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# 社区、企业、合作组织与 农村公共产品供给

Community, Enterprise, Cooperative Organization and  
Rural Public Goods Supply


涂圣伟◎著



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# 序言一

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经过 30 多年的改革开放，中国社会已经进入了一个关键转型期，处在走向公平与可持续发展的转折点。要巩固和发展前一阶段的改革成果，赢得下一个 30 年，我们需要更多关注发展中存在的一些深层次矛盾和问题，以更大的勇气和决心继续推进改革，理顺各种重大利益关系。在这些绕不开、躲不过的问题中，城乡关系的调整首当其冲。20 世纪 80 年代，我们推进了以家庭联产承包责任制为代表的制度改革，开启了国家与农民之间分配关系的调整进程。我们很高兴地看到，在实施了农村税费改革、县乡财政管理体制改革、社会主义新农村建设等一系列重大政策之后，国家与农民之间的分配关系基本理顺，但相比而言，城乡之间利益关系的调整则明显滞后很多，城乡之间、工农之间的差距反而有扩大的趋势，当下所谓的“三农”问题，很大程度上是工农收入差距过大、城乡之间公共产品配置极度不合理造成的。

过去几十年来，我国农村发展取得了长足进步，但总体上仍远远落后于城市。在不少地区，特别是广大中西部地区，农村“路不通、水不洁、医无药、上学难、保障低”的现象还十分普遍。不仅如此，取消农业税后，由于农村基层政府财力匮乏，集体经济组织萎缩，农村开展公益事业已经越来越困难，大量道路损毁严重，农田水利设施年久失修，亟待引起高度重视。在当前统筹城乡发展的背景下，亟须加快调整城乡利益关系，完善农村公共产品供给机制，加强农村基础设施和公共服务建设，使广大农村居民能够参与并分享现代化的成果。本书选择关注农村公共产品供给问题，把握住了一个影响经济社会长远发展的重大议题，体现了作者在选题上的前瞻性和研究的针对性。

这本专著关于农村公共产品供给问题的研究，跳出了以政府作为主体的

研究框架，没有简单盲从西方主流观点，而是围绕私人主体展开，着重对现实中的微观现象进行理论上的反思和归纳，得出的部分结论很有启发意义。不仅如此，这本著作还有另外一大亮点，就是十分注重理论和方法上的创新。全书关于农村公共产品私人供给机理的分析，综合采用了公共选择理论、声誉理论、博弈论等经济学理论和社会资本、社会性合约等社会学理论，研究的视域比较宽，理论基础扎实。在通过大量实践调研所获得的数据资料的基础上，综合采用案例分析和计量分析方法，演绎与归纳并重，分析较为深入透彻。在研究内容方面，这本专著也有不少创新：一是从制度本身和社区治理两个方面来分析“一事一议”制度的有效性，探索了农村社区内村民自我供给公共产品的可行性问题；二是建立了一个合作组织集体行动分析框架，采用声誉理论解释了农民专业合作经济组织内部均衡的实现机理；三是从行为动机、利益补偿、风险防范等方面，分析了社区内生型企业、产业化龙头企业供给农村公共产品的机理，一定程度上弥补了现有研究的空白；四是对公共产品需求表达机制进行了梳理，并重点分析了主动接触机制的作用逻辑和制约因素，研究具有一定的开创性。

当前我国农村发展的形势复杂多变，各种新情况、新问题不断涌现，有些实践已经无法依靠现有的理论来解释，这为我们进一步开展理论研究提供了很好的样本，同时也提出了更高的要求。我们需要有更多的青年人参与到对这些问题的研究中，不断去总结实践、完善理论。这本专著能够及时关注这些问题，并长期进行跟踪积累，我认为很有意义，也希望这样的著作越来越多。让我们共同努力和期待。

涂圣伟是我的学生，不论在学校读书期间，还是毕业后就职于发改委宏观院，都表现出了勤奋好学、善于思考问题的特点。在这本专著付梓之际，我写一点文字，算是庆贺，也算是讨论和推介。

是为序。

孔祥智

2011年11月7日

## 序言二

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改革开放以来，中国依靠工业优先和城市偏向的制度安排，实现了从一个落后的传统农业国家向现代工业化国家的历史性转变，并顺利迈入工业化中期阶段，经济社会发展取得显著成就，综合国力和国际地位大幅提升。这些成就的背后，离不开农业、农民和农村的巨大支持。当前中国已经处在迈向高收入国家的历史新起点，已经具备了以工补农、以城带乡的基本条件，如果社会继续以牺牲农业和农村发展为代价来发展非农产业和城市，就可能错失加快推进农村建设和农业现代化的历史性机遇，就可能激化长期以来积累的各种矛盾，跌落中等收入国家陷阱。这要求国家必须重新审视和加强农村建设，切实改变农业和农村发展长期滞后的局面，推进经济社会更加均衡、更加平等的发展。农村公共产品供给问题是当前统筹城乡发展的核心问题，也是关系农业农村长远发展和农民切身利益的重大问题。加强农村公共产品供给问题研究，深入探讨城乡利益关系，是一个极具价值又极富挑战性的课题。《社区、企业、合作组织与农村公共产品供给》这本著作的出版，对中国学者跟踪公共产品理论前沿，丰富中国农村公共产品供给理论，促进城乡公共产品供给向均衡化方向发展无疑是一次十分有益的探索。

公共产品问题是经济学领域的一个历久弥新的话题，相关研究文献卷帙浩繁，但系统深入的研究还相对比较少见。涂圣伟博士的这本专著，不再囿于对公共产品供给中政府角色、功能的研究，而是立足市场有效配置资源的思路，选择公共产品私人供给这一焦点问题，不论在研究方法上还是研究内容上都有显著创新。近年来，随着农村经济社会环境的持续改善和市场化改革不断向纵深推进，私人参与农村公共产品供给的现象已经越来越多见。这些现象具有一定的典型性和趋势性，我们不可能也不应该忽视这些现象，因为这些现象中可能就隐藏着破解农村公共产品供给滞后问题的“密码”，隐



藏着创新公共产品供给理论的“钥匙”。本书很敏锐地抓住了这一微观现象变化，围绕搭便车和需求表达这两个公共产品供给的核心议题，运用经济学前沿理论，结合实践中的典型案例，分别对农村社区、农民专业合作社经济组织、社区内生型企业、产业化龙头企业供给农村公共产品的内在机理进行了深入分析，论证科学严谨，案例丰富生动，多种方法并举，调查扎实可靠，研究具有前瞻性，观点鲜明新颖，结论很有说服力，值得悉心阅读和思索。

当前全球发展不确定性增强，中国农村发展的形势复杂多变，这对我们开展理论研究工作提出了更高的要求。正如作者所言，这本书只是对农村公共产品私人供给问题所做的一次探索性研究，只是一个开始而不尽全面，还有很多相关问题的研究有待今后进一步深化。希望本书的出版有助于读者对中国农村公共产品供给问题有一个更加深入的认识，能够给广大理论和实际工作者带来启发，能对破解农村公共产品供给困局有所裨益。

蓝海涛

2011年11月22日

# 摘要

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20 世纪 50 年代以来,为了适应国家工业化建设需要,我国确立了统购统销、人民公社、户籍制度“三位一体”的制度体系,城乡二元结构体制逐步形成并不断强化,城市与农村之间的利益关系逐渐失衡,矛盾不断显现加深,发展差距持续拉大,突出表现为城乡公共产品供给的严重失衡。目前,我国城市基础设施、教育医疗等公益事业几乎完全由国家财政投入,农村公益事业却主要依靠农民自己。这种显失公允的政策安排,造成农村发展严重落后于城市,对国民经济的持续健康发展和整个社会的和谐稳定构成严峻挑战。21 世纪以来,为了弥合城乡二元结构冲突,着力解决农村公共产品短缺问题,政府适时提出加快推进城乡基本公共服务均等化,不断扩大公共财政覆盖农村的广度和深度。然而,由于城乡二元体制依然没有根本突破,资源错配格局没有显著扭转,农村公共财政体制尚未有效建立,政府保障农村公共产品供给的意愿和能力均显不足。尤其是在现行体制下,各级政府之间缺乏清晰的责任划分,公共产品供给责任不断向下转嫁,基层政府被迫承担了过重的负担。实行分税制改革特别是取消农业税后,基层政府普遍出现债务危机,提供公共服务的能力显著弱化,“小马拉大车”的问题日趋加剧。农村公共产品政府供给缺位与农民需求刚性增长之间,产生了越来越难以调和的矛盾。如何从根本上解决农村公共产品供给滞后问题,有效保障农村居民的生存权和发展权,使发展真正惠及广大农村居民,已成为统筹城乡发展的重大课题。

结合我国国情和国外经验看,破解当前农村公共产品供给短缺困局,应该发挥政府的主导作用,但不可能也没有必要完全依赖政府,必须跳出唯政府论的思维定势,充分发挥私人部门的作用,形成政府、市场、第三部门多中心治理格局。实践中,随着技术的进步和制度条件的变化,农村社区、部



分营利性企业、农民合作组织等,或出于对政策的自主性适应,或出于集体生存或发展的需要,或出于对经济利益的最大化追求,或为增进社会公共利益,以不同的方式直接或间接地介入农村公共产品供给领域,并展现出巨大活力和发展潜力,一定程度上弥补了政府缺位造成的公共产品供给不足问题。然而,受西方主流经济学关于公共产品供给市场失灵论的影响,国内相关理论研究并没有及时跟进实践的发展,私人供给公共产品的现象被人为选择性地忽视或做出有偏见的解释。简单盲从西方主流观点而忽视农村私人供给公共产品的现实,显然不是一种科学的态度。本书依此立论,跳出公共产品供给唯政府论的研究定式,重点关注农村公共产品私人供给现象。这不是对政府在农村公共产品供给中主导作用的否定;相反,是在认可政府作用的基础上,依据理论研究现状和经验观察所做的一种理性化探求的必然结果,这对公共产品理论研究的推进和实践困局的破解都将有所裨益。

本书共7章。主要围绕搭便车和需求表达两大核心议题,系统分析了社区、企业与合作组织供给农村公共产品的内在机理,以及不完全信息条件下农村公共产品的需求表达问题。第1章为导论,主要介绍了研究背景和意义,对相关概念进行了界定,并简要回顾了国内外研究现状。第2章从社会资本角度,围绕“一事一议”制度的合理性问题,结合村级访谈和农户调查资料,探讨了农村社区公共产品自我供给的效率问题。第3章构建了一个农民合作组织供给公共产品的动态分析框架,从声誉效应角度探讨了组织内部合作均衡的实现机制,并结合具体案例进行了解释。第4章和第5章主要分析了企业供给农村公共产品的行为机理,重点对社区内生型企业和产业化龙头企业供给公共产品的行为动因、成本补偿机制等进行了理论和实证分析,探讨了营利性企业供给公共产品的技术和制度条件。第6章主要对不完全信息条件下“用手投票”、“用脚投票”、主动接触等需求表达机制的适用性和有效性进行了综合评价。第7章总括全书,对本书的主要结论进行了进一步凝练和阐述,并提出了相关对策建议。

通过分析,本书得出以下几点基本结论:(1)在村民自治制度框架下,由于“一事一议”制度在供给决策、成本分担和生产管理等方面存在一定缺陷,同时社区内传统社会资本治理机制日渐式微,以村民自治制度为核心的正式治理机制尚不健全,农村社区通过“一事一议”制度自我供给公共产品并不具有普遍的有效性。(2)理性选择学派关于“集体行动困境”的观点过于悲观,在重复博弈和关联博弈条件下,即使不存在强制或选择性激励,声誉机制作用下的农民合作组织依然可以克服成员搭便车问题,实现公共产品自我有效供给。如果能够使成员间的博弈变得可重复,并建立起有效

的规章和分级监督体系、舆论谴责和制度性惩罚体系、声誉信息传递体系，依靠声誉机制，农民专业合作经济组织可以成功走出集体行动的困境。(3) 企业供给公共产品并不会必然失败。社区内生型企业通过与社区居民达成社会性合约，低价使用社区资金和/或土地来补偿公共产品供给成本，社区居民则以低于银行年利率的资金租赁价格和/或低于征地补偿的土地使用权转让价格为公共产品消费付费，有针对性的户口准入制度排除了外来人口不用付出资源使用权转移的代价消费社区公共产品的可能性。产业链中龙头企业供给公共产品的成本，可以通过产业化收益、产品搭售收益以及政府补贴得到补偿；依靠专用性投资、公私搭售、缴纳违约金和虚拟高价等商品契约安排，以及引入中间组织扩展商品契约并建构信任治理机制，龙头企业可以比较有效地排除机会主义农户。(4) 在当前制度条件下，农民基本被“锁定”在社区内，由于参与“一事一议”投票的收益难以补偿成本，农村基层组织存在垄断性质，以及农民需求表达能力有限，社区内“用手投票”、“用脚投票”和主动接触机制均难以实现农民需求的顺利表达和有效转换。这一结果可以推演到农民合作组织和企业供给公共产品的情形。

本书只是对农村公共产品私人供给问题所做的一次探索性研究，资料和时间限制决定这仅仅是一个开始，对未来的研究而言，关于社会性合约的规范问题、农民专业合作经济组织成员异质性与搭便车治理问题、需求表达机制的相互替代关系问题等，都是进一步深化研究的重要课题。

# Abstract

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Since 1950s, In order to adapt to the needs of the construction of national industrialization, China established the Trinity system of State monopoly for purchase and marketing, the people's commune and household registration system. Then the dual-structure between urban and rural gradually formed and constantly improved. It bring about the seriously unbalance benefit relations between urban and rural area. The urban-rural contradictions are constantly deepened and the development gap is continually widened, which prominently appears the disproportion supply of public goods. Nowadays, urban public welfare establishments like infrastructure, education and health are almost wholly supported by national finance, while public welfare establishments in rural areas are loaded on peasants. These obvious unfair institutional arrangements cause of rural development lags seriously behind city, which seriously challenge the healthy development of national economy and also the whole social harmony and stability. Since the new century, In order to bridge over the chasm and solve the shortage problem of rural public goods, the task of equalizing public services for both urban and rural areas is put forward to balance urban and rural development in the new stage, and constantly expand the coverage of public finance in rural areas more widely and deeply. However, as the city and countryside dual system has not been broken radically, the resources mismatch pattern has not been converted markedly, and the rural public financial system has not been established yet, so the willingness and ability of government to guarantee rural public product supply are both insufficient. Especially in the current political power system, governments at all levels are lack of clear responsibility division, so the basic level governments are forced to assume the overload, as public products supply responsibility

are constantly shifted downward. After the tax-separating system reform, especially the cancel of agricultural tax, the township governments appear debt crisis generally, the public service capability are weakening and the problem of “small Mara and horse carts” is becoming increasingly salient. The conflict between absent governmental supply and peasants’ rigid growth demand for rural public service becomes more and more irreconcilable. How to solve the lag of rural public product supply fundamentally, to guarantee rural residents’ right to existence and development effectively, so that the development can really benefit the vast rural residents, has become a major subject of balancing urban and rural development.

From our country’s actual conditions and overseas experience, to solve the problem of rural public product supply shortages, the government should play a leading role, but it is impossible and also have no need to completely dependent on government, while we should jump out of the thought that public products can only be supplied by government, and make full use of private sectors, to form a pattern with multicenter management of government, market and the third sector. In reality, many bodies besides government like rural community, enterprise and farmer cooperative organizations are involving in the rural public product supply areas, with different ways directly or indirectly, and have showed great vitality and development potential. They or for the autonomous adaption of the policy, or for the need of collective survival and development, or for the pursuit of maximizing economic benefits, or for the increasing of social and public interests, etc. , some extent make up for the problem of rural public goods supply vacancy caused by the weakening of government’s public service capability. However, under the influence of market failure theory raised by western mainstream economists, the theoretical research lags behind the practice in our country. The behaviors of non-governmental bodies are ignored deliberately by scholar or given biased explanation. It is obviously not a scientific attitude to simply follow the western mainstream view while ignore the fact that in rural areas, some public products are supplied by private sectors, and that is what this research based on, it jumped out of the theory that public products can only be supplied by government, especially focused on private supply of public goods in rural areas. It doesn’t mean that we deny government’s leading function in rural public goods supply; on the contrary, the analysis is an inevitable result of rational research based on admitting the governmental function according to the theory research and experimental observation. This study will be good for promoting the public goods

theory research and breaking the practical predicament of rural goods supply.

This book is divided into 7 chapters. Mainly based on two core topics—consumers’ “free-rider” and demand expression. It systematically analysis inner mechanism of public products supply by community, enterprise and cooperation organizations in rural areas, and the demand preference expression problems on rural public product supply under incomplete information. The first chapter is introduction part, which mainly introduces the background and significance, defines the related concept, and briefly reviews the research situation at home and abroad. The second chapter, from the perspective of social capital. Combines with the basis of survey data, centers on the rationality and performance of “case-by-case approval system”, and discusses the behavioral efficiency of village community self-supply of rural public goods. The third chapter constructs a dynamic analysis framework, and meanwhile analyzes the mechanism of realizing the cooperation equilibrium inside one organization from the angle of reputation, then gives an explanation based on concrete cases. The fourth chapter and fifth chapter mainly discuss the inside mechanism of enterprises’ supply of rural community public goods. This chapter mainly analyzes the behavioral motivation, cost compensation mechanism, etc., of community-based enterprise and leading enterprises’ supplying of public goods, and then discusses the technological and institutional conditions for enterprise to effectively supply public goods. The sixth chapter appraises the applicability and validity of some demand expression mechanisms which are voting by hand, voting by foot and citizen-initiated contact, under the condition of asymmetry information. The seventh chapter is to summarize the full text, which compacts and generalizes the ideas of this study, and puts forward some policy suggestions.

On the basis of analysis, this study draws some basic conclusions as follow :

(1) it is not universal that village community effectively provides the rural public goods through case-by-case approval system induced by some reasons. One is case-by-case approval system exists defects in supply decision, cost sharing and production management; another is the traditional social capital governance mechanisms in village which are gradually declining; the third is the formal governance mechanism based on the system of villager autonomy is still not constructed fully; (2) the viewpoint of the rational choice school about “collective action dilemma” is too pessimistic. Under the condition of “repeated game” and “related game”, farmers’ cooperative economic organization based on their reputation effect can solve free-rider

problem and providing public goods effectively, in spite of compulsory mechanism or selective incentives. If farmers' cooperative economic organization can make the game among members repeatable, and meanwhile effectively construct the rule and hierarchical supervision system, consensus condemnation and institutional punishment system, reputation information transmission system, it can solve the member's free-rider problem and thus go out of "collective action dilemma"; (3) Private enterprises' supply of public goods isn't fate to failure. Community-based enterprise compensates the cost through using the community capital and/or land at the relative low price, because community residents and enterprise have already reached a social contract. Community residents should pay for consuming public goods by the capital rent lower than bank interest rate and/or the land-use-right price lower than land compensation fee. Pertinent household registration system makes it impossible to consume the community public goods for those migrated population who don't pay the cost of transferring their resources use right. The cost of public goods supply for leading enterprise in industry chain can be compensated from the industrialization revenue, profit of tying product and government subsidy. Through constructing the trust-based governance mechanism, leading enterprise can exclude the opportunistic farmers more effectively by commodity contract which contains the agreement about specific investment, tying product, payment penalty and virtual high price, and extending it through introducing inter-organization; (4) farmers are locked in rural community under the background of current institutions. Because the revenue of participating the voting of case-by-case approval system can't recover the cost, and basic organizations have monopoly nature as well as peasants' capacity of expressing demand is limited, the demand expression mechanism in community can't express and transfer the farmer's preference effectively, such as voting by hand, voting by foot, and citizen-initiated contact. This result can be deduced to the situation of farmers' cooperative economic organizations and enterprises' supply of public goods.

This study is just an attempt study on the problem of non-governmental bodies' supply of rural public products, which is a beginning point and not comprehensive yet when it comes to the limit of data and time. For further study on non-government supply of rural community public goods, some problems are important topics, such as the problem of social contract standard, the influence of member heterogeneity on solving "free-rider" problem, the substitution relationship between different demand preference expression mechanisms, etc.

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