

20世纪



西方翻译理论解读

The Interpretation of Western Translation Theories
of the 20th Century (Volume II)

董广才 孙永君 / 编著

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辽宁师范大学出版社

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· 大连 ·

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前 言

本书对 20 世纪八九十年代西方翻译理论的代表性人物、翻译思想及其流派进行系统介绍和评介。此书所涉及的作者及其观点均能代表其年代的主要翻译思想,并对翻译研究产生较重要影响。本书涉及的作者和翻译理论家当中既有国内介绍较多的知名语言学家、翻译理论家,也有国内翻译界关注不够、介绍不多而其翻译思想又影响较大的理论家;既有美国、英国的著名学者,也有法国、德国以及其他国家的著名学者。本书对每一位作者均选取其主要代表性文章或主要著作的章节进行原文收录,前附作者简介,后加注释并配评介文章。此书的读者可以是从事语言学、西方翻译理论研究的同仁,也可以是语言学及翻译方向的研究生。

西方翻译理论的研究和介绍在国内外都不是新鲜事,对某些较著名的翻译理论及学者的介绍并不罕见。但大多关注英、美、法、德、俄等主要国家的学者,而对其他国家学者的翻译研究关注不够。我国的翻译理论研究起步晚,缺乏系统性,理论性不强;西方翻译理论对我们的翻译研究影响较大。但对西方翻译理论介绍的片面和不够系统,使得我们对西方翻译理论研究的全貌缺乏足够的了解,使得我们的翻译理论研究不可避免地带有盲目性、重复性和片面性。国内外对西方翻译理论的系统介绍大都以以下两种形式出现:1. 选读类:重点选择,原文收录,略加注释;2. 评介类:只作评介,不收原文。

本书的特色如下:

1. 选材广泛

本书收录的作者及代表作选材广泛。包括韦努蒂的归化异化论、格特的关联理论、张伯伦的女性主义翻译观、费米尔的功能翻译论等。

2. 历时划分

按历史时间划分可使读者对西方翻译理论研究的历史及发展脉络有清晰的把握,进而对西方翻译理论在 21 世纪的发展走向及在中国的影响有进一步的思考和展望。

3. 评介并举

对按年代划分的每一部分、每一位作者及文章都有详尽的介绍和评论。评论除对国内外已有的评论有一定介绍外,重点阐述本书作者的独到见解。本书的相关评论一部分已在近两年的国内省级以上刊物上发表过。

我的研究生在此书编著过程中作了大量的基础工作,他们是:赵东方、蔡利娟、李春辉、

丁星、刘佳、张晓芳、姜东、王森、那丽、张凌、张聪、朱志伟、李谧、李倩、吴欣欣、王彤彤、孔邵辉、包磊、吕炆等。评介文章大多为我的学生独自撰写,感谢他们允许我在此书中采用。周康同学对全书的注释和参考文献进行了修改和补充,并对全书进行了校对。此书所引用的原文作者众多,虽多方努力,仍未能全部联系上,谨表谢意。

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第四章 20 世纪 80 年代

4.1 导读

巴斯内特(Susan Bassnett)的《翻译研究》(*Translation Studies*)的出版发行预示了 20 世纪 80 年代是翻译理论研究的新时代。她认为翻译研究并不是比较文学的分支,也不隶属于语言学,而是一门与文体学、文史学、语言学、符号学、美学等各个领域密切相关,同时又具有自身特点的独立学科。《翻译研究》采用历史性分析方法,结合相关理论概念,研究针对具体文化、社会背景的翻译策略。尽管巴斯内特强调文学翻译,她的这本著作仍然对 80 年代翻译理论研究产生巨大的影响,促进了“译本的相对自主性”假设的生成和发展。

尽管符号学家、话语分析家、后结构主义文本理论学家采用的理论各不相同,但他们一致认为翻译相对来说是一门独立的写作形式,在不同的语言和文化情境中起着重要作用。这种观点古来有之,而在 80 年代这一观点得以系统化,一些翻译理论研究者甚至将翻译的独立性应用到更深层次的功能主义中。

20 世纪 80 年代,人们对翻译的“对等”研究的热情有所降低。弗拉雷(William Frawley)在他的文章《翻译理论的序言》(*Prolegomenon to a theory of translation*)中针对“对等”提出质疑。这种“对等”究竟应该被理解成经验性的(基于同义关系)、生理性的(基于相同的认知器官)还是语言学的(语言的共性)呢?他认为若翻译是一种交际形式,所传递的信息必然是不同的。所以翻译实际上是有着自身规则、设定自身标准及结构预设与蕴含的代码。由此第三符码的概念应运而生,依据符号的创新程度,弗拉雷对翻译进行了分类。

布拉姆—库尔卡(Shoshana Blum-Kulka)对翻译转换的研究将翻译第三符码进一步定义为一种由翻译过程产生的语篇,是一个显性化(explicitation)的过程,提出了显性化的假想(explicitation hypothesis),认为翻译的过程就是一个显性化的过程,目标文本的意义比源文本更加明晰化。随后布拉姆—库尔卡又对翻译中的衔接与连贯的切换进行了具体的分析。

其他翻译理论家从功能主义视角将“译本的相对自主性”看成是社会因素直接作用于译者行为的结果。霍尔兹—曼塔里(Justa Holz-Mänttari)更是创造出一个新名词“译者行为”(translatorial action)来代替“翻译”(translation)。这个词不仅包含翻译、改编的意思,还包括编辑和咨询等含义,可以表达各种各样的跨文化交际行为。译者变得像是一个通过跟委托人沟通后制定“产品规范”(product specification)的专家,并生产符合接受者文化圈特定需要的“信息发送机”(message transmitter)。译作不再寻求与原文对等,而是提供一份能满足委托人需要的目标文本。

汉斯·费米尔(Hans Vermeer)是翻译目的论的拥护者,他相信翻译要在具体的目的的

指导下,使译文文本和原文文本达到功能上的对等,并且强调译者和译文文本的地位。费米尔的思想与文艺史和文艺批评读者反应理论以及接受美学理论相似,他的理论反映了翻译研究由侧重语言学和形式的翻译理论转向注重功能和社会文化因素的翻译观。

多元系统理论与目的论有着相似之处。受多元系统理论影响,勒弗维尔(André Lefevere)继承并发展了佐哈尔和图里的文化系统和规范概念。他认为翻译、编辑、文集编撰、文学史和工具书的编写都应该被看成是“折射”或“重写”的形式。他在《大胆妈妈的黄瓜:文学理论中的文本、系统和折射》中提及“折射把文学作品从一个系统带到另一个系统中”,并会受到该系统的“赞助人”、“诗学”和“意识形态”等因素的制约。

这一时期的后结构主义将居于从属地位的译文解放出来,把译文作为独立的文本来阅读,引发了人们对传统翻译理论的思考。1985年路易斯发表了《翻译效果的衡量方法》,在文中他重新定义了“忠实”,并提出了“忠实”与“创造”的对立关系,强调译者的创造性。

贝尔曼(Antoine Berman)对翻译伦理的基础进行了区分,他质疑民族中心主义翻译,民族中心主义翻译通过将原文本吸收到目标语及其文化中将原文本变形(deforms)。对于贝尔曼来说,翻译就是一次“异域的考验”,他在《翻译和异域的考验》一文中详细地探讨了翻译中存在的种种“变形倾向”(deform tendencies)。他在通过心理分析的方法使翻译的文本分析丰富化方面做出了突出贡献。

后结构主义对心理学、马克思主义、女性主义产生了重要的影响,同时也使翻译理论家更加强烈地意识到语言使用的等级性和排他性,进而关注原文本所承载的政治经济利益关系和译本对意识形态的影响。钱伯兰(Lori Chamberlain)在《翻译的性别和隐喻》中将焦点放在17世纪以来翻译理论中常常出现的性别隐喻,尝试从女性主义角度展开深入的翻译理论研究。

同时,在20世纪80年代后殖民主义对翻译理论、区域研究、文学理论和文艺批评也产生了一定影响。

简而言之,20世纪80年代的翻译理论研究十分繁荣,涉及不同的语篇、领域和学科。各个翻译理论研究流派层出不穷。

4.2 汉斯·费米尔

4.2.1 汉斯·费米尔(Hans J. Vermeer)简介

汉斯·费米尔(Hans J. Vermeer)是德国海德堡大学翻译学院教授,德国功能派翻译理论的代表人物之一。他长期从事语言与翻译研究,发表的译学作品不胜枚举,其中包括目的论的奠基文献《普通翻译理论的框架》(*Ein Rahmen für eine allgemeine Translationstheorie*, 1987),还有《翻译理论论文集》(*Aufsätze zur Translationstheorie*, 1983),《目的与翻译委任——论文集》(*Skopos und Translationsauftrag—Aufsätze*, 1989),《翻译目的理论:正论与反论》(*A Skopos Theory of Translation: Some Arguments for and Against*, 1996),《是不再问什么叫翻译学的时候了》(*Starting to Unask What Translatology Is about*, 1998)和《翻译教学法》(*Didactics of Translation*, 1998)。其中最具代表性的是《翻译行动中的目的与任务》(*Skopos and Commission in Translational Action*, 1989)。在该文中,费米尔从整体上对功能派的主要理论——目的论(skopos theory)进行了概述并对目的论中各因素的相互关系进行了详细的讨论并驳斥了反对目的的若干观点。

4.2.2 汉斯·费米尔翻译理论

Hans J. Vermeer

SKOPOS AND COMMISSION IN TRANSLATIONAL ACTION

Translated by Andrew Chesterman

THIS PAPER IS a short sketch of my *skopos* theory (cf. Vermeer 1978, 1983; Reiss and Vermeer 1984; Vermeer 1986; and also Gardt 1989).

1 Synopsis

The *skopos* theory¹ is part of a theory of translational action² (*translatorisches Handeln*—cf. Holz-Mänttari³ 1984; Vermeer 1986:269—304 and also 197—246; for the historical background see e. g. Wilss⁴ 1988:28). Translation is seen as the particular variety of translational action which is based on a source text (cf. Holz-Mänttari 1984, especially p. 42f; and Nord⁵ 1988:31). (Other varieties would involve e. g. a consultant's information on a regional economic or political situation, etc.)

Any form of translational action, including therefore translation itself, may be conceived as an action, as the name implies. Any action has an aim, a purpose. (This is part of the very definition of an action—see Vermeer 1986.) The word *skopos*, then, is a technical term for the aim or purpose of a translation (discussed in more detail below). Further: an action leads to a result, a new situation or event, and possibly to a “new” object. Translational action leads to a “target text” (not necessarily a verbal one); translation leads to a *translatum* (i. e. the resulting translated text), as a particular variety of target text.

The aim of any translational action, and the mode in which it is to be realized, are negotiated with the client who commissions the action. A precise specification of aim and mode is essential for the translator. —This is of course analogously true of translation proper; *skopos* and mode of realization must be adequately defined if the text-translator is to fulfil his task successfully.

The translator is “the” expert in translational action. He is responsible for the performance of the commissioned task, for the final *translatum*. Insofar as the duly specified *skopos* is defined from the translator's point of view, the source text is a constituent of the commission, and as such the basis for all the hierarchically ordered relevant factors which ultimately determine the *translatum*. (For the text as part of a complex action-in-a-situation see Holz-Mänttari 1984; Vermeer 1986.)

One practical consequence of the *skopos* theory is a new concept of the status of the source text for a translation, and with it the necessity of working for an increasing awareness of this, both among translators and also the general public.

As regards the translator himself, experts are called upon in a given situation because they are needed and because they are regarded as experts. It is usually assumed, reasonably enough, that such people “know what it's all about”; they are thus consulted and their views listened to. Being experts, they are trusted to know more about their particular field than outsiders. In some circumstances one may debate with them over the best way of pro-

ceeding, until a consensus is reached, or occasionally one may also consult other experts or consider further alternative ways of reaching a given goal. An expert must be able to say—and this implies both knowledge and a duty to use it—what is what. His voice must therefore be respected, he must be “given a say”. The translator is such an expert. It is thus up to him to decide, for instance, what role a source text plays in his translational action. The decisive factor here is the purpose, the *skopos*, of the communication in a given situation. (Cf. Nord 1988:9)

2 *Skopos* and translation

At this point it should be emphasized that the following considerations are not only intended to be valid for complete actions, such as whole texts, but also apply as far as possible to segments of actions, parts of a text (for the term “segment” (*Stück*) see Vermeer 1970). The *skopos* concept can also be used with respect to segments of a *translatum*, where this appears reasonable or necessary. This allows us to state that an action, and hence a text, need not be considered an indivisible whole. (Sub-*skopoi* are discussed below; cf. also Reiss⁶ 1971 on hybrid texts.)

A source text is usually composed originally for a situation in the source culture; hence its status as “source text”, and hence the role of the translator in the process of intercultural communication. This remains true of a source text which has been composed specifically with transcultural communication in mind. In most cases the original author lacks the necessary knowledge of the target culture and its texts. If he did have the requisite knowledge, he would of course compose his text under the conditions of the target culture, in the target language! Language is part of a culture.

It is thus not to be expected that merely “trans-coding” a source text, merely “transposing” it into another language, will result in a serviceable *translatum*. (This view is also supported by recent research in neurophysiology—cf. Bergström 1989.) As its name implies, the source text is oriented towards, and is in any case bound to, the source culture. The target text, the *translatum*, is oriented towards the target culture, and it is this which ultimately defines its adequacy. It therefore follows that source and target texts may diverge from each other quite considerably, not only in the formulation and distribution of the content but also as regards the goals which are set for each, and in terms of which the arrangement of the content is in fact determined. (There may naturally be other reasons for a reformulation, such as when the target culture verbalizes a given phenomenon in a different way, e. g. in jokes—cf. Broerman 1984; I return to this topic below.)

It goes without saying that a *translatum* may also have the same function (*skopos*) as its source text. Yet even in this case the translation process is not merely a “trans-coding” (unless this translation variety is actually intended), since according to a uniform theory of translation a *translatum* of this kind is also primarily oriented, methodologically, towards a target culture situation or situations. Trans-coding, as a procedure which is retrospectively oriented towards the source text, not prospectively towards the target culture, is diametrically opposed to the theory of translational action. (This view does not, however, rule out the possibility that trans-coding can be a legitimate translational *skopos* itself, oriented pro-

spectively towards the target culture; the decisive criterion is always the *skopos*.)

To the extent that a translator judges the form and function of a source text to be basically adequate *per se* as regards the pretermained *skopos* in the target culture, we can speak of a degree of “intertextual coherence” between target and source text. This notion thus refers to a relation between *translatum* and source text, defined in terms of the *skopos*. For instance, one legitimate *skopos* might be an exact imitation of the source text syntax, perhaps to provide target culture readers with information about this syntax. Or an exact imitation of the source text structure, in a literary translation, might serve to create a literary text in the target culture. Why not? The point is that one must know what one is doing, and what the consequences of such action are, e. g. what the effect of a text created in this way will be in the target culture and how much the effect will differ from that of the source text in the source culture. (For a discussion of intertextual coherence and its various types, see Morgenthaler 1980: 138—140; for more on Morgenthaler’s types of theme and rheme, cf. Gerzymisch-Arbogast 1987.)

Translating is doing something: “writing a translation”, “putting a German text into English”, i. e. a form of action. Following Brennenstuhl (1975), Rehbein (1977), Harras (1978; 1983), Lenk (edited volumes from 1977 on), Sager (1982) and others, Vermeer (1986) describes an action as a particular sort of behaviour; for an act of behaviour to be called an action, the person performing it must (potentially) be able to explain *why* he acts as he does although he could have acted otherwise. Furthermore, genuine reasons for actions can always be formulated in terms of aims or statements of goals (as an action “with a good reason”, as Harras puts it). This illustrates a point made in another connection by Kaspar (1983: 139): “In this sense the notion of aim is in the first place the reverse of the notion of cause.” (Cf. also Riedl 1983: 159f.) In his *De Inventione* (2. 5. 18.) Cicero⁷ also gives a definition of an action when he speaks of cases where “some disadvantage, or some advantage is neglected in order to gain a greater advantage or avoid a greater disadvantage” (Hubbell 1976: 181—183).

3 Arguments against the *skopos* theory

Objections that have been raised against the *skopos* theory fall into two main types.

3. 1 Objection (1) maintains that not all *actions* have an aim; some have “no aim”. This is claimed to be the case with literary texts, or at least some of them. Unlike other texts (!), then, such texts are claimed to be “aimless”. In fact, the argument is that in certain cases no aim *exists*, not merely that one might not be able explicitly to *state* an aim—the latter situation is sometimes inevitable, owing to human imperfection, but it is irrelevant here. As mentioned above, the point is that an aim must be at least potentially specifiable.

Let us clarify the imprecise expression of actions “having” an aim. It is more accurate to speak of an aim being *attributed* to an action, an author *believing* that he is writing to a given purpose, a reader similarly *believing* that an author has so written. (Clearly, it is possible that the performer of an action, a person affected by it, and an observer, may all have different concepts of the aim of the action. It is also important to distinguish between action, action chain, and action element—cf. Vermeer 1986.)

Objection (1) can be answered *prima facie* in terms of our very definition of an action: if no aim can be attributed to an action, it can no longer be regarded as an action. (The view that any act of speech is skopos-oriented was already a commonplace in ancient Greece—see Baumhauer 1986:90f.) But it is also worth specifying the key concept of the skopos in more detail here, which we shall do in terms of translation proper as one variety of translational action.

The notion of skopos can in fact be applied in three ways, and thus have three senses: it may refer to

- a. the translation process, and hence the goal of this process;
- b. the translation result, and hence the function of the *translatum*;
- c. the translation mode, and hence the intention of this mode.

Additionally, the skopos may of course also have sub-skopoi.

Objection (1), then, can be answered as follows: if a given act of behaviour has neither goal nor function nor intention, as regards its realization, result or manner, then it is not an action in the technical sense of the word.

If it is nevertheless claimed that literature “has no purpose”, this presumably means that the creation of literature includes individual moments to which no goal, no function or intention can be attributed, in the sense sketched above.

For instance, assume that a neat rhyme suddenly comes into one’s mind. (This is surely not an action, technically speaking.) One then writes it down. (Surely an action, since the rhyme could have been left unrecorded.) One continues writing until a sonnet is produced. (An action, since the writer could have chosen to do something else—unless the power of inspiration was simply irresistible, which I consider a mere myth.)

If we accept that the process of creating poetry also includes its publication (and maybe even negotiations for remuneration), then it becomes clear that such behaviour as a whole does indeed constitute an action. Schiller and Shakespeare undoubtedly took into account the possible reactions of their public as they wrote, as indeed anyone would; must we actually denounce such behaviour (conscious, and hence purposeful), because it was in part perhaps motivated by such base desires as fame and money?

Our basic argument must therefore remain intact: even the creation of literature involves purposeful action.

Furthermore, it need not necessarily be the case that the writer is actually conscious of his purpose at the moment of writing—hence the qualification (above) that it must be “potentially” possible to establish a purpose.

One recent variant of objection (1) is the claim that a text can only be called “literature” if it is art, and art has no purpose and no intention. So a work which did have a goal or intention would not be art. This seems a bit hard on literature, to say the least! In my view it would be simpler to concede that art, and hence also literature, can be assigned an intention (and without exception too). The objection seems to be based on a misunderstanding. Nowadays it is extremely questionable whether there is, or has even been, an art with no

purpose. Cf. Busch(1987:7):

Every work of art establishes its meaning aesthetically[...]The aesthetic can of course serve many different functions, but it may also be in itself the function of the work of art.

Busch points out repeatedly that an object does not “have” a function, but that a function is attributed or assigned to an object, according to the situation.

And when Goethe acknowledges that he has to work hard to achieve the correct rhythm for a poem, this too shows that even for him the creation of poetry was not merely a matter of inspiration:

Oftmals hab' ich auch schon in ihren Armen gedichtet,
Und des Hexameters Mass leise mit fingernder Hand
Ihr auf dem Rücken gezählt.

(*Römische Elegien* 1.5.)

[Often have I composed poems even in her arms,
Counting the hexameter's beat softly with fingering hand
There on the back of the beloved.]

Even the well-known “*I'art pour I'art*” movement (“art for art's sake”) must be understood as implying an intention; namely, the intention to create art that exists for its own sake and *thereby* differs from other art. Intentionality in this sense is already apparent in the expression itself. (Cf. also Herding (1987:689), who argues that the art-for-art's-sake movement was “a kind of defiant opposition” against idealism—i. e. it did indeed have a purpose.)

3.2 Objection (2) is a particular variant of the first objection. It maintains that not every *translation* can be assigned a purpose, an intention; i. e. there are translations that are not goal-oriented. (Here we are taking “translation” in its traditional sense, for “translation” with no *skopos* would by definition not be a translation at all, in the present theory. This does not rule out the possibility that a “translation” may be done retrospectively, treating the source text as the “measure of all things”; but this would only be a translation in the sense of the present theory if the *skopos* was explicitly to translate in this way.)

This objection too is usually made with reference to literature, and to this extent we have already dealt with it under objection (1); it can scarcely be claimed that literary translation takes place *perforce*, by the kiss of the muse. Yet there are three specifications of objection (2) that merit further discussion:

- a. The claim that the translator does not have any *specific* goal, function or intention in mind; he just translates “what is in the source text”.
- b. The claim that a specific goal, function or intention would restrict the translation possibilities, and hence limit the range of interpretation of the target text in comparison to

that of the source text.

c. The claim that the translator has no specific addressee⁸ or set of addressees in mind.

Let us consider each of these in turn.

a. Advertising texts are supposed to advertise; the more successful the advertisement is, the better the text evidently is. Instructions for use are supposed to describe how an apparatus is to be assembled, handled and maintained; the more smoothly this is done, the better the instructions evidently are. Newspaper reports and their translations also have a purpose; to inform the recipient, at least; the translation thus has to be comprehensible, in the right sense, to the expected readership, i. e. the set of addressees. There is no question that such “pragmatic texts” must be goal-oriented, and so are their translations.

It might be said that the postulate of “fidelity” to the source text requires that e. g. a news item should be translated “as it was in the original”. But this too is a goal in itself. Indeed, it is by definition probably the goal that most literary translators traditionally set themselves. (On the ambiguity of the notion “fidelity”, see Vermeer 1983: 89—130.)

It is sometimes even claimed that the very duty of a translator forbids him from doing anything else than stick to the source text; whether anyone might eventually be able to do anything with the translation or not is not the translator’s business. The present theory of translational action has a much wider conception of the translator’s task, including matters of ethics and the translator’s accountability.

b. The argument that assigning a *skopos* to every literary text restricts its possibilities of interpretation can be answered as follows. A given *skopos* may of course rule out certain interpretations because they are not part of the translation goal; but one possible goal (*skopos*) would certainly be precisely to preserve the breadth of interpretation of the source text. (Cf. also Vermeer 1983: a translation realizes something “different”, not something “more” or “less”; for translation as the realization of *one* possible interpretation, see Vermeer 1986.) How far such a *skopos* is in fact realizable is not the point here.

c. It is true that in many cases a text-producer, and hence also a translator, is not thinking of a specific addressee (in the sense of; John Smith) or set of addressees (in the sense of; the members of the social democrat party). In other cases, however, the addressee(s) may indeed be precisely specified. Ultimately even a communication “to the world” has a set of addressees. As long as one believes that one is expressing oneself in a “comprehensible” way, and as long as one assumes, albeit unconsciously, that people have widely varying levels of intelligence and education, then one must in fact be orienting oneself towards a certain restricted group of addressees; not necessarily consciously—but unconsciously. One surely often uses one’s own (self-evaluated) level as an implicit criterion (the addressees are (almost) as intelligent as one is oneself. . .). Recall also the discussions about the best way of formulating news items for radio and television, so that as many recipients as possible will understand.

The problem, then, is not that there is no set of addressees, but that it is an indeterminate, fuzzy set. But it certainly exists, vague in outline but clearly present. And the clarity