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
第十辑

NO. 10

儒学：学术、信仰和修养

Confucianism: Scholarship, Faith, and Self-Cultivation

刘笑敢 主编



漓江出版社

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
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# —目录—

## 主题论文：儒学：学术、信仰和修养

*Ruxue between Scholarship, Faith, and Self-Cultivation: Some*

*Desultory Historical and Methodological Reflections*(徘徊在学术、信仰和修养之间的儒学：一些历史省察和方法论的断想)

John Makeham(梅约翰)

*Reading Confucianism in the West: Domestication, Manufacture and*

*Reinvention*(儒家在西方的解读：归化、营造与再造)

On-cho Ng(伍安祖) 23

将“功夫”引入哲学

倪培民 49

天人合一：学术、学说和信仰——再论中国哲学之身份及研究

取向的不同

刘笑敢 著(陈孝龙 协助) 71

从学术、修养、信仰论孔门儒学

劳悦强 103

民主的形式和儒家的内容——再论儒家与民主的关系

李晨阳 131

儒家道德实践理论新论

杨祖汉 147

清末民初儒教的“去宗教化”

黄进兴 177

## 专论

陆象山的心性论——劳思光方法论的运用

钟彩钧 203

龚自珍论乾嘉学术：“专门之学”的兴起——钩沉传统学术分

化的一条线索

张寿安 231

价值与事实的分离？——民国的新史学及其批评者(上)

王汎森 259

## 学思录

在探索中反思——我的学术之路

牟钟鉴 297

## 评书台

回归文本、超越文本及思孟学派的呈现——读梁涛先生  
《郭店竹简与思孟学派》

孔德立 315

## 新叶林

《齐物论》的哲学语言

仲 辉 329

## 回音谷

对柏啸虎《“无为”的认知科学研究》一文的回应

李 伟 347

规范伦理学何以成为“经验上可信赖的”？

——对森舸澜先生的回应

徐英瑾 351

《庄子》中“变”与“化”的关系问题——与郑泽绵博士商榷

陈孝龙 355

一生襟抱人文开——对孟旦治学经验的感受

李晓英 359

## 编后语

纯学术与真生活

刘笑敢 363

## 第一辑至第十辑总目索引

369

## 友刊目录

*Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy*

380

《中国哲学史》

383

## 稿约

《中国哲学与文化》稿约

386

***Ruxue* between Scholarship, Faith, and Self-Cultivation:  
Some Desultory Historical and Methodological Reflections  
(徘徊在学术、信仰和修养之间的儒学:  
一些历史省察和方法论的断想)**

John Makeham (梅约翰)\*

**Abstract:** The first half of this paper is an historical reflection on the fact that over the past century in China, academic scholarship on *ruxue* 儒学 has flourished and self-cultivation has all but disappeared. It recapitulates the consequences that academic institutionalization has had for *ruxue*; reviews some contemporary assessments of the consequences of the institutionalization, professionalization and systematization of *ruxue*; and notes concerns about the pressure that has been brought to distinguish between “the philosophical” and “the religious” as well as concerns about whether “religion” is an appropriate framework for discussing *ruxue*. This section of the paper concludes with a response to Kwong-loi Shun’s 信广来 recent critical observation that viewing Chinese thought from the perspective of Western philosophical conceptions does not do full justice to the insights into the ethical experiences of human beings that are conveyed through concepts distinctive of Chinese ethical traditions.

The second half of the paper covers two broad sets of issues. First, I draw attention to the fact that the resurgence of academic and intellectual interest in *ruxue* in recent decades has brought with it a welter of terms to distinguish different conceptions of *ruxue*. As such, I argue, before attempting to answer such questions as “What is the relationship between

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the promotion of Confucianism as a national cultural faith and the study of Confucianism as an academic discipline?” and “Should academia take up the role of promoting Confucianism as a national cultural faith or even the role of ‘life mentor’?”, it should be recognised that there is limited consensus in contemporary Chinese academic discourse about how *rujiao* 儒教, *ruxue*, and the *rujia* 儒家 tradition should be distinguished. The second issue concerns the dangers of having the political system of China becoming involved in promoting Confucianism as a national cultural faith. I draw on the lessons of Taiwan’s experience with the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement of the mid-1970s in which *ruxue* was conscripted by the Guomindang. I argue that the lessons learned there are just as relevant today in the case of Mainland China.

**Keywords:** self-cultivation, institutionalization, Confucianism, *ruxue*

Viewed from perspective *ruxue*’s 儒学 intellectual history over the *longue durée*, the tension between scholarship and self-cultivation might well be dismissed simply as a resurfacing of the old tension between “honoring the moral nature” (*zun dexing* 尊德性) and “following the path of inquiry and learning” (*dao wenxue* 道问学). Since Song times, these two styles of practice have been portrayed as alternating trends in the pursuit of the *rujia* 儒家 way; sometimes viewed as complementary, at other times as antithetical. Over the past century, however, the relationship between them has been neither complementary nor antithetical. Instead, academic scholarship has flourished and self-cultivation has all but disappeared. ①

## I. Academic Institutionalization and *Ruxue*

Sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein describes the intellectual history of the 19th century as being “marked above all by [ the ] disciplinarization and professionalization of knowledge, that is to say, by the creation of

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① This, of course, is not to claim that scholarship on cultivation has come to an end

permanent institutional structures designed both to produce new knowledge and to reproduce the producers of knowledge.”<sup>②</sup> In China, similar processes began to take shape in the decades after 1900, as Western disciplinary models gradually superseded traditional schemes of knowledge classification. In the case of the new academic discipline of Chinese philosophy, Western philosophy provided key conceptual paradigms, vocabulary and technical terms, bibliographic categories, and even histories and periodization schemes essential to the demarcation, definition and narration of Chinese philosophy. This was not, however, a simple case of the blanket inscription of Western philosophy upon a Chinese *tabula rasa*. Nor was the process by which Western models of knowledge categorization became introduced into China a passive one in which the “foreign” was imposed on the “native.” Rather, it was an ongoing process of negotiation and appropriation initiated and conducted by Chinese protagonists, in which traditional categories of Chinese knowledge were “translated” into the new academic category of *zhexue* 哲学.

## II. Master Studies (*zhuzi xue* 诸子学)

By the late 1890s, the swelling tide of Western learning had hastened the demise of the authority of the Thirteen Classics and in so doing had also enabled new conditions conducive to the promotion of Masters Studies. Thus, in the translation of traditional categories of Chinese knowledge to modern categories of disciplinary knowledge, the writings of the pre-Qin masters (*zhuzi* 诸子)<sup>③</sup> constituted the main corpus of texts that were re-inscribed as the foundational texts of Chinese philosophy. This process culminated in the publication of Hu Shi's 胡适 (1891-1962) *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang* 中国

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② Immanuel Wallerstein et al., *Open the Social Sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 7.

③ This category includes such figures as Laozi, Zhuangzi 庄子, Liezi 列子, Han Feizi 韩非子, Xunzi 荀子, Mencius, Gongsun Longzi 公孙龙子, Mozi 墨子, Guanzi 管子, and so forth.



哲学史大纲 (An Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy) in 1919, following his return to China in 1917 to take up a position in the philosophy department of Peking University to teach courses on the history of Chinese and Western philosophy. The revival of interest in Masters Studies in the late Qing provided an essential impetus in this process.

A key work promoting Masters Studies was Zhang Binglin's 章炳麟 (Taiyan 太炎; 1869-1936) *Qiushu* 诹书 (Writings to Prompt Action; 1900). *Qiushu* broke the traditional mould in which *ruxue* was accorded an elevated status, by treating the *ru* 儒 as just one school among many. In the "Xue bian" 学变 (Transformations in Learning) chapter Zhang praised Wang Chong 王充 (27-ca. 100) for his criticisms of Confucius and in the "Ding Kong" 订孔 (Evaluating Confucius) chapter,<sup>④</sup> he described how the teachings of Confucius and the *ru* were based on those of Laozi 老子; presented Confucius as a mere scribe, as having an undeserved reputation; and as being inconsistent in his doctrines. He also portrayed both Mencius and Xunzi 荀子 as superior to Confucius. Indeed, already in 1897 Zhang had published "Hou sheng" 后圣 (Later Sage) in which he placed Xunzi on an equal footing with Confucius and claimed that for over two thousand years the meaning of Xunzi's essays such as "Zheng ming" 正名 (On the Correct Use of Names) and "Li lun" 礼论 (Discourse on Ritual) had not been properly understood.<sup>⑤</sup>

More generally, as a consequence of this process whereby orthodoxy was deemed an anachronism, authority in texts became more equally shared

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④ "Ding Kong" was completed in 1902 but not included in *Qiushu* until the 1904 edition

⑤ As contemporary scholar Wang Fansen 王汎森 points out, this essay was written in response to an anti-Xunzi movement in the late Qing initiated by a young Liang Qichao 梁启超 (1873-1929) (who at the time still aligned himself with New Text scholarship), Tan Sitong 谭嗣同 (1865-1898) and other New Text partisans Wang Fansen, *Zhang Taiyan de sixiang ji qi dui ruxue chuantong de chongji* 章太炎的思想及其对儒学传统的冲击 (Zhang Taiyan's Thought and Its Assault on the *Ruxue* Tradition) (Taipei, Shibao wenhua chubanshuyuan gongsi, 1985), p. 31. See also Liang Qichao, *Qing dai xueshu gailun* 清代学术概论 (Overview of Qing Learning) (1921; Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1993), pp. 138-139.

among the significantly increased number of referees concerned. It was precisely this context that enabled Masters Studies to flourish in the first two decades of the 20th century and gradually to be transformed into philosophy. This was largely at the expense of *ruxue* and it was not until the 1930s that Neo-Confucian philosophy emerged as a notable philosophical presence.

For some, the institutionalization (*zhuduhua* 制度化) and professionalization (*zhियehua* 职业化) of *ruxue* in the 20th century is symptomatic of the epistemic violence that accompanies the interrogation of traditional modes of Chinese thought through the deployment of Western concepts and paradigms. Jing Haifeng 景海峰 has decried the introduction of Western learning in the early part of the 20th century as having led to a fundamental change in how people understood *ruxue*: “From the original inner identification with *ruxue* as a matter of personal esteem, to a situation in which it has become an object of external, objective description and research.” He relates that the two processes of professionalization and institutionalization have led to *ruxue*’s being dismembered into various disciplinary specializations. At the beginning of the 20th century, in the wake of the disintegration of classical studies and the dissemination of Western learning, people’s understanding and evaluation of *ruxue* underwent a fundamental change: from the original inner identification with *ruxue* as a matter of personal esteem, to a situation in which it has become an object of external, objective description and research. For Jing, the sacred nature of *ruxue* ceased to exist as it came to be an object for analysis and criticism ⑥

Some understand the development of *ruxue* in the post-May Fourth period to have been influenced by a trend to highlight the overall integrity—relative to the situation in the West—of Chinese philosophy and the “cultural spirit,”

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⑥ Jing Haifeng 景海峰, *Zhongguo zhexue de xiandai quanshu* 中国哲学的现代诠释 (A Modern Interpretation of Chinese Philosophy) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2004), p. 219. The writings he refers to here are Zhang Binglin’s influential essay “Yuan Ru” 原儒 (Tracing the *Ru* to Their Source; 1909); Hu Shi’s “Shuo Ru” 说儒 (Interpreting *Ru*; 1935); Feng Youlan’s 冯友兰 (1895-1991) “Yuan Ru Mo” 原儒墨 (Tracing the *Ru* and the *Mo* to Their Source; 1935); and Guo Moruo’s 郭沫若 (1892-1986) “Bo ‘Shuo Ru’ ” 驳“说儒” (A Refutation of “Interpreting *Ru*”; 1937).

which, in turn, fostered an ever intensifying re-interpretation and systematization of *rujia* thought itself.<sup>⑦</sup> For these commentators, this systematization was inimical to the nature and spirit of traditional *ruxue*—a philosophy that points the way for people to verify its teachings in real life situations rather than relying on theory and rigorous logic.

As the process of knowledge compartmentalization, systematization and epistemological re-ordering intensified over the course of the 20th century in China, correspondingly pressure was brought to distinguish between “the philosophical” and “the religious” when in fact many scholars held that such a distinction is inappropriate in the case of “the tradition of the *rujia*.” (This distinction can be traced to the early part of the 20th century in debates about whether Confucius was a religious specialist [*zongjiaojia* 宗教家] or a philosopher [*zhexuejia* 哲学家].<sup>⑧</sup>) Thus the lack of consensus among many contemporary Chinese academics concerning whether a religious dimension should be ascribed to *rujiao* 儒教 and/or *ruxue* highlights a tension created, on the one hand, by the need for scholars to use these terms in a manner congruent with broader contemporary usage (viz. *ruxue*=the philosophical, *rujiao*=the religious), while, on the other hand, many of these scholars harbour profound misgivings about the viability of a sharp philosophical/religious distinction as applied to *ruxue*/*rujiao*/the *rujia* tradition.

Other commentators have similarly expressed concerns about “religion” being an appropriate framework for discussing *ruxue*. While acknowledging

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⑦ Zheng Jiadong 郑家栋, *Duanliezhong de chuantong: Xinnian yu lixing zhi jian* 断裂中的传统:信念与理性之间 (A Tradition in Fragmentation: Between Faith and Reason) (2001; Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2003), pp 154, 155.

⑧ Kojima Tsuyoshi 小岛毅, “Rujiao yu ruxue hanyi yitong chongtan: Xin rujia de guancha” 儒教与儒学含义异同重探:新儒家的观察 (On the Different Connotations of the Terms *Rujiao* and *Ruxue* Once Again: Investigating the New Confucians), in Liu Shuxian 刘述先, ed., *Rujia sixiang zai xiandai DongYa: Zhongguo dalu yu Taiwan pian* 儒家思想在现代东亚:中国大陆与台湾篇 (*Rujia Thought in Modern East Asia: Mainland China and Taiwan*) (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Zhongguo wenzhe yanjiusuo choubenchu, 2000), pp 206-207

that religious interpretations have enriched modern interpretations of *ruxue*, Jol Thoraval 杜瑞乐 has strong reservations about using the language of “religion” to discuss the possibility of the ongoing transmission of *ruxue* in modern Chinese society:

What contemporary forms [ of expression ]—be they individual or collective—are able to possess the artistry of [ traditional ] ritual and etiquette or to nurture the functions of the “original mind”? Yet the “attainment of sagehood” that people envision depends on these elements for its very possibility. Now that the *shidafu* of old are no more, the academies no longer in existence, and the Wenmiao have been transformed into museums, by what formal means can the “religious” dimension [ of *ruxue* ] find new modes of physical, symbolic, and institutional expression?<sup>⑨</sup>

Thoraval criticizes the privileging of reason and the methodologies of modern knowledge over personal cultivation, maintaining that the threat to *ruxue* comes not from some external source but from the internal cleavage of knowledge (知) and moral action (行), where the focus of intellectualized *ruxue* is ontology, not cultivation and practice.<sup>⑩</sup> He argues that unlike “Neo-Confucianism” which was a combination of cultivation and thought, New Confucianism has been reduced to a form of philosophical discourse. Whereas Neo-Confucian reflections on the classical scriptures were given various forms of expression—religious ceremonial to quiet-sitting; from social ceremonial and institutions to art—New Confucianism has been transformed on the model of Western philosophy (especially German idealism) and taken

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⑨ Du Ruile 杜瑞乐, “Rujia jingyan yu zhexue huayu: Dui dangdai xin ruxue zhu yi’ nan de fansi” 儒家经验与哲学话语: 对当代新儒学诸疑难的反思 (The *Rujia* Experience and Philosophical Discourse: Reflections on Various Difficulties Facing the New Confucians), *Zhongguo xueshu* 4.2 (2003): 15.

⑩ The “methodological reflections” of this paper’s title refers to the shift between these methodological paradigms.

on a rationalist form of philosophical discourse.<sup>⑪</sup>

Curiously, it is the now disgraced Zheng Jiadong, who, for all his criticisms of the intellectualization, institutionalization, and professionalization of *ruxue* in the 20th century, has proposed one solution to the seeming impasse imposed by the “scholarship versus cultivation” dichotomy: “For Xiong[ Shili]熊十力, Mou[ Zongsan]牟宗三, and the others, writing was itself a form of cultivation, and could even be said to have been an aesthetic practice.... In their straitened circumstances, writing had become a kind of bitter struggle, a fundamental method of pursuing their ideals.”<sup>⑫</sup> Although Zheng’s solution to the “scholarship versus cultivation” dichotomy is creative, there is some question as to how accurately it represents Xiong Shili (1885-1968), at least. In his critique of Yogācāra (瑜伽) Buddhist philosophy, Xiong often targeted the views of Dharmapāla (护法) (6th century). For example, in arguing that Dharmapāla had invested karmic seeds (种子) with self-nature, Xiong concluded his critique by describing how a correct perspective on fundamental reality is to be achieved:

若了现界实无,则知因缘亦莫从建立。唯由妄情所执现界空故,而本有不空实性,方乃以如理作意得深悟入。本有者,法尔本然,不由意想安立故。实性者,本体之异名。作意者,观照义。正智观照,契应正理,远离颠倒戏论,故曰如理作意。

If one understands that the phenomenal world in fact does not exist then one knows that there is no means for causes as conditions to be established. It is only because the phenomenal world to which false discriminations are attached through imaginatively constructed

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⑪ See Du Ruile, “Rujia jingyan yu zhexue huayu,” p. 10.

⑫ Zheng Jiadong, “Gudu, shuli, xuanzhi: Mou Zongsan yu dangdai xin rujia de jingyu” 孤独、疏离、悬置: 牟宗三与当代新儒家的境遇 (Solitariness, Alienation, and Being Placed in Suspension: The Circumstances of Mou Zongsan and the New Confucians), in Li Minghui 李明辉, ed., *Rujia sixiang de xiandai quanshi* 儒家思想的现代诠释 (Modern Interpretations of *Rujia* Thought) (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Zhongguo wenzhe yanjiusuo choubichu, 1997), p. 171.

discrimination is empty, that inherent Reality which is not empty is able to be profoundly realized by means of proper attentiveness. “Inherent” means “inherently so of itself” because it is not established by ideation. “Reality” is an alternative name for Fundamental Reality. “Attentiveness” (作意) means “detailed reflection through accurate cognition” (观照). Detailed reflection through accurate cognition of the wisdom that perceives reality as-it-is tallies with truth, and is far removed from deluded and misguided conceptual elaboration, hence it is said: “proper attentiveness.”<sup>⑬</sup>

Although Xiong’s various critiques of Dharmapāla are based on rigorous argument and rational critique, the above references to “detailed reflection through accurate cognition” (观照) make it clear that Xiong regarded direct perception (*xianliang* 现量) to be a key practice in self-cultivation, with the implication being that this insight was based on his own personal experience.

Yet still others argue that historical distance means that the true nature of *ruxue* philosophy can never be recaptured. Hu Yong 胡庸, for example, claims that *ruxue* has come to an end because

the entire body of categories used in classical Chinese philosophy is no longer able to represent the thought of modern-day, Hanyu speaking philosophers. The central categories of *ruxue*—humaneness, rightness, ritual propriety, doing one’s best for others, empathy, filial piety—are no longer the conceptual tools of modern philosophizing.... This system of philosophy [*ruxue*], its unique conceptual system, and its styles of thinking and expression have only an historical existence and are inevitably transformed when they are merged into the lives of modern people.... The language of traditional philosophy is now merely an object for philosophical reflection and not the means by which this philosophical reflection is

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<sup>⑬</sup> Xiong Shili, *Xin wei shi lun* 新唯识论 (New Treatise on Nothing But Consciousness), literary text version (1932), in *Xiong Shili quanji* 熊十力全集 (Complete Writings of Xiong Shili), Vol. 1 (Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001), p. 54.

undertaken. The relationship between traditional philosophers and modern philosophers is merely a historical relationship. <sup>⑭</sup>

While not jumping to the same rash conclusions, Nicolas Standaert has made a related observation: “When one talks about philosophy in China today, even about Chinese philosophy, one uses a language that is based on the Chinese adoption of Western philosophical terms.” Standaert’s comment is made in the context of discussing the Jesuit adoption of Neo-Confucian terms and concepts to discuss Aristotelian philosophy in 17th-century China. The situation then provides a stark contrast to the situation he describes for today: “The choice of the Jesuits and their collaborators to use common Chinese terms had as a result that Aristotelian philosophy was explained in (Neo-) Confucian terms, as is clear from the different branches in ethics *xiushen* [修身], *keji* [克己], etc. As such, the Chinese philosophical system prevailed over the Western system... In the first encounter between China and the West...Westerners were predominantly compelled to talk about their own tradition in Chinese (Neo-Confucian) terms.”<sup>⑮</sup>

In an important recent essay, Kwong-loi Shun 信广来 has drawn attention to the consequences of the modern default practice of using Western concepts and frameworks for doing comparative work between Chinese and Western philosophies, noting that “while we see frequent deployment of Western philosophical frameworks in the study of Chinese thought, we rarely encounter the reverse phenomenon, namely, the deployment of Chinese philosophical frameworks in the study of Western thought.” And while acknowledging that the use of Western philosophical concepts can help highlight certain features of Confucian thought related to ethical issues, Shun further insists that “Chinese ethical traditions

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<sup>⑭</sup> Hu Yong 胡庸, “Ruxue de zhongjie” 儒学的终结 (The End of Ruxue), *Xuehai* (Nanjing), 3 (1997): 55, 56.

<sup>⑮</sup> Nicolas Standaert, “The Classification of Sciences and the Jesuit Mission in Late Ming China,” in Jan A. M. de Meyer and Peter M. Engelfret, eds., *Linked Faiths: Essays on Chinese Religions and Traditional Culture in Honour of Kristofer Schipper* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), p. 293.

themselves have rich insights into the ethical experiences of human beings that are conveyed through concepts distinctive of these traditions. Viewing Chinese thought from the perspective of Western philosophical conceptions will not do full justice to these insights.”<sup>⑩</sup>

Indeed, even the neologism for philosophy, “哲学”, has historically-embedded normative connotations that are independent of meanings associated with modern Western notions of “philosophy.”<sup>⑪</sup> As a contraction

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<sup>⑩</sup> Shun Kwong-loi, “Studying Confucian and Comparative Ethics: Methodological Reflections,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 36.3 (2009): 456-457, 476.

<sup>⑪</sup> By the same token, we should not ignore the important creative function that local context plays in the naturalization of foreign concepts. In his discussion of the introduction of the Western notion of logic in China, Joachim Kurtz writes:

Modern Chinese discourses, no matter whether on social or ideological questions or on China's intellectual and cultural heritage, are articulated to a large extent in terms that were coined and normalized as translations of Western or Western-derived notions. Yet far from serving as simple equivalents of imported ways of understanding, many terms of foreign origin have unfolded a life very much of their own in modern Chinese contexts. More often than not they have acquired new meanings that creatively alter, extend or even undermine established European conceptions.

See Joachim Kurtz, “Coming to Terms with ‘Logic’: The Naturalization of an Occidental Notion in China,” in Michael Lackner et al., *New Terms for New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p. 147. Christoph Harbsmeier also remarks:

I believe that the agenda of modernisation in China is set by Westernisation mainly from the 19th century onwards. But what needs careful detailed attention is the persevering constitutive interference of pre-modern traditional Chinese conceptual modes in the creative process of the Chinese appropriation of new Western conceptual content, and the way in which concepts of Western origin get to live very much their own independent lives in the varied and evolving modern Chinese cultural contexts.

By “own independent lives” I take Harbsmeier to be referring to these concepts’ no longer being determined by their original meanings. See Christoph Harbsmeier, “Concepts That Make Multiple Modernities: The Conceptual Modernisation of China in a Historical and Critical Perspective”, unpublished paper at <http://www.hf.uio.no/ikos/forskning/forskningsprosjekter/harbsmeier/concepts.pdf>, accessed January 20, 2010.



of 希哲学, which, in turn, was inspired by Zhou Dunyi's 周敦颐 (1017-1073) notion of 希贤 "to emulate worthies,"<sup>⑩</sup> implicit in the concept of *zhexue* when applied to Chinese contexts are such notions as the authority invested in sages and sage-like historical figures; the normative power accorded models: human—and by correlative association—natural and cosmological; and the conviction that reading certain texts bequeathed by former sagely men affords unmediated encounters with the transformative personalities of these exceptional historical figures, the ultimate expression of which is to be "inwardly wise/sagely and outwardly kingly" (*neisheng waiwang* 内圣外王). As the academic stocks of *ru*xue have grown in value over the past three decades, the culturally-embedded connotations of the term *zhexue* have taken on renewed significance.

Kwong-loi Shun's highlighting of insights into the ethical experiences of human beings conveyed by Chinese philosophical concepts, presents academic practitioners of *ru*xue with an important challenge. That is, if one's goal is to move beyond a purely historical enquiry, then greater effort will need to be applied to show how these insights into the ethical or other experiences of Chinese people in the past have a contemporary relevance that extends beyond mere cultural pride in the legacies of the past. How might this

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⑩ Saito Tsuyoshi 斎藤毅, "Tetsugaku Gogen —Ai Rulue kara Nishi Amane, Miyake Setsurei made" 哲学语源 艾儒略から西周・三宅雪岭まで (The Origins of the term *Tetsugaku* [Philosophy]—From Ai Rulue [Giulio Aleni] to Nishi Amane and Miyake Setsurei), in his *Meiji no kotoba: Higashi kara nishi e no kakehashi* 明治のことば: 东から西への架け橋 (*Meiji Words. The Suspension Bridge From East to West*) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1977), pp. 342-344, shows that in lecture notes dating from 1862 Nishi Amane 西周 (1829-1897) had already translated "philosophy" as 希哲学 Saito further notes (p. 341) that in his 1873 manuscript 生性发蕴 *Seisei Hatsu'un* (On the Relation of the Physical and Spiritual) Nishi explained that the term "philosophy" derives from the Greek *philos* "to love" and *sophos* "wise," and concluded that the learning or science of philosophy means to love the wise Nishi further related that the meaning is compatible with Zhou Dunyi's notion of *xxxian* 希贤 "to emulate worthies." In the "To Fix One's Mind on Learning" ("Zhi Xue" 志学) chapter of his *Penetrating the Book of Change* ("Tong Shu" 通书) Zhou Dunyi 周敦颐 (1017-1073) wrote: "Sages emulate heaven, worthies emulate sages, and men of learning and social standing emulate worthies."