


MAJOR PROBLEMS IN  
AMERICAN HISTORY



Heath

*Major Problems  
in American Foreign Policy  
Volume I: To 1914*

THIRD EDITION



DOCUMENTS AND ESSAYS EDITED BY  
THOMAS G. PATERSON

*Major Problems  
in American Foreign Policy  
Volume I: To 1914*



DOCUMENTS AND ESSAYS

THIRD EDITION

EDITED BY  
THOMAS G. PATERSON  
UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT

D. C. HEATH AND COMPANY  
Lexington, Massachusetts Toronto

Cover painting: *Ship America on the Grand Banks* by Michele Felice Corne.  
(The Peabody Museum of Salem/photo by Mark Sexton)

Copyright © 1989 by D. C. Heath and Company.

Previous editions copyright © 1984 and 1978 by D. C. Heath and Company.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Published simultaneously in Canada.

Printed in the United States of America.

International Standard Book Number: 0-669-15856-9

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 88-80720

*For Aaron M. Paterson*

## Preface

The writing of diplomatic history changes, and so, happily, must this volume. In this third edition, new documents and essays have been included and chapters revised to reflect recent research and interpretations. The original goal remains: to provide students and instructors with the most distinguished, readable, stimulating, and up-to-date scholarship in the field.

The first chapter presents the diversity of scholarly opinion on the chief characteristics of American foreign policy. After this general opening, each chapter addresses a major issue in the history of American diplomacy. The primary documents introduce the problem, identify key issues, reveal the flavor of the times, and convey the intense spirit and conviction that usually marked debate. The essays in each chapter, by outstanding historians, political scientists, diplomats, and others, reveal how different interpretations can emerge from readings of the same documents or from observations of the same phenomena. The chapter introductions and section headnotes set the readings in historical and interpretive perspective. The aim is to encourage readers to reach their own interpretations. A list of books and articles for further reading, with emphasis on recent works, appears at the end of each chapter.

Many friends, colleagues, and students contributed, through their generous suggestions, to the shaping of this edition. J. Garry Clifford and Kenneth J. Hagan made excellent recommendations, as did Marvin Zahniser. I also received helpful advice and research assistance from Bruce dePyssler, Mark Gilderhus, Laura Grant, Frederick Marks, Barney J. Rickman, and Rodney Scudder. My thanks to them.

I am also pleased to recognize again the help I received during the preparation of the first and second editions from Harold Barto, Richard Dean Burns, Bruce Cumings, Joe Decker, John Dobson, Michael Ebner, Gerald Gordon, Gregg Herken, James Hindman, Michael Hunt, Donald Johnson, Lawrence Kaplan, Ellen Kerley, Warren Kimball, Karen Kupperman, Melvyn Leffler, Douglas Little, Jean Manter, James Matray, John Merrill, Jean-Donald Miller, Charles Neu, Holly Iazard Paterson, Stephen Pelz, Carol Petillo, Sister Eileen Rice, Harlow Sheidley, Kenneth Shewmaker, Mark Stoler, Harry Stout, William Stueck, John Sylvester, Paul Varg, and Thomas Zoumaras. The staff of D. C. Heath, including Linda Halvorson, Sylvia Mallory, James Miller, Margaret Roll, and Bryan Woodhouse, has improved this book, and I thank them for their care and encouragement.

Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the comments and support of the many students and instructors who have enthusiastically received *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy* over the years. This classroom success has prompted D. C. Heath to launch a new series—Major Problems in American

History—modeled upon this book's format of primary-source documents and analytical essays. The several volumes in this series, edited by distinguished scholars, will explore a variety of topics in American history. As these volumes appear during the next few years, we invite comments and suggestions on their content.

T.G.P.

*Major Problems  
in American Foreign Policy*

# Contents

## CHAPTER 1

### *Explaining American Foreign Policy*

Page 1

#### ESSAYS

- C. Vann Woodward • Free Security 2
- Michael H. Hunt • Ideology of National Greatness and Liberty 7
- William Appleman Williams • The Open Door Policy: Economic Expansion and the Remaking of Societies 12
- Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. • Seeking Power, Not Markets 18

## CHAPTER 2

### *The Origins of American Foreign Policy*

Page 27

#### DOCUMENTS

- John Winthrop's "City Upon a Hill," 1630 28
- John Adams on Connection with France, 1775 29
- Thomas Paine's "Common Sense," 1776 30
- The Declaration of Independence, 1776 33
- Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France, 1778 35
- Treaty of Alliance with France, 1778 37
- Ezra Stiles's "The United States Elevated to Glory and Honour," 1783 38
- Treaty of Peace, 1783 41
- Foreign Policy Powers in the Constitution, 1789 42

#### ESSAYS

- Max Savelle • Early American Diplomatic Principles 45
- James H. Hutson • Revolutionary Americans, Empire, and the Balance of Power 55

## CHAPTER 3

### *The Great Debate of the 1790s*

Page 66

#### DOCUMENTS

- Alexander Hamilton on the Alliance with France, 1793 67
- Thomas Jefferson on the Alliance with France, 1793 68



<b>The Jay Treaty, 1794</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>James Madison's Criticism of the Jay Treaty, 1795</b>	<b>74</b>
<b>George Washington's Farewell Address, 1796</b>	<b>74</b>
<b><u>E S S A Y S</u></b>	
<b>Paul A. Varg • The Virtues of Hamiltonian Realism over Jeffersonian Idealism</b>	<b>78</b>
<b>Lawrence S. Kaplan • Jefferson as Idealist-Realist</b>	<b>92</b>
<b>Alexander DeConde • Political Opportunism and Statesmanship</b>	<b>102</b>

**C H A P T E R 4**  
*The Louisiana Purchase*  
*Page 109*

<b><u>D O C U M E N T S</u></b>	
<b>Thomas Jefferson on Louisiana, 1802</b>	<b>110</b>
<b>Napoleon Bonaparte on the Sale of Louisiana, 1803</b>	<b>111</b>
<b>Robert R. Livingston on the Paris Negotiations, 1803</b>	<b>112</b>
<b><u>E S S A Y S</u></b>	
<b>Lawrence S. Kaplan • America's Advantage from Europe's Distress</b>	<b>115</b>
<b>Alexander DeConde • America's Pressure for Empire</b>	<b>118</b>
<b>Drew R. McCoy • Ensuring a Republican Political Economy</b>	<b>125</b>

**C H A P T E R 5**  
*The War of 1812*  
*Page 133*

<b><u>D O C U M E N T S</u></b>	
<b>Napoleonic Decree (Berlin), 1806</b>	<b>134</b>
<b>British Order-in-Council, 1807</b>	<b>134</b>
<b>The Embargo Act, 1807</b>	<b>135</b>
<b>Henry Clay on Grievances Against Britain, 1811</b>	<b>136</b>
<b>James Madison's War Message, 1812</b>	<b>137</b>
<b>The Hartford Convention, 1814–1815</b>	<b>141</b>
<b><u>E S S A Y S</u></b>	
<b>Julius W. Pratt • Western Demands</b>	<b>143</b>
<b>Bradford Perkins • A Question of National Honor</b>	<b>154</b>
<b>J. C. A. Stagg • Coveting Canada: The American Strategy of Economic Coercion</b>	<b>164</b>

**CHAPTER 6**  
*The Monroe Doctrine*  
Page 180

**DOCUMENTS**

George Canning's Overture for a Joint Declaration, 1823	181
Jefferson's Advice to James Monroe, 1823	182
John Quincy Adams's Account of the Cabinet Meeting of November 7, 1823	183
James Monroe's Annual Message, 1823	184

**ESSAYS**

Dexter Perkins • Defense of Commerce and Ideals	186
William Appleman Williams • Manifesto of the American Empire	194
Ernest R. May • Domestic Politics and Personal Ambitions	196
Harry Ammon • National Interest, Not Politics	203

**CHAPTER 7**  
*Westward Expansion and Indian Removal*  
Page 208

**DOCUMENTS**

The Removal Act, 1830	209
Andrew Jackson's Case for Removal, 1830	211
Edward Everett's Protest, 1831	213
Cherokee Nation v. the State of Georgia, 1831	216
Black Hawk's Surrender Speech, 1832	220

**ESSAYS**

Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr. • The White Advance Upon Native Lands	222
Robert V. Remini • Andrew Jackson and Indian Removal	237

**CHAPTER 8**  
*Manifest Destiny and the War with Mexico*  
Page 254

**DOCUMENTS**

John L. O'Sullivan on Manifest Destiny, 1839	255
James K. Polk on Texas and Oregon, 1845	256
Polk's War Message, 1846	258
The Wilmot Proviso, 1846	262
Massachusetts Protests the Mexican War, 1847	263
A Mexican Perspective, 1849	263

E S S A Y S

<i>Reginald Horsman</i> • Anglo-Saxon Racism	266
<i>Norman A. Graebner</i> • Concrete Interests and Expansion	276
<i>David M. Pletcher</i> • Polk's Aggressive Leadership	287

C H A P T E R 9  
*Civil War Diplomacy*

*Page 305*

D O C U M E N T S

William H. Seward's Call for a Foreign War, 1861	306
Abraham Lincoln's Blockade Proclamation, 1861	306
Seward's Warning to the British, 1861	307
The Confederacy Lures the British with Cotton, 1861	309
Charles Sumner on the <i>Trent</i> Affair, 1862	311
Charles Francis Adams's Protest Against the Ironclads, 1863	314

E S S A Y S

<i>Gordon H. Warren</i> • The King Cotton Theory	315
<i>Norman A. Graebner</i> • Northern Diplomacy and European Realism	322

C H A P T E R 10  
*Late-Nineteenth-Century Diplomacy and Economic Expansion*

*Page 339*

D O C U M E N T S

William H. Seward on Alaska, 1869	340
Ulysses S. Grant on Santo Domingo, 1870	343
Call for a Pan American Conference, 1888	345
Alfred T. Mahan on Sea Power, 1890	345
Josiah Strong on Anglo-Saxon Predominance, 1891	347
Richard Olney on Venezuela, 1895	350
United States Trade Expansion, 1865–1914	353

E S S A Y S

<i>Robert L. Beisner</i> • A Shift in Paradigm	354
<i>Thomas G. Paterson</i> • The Importance of Economic Expansion	363
<i>David M. Pletcher</i> • Rhetoric Versus Results: Economic Expansion Questioned	369

## CHAPTER 11

*The Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War and Empire*

Page 381

DOCUMENTS

William McKinley's War Message, 1898	382
William James on the Suppression of the Philippines, 1899	384
American Anti-Imperialist League Program, 1899	387
Albert J. Beveridge's Salute to Imperialism, 1900	389

ESSAYS

Richard Hofstadter • The Psychic Crisis of the 1890s	392
Walter LaFeber • Preserving the American System	396
Ernest R. May • Influence from Abroad	404

## CHAPTER 12

*The Open Door Policy and China*

Page 415

DOCUMENTS

The Open Door Note, 1899	416
The British Reply, 1899	418
The Russian Reply, 1899	418
John Hay Declares Acceptance, 1900	419
Circular Note to the Great Powers, 1900	419

ESSAYS

Michael H. Hunt • The Open Door Constituency	420
George F. Kennan • Principle Without Precision or Power	439
Thomas M. McCormick • The China Market and American Realism	446

## CHAPTER 13

*Theodore Roosevelt, the Big Stick, and the Panama Canal*

Page 454

DOCUMENTS

The Platt Amendment, 1903	455
The Panama Canal Treaty, 1903	456
Roosevelt's Case for Supporting the Panamanian Revolution, 1903	457
Colombia's Grievances, 1904	458
The Roosevelt Corollary, 1904	461

E S S A Y S

<i>Frederick W. Marks III • A Cautious and Sensitive Diplomat</i>	<b>462</b>
<i>Walter LaFeber • A Bullying Policeman for Empire</i>	<b>476</b>
<i>Robert Dallek • A Crusading Progressive</i>	<b>495</b>

C H A P T E R 14

*Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Revolution*

*Page 503*

D O C U M E N T S

<i>Woodrow Wilson on Latin America Policy, 1913</i>	<b>504</b>
<i>Francisco García Calderón on American Imperialism, 1913</i>	<b>506</b>
<i>Wilson on Huerta and Veracruz, 1914</i>	<b>509</b>
<i>Robert Lansing on "Intervention," 1916</i>	<b>510</b>
<i>Some Mexican Complaints Against the United States, 1919</i>	<b>511</b>

E S S A Y S

<i>Robert Freeman Smith • Wilson's Pursuit of Order</i>	<b>513</b>
<i>Ramón Eduardo Ruíz • Mexico at the Whim of Washington</i>	<b>530</b>

## CHAPTER

### I

# *Explaining American Foreign Policy*



*What most influenced American foreign policy to permit and encourage the United States to expand into a world power from the colonial era to the early twentieth century? Scholars have offered a host of answers to this fundamental question: a protective geography, free land, weak neighbors, a multifaceted ideology that included republicanism, manifest destiny, and a reformist mission, racism, rich natural resources, impressive economic and demographic growth, capitalism, democratic and consensual politics, and a strong but elastic Constitution.*

*A second fundamental question has also prompted a variety of answers: Given these influences, what became the most enduring characteristics and over-arching themes of American foreign policy from the colonial period to the progressive era? isolationism? unilateralism? neutralism? the reform of other societies? idealism? humanitarianism? economic expansion and the pursuit of an "open door" to ensure trade opportunities? the pursuit of order? the seeking of power to ensure physical security? an antirevolutionary conservatism? imperialism? We can explore the importance of many of these categories by asking why the people and leaders of the United States believed it necessary to expand both at home and abroad. Careful definition and illustration from the historical record are required. Scholars have usually met this requirement, but far too many Americans have carelessly bandied about the concepts and phrases in political campaigns, sloganeering, and crusades against foreign enemies to the extent that the terms have lost precise meaning for analysis. The following essays, by accomplished historians, suggest ways to explain the mainsprings of American foreign policy over time with both definition and evidence.*

## \* ESSAYS

C. Vann Woodward, long a historian at Yale University specializing in the American South, has suggested that much of American history can be explained best by the theme of "free security." In the second essay, Michael H. Hunt of

the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill identifies what he considers the core ideas of an American ideology before the twentieth century. Here he concentrates on one of them: the quest for national greatness and the promotion of liberty. In the third essay, William Appleman Williams, retired from the University of Wisconsin and Oregon State University after becoming a major influence in the development of a critical perspective on the nation's past, argues that American diplomacy has suffered "tragedy," because the American people, driven by an "open door" economic expansionism that has meant the coercing of others, have violated their own noble ideals. Finally, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., a historian at the City University of New York and chronicler of the administrations of Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy, serving the latter as a White House adviser in the early 1960s, specifically questions an emphasis on "open door" economics and implicitly doubts the centrality of ideology and "free security." He claims that the quest for power to guarantee physical security best explains American expansionism and empire.



## Free Security

C. VANN WOODWARD

Throughout most of its history the United States has enjoyed a remarkable degree of military security, physical security from hostile attack and invasion. This security was not only remarkably effective, but it was relatively free. Free security was based on nature's gift of three vast bodies of water interposed between this country and any other power that might constitute a serious menace to its safety. There was not only the Atlantic to the east and the Pacific to the west, but a third body of water, considered so impenetrable as to make us virtually unaware of its importance, the Arctic Ocean and its great ice cap to the north. The security thus provided was free in the sense that it was enjoyed as a bounty of nature in place of the elaborate and costly chains of fortifications and even more expensive armies and navies that took a heavy toll of the treasuries of less fortunate countries and placed severe tax burdens upon the backs of their people. The costly navy that policed and defended the Atlantic was manned and paid for by British subjects for more than a century, while Americans enjoyed the added security afforded without added cost to themselves. In 1861 the United States was maintaining the second largest merchant marine in the world without benefit of a battle fleet. At that time there were only 7,600 men in the United States Navy as compared with more than ten times that number in the British Navy.

Between the second war with England and the Second World War, the United States was blessed with a security so complete and so free that it was able virtually to do without an army and for the greater part of the period without a navy as well. Between the world war that ended in 1763 and the world wars of the twentieth century the only major military burdens

placed upon the people were occasioned not by foreign threats but by domestic quarrels, the first to establish independence for the American colonies and the second to thwart independence for the southern states. After each of these civil wars, as after all the intervening wars, Americans immediately dismantled their military establishment. They followed the same procedure after every succeeding war, down to World War II, and even after that they carried demobilization to dangerous extremes before reversing the policy.

The end of the era of free security has overtaken Americans so suddenly and swiftly that they have not brought themselves to face its practical implications, much less its bearing upon their history. Conventional aircraft and jet propulsion had shrunk the time dimensions of the Atlantic and Pacific from weeks to hours by the mid-fifties. But before military adjustment could be properly made to that revolution, the development of ballistic missiles shrank the two oceans further from hours to minutes. In the same period the hitherto impenetrable Arctic Ocean has not only been navigated by atomic-powered submarines under the ice cap, but has been shrunk in time width to dimensions of minutes and seconds by which we now measure the other oceans. The age of security and the age of free security ended almost simultaneously.

The proposition was advanced before a meeting of the American Historical Association in 1893 that "the first period of American history," a period of four centuries, was brought to an end by the disappearance of free land. Perhaps it is not premature to suggest that another epoch of American history was closed even more suddenly sixty years later by the disappearance of free security. It may be objected that security was never completely free and that the period when it came nearest to being so did not last very long. But one can reasonably ask as much latitude to speak in comparative and relative terms about free security as the theorists of free land enjoyed in their generalizations. Land was of course never completely free either, and the period when it came nearest to being so only dated from the Homestead Act of 1862, less than three decades before the end of the frontier era. In a comparative sense land may nevertheless be said to have been relatively free for a much longer period. In similar terms security may also be said to have been free until quite recently.

Military expenditures of the federal government have, of course, increased greatly and almost continuously since the last decade of the eighteenth century. Until very recently, however, they have not increased so rapidly as the government's nonmilitary expenditures. During the first century of the Republic's history, save in war years, annual military expenditures rarely came to as much as 1 per cent of the gross national product, returned to that level a few years after the First World War, and remained there until the Great Depression cut production back drastically. In the decade preceding Pearl Harbor, the percentage of federal expenditures devoted to military purposes fell lower than ever before in our history.

Another measure of free security is the small demand that military service has made upon national manpower. Before World War I, apart from



actual war periods and their immediate aftermath, it was an extremely rare year in which as many as 1 per cent of the total male population between the ages of twenty and thirty-nine saw military service. Between Reconstruction and the Spanish-American War there was no year in which as many as one-half of 1 per cent served in the armed forces. The handful of men who made up the regular army during the nineteenth century were not employed in patrolling frontiers against foreign invasion, but chiefly in coping with a domestic police problem posed by the Indians. Upon the outbreak of the Civil War the United States Army numbered a few more than sixteen thousand men, and 183 of its 198 companies were spread among twenty-nine posts on the Indian frontier. The remaining fifteen companies were available for "defense" of the Canadian and Atlantic frontiers, and the incipient Confederate frontier. The southern constabulary that patrolled the slaves was organized on military lines, but like the regular army it was concerned with a domestic police problem.

The contrast between free security and security costs of the present era scarcely requires emphasis. Military expenditures in 1957 and the years since have amounted to 10 per cent of the gross national product. By way of comparison, military expenditures in the 1880's were never over four-tenths of 1 per cent. In spite of the vast increase of the gross national product during the last century, military costs have increased far faster and now represent ten to twenty times the percentage of the gross national product they represented in the peace years of the previous century. Not counting payments to veterans, they now account for nearly 70 per cent of the federal budget. The more advanced and improved military machinery paradoxically requires more instead of less manpower, both military and civilian. The Department of Defense and its branches employ more civilian workers now than did the entire federal government before the Great Depression. Indications are that we are only at the beginning instead of the culmination of expansion in costs and manpower for military purposes and that future expenditures will be larger still.

If historians waited until the disappearance of free land to recognize fully the influence of the frontier-and-free-land experience on American history, perhaps the even more sudden and dramatic disappearance of free security will encourage them to recognize the effect of another distinguishing influence upon our national history. I am not prepared to make any claims about the comparative importance of the two themes, nor do I wish to make or inspire any exaggerations of the influence of free security. But if the influence of free land may be considered significant in the shaping of American character and national history, it is possible that the effect of free security might profitably be studied for contributions to the same ends.

Certain traits that Americans generally regard as desirable, such as democracy, individualism, self-reliance, inventiveness, have been attributed in some measure to the frontier-and-free-land experience. It might be that the sunnier side of the national disposition—the sanguine temperament, the faith in the future, what H. G. Wells once called our "optimistic fa-