



---

SAMIR AMIN, DERRICK CHITALA  
and IBBO MANDAZA (Editors)

# SADCC

Prospects for Disengagement  
and Development in  
Southern Africa

---

Studies in African Political Economy

THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY/THIRD WORLD FORUM  
STUDIES IN AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

---

# **SADCC Prospects for Disengagement and Development in Southern Africa**

edited by  
Samir Amin  
Derrick Chitala  
Ibbo Mandaza



The United Nations University  
Zed Books Ltd.  
London and New Jersey

*SADCC: Prospects for Disengagement and  
Development in Southern Africa* was first published in 1987

by:

Zed Books Ltd., 57 Caledonian Road, London N1 9BU, UK, and  
171 First Avenue, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey 07716, USA  
and:

The United Nations University, Toho Seimei Building,  
15-1 Shibuya 2-chome, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150, Japan  
in co-operation with:

The Third World Forum, B.P. 3501, Dakar, Senegal.

Copyright © The United Nations University, 1987.

Cover designed by Andrew Corbett.

Typeset by EMS Photosetters, Rochford, Essex.

Printed and bound in the United Kingdom  
by Biddles Ltd., Guildford and King's Lynn.

All rights reserved.

**British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data**

SADCC: prospects for disengagement and  
development in Southern Africa.—(The  
United Nations University/Third World Forum  
studies in African political economy).

I. Africa, Southern—Economic  
conditions—1975—

I. Amin, Samir II. Chitala, Derrick

III. Mandaza, Ibbo IV. Series

330.968'063 HC900

ISBN 0-86232-748-2

ISBN 0-86232-749-0 Pbk

**SADCC**  
**Prospects for**  
**Disengagement**  
**and Development in**  
**Southern Africa**

# THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY/THIRD WORLD FORUM

## STUDIES IN AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

General Editor: Samir Amin

The United Nations University's Project on Transnationalization or Nation-Building in Africa (1982-1986) was undertaken by a network of African scholars under the co-ordination of Samir Amin. The purpose of the Project was to study the possibilities of and constraints on national autocratic development of African countries in the context of the world-system into which they have been integrated. Since the 1970s the world-system has been in a crisis of a severity and complexity unprecedented since the end of the Second World War; the Project examines the impact of this contemporary crisis on the political, economic and cultural situation of Africa today. Focusing on the complex relationship between transnationalization (namely, the dynamics of the world-system) and nation-building, which is seen as a precondition for national development, the Project explores a wide range of problems besetting Africa today and outlines possible alternatives to the prevailing development models which have proved to be inadequate.

### TITLES IN THIS SERIES

M. L. Gakou

**The Crisis in African Agriculture**

1987

Peter Anyang' Nyong'o (editor)

**Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa**

1987

Samir Amin, Derrick Chitala, Ibbo Mandaza (editors)

**SADCC: Prospects for Disengagement and Development in Southern Africa**

1987

Faysal Yachir

**The World Steel Industry Today**

1988

Other titles in preparation.

# Editors and Contributors

## Editors

<b>Professor Samir Amin</b>	Co-ordinator of the Third World Forum (Africa Office).
<b>Dr Ibbo Mandaza</b>	Formerly lecturer in Political Science, Universities of Botswana and Dar es Salaam. Secretary, Ministry of Planning, Zimbabwe.
<b>Derrick Chitala</b>	Lecturer, University of Zambia.

## Contributors

<b>Dr Jumanne Hamisi Wagao</b>	Senior lecturer in Economics, University of Dar es Salaam.
<b>Benedict Stephen Mongula</b>	Lecturer, IDS, University of Dar es Salaam.
<b>Denny H. Kalyala</b>	Lecturer in Economics, University of Zambia.
<b>Clever Mumbengegwi</b>	Lecturer in Economics, University of Zimbabwe.
<b>Dr Daniel B. Ndlela</b>	Head of Department of Economics, University of Zimbabwe. His main interest has been in industrialization and economic planning.
<b>Dr Gilbert Mudenda</b>	Lecturer, University of Zambia.
<b>Dr Chiselebwe Ng'andwe</b>	Lecturer in Economics, University of Zambia.

# Acknowledgements

This book was produced in the framework of the United Nations University (UNU) African Regional Perspectives project, conducted by the African Bureau of the Third World Forum (TWF) and the network of African researchers associated with it. We would like here to thank the UNU, which met a large part of the financing of this programme, and the Swedish agency SAREC, which gives generous and constant support to the African Bureau of the Third World Forum. But, of course, in the hallowed formula, the opinions expressed here are those of their authors only and in no way commit the institutions mentioned.

# Contents

<b>Notes on Editors and Contributors</b>	x
<b>Acknowledgements</b>	xi
<b>Preface</b> <i>Samir Amin</i>	1
<b>Introduction</b>	8
<b>1. The Political Economy of SADCC and Imperialism's Response</b>	
<i>Derrick Chitala</i>	13
Imperialism and the South African State	14
The South African State and SADCC Countries	20
Dependence, Transformation and Regional Cooperation	30
<b>2. The Manufacturing Sector in the East and Southern African Subregion, with Emphasis on SADCC</b> <i>Daniel B. Ndlela</i>	37
A Theoretical Basis for the Development of the Manufacturing Sector in the SADCC	37
The Structure and Potential of the Manufacturing Sector in the SADCC	41
Iron and Steel Production in the East and Southern African Region	47
The Capital Goods Sector in the Subregion	52
Some Consequences of the Subregion's Industry Sector's International Links	54
<b>3. Food and Agricultural Cooperation in the SADCC: Progress, Problems and Prospects</b> <i>C. Mumbengegwi</i>	62
The Food and Agricultural Crisis in the SADCC:	
An Overview	63
The SADCC Framework and Approach to Cooperation	67
Problems and Future Prospects for SADCC Cooperation in Agriculture	79
Summary and Conclusions	83
<b>4. Limits to Development in Southern Africa: Energy, Transport and Communications in SADCC Countries</b> <i>Benedict S. Mongula and Chiselebwe Ng'andwe</i>	85



The Energy Crisis in SADCC	88
The Energy Situation in Individual Countries	90
Energy Potential and Prospects in SADCC	97
SADCC Energy Projects	100
Transport and Communications	101
Concluding Observations	107
<b>5. The Effects of the World Economic Recession on the Mining Sector in the SADCC Region</b> <i>Denny H. Kalyala and Gilbert N. Mudenda</i>	109
Imperialism and the Mining Industry	109
The World Economic Recession and Minerals/Metals	111
Mineral Resources of the SADCC Region and Possibilities of Effective Regional Cooperation	117
The Coordination of the Mining Sector	123
Recommendations for Policy and Planning	125
A Concluding Note	127
<b>6. The Development of a Local Technological Capacity in the SADCC Region</b> <i>Gilbert N. Mudenda</i>	128
Imperialism and the Commercialization of Technology	129
The Colonial Period	131
Review of Performance	135
Demand and Supply of Technological Resources	141
Recommendations for Policy and Planning	144
<b>7. Trade Relations among SADCC Countries</b> <i>Jumanne H. Wagao</i>	147
The Role of Foreign Trade in SADCC	147
Relevance of Experiences in Regional Cooperation	148
The Structure of SADCC's Trade	150
Prospects and Problems of the Trade Sector in SADCC's Economic Cooperation	159
Desirability and Limits of Coordinated SADCC Regional Trade	169
Concluding Remarks	176
<b>8. Financial Integration and Development in SADCC and PTA Countries</b> <i>Chiselebwe Ng'andwe</i>	181
The Theoretical Framework	183
The Preferential Trade Area (PTA)	190
Concluding Observations	207
<b>9. Perspectives on Economic Cooperation and Autonomous Development in Southern Africa</b> <i>Ibbo Mandaza</i>	210
Regional Economic Cooperation in Africa in the Era of Imperialism and International Finance Capital	211
SADCC: Concept and Reality	215
SADCC and South Africa	222
US Policy in the Light of Revolutionary Pressures in South Africa	226

Conclusion	229
Appendix	231
Bibliography	247
Index	255

## Tables

1.1	SADCC Countries' Trade with RSA	21
1.2	Migrant Labour in Southern Africa, 1973	23
1.3	Origins of Miners in South Africa	23
1.4	Mozambique: Direct Losses and reduction of Income from 1978 to 1983	26
1.5	SADCC Terms of Trade	28
1.6	SADCC Debt Ratios	29
1.7	Balance of Payments of SADCC Countries	29
2.1	Domestic Supply and Disposition of Manufactures of Seven SADCC States	44
2.2	Supply and Disposition of Manufactures by ISIC Category, 1980	45
2.3	Iron and Steel Industry Raw Materials	48
2.4	Coal Reserves in ESASDC Countries	48
2.5	Industrial Raw Material Sources in the SADCC	58
3.1	Population, Agricultural Food Production and Food Demand Growth Rates for SADCC Countries 1971-80	64
3.2	Cereal Output and Imports per capita: Selected SADCC Countries 1980-82	64
3.3	Food Self-Sufficiency and Policy Objectives in SADCC Countries	67
3.4	SADCC Regional Food Security Projects by Major Focus	72
3.5	Regional Projects (Combined)	73
3.6	National Projects with a Regional Impact	74
3.7	SADCC: National Projects: Foreign Financial Proportions	74
3.8	Summary Data on Agricultural Research Financing	76
3.9	Summary Data of Financing Arrangements for Animal Diseases Control	77
3.10	Summary Data on Financing for Fisheries, Wildlife and Forestry Products	79
4.1	Pattern of Energy Use in Angola	91
4.2	Energy Consumption in Botswana	92
4.3	SADCC Projects in the Transport and Communications Sector	105
5.1	Change in Export Prices for Developing Countries	112
5.2	Metal Prices 1970-1983	113
5.3	Change in Exports from Developing Countries	113

5.4	Debt Indicators for Developing Countries in Selected Years 1970-84	114
5.5	Percentage of Developing Africa's Contribution to Total World Mineral Production 1980-82	117
5.6	SADCC Production of Major Minerals/Metals, 1982	119
5.7	Percentage Share by Origin and Destination of Trade in Ores and Metals of Developing Africa	120
5.8	Current Minerals/Metal Exports and Imports of SADCC Member States, January 1985	121
5.9	The Marketing of African Minerals	122
6.1	SADCC Industrial Projects	139
7.1	SADCC: Relative Importance of Regional Trade to Individual Member Countries, 1981	150
7.2	SADCC: Country Share in Regional Trade, 1981	151
7.3	SADCC: Trade within the Region, 1981	152
7.4	SADCC: Relative Importance of Intraregional Trade for Bilateral Trade Relations	153
7.5	Relative Importance of Trade with South Africa for SADCC	153
7.6	SADCC: Relative Importance of Regional Trade to Individual Member Countries, 1981 and with South Africa	154
7.7	SADCC: The Commodity Structure of Imports, 1979	157
7.8	SADCC: % of Exports Accounted for by SOAs, TNCs and PDAs, 1979	159
7.9	RMA: Intra-Regional Merchandise Trade, 1974 and 1982	162
7.10	Exported Manufactures % of Total Exports: Selected SADCC Countries	164
7.11	SADCC: Direction of Regional Trade by Major Origins and Destinations, 1982	172
7.12	SADCC: National Shares of Intraregional Trade and Ratios to Total Trade, 1979-82	174
7.13	SADCC: Country Matrix of Intraregional Trade 1982	175
8.1	PTA Countries' Credit and Debit Limits	195
8.2	Sample Five-Year Cooperation Transaction	201
A.1	Basic Economic Indicators 1983	231
A.2	Structure of Industrial Production 1983	232
A.3	Mineral Raw Materials - Agricultural Sector	233
A.4	Mineral Raw Materials - Industrial Sector	234
A.5	Mineral Raw Materials - Construction Sector	235
A.6	Mineral Raw Materials - Communication Sector	236
A.7	Number of Industrial Establishments by Branch	237
A.8	Principal SADCC Commodity Exports and Regional Cooperation	238
A.9	Intra-SADCC Flows by Individual Commodities, 1980-81	240
A.10	Structure of the Labour Force, 1960-80	243
A.11	Education Indicators	244

A.12 Total Overseas Trade through the Regional Ports 1981	245
A.13 Total Overseas Trade on Railway Lines 1981	246

## Figures

3.1 Food production and demand	65
3.2 SADCC Food and Agricultural Sector: Structure of Cooperation	70
3.3 Food supply/demand	82

# Preface

**Samir Amin**

This book in our series is the fruit of collective discussion and reflection within the framework of one of our working groups built around the problematic of the SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference). The aim of the group was to analyse the development policies of the states confronting South Africa, stressing regional cooperation among them, and, from that, to answer the following questions:

- (1) Are their policies likely to strengthen their internal cohesion and resistance capacity in the face of South African expansionism and its destabilizing acts of aggression?
- (2) Do these policies reduce the historic dependence of these countries on South Africa by 'delinking' them from South Africa?
- (3) Do these policies also aim at initiating a policy of 'delinking' the region from the global imperialist system?

Such systematic reflection as ours was already underway several years before the people of South Africa, in the early summer of 1984, obliged all parties involved to undertake a total review of their strategies by carrying its struggle against the apartheid regime to an irreversible level, heralding the end of the regime.

For a century, imperialism had established a system of total domination of the Southern African region in which the white settler colony of South Africa played a key role. The discovery of the mineral riches of the region (such as gold and diamonds in South Africa, copper in Katanga and Northern Rhodesia) just when capitalism was entering a new stage of monopolistic expansion inspired a particular form of colonization – that of 'the economy of the reserves'. That is, a partition of the country and the forcing of the African peasantries back into reserves deliberately planned to be inadequate so as to ensure the failure of subsistence in earlier traditional forms; consequently it would have to re-emerge as a proletarianized migrant labour force for mining capital. The agricultural economy of European plantations in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, and then later manufacturing industry, also benefited from this system.

Apartheid was thus always an intrinsic part of this form of the expansion of peripheral capitalism, whose peculiar features we have demonstrated elsewhere, in contrast to the forms established in other regions of the continent, notably, the colonial trade economy in West Africa.<sup>1</sup> Contrary to a deep-seated prejudice, it was not the Boers who, in an excess of racism peculiar only to them, invented this

system. The Boers had until then elaborated only a crude conception of their society – then agrarian and patriarchal – which involved the conquest of land and the driving back, or wiping out of its occupants rather than integrating them into an efficient capitalist exploitation. In short, a plan similar to the one the Zionists contemplate for the Palestinians. But the defeat inflicted on them by British imperialism gave them a new place and functions in the system invented by English rulers brought up on an interpretation of the ranking of classes and races inspired by a Cambridge reading of Plato. The British established the system of apartheid, and then claimed that it was the Boers who had invented it. They also encouraged the popular misconception that apartheid is a ‘vestige’ in conflict with the needs of capitalist expansion: on the contrary, it fitted in perfectly with that expansion.

Bourgeois ideology attempts to justify the ‘progressive’ character of capitalism by claiming that the legal equality of individuals and electoral democracy are absolute hallmarks of this mode of production. Reality tells a different story, which, among other things, stresses the qualitative distinction between centres and peripheries in this global capitalist expansion. For, while in the centres the struggles waged by the bourgeoisie against the absolutism of the *ancien régimes*, and later those waged by the working class did indeed impose bourgeois democracy, as we know it, in the periphery the functions allotted to the conquered peoples called for brutal forms of exploitation – slavery in America, apartheid in South Africa, colonization (and the negation of basic rights which defines it) are necessary forms of capitalist expansion. If today apartheid is being called into question in South Africa, it is not because this form constitutes an obstacle to capitalist expansion, but because the struggles of the black South Africans who are its victims, make it unworkable.<sup>2</sup>

From the end of the 19th Century until 1984, the system functioned well with no major crises calling into question the dominant interests of monopolistic capital. The collapse of British and Belgian colonization in the 1960s did not lead to the destruction of the regional system of imperialist domination. The respective national liberation movements in the region, like others all over the continent, were persuaded or forced to bow to basic ‘Western’ interests. Of course, depending on the class nature of the alliances that made up these movements, and the vicissitudes of their political and ideological evolution, the range of post-colonial attitudes and practices was very wide, ranging from the open neo-colonialism of Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho and Zaïre to the national efforts of Tanzania or Zambia. But these latter remained vulnerable and fragile, as the facts have amply demonstrated.

The subsequent collapse of Portuguese colonialism in 1974 and of the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia in 1980 did, however, constitute a threat to imperialist interests. However, neither in Angola nor in Mozambique, had the West definitively lost the battle. The internal limits typical of the capacities of new nationalist governments obliged them to respect the interests of monopoly capital (as with oil in Angola), or to maintain the system of dependent economic relationships which governs the capitalist world as a whole. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has been neither able nor even disposed to replace Western partners in this area. In Zimbabwe, the independence negotiated by the Lancaster House Agreement prolonged the survival of the previous economic system practically intact in both

the rural areas (no agrarian reform liquidating the settler lands in favour of the peasantry) and in the industrial arena (respect for the predominance of the interests of local private capital in partnership with globalized capital).

Nonetheless, it remains the case that the regimes in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, like those in other frontline states (Tanzania and Zambia) remain 'rather unreliable' in the eyes of the West. Hence the West has considered it positive and useful – for itself – that South Africa has, since 1974 in Angola and Mozambique and since 1980 in Zimbabwe, carried out destabilizing acts of military aggression there. These are complemented on the economic level by the destabilizing aggression of the IMF, acting for the global account of imperialism, turning the weaknesses and errors – sometimes very serious ones – of local policies to advantage. The results of this strategy, aimed at establishing openly neo-colonial regimes, are not at all disappointing for imperialism. Angola was obliged to call for Cuban military assistance to deal with South African attacks, Mozambique to sign the Nkomati Accord, Zimbabwe to show scrupulous respect for the Lancaster House Agreement, Tanzania and Zambia to submit to the humiliating terms of the IMF. The 'Soviet presence' in the region, and the presence of the rear bases of the liberation movements of Namibia and South Africa (SWAPO, ANC, PAC), are no more than excuses, and not the real reasons for the West's offensive strategy. For these presences are the result – and not the cause – of the refusal by the West to accept regimes in Africa that are other than neo-colonial, and, down to the present day, to contemplate the decolonization of Namibia and South Africa.

But since 1984 things have been changing. The struggle in which the people of South Africa have been engaged since then raises the question of the future of the region in terms of new alternatives – global neo-colonialism for Southern Africa, or popular national liberation?

On this I would like here to make six general observations that seem to me useful in throwing light on the nature of the issues and possible strategies:

1. What is in direct, immediate and violent crisis in South Africa is the political regime of apartheid and the denial that it involves of any respect for the basic rights of the African majority. Although, because of the size of the urban proletariat the relations of exploitation typical of capitalism constitute the potential issue in the crisis, the main force of the blow is borne by the demand for majority rule (majority rule against minority rule and apartheid). This characteristic of the movement is, of course, altogether natural in current conditions.
2. In these conditions, and if the struggle does not develop to the point of a real challenge to the relations of production, a neo-colonial solution is not ruled out, even in South Africa. After all, a sort of Lancaster House arrangement would be quite acceptable to the West. No doubt some white settler interests in South Africa would be sacrificed in it; but so they were at the time of the defeat of the Boers at the beginning of the century! There is no point in going any further in attempting to predict possible scenarios. These may well include, in favour of African interests, more or less extensive agrarian reforms and a greater or lesser degree of political representation and, in favour of settler interests, more or less precise and strong 'guarantees'. The essential thing for imperialism is to safeguard capitalist production relations in industry and the mines and the international 'specialization'

of the region that flows from it.

There is, in this perspective, no avoiding heavily qualifying the overly facile arguments that such an outcome would be totally 'impossible'. There is no black bourgeoisie in South Africa, apartheid made it impossible for one to emerge, it is said. That may well be so, but so it was in many African countries and yet a political bourgeoisie was soon able to take over. South Africa's nuclear capacity rules out any compromise, it is said, because the West will never accept that a black government have access to this weapon. Have people ruled out the prospect of this capacity being dismantled, if that proved to be necessary? South Africa is the sole possible supplier of strategic minerals, if imports from the Soviet Union are ruled out. True, but does not the neo-colonial solution aim precisely at ensuring the permanence of those supplies? Finally, the argument that white power in South Africa has an autonomy that enables it to reject any 'plans' that it thinks ask it to sacrifice too much. The analogy with Israel, which could also indefinitely cock a snook at the West as well as force it to give it unconditional support, or even do without it, is frequently put forward. We doubt the strength of this argument. In our view South Africa would stand up poorly to sanctions, even simply economic ones, and the present white regime would collapse even faster if they were to be adopted. Perhaps the spread of the war inside the country will, on its own, lead to such a collapse.

3. It is idle to hope for differences to emerge in the strategies pursued by the various partners in the imperialist system. Certainly imperialism, such as Lenin knew and analysed in his time, was in economic, and even military, conflict (the evidence is the two world wars). But the changes that followed World War II altered the nature of inter-imperialist relations and have apparently ruled out recourse to inter-imperialist wars. But they have also led to a new stage of deeper globalization of the interpenetration of interests. The European Community, the United States and Japan, particularly in regard to the key mining sector in South Africa, deploy perfectly integrated strategies of firms and states.<sup>3</sup> The argument that the EEC, anxious to maintain its African friendships, might detach itself from its American rival and ally scarcely stands up to an examination of the facts, for the subordination of neo-colonial regimes, on the one hand, and the vulnerability of those who attempt to challenge the existing order, on the other, have so far made it possible for European interests to sleep peacefully on their laurels.

4. The neo-colonial outcome is no more an inevitable solution than the opposite – national liberation with a popular content and a socialist vocation. What happens will depend, in the main, on the strategies of struggle deployed in South Africa. If these were to set themselves the sole target of 'majority rule' and actively seek negotiations on that basis, the neo-colonial compromise might perhaps be secured more quickly than might seem possible. But, if the strategies were to be based on an increased emphasis on social objectives (that is on the struggle for workers' control of the means of production and peasant warfare for the recovery of land), it would certainly not be the same. Herein lies all the historical responsibility of vanguards.

5. A question poses itself, namely – is it a struggle for the eventual building of socialism (in the most optimistic hypothesis of the development of the struggle), or a struggle which, on this hypothesis, would simply result in popular national rule



with only a potential socialist vocation? The debates on this issue appear to me to be confused and distorted by the predominant thesis of the 'revolution by stages' (national democratic and then socialist). This is doubtless not the place to analyse these debates in detail; I shall therefore simply formulate a few general thoughts on this issue:<sup>4</sup>

(a) This thesis put forward by recent (post-World War II) vulgar Marxism – which seems to me to be neither truly Leninist, nor Maoist (but, in the last analysis, it matters little whether it is or not) – is little more than the expression of the legitimization of the practices of post-revolutionary governments: first big reforms (including agrarian ones), then 'collectivization' reduced to the substitution of the forms of public ownership (state and cooperative) for private ownership. The vulgar thesis stops there, i.e. it completely glosses over discussion of the content of ownership. Public ownership is treated as if it were socialism, whereas it is only the first condition of it; there is no attempt to look at whether the real functioning of society allows control of the means of production by the producers (through an advanced social and political democracy).

(b) Reality disconfirms the thesis. Is not socialism confronted with the repeated revival of relations of production capable of ensuring greater efficiency in the development of productive forces? Fifty years after the victory of socialism in the USSR (i.e. after the liquidation of the NEP and collectivization) the question of the 'market' is back on the agenda. Twenty years after the Cultural Revolution in China had, it was said, settled the problem, here we are again with these same relations that had been 'abolished' being re-established. In such conditions, is it not necessary to get shot of the dogmatic and empty old saw of the 'national democratic' stage to be followed by 'the stage of building socialism'?

(c) Instead of this misconception, I see that the overthrow of dominant capitalist rule in the conditions in which real history actually makes it happen, i.e. following the unequal development immanent in capitalist expansion, from the peripheries of the global system, calls into question the vulgar theorization of the transition. The objectively necessary task of developing the producing forces, the inevitable conflict with the global logic of world-wide capitalist expansion, the complex internal class relations produced by 'incomplete' capitalist development (the peasant question, the question of petty bourgeoisies and middle classes, the limitations of the labour movement, etc.), call for a long transition. In this period the forces of socialism, capitalism and a statism that I think cannot be reduced to either, combine, and conflict, in forms that are specific to each country and each stage, without one 'general line' – whether desirable or real – being able to constitute a sort of 'model'. It is for this reason that I have preferred to describe the societies in question as 'popular-national', rather than 'socialist'. In so doing, I intend to stress their 'delinking' from the world-wide capitalist system (whence the 'national' character), and the conflict-laden nature of their social content and potential evolution.

These observations are made here because I believe that there is nothing to enable us to say that the issues in South Africa are different from those that this analysis makes it possible to isolate.

6. So long as the popular national construction is not underway, in South Africa