



# 武汉抗战 与民族复兴

涂文学 邓正兵 主编

中国社会科学出版社

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# 序

叶金生

武汉抗战是中华民族对外抗击史上辉煌的一页，也是武汉城市史上辉煌的一页。前事不忘，后事之师。缅怀这段苦难而光荣的岁月，对于我们振奋民族精神，实现中华民族的复兴有巨大的现实意义。

70年前，在平津沪宁相继失守的情况下，武汉成为当时全国抗日运动的中心，事实上的暂时首都。在抗日民族统一战线的旗帜下，各党派、各阶层民众团结抗战，共赴国难，掀起了轰轰烈烈的抗日救亡运动的高潮。1938年的武汉抗战，是中国抗日战争中规模最大、时间最长、歼敌最多的一次大会战。虽然武汉最终沦陷，但是沉重地打击了日本侵略者的嚣张气焰，粉碎了日本侵略者速战速决、最后灭亡中国的企图，使抗日战争进入僵持阶段。事实上，武汉抗战为抗日战争及世界反法西斯战争的胜利做出了巨大的贡献，它的伟大意义和历史功绩永垂青史。

第一，武汉抗战是当时反法西斯战争的主战场，承担了抗击日本法西斯主力的艰巨任务。武汉抗战时期正值全世界遭受法西斯侵略者严重威胁之时。在欧洲，德国法西斯吞并奥地利之后，又把侵略的魔掌伸向了捷克斯洛伐克，通过《慕尼黑协定》强占苏台德区。德意法西斯还公然挑起西班牙内战，怂恿支持西班牙法西斯肆意发动叛乱。此前，意大利也在非洲吞并了埃塞俄比亚。在亚洲，日本法西斯在“卢沟桥事变”以后悍然全面扩大侵华战争，继侵占东北之后又侵占了华北、华东大片的中国领土。由于当时美、英、法等西方大国对法西斯侵略采取姑息纵容和妥协退让的绥靖政策，致使中国不得不在缺少国际援助的情况下在远东太平洋地区独自承担起抗击日军全部主力的重任。仅在武汉会战中，中国军队就抗击了日军14个师团的兵力，而在武汉抗战时期，

## 2 武汉抗战与民族复兴

整个中国战场共抗击日军陆军 34 个师团中的 32 个，日本陆军总兵力的 94%。由此可见，武汉抗战在当时确实是名副其实的世界反法西斯战争的主战场。在武汉抗战期间，中国军民的英勇奋战大量地歼灭和消耗了日本法西斯的有生力量，牵制了日军的主力，既粉碎了日军北进侵略苏联的企图，又阻滞了日军南进的计划，为此后美英等盟国准备太平洋战争争取了宝贵的时间。包括武汉人民在内的中国广大军民，以自己巨大的民族牺牲为世界反法西斯战争做出了卓越的贡献。

第二，武汉抗战是中华民族抗日战争的伟大转折点，实现了由战略防御阶段向战略相持阶段的重大转折。在武汉抗战期间，随着以国共合作为基础的抗日民族统一战线的不断巩固扩大和全国抗日救亡运动的日益高涨，国共两党在正面战场与敌后战场相互支持、密切配合，歼灭了日军大量有生力量，仅在徐州会战和武汉会战中，中国军队分别投入了 60 多万和 100 多万兵力，在绵延数千里的战线上与日军进行了数百场血战。在华北、西北、察哈尔和津浦路沿线的中国军队也与日军展开了多次激战。中国共产党领导的八路军、新四军则分别在华北和华中挺进敌后，广泛地开展抗日游击战争。八路军在华北先后取得了神头岭、响堂铺、长乐村等许多重要战役的胜利，并对正太、同蒲、平汉等交通线展开了大规模的破击战，沉重地打击了日军。新四军在武汉建军以后也迅速地完成了改编，随即挥师东进敌后。在武汉抗战期间，先后取得了多次战斗的胜利，歼灭了大批的日伪军。与此同时晋察冀、晋察鲁豫、晋绥、山东和华中五大抗日根据地也随着敌后战场的开辟而初步形成。在整个武汉抗战期间，国共两党从正面战场和敌后战场对日军的两面夹击，使日军付出了惨重的代价。仅武汉会战，中国军民就击沉日军舰艇 640 余艘，击毁日军飞机 100 余架，击伤日军官兵 12 万余人，消耗日本财力物力达到 30 亿日元以上。日军不仅未能实现速战速决征服中国的战略企图，反而从此丧失了发动大规模侵略战争进攻的能力，因此武汉抗战就成为中华民族抗日战争由战略防御转向战略相持阶段的伟大转折点。

第三，武汉抗战在政治、经济、文化与思想各方面为长期抗战奠定了重要的基础，成为中国持久抗战的奠基石。在政治方面，武汉抗战是国共两党在八年抗战中合作最为默契、最为融洽的时期，被誉为第二次国共合作的“蜜月期”。这一时期，全国各党派、各阶层、各民族一致

空前团结，同仇敌忾，共同抗日，表现出了高度的民族凝聚力和爱国热情，这一切都为后来的持久抗战奠定了政治基础。在经济方面，抗战爆发后不久，国民政府就开始组织和动员沿海地区的工商企业、金融机构和学校向内地转移。武汉作为当时全国第二大工商业城市、金融中心和内地重要的交通枢纽，在这次迁移中迅速成为全国的经济和金融中心，当时全国各地迁移到武汉的工厂有 170 多家，加上武汉本地原有的工厂，总数达到将近 700 家，年工业总产值达到 2 亿元以上。中国、中央、农民、交通四大银行和全国许多的金融机构也迁来武汉。武汉沦陷前，这些工商企业、金融机构和学校又有组织地向大西南、湘西、鄂西等地撤退和迁移。当时从武汉迁往川、陕、湘、滇、黔、贵等地的工厂共有 250 家，占全国内迁工厂总数的一半。长达十个多月的武汉抗战，为中国的经济文化重心的西迁争取了时间，为国家保存了经济实力和基本国力，为开发大西南和长期坚持抗战创造了条件，打下了基础。在思想文化方面，武汉当时已成为全国抗日救亡运动和抗战文化宣传的中心，数以百计的文化团体、民族救亡团体以及上千名文化艺术界人士云集武汉，掀起了轰轰烈烈的全国性抗日救亡运动和抗战文化宣传的高潮。中国共产党提出的全面抗战、持久抗战思想和各种抗日主张也随之传遍神州大地，深入人心。这种民族意识的觉醒、爱国热情的高涨和抗战文化的繁荣，为后来中国的持久抗战奠定了重要的思想文化基础，为新民主主义文化的形成产生了深远的影响。

第四，武汉抗战是中国走向国际舞台的突破口和中国共产党外交工作的新起点，向世界展示了中华民族英勇不屈、百折不挠的精神。武汉抗战之前，中国国际地位不高，曾是一个受人歧视、冷落和欺凌的贫穷落后的国家，通过武汉抗战中国军民用自己的鲜血和生命捍卫了国家独立和民族的尊严，同时也在国际上赢得了前所未有的尊重和广泛的同情与支持。苏联派出空军志愿队来中国，与中国空军并肩作战。来自世界各地许多进步人士和国际友人，如史沫特莱、斯诺、白求恩、艾黎、陈纳德等为了反法西斯事业纷纷来到武汉，用各种方式支持中国人民的抗战，他们的国际主义精神和正义行动为中国和世界各国的交往架设了友谊的桥梁。曾经长期被封锁围困在中国边远乡村的中国共产党也正是在武汉抗战时期走向了都市、走向全国并登上了国际舞台，向世界展示了自己的风采，吸引了世界关注的目光。周恩来、董必武等中共领导人在

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武汉曾多次会见国际友人，接待外国记者。世界各国捐献的抗战物资由武汉八路军办事处源源不断地转送到延安和各新四军驻地。由此可见，武汉抗战不仅是中国走上国际舞台的突破口，也是中国共产党外交工作的新起点。

今天，我们开展对武汉抗战历史的研究，就是要宣传武汉抗战在中国抗日战争和世界反法西斯战争中的历史功绩，弘扬民族精神，凝聚民族力量，激励和动员海内外中华儿女为祖国的统一大业、为实现中华民族的伟大复兴贡献力量。

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# 历史记忆与城市升华

## ——纪念武汉保卫战 70 周年

章开沅

历史记忆是城市的宝贵文化遗产，它不仅增添了城市的底蕴与魅力，而且可以促进城市的升华。

我最近从南京归来，发现南京又有很大变化。其中之一，就是由于日军大屠杀衍生的悲情城市情结，逐渐转向为营造和平之都，显示出更为健康的社会心态与宽阔胸怀。我认为这就是一个城市的升华。由六朝古都到民国首都，到和平之都，历史底蕴与现实生活相融合，并且预示着更为辉煌美好的明天，这就是南京人的智慧。

从历史记忆的蕴藏而言，武汉并不比南京逊色；但对于历史资源的发掘与利用，则或多或少存在若干差距。南京早在 20 世纪 90 年代，就敢于肯定 20 几位外国人救援中国难民的丰功伟绩，其中包括多个美国传教士，特别是还有一个德国纳粹。可是武汉却迟迟未能重视武汉保卫战的历史记忆，虽然也有不少有识之士为此呼吁，然而落实于行动却是步履蹒跚。

武汉保卫战是伟大的抗日战争的一个重要组成部分，也是伟大的世界反法西斯战争的一个重要组成部分。1938 年保卫大武汉的民众热潮，吸引了全世界的反法西斯进步力量的关注，乃至一些“保卫马德里”的国际战士，也不远万里赶来武汉，参与保卫中国战时“临都”，仿佛是投身于一场伟大的圣战。

武汉曾经是抗日战争的政治中心与军事中心，引领着全国各个主要战场的浴血抵抗，特别是通过国共合作而彰显的同仇敌忾，武汉曾经成为凝聚整个民族团结的精神堡垒。武汉保卫战是壮烈的，经由武汉转向

## 2 武汉抗战与民族复兴

西南地区的大撤退也是壮烈的，中外学者已经开始关注那波澜壮阔的难民潮，其中蕴涵着可贵的民族刚毅精神和丰沛的生命活力，此乃八年抗战取之不尽用之不竭的民气源泉。

武汉虽然是沦陷了，但百万以上的大规模军队浴血奋战，不仅牵制并消耗了侵略者的主要军力，而且还彻底粉碎了日本最高统帅部的速战速决美梦，促使抗战决定性地进入战略相持阶段。即使在武汉沦陷以后，中国军民的英勇抵抗，仍然长期扼守两湖战略要地，有效地保卫了以四川为主体的大后方，这样才实现了名副其实的八年抗战。

今天，海内外学者能够欢聚一堂，纪念武汉保卫战的丰功伟绩，并且深入探讨其历史意义，这是众多热心人士长期共同努力策划推动的结果。我们特别感谢以陈幸、余传韬为代表的辞修先生的家属，是他们多年如一日地整理出版家藏宝贵文献，为我们提供了丰富的有关武汉保卫战的第一手资料。同时，我们也感谢以蒋方智怡女士为代表的介石先生亲属，是他们慷慨大度地公开提供了蒋氏日记原始稿本，这些都为我们深入研究这段重要史事提供了极大方便。早在 1995 年纪念抗战胜利 50 周年时，我在台北就倡言“尊重历史，超越历史”，我们现在既然有这么良好的学术氛围与资料条件，就不应该辜负海峡两岸热心人士乃至整个华人世界的殷切期望，努力研究武汉保卫战，并且弘扬当年那种昂扬的民族精神，把武汉建设得更为美好，尽快成为名副其实的历史名城与国际大都市。只有这样，我们才可以告慰武汉保卫战中先烈们的在天之灵。

# 武汉抗战：历史的转折点

——来自外国学者的视角

麦金农

（美国亚利桑那州立大学）

Stephen R. MacKinnon, Arizona State University (USA)

Foreign historians of Republican China writing in English like Eastman or Chi Hsi - sheng have often dismissed inspirational role of United Front Wuhan in 1938 as inconsequential or at best quixotic, a fleeting anomalous moment in the otherwise fratricidal politics of the Republican era.<sup>①</sup> Indeed, if we consider only the history of the Guomindang and Communist Parties, this is largely true. The ten months of unified governance at Wuhan were an aberration—a time of unusual amity both in terms of internal factionalism and in relations between the parties. The Guomindang leaders exercised surprising flexibility: they tolerated diversity of opinion, limited police repression, and made deft use of propaganda. The behavior of the Communists was likewise strangely out of sync with the accepted narrative of what lay behind their rise to power in 1949. Though leaders like Zhou Enlai and Wang Ming gave stirring speeches that connected Wuhan to Madrid by calling on workers and army to defend the tricity in the manner of their Spanish brothers, their organizational initiatives were few.<sup>②</sup> They were slow to respond to the efforts of others in organizing ref-

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① Eastman (1984 & 1986) and Ch'i Hsi-sheng (1982).

② See for example the lead editorial by Wang Ming, Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai in Xinhua ribao, June 15, 1938.

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ugee welfare, students, women, and intellectuals. And most noticeably, the Communists did little to organize the workers toiling in the burgeoning war industries of Wuhan and being badly exploited in the eyes of foreign observers. The CCP leadership's obsession at the time was with combating Trotskyite influences on students, intellectuals, and the media of Wuhan.

The more important historical question is a bigger one: why did the defense of Wuhan become a turning point in both the history of the War and the history of twentieth century China. It is a story which was being written at the time not by the Guomindang or CCP, but by the refugee population that overwhelmed Wuhan and surrounding cities during the spring of 1938. The effort made by the refugees as a community under the military leadership of the group of Baoding graduate generals led by Chen Cheng is the focus of this paper (and book on which it is based) . . . changed international opinion and won support for China's long term war effort and strategy of *chijiu zhan* against the Japanese.

Nationwide the flight of refugees in 1937—1938, first to the south and then inland to the west, was an immediate result of the terrible violence of the early years of the war. The movement of peoples was unprecedented, even for Chinese history. Family members who had survived the killing and destruction of war as well as the rampages of Japanese troops during the first few weeks of occupation fled in terror. They had no clear destination in mind and took few belongings with them. Needless to say, they were also deeply traumatized by the violence they had witnessed; everyone had a grim personal story to tell. But precisely because the violence had been so extreme and arbitrary, and the path to survival so haphazard, the refugee experience became transformative. When the population of Wuhan doubled within a few months, producing a social and health crisis of grave proportions, refugees pulled together as a community in new ways. Because their survival to this point had seemed miraculous, uniting to make a last stand became a moral necessity, and psychologically a way of facing survivor guilt. Such an attitude helps explain the desperately optimistic atmosphere that gripped Wuhan for ten months in 1938, standing in sharp contrast to the panic and chaos that

had characterized the fall of Nanjing and Jinan in November and December of 1937.

The key to understanding why the civilian population pulled together as they did in the face of a seemingly hopeless situation lies in the military history of the defense of Wuhan. The defense of Wuhan was led by a group of senior generals—most them Baoding *junxiao* graduates. Chiang Kaishek's leadership was symbolically important, but decision-making and leadership on the battlefield was in the hands of generals like Chen Cheng, Li Zongren, Bai Chongyi, Xue Yue, and others. Initial victories at Taierzhuang in April during the battle for Xuzhou boosted morale and made overnight heroes of the commanders. It also strengthened the civil authority that the Baoding generals were exercising over Wuhan through the Military Affairs Council (*Junshi weiyuan hui*) led by General Chen Cheng (陈诚). In other words, it was the concentration of military and political power in the hands of these generals that created an atmosphere of tolerance for experiment in social and cultural affairs which was unique for a Chinese capital. Of key importance politically was the generals' encouragement of a free press. To promote unity and political participation, the new media of Wuhan publicized major changes in social organization and cultural activity as part of the war effort.

In these ways the Wuhan experience of 1938 anticipated broad patterns of change, such as the unprecedented mobilization and politicization of the populace, both urban and rural, that would characterize the rest of the war period (and extend well into the 1950s). While defending their city for ten months, I argue in my book that the activists of Wuhan initiated changes in Chinese society, culture, and politics which were as far-reaching as those that transformed Europe during the First World War.

Wuhan in 1938 became a laboratory for cultural experimentation. Among the intellectuals who gathered at Wuhan—a group that included most of the nationally prominent figures in many fields—there was consensus that culture must be turned into a potent propaganda weapon in the war against the Japanese. Lao She (老舍) was at the height of his influence promoting the *tongsu wenhua* movement. The arts and letters must be reshaped so as to reach the

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masses – especially the rural masses—and persuade them, at the very least, to cease cooperating with Japanese occupying forces. Among the writers, there were disagreements about how to do this. I highlight in the book clashes between Lao She and Feng Xuefeng (冯雪峰). Should traditional folk forms and styles be reshaped (as new wine in old bottles *jūping zhuang xīnjiu*) or completely new forms of art be tried?

The overall result of the war effort in the cultural sphere has been criticized by foreign scholars like Vera Schwarcz and leading Chinese scholars like Li Zehou (李泽厚) as a tragic watering down of the New Culture experiments associated with the “renaissance” period of the May Fourth Movement. But it would be a mistake to see the Wuhan effort simply as a process by which intellectual elites were co-opted by the state. At Wuhan state power was fragmented; the authority of the central government was relatively weak. The embrace of new directions in cultural production at Wuhan was clearly voluntary, elite inspired, and enthusiastically pursued at the time. The atmosphere was too much for May 4<sup>th</sup> generation writers Wen Yiduo and Qian Zhongshu or the painter Xu Beihong who retreated from Wuhan, repulsed by the strength of the popularization movement. Intellectual elites were reacting to pressure from their peers, not the state.

The impact of the popularization movement on Chinese culture was long-lasting. It was later picked up and magnified skillfully by cultural commissars in Yan'an—by figures like Zhou Yang and eventually by Mao in his talks at the Yan'an Forum of 1942. Can the fact that the Chinese Communist Party's won the support by the late 1940s of leading cultural figures like Lao She, the painter Xu Beihong, the cartoonist Feng Zikai, the philosopher Feng Youlan, and others be attributed to enthusiasms generated at Wuhan? Perhaps. But it would certainly be ahistorical to blame the enthusiasms of the Anti-Japanese War period for the repression of intellectuals during the 1950s (Anti-Rightist Movement) and the excesses that culminated in the Cultural Revolution of 1966—1976.

Other, more positive interpretations of the cultural impact of the war become possible when we look at the Wuhan period in terms of the history of Chi-



nese journalism.<sup>①</sup> Leninist-inspired controls on the media by either the Guomindang or Communist Parties were not present at Wuhan. The result was a remarkable blossoming of voices in the daily newspapers and periodicals, as well as in the arts. Not a single publisher or journalist was arrested or murdered in 1938, a record for a Chinese capital. The Wuhan media scene was also so vibrant because the more adventurous treaty-port publications like *Da Gongbao* and *Shenghuo* of Tianjin and Shanghai were reestablished there, finding new homes and audiences in inland China.<sup>②</sup> One lesson from Wuhan is never to underestimate the power and ingenuity—including speed of response—of Chinese publishers and journalists when censorship is reduced.

Another legacy of Wuhan was the state-sponsored public health campaigns that began to be organized for both the rural and urban populations. These proved to be early steps taken toward the national health systems that were established later in the Peoples Republic of China and Taiwan. Similarly, the organization of refugee welfare centers (*Nanmin*. . . ) and relief way stations at Wuhan paved the way for the state to take major responsibility in such matters and trained those who would lead in these fields during the second half of the twentieth century. Most visible at the time was the concerted effort made at Wuhan to rescue children orphaned by the war (*nanmin ertonghui*). Mme Chiang Kaishek herself led the charge, pushed by remarkable activists like the Shanghai lawyer Shi Liang (史良). The state's assumption of major responsibility for orphans was new, and has remained a pillar of the Chinese welfare state ever since.

More difficult to describe with precision was the changing position of women during the war. Out of necessity, many were forced out of the home and into the workplace – often as widows left to fend for themselves and their children as sole breadwinners. Higher education expanded during the war. This gave a growing percentage of young women opportunities for service be-

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① Stephen MacKinnon, "Toward a History of the Chinese Press in the Republican Period", *Modern China*, vol. 23, no. 1 (January, 1997), pp. 3–32.

② Wang Jianhui, "Da Wuhan: 1937–38 nian de quanguo zhuban zhongxin", in *Wuhan luntan*, no. 12 (December 2000), pp. 85–90.