreover, in order to carry out this plan, the developers would need to rent, rather than sell, most of the houses, thereby retaining proprietary rights during Weston's formative years. Rentals meant transiency, and intense land use meant low-income families and greater demands on county services. Taking all these things together, the situation was unconscionable to the *suburban* outlook that dominated DuPage County. The Weston model gave an initial impression of being an *urban* model. That was the sticking point. The villagers themselves were on the verge of middle-class respectability, but their village was an urban phenomenon, and it had to go.

LEVEL OR LOCATION OF PARTICIPANT	RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL OR POSITION	DEFINITION OF GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES	LEADS TO PERSPECTIVES	WHICH GUIDE POLICIES
1. Atomic Energy Commission	Site selection committee NAL director	Advance pure science. Stay ahead of the Russians in pure and applied science. Make life better for scientists and the universities.	What's good for science is good for America. Everyone wants an accelerator in his neighborhood. Nonscientists generally share our perspective.	Build the biggest accelerator at least cost. Serve a maximum number of scientists. Provide maximum amenities for scientists' families. Find some added social benefits *after* site is chosen and project is built. Remain ignorant about acquisition process.
2. Congress	State delegations Joint Committee on Atomic Energy	Preserve U.S. technological and military supremacy. Spread benefits from science projects to entire country.	What's good for R&D is good for America. AEC requests are by and large good for R&D.	Lose gracefully to AEC and president. Get assurances on open housing. Reelect Paul Douglas but don't hurt

		Deal with conflict so as to minimize it. Reelect as many incumbents as possible.	Benefits from a big site are so great that local governments will want to share costs.	Pat Brown. Remain ignorant of specific "spillover effects" of site acquisition and construction.
3. President	President Johnson Science advisor	Same as 2, except reelect as many Democrats as possible.	What's good for R&D is probably good for America. AEC decisions are politically problematic. The Midwest needs and deserves help.	Guide AEC gracefully toward Chicago. Help Paul Douglas, liberal hawk. Remain ignorant of specific effects of site acquisition. Get assurances from Daley that site is desirable.
4. State of Illinois	Governor Kerner Department of Business and Economic Development	Build prestige of newly established Department of Business and Economic Development. Get the accelerator to stop the scientific brain drain. Keep the Chicago metropolitan area alive.	What's good for Illinois is good for America. What's good for science in Illinois is good for Illinois. What's good for Chicago suburbs is good for Chicago.	Get the accelerator regardless of cost. Displace the costs during the acquisition. Leave acquisition to professionals and the county. Remain ignorant of county plans.