

美国国家安全档案馆最新解密档案

(威尔逊国际学者中心为 2001 年 6 月上海冷战会议提供)

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- 6、1971 年 7 月 16 日 (北京时间, 美国时间 7 月 15 日) 尼克松访华公告 (中英文) 及美方公告稿本 (三份) (6 页)
- 7、美国国会图书馆手稿部注册文件目录 (包括范围和内容介绍) (28 页)

《唐宋茶叶经济研究》审稿意见

99006

本书从一般商品生产的主要环节即生产、分配、交换、消费四个方面对唐、宋时代的茶叶经济进行研究,其主要特点是理论性强、系统性强、内在逻辑性强;善于综合吸收利用国内外相关学术成果,资料丰富,说服力强。本书应属近年国内研究唐宋茶叶经济的集大成之作,而作者着眼点又不限于茶叶经济本身,还力求从这一视角重新认识唐宋社会经济的发展,这就使他在一些重要方面超过了前人。

全书在许多问题上提出了自己的看法,多有新意,如:p.2、p11等处对唐宋商品经济发展程度的认识;p.27对官茶园与私茶园及茶叶商品化之关系的分析;p.37关于制茶形式变化原因的看法;p.38以下关于唐宋茶叶产地与产量问题的辨析;p.45从茶叶分布格局反映商品经济的发展;p.47以下关于茶叶产量的考察;p.76以下关于茶商的产生及社会历史作用的研究;p.102以下关于茶商资本的研究;pp.153_154关于茶叶消费对生产积极作用论点;p.155以下研究分析唐、宋不同时代茶法的具体变化,实际上是研究唐、宋两朝政府对茶叶这种特殊商品的经济管理问题,尤有重要学术参考价值;p.182对宋代“入中”固有矛盾的分析,等等。

总之,本书如作者自己所称“已成为关于唐宋茶叶经济的一部专门论述”,值得资助出版,为学界增添一本新著,以下意见供作者修改参考:

一、p.46引日人宫崎市定有关“五代政治分裂为茶叶生产发展带来有益影响”的说法不妥。如本书前面论述,唐末产茶区正遍布南方,五代十国分裂,茶并非一国特产,宫崎之说殊无道理!

二、pp.201_202引日人桑原陈藏关于中国南方优于北方的说法也有片面性,此不具论,本书既未展开论述,建议删去。

对外国人的说法亦须辨正,本书称引其观点(不是资料)略嫌过多。

三、个别地方叙述明显重复累赘,如p.162第二、三段与最后一段。

四、英文提要明显是中文提要的硬译,语法错误很多,在国内出版可删去,如不删则需请专家认真修改。

五、主要参考文献部分:历史文献无版本注记;近人著述书、文不分,排列无序。如交付正式出版,一定要改!(如非本书参考使用过,不必列入。如第73《史语所集刊》(共十册)显然不合适)

六、引文出处多有不注页码,看不出是作者自己收集还是转引他人,不仅不便读者查对利用,也降低了作品的可信性。请作者最后交稿前一定一一核对所引资料,注明出处页码。

七、还有一些文字错误,这里不烦列举,望作者交稿前仔细阅读改正。

编委会

1999年9月

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTIO

FILE GROUP TITLE

BOX NUMBER

FOLDER TITLE

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would Violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial financial information.
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- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

July 29, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Winston Lord ^W

SUBJECT: Memcon of Your Conversations with Chou En-lai

Attached is the transcript of the July 9 afternoon, dinner, and evening sessions in Peking. This was put together by Holdridge, Smyser, and myself.

Unsurprisingly, it makes fascinating reading.

Following are a few preliminary impressions upon reading over this record, none of which diverges from the feelings we had when we left Peking:

-- Chou does come across very impressively, even without the presence of his personality. So does his opposite number. One is struck again just how "searching, sweeping, and significant" these talks were.

-- The general comments we have made on Chou's style hold up. He is perhaps a little more rhetorical, without being nasty, than we remember him. His great emphasis on history comes through, and he is careful to point out (for example, on Taiwan and Indochina) that President Nixon is not responsible for the mistakes of the past which he inherited.

-- On Taiwan, he was tough but clearly understood the need for time on the political side.

-- On Indochina, his language was relatively restrained, but he gave firm support to his friends and a hands-off attitude, even while recognizing the link you were establishing between this issue and Taiwan. ¹⁸⁴⁸ ₁₈₄₈ ✓

-- His pre-occupation with Japan.

/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

(continued)

You will recall that you promised Chou the figures on our Lend Lease aid (pages 40-41). We have now run this down: from 1940 - 1948 (the program ended March 31, 1948) we provided \$48,405,414,576.59, i.e., \$48 1/2 billion. We can have our intermediary pass this to the other side the next time we have a message.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

We are working on the transcripts for the second and third day. The attached is 46 pages, and I think the total should come to roughly 110 pages.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached memorandum of conversation.

Approve _____

See changes _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Prime Minister Chou En-lai, People's Republic of China
Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman, Military Affairs
Commission, Chinese Communist Party, PRC
Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to Canada
Chang Wen-chin, Director, Western Europe and American
Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
One Other Chinese Official, and Deputy Chief of Protocol
Tang Wen-sheng and Chi Chao-chu, Chinese Interpreters
Chinese Notetakers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
John Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC
W. Richard Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC

Place: Chinese Government Guest House, Peking

Date and Time: July 9, 1971, Afternoon and Evening
(4:35 p.m. - 11:20 p.m.)

PM Chou: There is special news this afternoon -- you are lost.

(Premier Chou offers cigarettes to the American party.) No one wants
one? I have found a party that doesn't smoke.

First of all, I would like to welcome you, especially as Dr. Kissinger
is the special representative of the President.

Dr. Kissinger: It is a great pleasure to be here. I have looked forward a
long time to this opportunity.

PM Chou: As Chairman Mao Tse-tung has already spoken about this to
Edgar Snow, there is no need to elaborate. I believe you have first-hand
knowledge of this article by now.

Dr. Kissinger: I read it with great attention.

PM Chou: You do not know Mr. Edgar Snow?

Dr. Kissinger: I have never met him.

PM Chou: Thirty-five years ago he became a friend with us. Now he is an old friend. He is considered an old man in your country now, over 60, I believe 65.

Dr. Kissinger: I have read his books with great interest, and all his articles. I read the book in which he recounted his long conversation with the Premier.

PM Chou: I was the first to see him. The most important point is his conversation with Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and we read those that had been published.

PM Chou: It seems to me that in 1936 when he left China and went back to the U.S. to write an article, his first article was published in LIFE. This time it is also in LIFE.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it is in LIFE magazine. The article of him with Mao Tse-tung has been widely read, particularly by President Nixon, who read it with the greatest attention.

PM Chou: Of course not all his works were so accurate, because they were written in the manner of conversation. Certain points were not so accurate, and in individual places were wrong. It is basically correct.

Dr. Kissinger: President Nixon has asked me to convey his sincere greetings both to you and Chairman Mao. He looks forward warmly to visiting Peking personally in the not too distant future.

PM Chou: We thank His Excellency, the President, for his kind attention, and I believe that this desire will be able to be fulfilled eventually through exchanges of our opinions.

Dr. Kissinger: We expect that.

PM Chou: According to our custom, we first invite our guest to speak. Besides, you already have prepared a thick book. Of course, later on we will give our opinions also.

Dr. Kissinger: It is most unusual for me to have written notes. However, because of the importance of this occasion and because I wanted President Nixon to see what I would say, I have taken the liberty to write out certain of my comments.

PM Chou: Please.

Dr. Kissinger: As I have already pointed out to you, President Nixon has asked me to convey to you and Chairman Mao his high personal regards. He looks forward to meeting with the leaders of the People's Republic of China personally to exchange ideas.

PM Chou: We thank His Excellency, the President, for his regards. As Chairman Mao has already said, we welcome President Nixon to our country for a visit, no matter whether he comes as President or as a private person. Of course, he now is still in his capacity as President.

Dr. Kissinger: He expects to remain there for some time.

PM Chou: That's good.

Dr. Kissinger: The President asked that this mission be secret until after we meet, so we can meet unencumbered by bureaucracy, free of the past, and with the greatest possible latitude.

PM Chou: You don't like bureaucracy either.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and it's mutual; the bureaucracy doesn't like me.

PM Chou: Do you know that some people call me the dictator of bureaucracy and warlords?

Dr. Kissinger: But that has been strongly overcome. For us this meeting .

PM Chou: Perhaps you did not understand. Do you know who said that?

Dr. Kissinger: No.

PM Chou: You have not read the articles and documents printed by our northern neighbor?

Dr. Kissinger: They tell us so many things about you that we can't follow them all.

PM Chou: This is a very outstanding article, a recent title.

Dr. Kissinger: For us this is an historic occasion. Because this is the first time that American and Chinese leaders are talking to each other on a basis where each country recognizes each other as equals. In our earlier contacts we were a new and developing country in contrast to Chinese cultural superiority. For the past century you were victims of foreign oppression. Only today, after many difficulties and separate roads, have we come together again on a basis of equality and mutual respect. So we are both turning a new page in our histories.

We are here today, brought together by global trends. Reality has brought us together, and we believe that reality will shape our future.

Because this is the beginning of our discussions, let me generally state our general approach towards the People's Republic of China.

We consider that the People's Republic of China, because of its achievements, tradition, ideology, and strength, must participate on the basis of equality in all matters affecting the peace of Asia and the peace of the world. We consider it in our interest, and above all in the interest of the world, that you play your appropriate role in shaping international arrangements. ✓

We realize, of course, that there are deep ideological differences between us. You are dedicated to the belief that your concepts will prevail. We have our own convictions about the future. The essential question for our relations is whether both countries are willing to let history judge who is correct, while in the interval we cooperate on matters of mutual concern on a basis of mutual respect and equality and for the benefit of all mankind.

Mr. Premier, I see two principal purposes for our meetings today and tomorrow. First, as Chairman Mao and you have suggested, we should work out satisfactory understandings concerning a visit to China by President Nixon, a visit which he intends to make and to which he looks forward. I am authorized to settle all matters concerning such a visit, including its nature, time, and other details; the manner in which the meeting should be prepared; the subjects to be discussed; the possible outcome; and as well, a possible communique when I have returned to the U.S.

Secondly, to make President Nixon's visit the success we want it to be, we should lay the groundwork by discussing issues between us, our mutual concerns in Asia, and the peace of the world.

Among the topics I believe we should cover are the following:

1.
-- Taiwan, which, from the exchange of notes between us, we know to be your principal concern in relations between us. Mr. Premier, you have defined this as the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. I am prepared to hear your views and to discuss the matter practically.

2.
-- Indochina, which is currently the major area of conflict and tension in Asia.

3.
-- Relations with other major countries, for example, the Soviet Union and Japan, which of course will certainly affect the future peace of the world.

4.
-- The situation in the South Asian subcontinent, which involves many outside countries.

5.
-- Establishment between us of a secure channel of communications ✓ which is not dependent on the goodwill or the upheavals in third countries, and which is entirely within the control of our two leaders.

6.
-- Issues of arms control, such as the recent proposal for a five power conference, on which we have delayed our reply until we could have the benefit of the views of the Premier.

7.
-- Any other topics which the Chinese side would care to raise.

In discussing these matters, Mr. Premier, I will be absolutely candid with you, because I want to make sure that if we disagree, it will be in full knowledge of each other's point of view, and because I hope with full candor we will come closer to an agreement.

As a close associate of President Nixon, I am authorized to explain to you fully what our interests are in major areas of the world and areas of policy, and I hope you will feel free to raise any issue with me.

I need not add that any assurances made in this channel will be honored absolutely.

We will have an opportunity to discuss in detail all of these issues, but there's one issue which I know from the statement of the Premier is very much on your mind, which I would like to take the liberty of raising now.

I know you are concerned about collusion, or what you call collusion, of other countries against you. Let me say now that we will never collude with other countries against the People's Republic of China, either with our allies or with some of our opponents. Of course, you may believe that the objective consequences of our actions will bring about collusion, no matter what we say. But we will consciously strive to avoid this.

It is the conviction of President Nixon that a strong and developing People's Republic of China poses no threat to any essential U.S. interest. It is no accident that our two countries have had such a long history of friendship.

To make these thoughts concrete, President Nixon has authorized me to tell you that the U.S. will not take any major steps affecting your interests without discussing them with you and taking your views into account.

I hope while I am here to arrange for a channel which will enable us to communicate directly and secretly. We are prepared to set up communications comparable to those that link us to other major countries of decision, and other means of communication which will enable us to explain our views to each other better.

I am authorized to discuss with you negotiations in which we are engaged with some of your neighbors which you believe may affect your interests.

Both our countries face a difficult task as we move to formalize these contacts. I know that we must both be true to our basic principles, because neither of us can play a responsible world role or build a lasting peace if we abandon our principles.

My colleagues and I look forward to our conversations here with warm anticipation and a keen awareness of the responsibilities we share.

Many visitors have come to this beautiful, and to us, mysterious, land.

PM Chou: You will find it not mysterious. When you have become familiar with it, it will not be as mysterious as before.

Dr. Kissinger: All have departed with new perspectives, and a few have left some modest contributions behind.

We have come to the People's Republic of China with an open mind and an open heart. We hope that when we leave we may have contributed to some understanding between our countries, peace in this region.

PM Chou: I thank you for the statement you have made at the beginning and for your general explanations of U.S. policy. Before you came, we had already received a message from the NSC Chief of Gen. Yahya Khan, who told us you were coming here with a frank and sincere attitude and wanted to have serious discussions with us. We welcome this attitude. We come with the same attitude, and we are ready to explain our opinions frankly. It is very clear that the world outlook and stands of our two sides are different. As you just said, each side has its own convictions, and we both believe our ideas will become reality. But this shouldn't hinder our two countries on the two sides of the Pacific Ocean seeking what you mentioned -- a channel for co-existence, equality, and friendship.

The first question is that of equality, or in other words, the principle of reciprocity. All things must be done in a reciprocal manner. I agree with what you just said -- the Chinese and American peoples are friendly toward each other. This was true in the past and will be true in the future. Recently, we invited the U.S. table tennis delegation to China -- perhaps you met some of them -- and they can bear witness that the Chinese people welcomed this visit of the American people. We have also received many repeated invitations from the U.S. Table Tennis Association to send a delegation to the U.S. We feel this shows that the U.S. people want to welcome the Chinese people.

Dr. Kissinger: We have talked to Mr. Steenhoven.

PM Chou: He recently sent us a cable.

But the question of friendship between the Chinese and American people began to be discussed very early after New China appeared. In 1955, at the Bandung Conference, I answered questions put to me by some American correspondents on relations with the U.S. But later, due to various factors it was not possible to continue the exchanges which began from this time. Perhaps Your Excellency knows the reason why. Later on, beginning from August 1, 1955, representatives of our two governments sat down for negotiations.

Our meetings have gone on for almost 16 years now. We have met 136 times, but there's still no result. Just as you have now mentioned, it's not so easy to bring about results through official negotiations. This is not solely because the negotiations are official, because these today are official; it is whether there is an intention to solve problems. This is the

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You just now mentioned the objectives of your present mission. Your first objective is also linked to your second objective, because your second objective is to engage in a preparatory exchange of views in order to bring our basic stands closer together and make them favorable for resolution.

Just now you mentioned seven issues. Of course, we are not limited to seven because we can each put forward what we like. That was your seventh point. You said that you brought with you the desire of your President to make it possible for our views to a certain extent to come closer, and so be beneficial to a settlement. This is a different situation than that in which the Ambassadorial talks began first at Geneva and later in Warsaw. At that time the U.S. Ambassador always said he would like first to settle the small questions one at a time so that we could gradually come closer. We consistently said that only the settlement of fundamental questions first could lead to the settlement of other questions. Therefore, our stands were always different.

However, since President Nixon came into office he has expressed a willingness to settle fundamental questions with us. From the very beginning, he took the attitude that he was willing to come to Peking to meet us, either to send his special envoy or to come himself.

Of course, after he expressed this opinion there was a cessation of contacts for a period of time. As you know, one reason was last year's Cambodian incident, and this year there was the Route 9 battle. This could not but affect our contacts.

Dr. Kissinger: We agree. That is why I wanted the opportunity to express our views concerning peace in Indochina, so that these differences can be settled, both in Indochina and in our relationship.

PM Chou: That's your second item, that's true. I think that as we are beginning to exchange ideas today, we can put forward all kinds of questions. One item can be expanded to link up with other items in a wider field and we can express clearly the stands and views of each side.

The first question is Taiwan. Dr. Kissinger has put forward views very frankly and we will express our own ideas.

Dr. Kissinger: I have quoted from a communication from Prime Minister Chou which may account for my uncharacteristic clarity.

PM Chou: You mentioned that the meeting today is an historic occasion. Of course a still greater historic occasion would be if President Nixon comes to China and meets Chairman Mao Tse-tung. That would be an historic occasion, if we could solve problems. Of course, we can begin today to create the atmosphere, because as you mentioned, our two separate roads meet each other. On the other hand, we would like to settle on the basis of equality.

Therefore, the question of Taiwan becomes one regarding which we cannot but blame your government. Of course, you are not responsible for this, and you may say that President Nixon wasn't responsible for it either.

As for the U.S. Government, however, I must say a few words. I will not mention the old meetings in China in which U.S. representatives participated, because this is too long ago. Dean Acheson's White Paper shows what happened more clearly than anything else, and shows that it was the Chinese people themselves who won their own liberation, who liberated our motherland, and drove away the reactionary rule of the Chiang Kai-shek clique. At that time, the U.S. Government considered this an internal affair of China. This was during the period of 1949 to the beginning of 1950. By then, Taiwan was already restored to the motherland, and China was that motherland. The U.S. stated then that it had no territorial ambitions regarding Taiwan or any other Chinese territories. And, therefore, the U.S. declared that it wouldn't interfere in China's internal affairs and would leave the Chinese people to settle internal questions.

This attitude was proclaimed in all your documents of that time, although some documents adopted an attitude hostile to us -- you wouldn't agree that the Chinese Communist Party was leading a new China, but you couldn't do anything about it. Therefore, you made a statement that you would not interfere in China's internal affairs.

Within a short period afterwards, the Korean war broke out and you surrounded Taiwan and declared the status of Taiwan was still unsettled. Even up to the present day the spokesman of your State Department still says that this is your position. That is the crux.

Dr. Kissinger: He hasn't repeated it! (Considerable laughter from the Chinese side.)

PM Chou: If this crucial question is not solved, then the whole question will be difficult to resolve. We are two countries on two sides of the Pacific Ocean, yours with a history of 200 years, and ours with a history of only

22 years, dating from the founding of New China. Therefore, we are younger than you. As for our ancient culture, every country has it -- the Indians in the U.S. and Mexico, the Inca Empire in South America, which was even more ancient than China. It's a pity that their scriptures were not preserved, but were lost. With respect to China's long history, there's one good point, the written language, which contains a heritage of 4,000 years based on historical relics. This is beneficial to the unification and development of our nation. But there's also a weak point. Our symbolic language of ideograms restricted our development. You might think that these are all idle words, but they are not. They show that we know our objective world and we can coolly appraise it.

History also proves that Taiwan has belonged to China for more than 1000 years -- a longer period than Long Island has been a part of the U.S. In the middle (sic) of this period Taiwan was temporarily grabbed away by Japan when China was defeated in the war. It was returned to China in the Cairo and Tehran Declarations, and by the Japanese surrender. Both Acheson's White Paper and Truman's statement serve as evidence to that.

Therefore, in recognizing China the U.S. must do so unreservedly. It must recognize the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China and not make any exceptions. Just as we recognize the U.S. as the sole legitimate government without considering Hawaii, the last state, an exception to your sovereignty, or still less, Long Island. Taiwan is a Chinese province, is already restored to China, and is an inalienable part of Chinese territory.

This leads us to the second question: The U.S. must withdraw all its armed forces and dismantle all its military installations on Taiwan and in the Taiwan Straits within a limited period. This is the natural logic of the matter.

Of course, the treaty between the United States and Chiang Kai-shek which was signed by Dulles in 1954 is considered to be illegal by the PRC and Chinese people, and we do not recognize it. So speaking of the Taiwan question, this is crucial. I would like to know your opinion so we can exchange views.

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to ask the Prime Minister how he proposes to proceed. We can do it in one of two ways -- each stating the problems which concern us, reserving its answers until later, or proceeding with the issues one at a time. Which do you prefer?

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PM Chou: What is your opinion?

Dr. Kissinger: I have no strong opinion. One possible way is that since Prime Minister Chou has stated his views on Taiwan, we could state our views on Indochina. Then I could tell him of my reaction to his statement on Taiwan, and he could tell me of his reaction to mine on Indochina. Or we could take each issue one at a time.

PM Chou: Either way, it's your decision. You can say whatever you like. You could speak first on the Taiwan question or Indochina, or together, because you may think they are linked.

Dr. Kissinger: I believe they are linked to some extent. But why don't I give a brief reply to your comments on Taiwan and then speak about Indochina, after which we can have an extended discussion of both.

PM Chou: That's agreeable.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me then make a few comments first about Taiwan, and then perhaps say a few things about Indochina.

I agree with a great deal of the historical analysis presented by Prime Minister Chou. There's no question that if the Korean war hadn't occurred, a war which we did not seek and you did not seek, Taiwan would probably be today a part of the PRC. For reasons which are now worthless to recapitulate, a previous Administration linked the future of Korea to the future of Taiwan, partly because of U.S. domestic opinion at the time. Whatever the reason, a certain history has now developed which involves some principles of foreign policy for us.

I have noticed that the Prime Minister in his remarks here went beyond some of the communications we have previously exchanged. Both in these communications and in our Warsaw meetings he has spoken of withdrawing military presence and installations from the area of Taiwan and the area of the Taiwan Strait. Today he has spoken also of certain official political declarations.

PM Chou: This was because in order to exchange opinions one must give the entire opinion on the matter.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course. I am not saying this critically, but simply to divide the matter into two parts -- first, the military situation in Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits, and second, the question of political evolution between Taiwan and the PRC.

PM Chou: This differs from our opinion. We hold that our relations with Taiwan is a question of China's internal affairs. We have consistently repeated this in the Warsaw talks and in all our open declarations we have also maintained this same consistent stand. What I was speaking of just now, that if relations are to be established between our two countries, China and the United States, the United States must recognize that the PRC is the sole legitimate government in China and that Taiwan Province is an inalienable part of Chinese territory which must be restored to the motherland. Under these circumstances, the U.S. -Chiang Kai-shek Treaty would not exist.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand what you have said with respect to the problem of diplomatic relations. Let me talk about Taiwan in our relations in the immediate present in the absence of diplomatic relations.

First, let me say some things about our military presence and then let me say something, in the frankness that these talks permit, about how we see future relations between Taiwan and the PRC as we see objective reality. I am not talking about the formalities of diplomatic relations for the time being.

First, about our military presence, which was the first point the Prime Minister raised with us in his communications and also in the two Warsaw talks that took place in our Administration. We have demonstrated our general intentions with a number of symbolic steps. For example, we have ended the Taiwan Strait Patrol, removed a squadron of air tankers from Taiwan, and reduced the size of our military advisory group by 20 percent. I know this is not your principal point, and I only mention it to show the general direction of our intentions.

Our military presence in Taiwan at this moment is composed of two elements, the two-thirds of it which is related to activities in other parts of Asia, and the one-third of it which is related to the defense of Taiwan. We are prepared to remove that part related to activities other than to the defense of Taiwan, that's two-thirds of our force (I have the detailed numbers here in case you would like to hear them) within a specified brief period of time after the ending of the war in Indochina. We are prepared to begin reducing our other forces on Taiwan as our relations improve, so that the military questions need not be a principal obstacle between us. I may say, incidentally, that these are personal decisions of President Nixon which have not yet been discussed with our bureaucracy or with Congress, and so should be treated with great confidence.

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