

中央研究院 民族學研究所集刊

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目 錄

Family Structure and Economic Development
in Taiwan SUNG-HSING WANG

影響工人工作滿足感的因素：領導方式、
情境因素及人格特質 鄭伯璵
楊國樞

Propitiating the House Spirit among the Lahu Nyi
(Red Lahu) of Northern Thailand: Three Lahu
Texts with an Ethnographic Introduction.....ANTHONY R. WALKER

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Family Structure and Economic Development in Taiwan	SUNG-HSING WANG	1
影響工人工作滿足感的因素：領導方式、 情境因素及人格特質	鄭伯璵 楊國樞	13
Propitiating the House Spirit among the Lahu Nyi (Red Lahu) of Northern Thailand: Three Lahu Texts with an Ethnographic Introduction.....	ANTHONY R. WALKER	47
泰雅族東賽德克羣的部落遷徙與分佈(上).....	廖守臣	61

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中華民國六十六年秋季

FAMILY STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN TAIWAN*

SUNG-HSING WANG

In determining the interrelation between family system and economic development, we cannot confine ourselves merely to the influence of family system on economic development and vice-versa. A more positive approach to this question is to look for the distinctive characteristics of a certain family structure and how these features can be utilized under specific economic set-ups to achieve the desired results. To ascertain what role the Chinese family system actually plays in the path of Taiwan's economic development, this paper brings up the following points: (1) Increased job mobility, (2) Leverage on capital flow, and (3) Management of industrial enterprise.

Chinese family system has been the main subject of investigation for social scientists concerned with the study of Chinese social structure either in the traditional or in the modern period. In analyzing traditional Chinese society, the family system is taken as the basis of all social organizations. It is as if the study of the family system opens the door to understanding of Chinese society itself; based on the assumption that society is composed of families and families are the basic units of all social groups. In contrast, coming to the study of modern Chinese society, the main preoccupation is towards establishing the persistence or non-persistence of the Chinese family system; at the same time determining the role it plays in the processes of change and transformation which started towards the end of the Ching Dynasty.

I

This paper will mainly touch upon the study of Chinese family system in this age of rapid modernization. Generally speaking, studies regarding this subject are divided into two categories: the first one is concerned with pinpointing the effects of economic change on the family system and the second one deals with the opposite—knowing the effects of family system on economic development.

Taking the first category—how does economic change affect family system—we can consider changes such as the atomization of the family when society entered a market economy system, the changing role of parents, the changing relationship among family members, and the problems of youth delinquency as parts of this discussion.

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As for the second one, the consideration is whether the family system has a positive or negative effect on economic development or whether family system assists or hinders economic development. In discussing this point, it is rather difficult to arrive at a definite criteria of what constitutes a positive or a negative effect. Very often, we get into contradicting conclusions regarding one particular system. In other words, one system can at the same time be beneficent and detrimental to economic development depending on the viewpoint we take in making the examination.

Let us take Chinese familism as an example. A number of scholars in Japanese and Chinese modernization conclude that the Chinese family system is the culprit in the slow modernization of China (Levy, Jr. 1953). However, bringing the same family system to Southeast Asian countries, we can also say that Chinese extended family and web of kinship relations is a positive catalyst in the development of a capitalist entrepreneurial system in most of these countries (Madge 1974).

Why is it then that one family system can become an obstruction to economic growth within China and at the sametime become a useful instrument in the process of economic advancement within Southeast Asian society? This discrepancy shows to a large extent that in discussing the role of a certain family system upon economic development, it may prove futile to be overly preoccupied with the superficial effects, positive or negative, of such and such a system. Going into a deeper and more critical investigation of the dynamics of that family system under a particular framework, may in most cases, prove to be more fruitful. This line of investigation will take into consideration the relationship between family system and economic development within a particular social set-up. It will involve drawing out the distinctive or outstanding structural features of a family system to determine how such features function under particular economic environments.

Using this third category of investigation, this paper aims to present the relationship between family structure and economic development in a better light. It aims to clarify how distinctive features of a family structure, under different economic set-ups, can be manipulated differently so much so that when either expressed or submerged they become significant factors in hastening or retarding economic growth and change. In the presentation following, this paper endeavors to cite various cases to illustrate the distinct features of the Chinese family structure and their role vis-a-vis a given economic situation.

II

It is a general observation that because of the practice of dividing family property equally among sons, no affluent family can stay affluent for three or four generations. Another observation is that in traditional agricultural societies, it is a common practice for a poorer brother to become a dependent of the wealthier brother. Under such circumstances, development of a system of capital accumulation appears to be quite an impossible task.

Allow me to mention two controversial views on this observation. Martin Yang, a

good-hearted man who always look at the sunny side of life, gives an encouraging picture of a well-organized pooling of family property in his *Taitou, Shantung Province*, while Fei Hsio-tung points out the darker pessimistic picture of property-division in his *Earthbound China*.

Martin Yang gives an account of two families (Yang 1945)

A family of the Yang clan has three sons, one of whom is a very popular mason in this district. The family was terribly poor two decades ago but because the sons worked very hard and saved as much as they could, the family's condition gradually improved. It was really the efforts of the eldest that contributed most to this. His trade brought in about one hundred dollars every year besides his own maintenance. A great of this money was saved to buy land or repair houses. Recently, he helped his two younger brothers to get married, though he has not married himself... (p. 77) Another family, a member of the P'ans has four sons. They are primarily a farm family, but in addition run a small foundry in the village, and the first son teaches in the village school. One son usually works in the foundry while the others work on the farm, though when the exigencies of the season demand it, they all work together. The proceeds from work on the farm, teaching in school, and the foundry are all turned over to the family as a whole, that is to the family head... As a result of this cooperation, the family is now one of the most prosperous in the village....

Martin Yang, in this account, paints an idyllic picture of a well-organized system of pooling underlying the Chinese family system.

Fei Hsiao-tung takes the contrary view on this aspect of property division. He gave as illustration the grandsons of the family of Wang: The grandfather left equal shares of land to both sons. However, while the eldest son worked hard to make the family prosper, his sons did not gain much benefit for they were many in number. On the other hand, the second son died early and had only one heir to his share of land and therefore got all the land. Fei's conclusion on this case is: "How tragic it is that the blessing of economic security in this rural economy should require the premature death of a father" (Fei and Chang 1948: 117-118).

In another work on *Kinship* (1974), Fei discussed the inheritance institution with equal division of property among brothers under the heading of *Chi tou hsiang chien* (莢豆相煎)

(1). He wrote:

One more brother, less one part of property. This is a simple arithmetical proposition. When I was in country villages, I heard frequently that someone made a joke on children and said: "Your mother is going to bear a younger brother to you and share your property."

(1) *Chi Tou Hsiang Chien* (莢豆相煎) - *Chi* is beanstalk, *Tou* is beans; this is the title of a poem compiled by Ts'ao Chin (曹植) and is hereby translated as follows:

Beanstalk burns to cook the beans
Inside boiling pot the beans cry loud:
You and I from one root grow
Why needst you hurry to burn me out?

This poem illustrates the point that it is not unusual for brothers of the same parents to come at odds when the question of dividing family property come up.

Unlike Yang's systematically organized mode of property division, Fei sees the pessimistic side of the loser because he emphasized its sharing rather than pooling aspect.

To illustrate further, this family system when brought under a contrasting economic set-up such as a fishing economy, the results again will be entirely different. Allow me, at this point, to mention my own research on a fishing community of Kuei-shan Island (Wang 1967, 1971). In writing the report of this field study earlier, I did not particularly mention the point I just brought up. I only covered a description of the island's family system and the concept of 'sharing' derived from it. Now, looking at this fishing economy closely from the angle of development, we can find that the same family structure we found in an agrarian economy does not pose an obstacle in the management of the Kuei-shan Island fishing enterprise and instead becomes a motivating factor. The following three paragraphs are summarized from the concluding part of my 1971 thesis.

We all know that the Chinese family is built upon patrilineal descent. It is from this that Chinese derive the concepts of succession and inheritance. To the great mass of people without special social position, succession does not have any meaning at all and attention is placed on the question of inheritance. For the Chinese, succession is secondary to inheritance and both are expressed by the same term: *Ch'eng chi* (承繼).

However, if we take the Japanese family system for comparison, then we realize its distinctiveness. Inheritance, for the Japanese, bears no importance whatsoever. In contrast to the Chinese, succession plays a central role in Japanese society. Inheriting the property of a family is the result of succeeding to family and both are designated by the same term: *Sozoku* (相續).

A short time after the Japanese occupation of Taiwan, scholars studying the family institutions in Taiwan made this conclusion in comparing Chinese *Ch'eng-chi* with Japanese *Sozoku*:

The object of *Ch'eng-chi* is property but the object of *Sozoku* is the authority to which the property is attached.

In other words, the Chinese are inheritance-oriented while the Japanese are succession-oriented.

In a family under an inheritance-oriented society, the continuity of a family line depends not only on having generation follow generation, but also upon the uninterrupted transmission of the family's common property. In a report on *Social Change in a Suburban Village of Taipei* (Wen, et al 1975) Huang Hsun-erh points out that the inhabitants of the place possess strong attachment to the land and property left by their ancestors. They will not easily put such land bequeathed by their ancestors for sale, because such an action means an interruption of family line. Records of land selling from 1950 to 1971 gives this evidence (Wen 1975, 53-57):

Table I.

	Total	Land acquired by land reform	Ancestral land
Area	38.9104 ha	30.5006 ha	8.4098 ha
%	100.0%	78.4%	21.6%
Cases	170	159	11
%	100.0%	93.5%	6.5%

Table II.

	Land acquired by land reform	Ancestral land	Total
Sold	30.5006 (56%)	8.4098 (45%)	38.9104 (53%)
Unsold	24.4344 (44%)	10.0249 (55%)	34.4593 (47%)
Total	54.9350 (100%)	18.4347 (100%)	73.3697 (100%)

III

The opening statement of the "Contract of Family Division" best described the situation mentioned above. It said "The division of a main branch into smaller branches is a natural occurrence." This exemplifies that the division of a family is inevitable. In an inheritance-oriented society, the emphasis in cases of family division is essentially property division. Take a contract, for instance: It states that "the ancestral land, house and all farming elements acquired by myself will be divided into three parts..." Generally, each son has one part, a concubine's son one-half, a step-son one-fourth. In this process of family partition, we find that the sons, share in the family property takes the form of a stocks-share. Furthermore, the property of a family, a basis of Chinese family system, can be regarded as a joint-stock. The joint-stock is formed by the number of sons a family has. For instance, a family has three sons, it is accepted that family property is formed by three shares; if another is born much later, it follows that property will be composed of four shares. This concept is in great contrast with the Japanese norm of family property which is treated like a 'fund' and cannot be divided.

Because family property has the characteristic of a joint-stocks, we easily find the mechanisms of pooling and sharing built within the family system. The economic activities based on such a family can be defined as an 'inclusive economy'.⁽¹⁾ In contrast, we have

- (1) The readers will find from the context that the concept of 'inclusive economy' explicated here is mainly in the light of a comparison with the 'exclusive economy' of the Japanese. Myron Cohen has also made use of this term (1970, 1976). Some of my arguments in this paper are more or less in parallel with Cohen's most recent book (1976). I regret that this book came to my eyes only after this paper is finished and I had no time to rewrite it. My viewpoints here regarding the characteristic features of Chinese family structure are derived solely from my previous studies in 1967 and 1971.

the 'exclusive economy' of the Japanese which has *ie* as its basis.

Let us first talk about the inclusive economy of the Chinese family. Lin Yueh-hwa in his *The Golden Wing* (Lin 1948) described how Dunglin and his sister's husband jointly opened a store in the city. The Dunglin's share of the store, together with the land in the village, became the property of Dunglin's family. Dunglin stays in the city managing the store, his wife stays in the village together with Dunglin's mother, his brother and sister-in-law, and their children. The capital and income of the store, as well as the revenues from the village farm, are shared by the brothers. The two of them are much concerned with each other's work and both strive hard for the welfare of their family.

Let us take a more complicated example. Myron Cohen in 1965 made a study of Meinung, with Lin Shang-yung as the head of family. There are forty two people in all (Cohen 1970). The estates of this family are scattered into four areas, each area forming a household. These are:

- 1) The buildings and fields in the original village
- 2) A rice mill in an adjoining village
- 3) A merchandise store in the neighboring village dealing with fertilizers and animal feeds
- 4) Another farm and house twenty-five miles to the south

This example is often seen in families which are not yet partitioned.

Cohen went further to point out that the diversification of economy such as the example given above, induces the formation of joint family (Cohn 1967).

Now, let us go to the exclusive economy of the Japanese family system.⁽¹⁾ In Japan, only the eldest son can succeed the family head and all the family properties that come under his name. From the second son below, all must leave their natal family and seek their own fortune, usually even before they are married. In most occasions, they go to the city to seek their fortune and make a fresh start. Their only connection with their village family is that it usually arranges for their jobs or positions in the city, and then later arranges for their marriage. After marriage, the young couple establishes their own home and since then terminate their relationship and communication with the village home. Vogel in his work on kinship structure and Japanese modernization (Vogel 1967) believes that this kind of family system has rendered impetus to the industrialization of Japan and the emergence of a system of capital accumulation. Since the Meiji reformation, it seems that the number of rural households have not increased. At the same time, the young people who leave their hometown village for the city of industries, usually bring their *ie* or family loyalties into the new entrepreneurial group. I will add here that they brought this family loyalty even to the military group during World War Second.

To recapitulate, scholars of Japanese modernization and industrialization all agree that

(1) For more details on the Japanese 'exclusive economy' please refer to Ezra R. Vogel (1967).

the family system mentioned above is a valuable asset to an exclusive economy such as that existing in Japan. I agree with this statement too. However, I find it unfair and too simplified to use this criteria to judge the problem of Chinese modernization. Many have argued that the Chinese family system forms a stumbling block to economic change. I am not a confirmed nationalist but I do think that scholars should avoid jumping into conclusions without first giving the Chinese family system a broader and more open analysis. Let me discuss this pitfall further by going back to the original topic of the distinctive features of the Chinese family structure.

IV

Based on the above discussions, we can name three distinctive features of the Chinese family system:

- 1) It has an in-built mechanism of pooling and sharing
- 2) It is an inclusive economy
- 3) It has a natural tendency for diversification

The economic environment allowing, once these three features are given maximum expression, there is no doubt that Chinese family system has a salutary effect on economic development. Its functions are incongruent with the characteristics of the Japanese family system. Naturally, in an agricultural economy, capital is limited and diversification is hardly possible. One brother becoming a burden on the other is also a natural phenomenon. However, since industrialization in Taiwan has taken off after the Japanese occupation, we cannot see and nobody has talked about the family system hindering economic development. To ascertain what role the Chinese family system actually plays in the path of Taiwan's economic development, we can bring up the following points:

1) *Increased Job Mobility*—Like the example of Lin Shang-yung mentioned above, his family is founded on agriculture but he established two other enterprises besides his farm. Eberhard (1962) made a survey of businesses in Ching-mei, suburban district of Taipei City. In 106 business families in this area, 43.4% or 46 households are first generation businessmen. This mobility, of course, also applies to those who have gone to the cities as labourers. Like the Japanese family system, we can see the influence of the Chinese family system in pushing people out of the farm into the city-industries. But there is a divergent point from that of the Japanese. Those who have left their hometown villages, unlike the Japanese, do not disregard their origins and they retain their attachment to their home villages. O. Lang made a survey in the nineteen thirties with these findings: In Peking, the working class and the lower middle class are the tradition-bound group. They persist in the practice of sending financial aid home to feed their parents and family in rural areas (Lang, 1946) In Shanghai, a study reveals that 28 out of 44 labourers in textile factories and 13 out of 43 in civil service still possess landed property back in their hometowns. However, this property exists only in form because they receive no benefit from the

produce of the land. The land is left to their brothers to be cultivated and they do not share in the revenues from the farm. These lands are but symbols of security, something to go back to in case they lose their jobs in the cities (Lang: 1946).

This case is similar to our study on Rice Farming in Taiwan in 1971. Remittances from the city consists of 29% of the income in rural families. (Wang and Apthorpe 1974: 142) From this we can draw one conclusion. Because of this particular family system, relationship between the rural folks and the urban industrialized city folks are not terminated abruptly. A balance between these two groups is maintained by this particular system. The unproductiveness of agriculture in Taiwan, reaching its peak in 1971, did not create the destruction of agrarian economy. Likewise, the ill-effects of the energy crisis in industry starting in a few years back, did not create the same deterioration and damage as in other countries. Of course we also can mention the timeliness and effectiveness of state policy in warding off economic disaster but definitely, the family system can be credited for its salutary influence in maintaining economic balance. The demarcation between industrial and agricultural sectors is not very clear in Taiwan. But within the given family system, there is great flexibility between the two sectors.

2) *Leverage on Capital Flow*—My colleague at the Institute of Ethnology, Mr. Chuang Ying-chang, discussed this based on field work done in a village in Central Taiwan. He maintains that both the people in the village and town still consider themselves as part of the family even after it has been divided. Mr. Chuang has coined a new term for such a family unit: federal family which he defines as "A family unit in which the members do not share the same residence but maintain close social contacts, do not share common property but maintain a high degree of economic cooperation." He went further to point out that this new family system is a product of modernization in Taiwan (Chuang: 1972). This is an advantage to capital formation in a closer analysis. William Parish (1970: 182, 220) gave us some figures to exemplify this point.

	adult offsprings receiving financial aid from parents	among siblings
Tainan City	63%	47%
Kaoshiung	71%	43%
Detroit	30%	15%
Cleveland	47%	6%

Information of this kind cannot be found in the Japanese society. Perhaps, this kind of capital flow, especially among siblings, does not even exist in an exclusive economy.

From here we see that Chinese family system is important to intersectoral capital flow, and this is another point worthy of our attention. We often see some people from the cities returning to their village hometowns and initiating some innovations in their farm activities like setting up fish ponds, dairy farming and others (Wang and Apthorpe: 1974,

92-93). We can also see here examples of agrarian economy turning into the industrial sector.

T. H. Lee in his *Intersectoral Capital Flow in the Economic Development of Taiwan, 1895-1960* (1971), has discussed in detail the capital flow in two sectors. He confined his information mainly on the public sector. But capital flow in the private sector still needs further investigation, especially after the rise of small-scale enterprises in the 1950's.

3) *Management of Industrial Enterprise*—Most of the industrial enterprises in Taiwan have been formed since late 1950s. At this early stage of industrialization, people have already taken advantage of the diversification potentialities of the family system in expanding their enterprises. Such activities may be considered as a kind of multiformity and multilateral expansion. In such cases, a mother-enterprise is usually augmented to form several smaller related enterprises. Main rationale behind this can be traced to the lack of supporting or auxiliary industries to a certain enterprise, the desire of families to spread risks, and from the desire of individuals to pursue ventures of their own interest. In such related enterprises, capital is drawn from the family itself, with individual proprietors investing in each other's businesses. To minimize conflict, management of each particular enterprise is usually left to the interested party (Mark 1972).

The three points discussed above substantiate the contention that instead of having a baneful influence, family system can serve the ends of economic development. Furthermore, this paper wish to emphasize the point brought up at the beginning—that in determining the interrelation between family system and economic development, we cannot confine ourselves merely to the influence of family system on economic development and vice-versa. A more positive approach to this question is to look for the distinctive characteristics of a certain family structure and how these features can be utilized under specific economic set-ups to achieve the desired results.

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家族結構與經濟發展

(摘要)

王 崧 興

家族結構在經濟發展中所扮演的功能與運作過程，不能單以有利或有弊的結論為滿足，吾人應分析某一特定的家族結構的本質與特徵，然後再探討這些本質與特徵，如何在不同的經濟情境下發揮它的功能。本文指出，中國的家族制度對當前臺灣經濟發展有下列三點貢獻：(1)職業流動性，(2)資本流通，以及(3)中小企業的興起。

影響工人工作滿足感的因素： 領導方式、情境因素及人格特質

鄭伯璦 楊國樞

本研究之主要目的，在探討情境因素、領導方式及工人人格特質對各種工作滿足感的影響。其中情境因素是指工作技術水準因素（即工作性質），領導方式是指體恤因素與結構因素（以修訂之 SBD 測得），工人人格特質則指支配性的強弱（以 CPI 之支配性量表測得）。至於工作滿足感，則分別涉及工作本身、薪水、陞遷、班長、工作伙伴等各方面，係以修訂之 JDI 加以測量。本研究的受測樣本係取自某大塑膠工業公司，先以 SBD 施測 496 人，依據情境因素與領導方式分組後，共得 225 人。經以變異量分析法與多元直線迴歸分析後，獲得如下的主要結果：(1)班長之體恤因素或結構因素較高，則工人的整體工作滿足感較高。(2)體恤因素與工作性質的交互作用，對工作本身的滿足感有影響。(3)班長的結構因素較高，則工人對薪水滿足感較高；工作性質與支配性的交互作用對薪水滿足感也有影響。(4)工作性質與領導方式的交互作用，對工人的陞遷滿足感有影響。(5)在針車組的工人中，班長的體恤因素較高，則工人對班長的滿足感較高。(6)班長的體恤因素較高，則工人對工作伙伴的滿足感較高。

依照近代的看法，領導行為在本質上是屬於人際影響力 (interpersonal influence) 的一種 (Holland, 1971; Porter, Lawler III, & Hackman, 1975)。它至少包括三個要素：(1)領導者：舉凡領導者的人格特質、價值觀、動機、技巧及領導方式…等均屬此類要素；(2)下屬：包括下屬人員的人格特質、對領導者的看法、個人的需要…等；(3)情境因素：泛指工作結構、工作資源、團體性質、團體大小…等。經由這三個因素的交互作用，來探討領導行為才是有意義的。因此，晚近的研究者，均從這個方向來探討領導行為（例如，Fiedler 1964, 1967; Hollander & Julian, 1968, 1969; Nealey & Fiedler, 1968; Marr, 1971; McCormick & Tiffin, 1974）。

研究領導行為的主要目的之一，是想瞭解領導行為的內涵，然後設計出一套訓練計劃來，以便培養領導人才 (Greenwood & McNamara, 1969)。因此，在組織裏面研究領導行為時，必須兼顧到組織目標及領導目標的問題。所以，有效領導行為的研究是刻不容緩的事。這也就是 Fiedler (1967) 所說的“究竟何種人格因素或屬性，決定一個領導者是否有效力？”的問題。所謂效力，通常是指能達成團體目標而言的。而

團體目標則指團體生產力及團體成員的工作滿足感，前者是團體或組織的利潤目標，後者則為維持組織生存的目標 (Miner, 1969)。因為團體的生產力高，表示這個團體獲利的能力高；而工作滿足感 (job satisfaction) 則和流動率 (turnover)、怠工率 (absenteeism) 及訴怨 (grievance) 等有關係 (Vroom, 1964)。換句話說，假使工作者的工作不滿足感愈高，則工作者離職及曠職的可能性會提高。而領導的主要功能即在達成上述兩大目標。

晚近，利用交互作用的概念來研究有效領導行為的論文，還不在少數 (如 Fiedler, 1967; House, Filley & Gujarati, 1971; Hunt & Osborn, 1975)。但大部份均只注重兩變項間的交互作用而已，且研究通常在實驗室進行，或只是著重某一層面。但領導行為的情境因素，不但多而且複雜，因此有系統地選取幾種較重要的情境因素，來探討其和有效領導行為間的關係，是相當有意義的。因此，本文擬採用問卷調查法，以交互作用的眼光，來探討領導方式、下屬性格、工作性質及其他個人背景因素和工作滿足感間的關係。

一、領導方式

早期，Lewin 及其同事 (Lewin, Lippitt & White, 1939) 在美國揭開了一連串領導方式的研究。他們把注意力集中在社會氣氛 (social climate) 上，創造了三種領導方式，即為獨裁 (authoritarian)、民主 (democratic) 及放任 (laissez-faire)，並同時比較這三種領導方式對組織社會氣氛的影響。後來的人，如 Tannenbaum 及 Schmidt (1958) 發現，利用連續單一的向度來區分‘老板為中心’ (boss-centered) 及‘部屬為中心’ (subordinate-centered) 的領導行為是非常有意義的。但上述看法，或區分向度，並不能概括所有的領導行為。

因此，1950年左右，俄亥俄州州立大學的研究人員想搜羅所有關於領導行為的描述，並加以分析，以便概括所有的領導行為。首先，他們運用各種方法去搜集題目，建立領導行為描述的題庫，題目超過一千八百題。這些題目有的是經由領導人員的晤談而來，有的則經由觀察、問卷調查及其他有關期刊而來 (Stogdill & Sharle, 1948)。經過因素分析之後，得到兩個向度，一為體恤因素 (consideration)，一為結構因素 (initiating structure)，且發現這兩個向度是互相獨立的 (Fleishman, 1953)。體恤因素指領導者與從屬份子之間互相信賴、尊敬、並建立良好而溫暖的關係。但這並不表示兩者之間可以沒大沒小地互開玩笑，或完全放任部屬胡作亂為。而是強調領導者會深深地體會或察覺部屬的需要，且允許部屬們做決策，並鼓勵大家採用雙向的溝通方式。而結構因素則指領導者會界定或組合團體活動的行為。包括分派工作，說明工作