

關於美國侵略中國與朝鮮問題

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被俘美國海軍陸戰隊第一空軍聯隊參謀長弗蘭克·赫·許威布爾上校暴露美國在朝鮮進行細菌戰的供詞之一：主要供詞

一九五二年十二月六日

THE FIRST DEPOSITION BY CAPTURED CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE U.S. 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, COLONEL FRANK H. SCHWABLE, DISCLOSING U.S. BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE IN KOREA: MAIN DEPOSITION

December 6, 1952

我是弗蘭克·赫·許威布爾上校，04429。至一九五二年七月八日我被擊落並被俘時止，我是海軍陸戰隊第一空軍聯隊的參謀長。我自一九二九年開始在海軍陸戰隊中服役，一九三一年被任命為航空員，在世界許多地方担任過任務。在我到朝鮮之前，我曾在海軍陸戰隊總部的航空處值勤。

參謀長聯席會議的指示

我於一九五二年四月十日到達朝鮮，來担任我作為海軍陸戰隊第一空軍聯隊參謀長的職務。我的一切指示和決定都必須由副司令萊姆遜——斯克里布納將軍批准。在我完全擔負起參謀長的職責前，萊姆遜——斯克里布納將軍把我召到他的辦公室去討論聯隊的各種問題。在會談中，他說：「賓涅告訴了你 V. M. F. —513 的特別任務的所有背景沒有？」我問他是否就是指「超級宣傳」而言（這就是我們替細菌彈所起的密碼名稱），他證實了一這點。我告訴他，賓涅已經把一切背景告訴我了。

由我接替他任參謀長的軍官，阿瑟·阿·賓涅上校，按照他的職責所要求的那樣，告訴了我關於在朝鮮的細菌戰的總計劃的輪廓，以及關於海軍陸戰隊第一空軍聯隊迄該時止所負責的一部份的細節。

在朝鮮的細菌戰的總計劃，是由美國參謀長聯席會議在一九五一年十月指示的。在那一月，參謀長聯席會議特派專人送給遠東司令部總司令（當時是李奇

I am Colonel Frank H. Schwable, 04429, and was Chief of Staff of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing until shot down and captured on July 8, 1952.

My service with the Marine Corps began in 1929 and I was designated an aviator in 1931, seeing duty in many parts of the world. Just before I came to Korea, I completed a tour of duty in the Division of Aviation at Marine Corps Headquarters.

Directive of the Joint Chief of Staff

I arrived in Korea on April 10, 1952, to take over my duties as Chief of Staff of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. All my instructions and decisions were subject to confirmation by the Assistant Commanding General, Lamson-Scribner. Just before I assumed full responsibility for the duties of Chief of Staff, General Lamson-Scribner called me into his office to talk over various problems of the Wing. During this conversation he said: "Has Binney given you all the background on the special missions run by V.M.F-513?" I asked him if he meant "Suprop" (our code name for bacteriological bombs) and he confirmed this. I told him I had been given all of the background by Colonel Binney.

Colonel Arthur A. Binney, the officer I relieved as Chief of Staff, had given me, as his duties required that he should, an outline of the general plan of bacteriological warfare in Korea and the details of the part played up to that time by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

The general plan for bacteriological warfare in Korea was directed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in October, 1951. In that month the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a directive by hand to the Com-

微將軍)一個指示,命令在朝鮮開始細菌戰,最初是在一個小的、試驗性的階段,但是漸漸擴大。

這個指示被傳達給駐在東京的遠東空軍司令威蘭將軍。威蘭將軍於是親自召集了在朝鮮的第五航空隊司令埃弗雷斯特將軍,以及在遠東空軍直接指揮下作戰的、駐在沖繩島的第十九轟炸機聯隊司令官,舉行會議。

那一計劃(我現在即將加以概述的)經過了研究,對於問題的大的方面取得了協議;而下述情報則由埃弗雷斯特將軍親自並口頭地帶回朝鮮,因為為了保密的目的,決定在朝鮮關於此事不得有能被俘獲的任何書面東西。

目 標

當時的基本目標是在實地的情況下試驗細菌戰的各種不同的因素,並在日後,視所得的結果以及朝鮮的形勢,可能把實地的試驗擴大成為正規作戰行動中的一部分。

各種可用的疾病的效果要加以試驗,特別是它們在不同情況下的蔓延性或傳染性,也要試驗每一種疾病是否嚴重地破壞敵人的行動或平民的日常工作,或是只引起次要的不方便,或者完全可以加以控制而不造成困難。要在實地的情況下,要試驗不同種類的軍器或容器,並使用不同類型的飛機來試驗它們作為攜帶細菌彈的工具的適合性。

要加以試驗的地形包括高原、海岸地帶、空曠地區、山谷地區、孤立地區、相互毗連的地區、大小市鎮、聚集在一起的城市以及相當分散的城市。各種可能的地區或是地區各種可能的組合,都要加以試驗。

這些試驗要延續多久,並未說明,但要足以包括朝鮮的一切極冷和極熱的氣溫。

一切可能的投擲辦法要加以試驗,並且要發展戰術,包括起初僅是夜間襲擊,其後擴大為由專門的中隊進行日間襲擊。各種式樣的轟炸都要試驗一下,各種轟炸由單獨一架飛機直到成羣結隊的飛機進行轟炸,都要試驗一下,而細菌彈要與慣用的炸彈同時使用。

manding General, Far East Command (at that time General Ridgway), directing the initiation of bacteriological warfare in Korea on an initially small, experimental stage but in expanding proportions.

This directive was passed to the Commanding General, Far East Air Force, General Weyland, in Tokyo. General Weyland then called into personal conference General Everest, Commanding General of the 5th Air Force in Korea, and also the Commander of the 19th Bomb Wing at Okinawa, which unit operates directly under F.E.A.F.

The plan that I shall now outline was gone over, the broad aspects of the problem were agreed upon and the following information was brought back to Korea by General Everest, personally and verbally, since for security purposes, it was decided not to have anything in writing on this matter in Korea and subject to possible capture.

Objectives

The basic objective was at that time to test, under field conditions, the various elements of bacteriological warfare, and to possibly expand the field tests, at a later date, into an element of the regular combat operations, depending on the results obtained and the situation in Korea.

The effectiveness of the different diseases available was to be tested, especially for their spreading or epidemic qualities under various circumstances, and to test whether each disease caused a serious disruption to enemy operations and civilian routine or just minor inconveniences, or was contained completely, causing no difficulties. Various types of armament or containers were to be tried out under field conditions and various types of aircraft were to be used to test their suitability as bacteriological bomb vehicles.

Terrain types to be tested included high areas, seacoast areas, open spaces, areas enclosed by mountains, isolated areas, areas relatively adjacent to one another, large and small towns and cities, congested cities and those relatively spread out. Every possible type or combination of areas were to be tested.

These tests were to be extended over an unstated period of time but sufficient to cover all extremes of temperature found in Korea.

All possible methods of delivery were to be tested as well as tactics developed to include initially, night attack and then expanding into day attack by specialised squadrons. Various types of bombing were to be tried out and various combinations of bombing, from single planes up to and including formations of planes, were to be tried out with bacteriological bombs used in conjunction with conventional bombs.

特別要用一切可能的辦法來試驗和觀察敵人的反應，以探知他的對策是什麼，他將採取什麼宣傳步驟，以及這種戰爭對他的軍事行動起了何種程度的影響。

保密措施要徹底加以試驗——既對友方又對敵方。對於友方，要採取一切可能的步驟來限制關於使用這種武器的消息並控制關於這個問題的情報。對於敵方，要用一切手段來欺騙敵人，阻止他實際證明這種武器正被使用。

最後，如果情況有此需要，可按參謀長聯席會議的指示，把試驗階段的細菌戰擴大成爲在朝鮮的軍事或戰術行動的一部分。

最初的階段

從沖繩島起飛的B-29型飛機自一九五一年十一月開始使用細菌彈，對北朝鮮所有的目標採取一種可以稱爲隨意轟炸的辦法。頭一天夜裏的目標可能在朝鮮東北部，第二天夜裏可能在朝鮮的西北部。它們擲細菌彈的行動是與尋常的夜間武裝偵察結合起來進行的，作爲一種經濟和保密的辦法。

一九五二年一月初，當時海軍陸戰隊第一空軍聯隊司令希爾特將軍被召到在漢城的第五航空隊總部去。在那裏，埃弗雷斯特將軍告訴他參謀長聯席會議發出的指示，並命令他派海軍陸戰隊第一空軍聯隊第三十三空軍大隊第五一三夜間戰鬥機中隊——VMF513參加細菌戰計劃。VMF513以K-8爲基地，這是第三轟炸機聯隊在羣山的空軍基地，該聯隊的B-26型飛機已經開始了細菌戰的行動。VMF513由第三轟炸機聯隊給予地勤方面的服務。

雖然一切在朝鮮以陸地爲基地的海軍陸戰隊的飛機（作戰類型）都直屬第五航空隊作戰，並以它們的行動報告海軍陸戰隊第一空軍聯隊，但是爲了表示禮貌，當一個新的或是在進行中的計劃開始的時候，第五航空隊通常先通知聯隊。

一九五二年一月底，五一三中隊的海軍陸戰隊夜間戰鬥機，以單獨的飛機作夜間的武裝偵察，攜帶細菌彈，與B-26型飛機分擔北朝鮮下半部的目標，特別着重於西邊的一部分。五一三中隊在所有這些任務中與第三轟炸機聯隊配合，使用F7F型飛機（虎貓式），因爲它們是雙引擎的，有利於安全。

Enemy reactions were particularly to be tested or observed by any means available to ascertain what his counter-measures would be, what propaganda steps he would take, and to what extent his military operations would be affected by this type of warfare.

Security measures were to be thoroughly tested—both friendly and enemy. On the friendly side, all possible steps were to be taken to confine knowledge of the use of this weapon and to control information on the subject. On the enemy side, every possible means was to be used to deceive the enemy and prevent his actual proof that the weapon was being used.

Finally, if the situation warranted, while continuing the experimental phase of bacteriological warfare according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive, it might be expanded to become a part of the military or tactical effort in Korea.

Initial Stage

The B-29s from Okinawa began using bacteriological bombs in November, 1951, covering targets all over North Korea in what might be called random bombing. One night the target might be in Northeast Korea and the next night in Northwest Korea. Their bacteriological bomb operations were conducted in combination with normal night armed reconnaissance as a measure of economy and security.

Early in January, 1952, General Schilt, then Commanding General of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, was called to 5th Air Force Headquarters in Seoul, where General Everest told him of the directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ordered him to have VMF-513—Marine Night Fighter Squadron 513 of Marine Aircraft Group 33 of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing—participate in the bacteriological warfare programme. VMF-513 was based on K 8, the Air Force base at Kunsan of the 3rd Bomb Wing, whose B-26s had already begun bacteriological operations. VMF-513 was to be serviced by the 3rd Bomb Wing.

While all Marine aircraft (combat types) shore based in Korea operate directly under the 5th Air Force, with the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing being kept informed of their activities, when a new or continuing programme is being initiated, the 5th Air Force normally has initially informed the Wing as a matter of courtesy.

Towards the end of January, 1952, Marine night fighters of 513 Squadron, operating as single planes on night armed reconnaissance, and carrying bacteriological bombs, shared targets with the B-26s covering the lower half of North Korea with the greatest emphasis on the western portion. Squadron 513 coordinated with the 3rd Bomb Wing on all these missions, using F-7 F aircraft (Tiger Cats) because of their twin engine safety.

在引擎發生故障時，K—8 基地（羣山）所提供的好處是直接飛到海面上，它也提供了經過水面飛臨敵區的安全與保密。

爲了保密的原因，關於所用的細菌種類的情報不提供給海軍陸戰隊第一空軍聯隊。

一九五二年三月，希爾特將軍又被召到第五航空隊總部去，並由埃弗雷斯特將軍口頭指示他準備派海軍陸戰隊第一空軍聯隊第三十三空軍大隊第一照相中隊（VMJ—1）參預計劃。VMJ—1 以海軍陸戰隊第三十三空軍大隊在朝鮮浦項的 K—3 爲基地，使用 F2H—2P 型的照相偵察機（女妖式）。

任務是斷斷續續的，並且與尋常的照相任務結合起來，並由第五航空隊以單獨的、絕密的命令來佈置。

在計劃中起用女妖式飛機，是因爲它們的專門性的活動、器材和設備，以及因爲 K—3 基地這個活動的地區是隔離的。就敵方的防禦行動而論，這種飛機能更深入北朝鮮。它們以兩架飛機爲一組而進行工作，只須最少數的機上人員，而對於尋常的任務也儘少擾亂。它們也能在進行照相飛行，與地面平行飛行時，試行從高空投彈。

在一九五二年三月，海軍陸戰隊第一照相中隊的女妖式飛機開始細菌戰行動，以繼續並擴大用細菌彈轟炸北朝鮮的城鎮，而時常把這些行動與尋常的照相任務結合起來。手頭只保持最低限度的炸彈供應，以減少儲存的問題。第五航空隊派了一隊人到 K—3 基地來（浦項），其中包括兩名軍官及幾名士兵，以便教練海軍陸戰隊的專門人員如何管理炸彈。

海軍在這個計劃中所擔負的部分是使用 F9F 型（豹式）、AD 型（空中侵略者式）以及標準的 F2H 型（女妖式，但與照相用的一類不同）飛機，利用朝鮮東海岸外的航空母艦。

空軍也擴大了它本身的行動以包括幾個使用不同種類飛機的中隊，並用不同的方法和戰術來進行細菌戰。

這就是我到達朝鮮前的情況。其後發生了下述的事情。

作戰的階段

在一九五二年五月下旬，海軍陸戰隊第一空軍聯隊的新司令傑羅姆將軍被召到第五航空隊總部去，並

K 8 (Kunsan) offered the advantage of take-off directly over the water, in the event of engine failure, and both the safety and security of over water flights to enemy territory.

For security reasons, no information on the types of bacteria being used was given to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

In March, 1952, General Schilt was again called to 5th Air Force Headquarters and verbally directed by General Everest to prepare Marine Photographic Squadron One (V.M.J.-1 Squadron) of Marine Aircraft Group 33, to enter the programme. V.M.J.-1 based at K 3, Marine Aircraft Group 33's base at Pohang, Korea, was to use F-2 H-2 P photographic reconnaissance aircraft (Banshees).

The missions would be intermittent and combined with normal photographic missions and would be scheduled by 5th Air Force in separate, Top Secret orders.

The Banshees were brought into the programme because of their specialised operations, equipment, facilities and isolated area of operations at K 3. They could penetrate further into North Korea as far as enemy counter-action is concerned and worked in two-plane sections involving a minimum of crews and disturbance of normal missions. They could also try out bombing from high altitudes in horizontal flight in conjunction with photographic runs.

During March, 1952, the Banshees of Marine Photographic Squadron One commenced bacteriological operations, continuing and expanding the bacteriological bombing of North Korean towns, always combining these operations with normal photographic missions. Only a minimum of bomb supplies were kept on hand to reduce storage problems and the 5th Air Force sent a team of two officers and several men to K 3 (Pohang) to instruct the Marine specialists in handling the bombs.

The Navy's part in the programme was with the F-9 Fs (Panthers), ADs (Skyraiders) and standard F-2 Hs (Banshees), as distinct from the photographic configuration, using carriers off the east coast of Korea.

The Air Force had also expanded its own operations to include squadrons of different type aircraft, with different methods and tactics of employing bacteriological warfare.

This was the situation up to my arrival in Korea. Subsequent thereto, the following main events took place.

Operational Stage

During the latter part of May, 1952, the new Commanding General of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, General Jerome, was called to the 5th Air

接到一個擴大細菌戰行動的指示。這個指示是由第五航空隊的新司令巴克斯將軍親自口頭傳達給他的。

次日，五月二十五日，傑羅姆將軍在他辦公室裏的一個會議上向聯軍參謀部概述了細菌戰行動的新階段，我以參謀長的身份出席了這次會。

出席的其他海軍陸戰隊第一空軍聯隊參謀部人員是：萊姆遜—斯克里布納將軍，副司令，斯特奇上校，情報官員（G—2），溫特上校，作戰官員（G—3）以及克拉克上校，後勤官員（G—4）。

從巴克斯將軍那裏得來，在那天早晨傳達給我們並由我們討論的指示如下：

橫貫朝鮮建立一個沾染地帶，為的是使阻擊計劃生效，制止敵人的供應到達前綫。海軍陸戰隊負責這個地帶的左翼，包括新安州與軍隅里兩城以及在這兩城之間和周圍的地區。這個地帶的其他部分，由空軍負責中部，海軍負責東部，也即右翼。

海軍陸戰隊第五一三中隊要由隨意轟擊的目標轉向這個集中的目標，自 K—8（羣山）起飛，仍由第三轟炸機聯隊給予服務，使用 F7F 型（虎貓式）飛機，因為它們是雙引擎的，有利於安全。這個中隊缺乏這種飛機，但已得到承諾可增加其數量。

使左翼沾染並保持其被沾染的責任被指派給五一三中隊的指揮官，行動的時間表由中隊決定，但限於下列範圍之內：

最初的一次沾染要儘早完成，以不超出十日為一期，每一期這個地區要重新沾染一次或重新補充一次。

從事這些任務的飛機被給予一個標準的夜間武裝偵察任務，通常是在海州半島。但是在飛向目標途中，這些飛機將飛經新安州或軍隅里，投下它們的細菌彈，然後再完成它們的尋常任務。這樣既增強保密，又盡少擾亂尋常任務。

關於維持沾染地帶的報告直接交給第五航空隊，報告第某某次尋常任務已經完成，「途經新安州」或「途經軍隅里」，並說明投下了多少枚「超級宣傳」彈。

Force Headquarters and given a directive for expanding bacteriological operations. The directive was given personally and verbally by the new Commanding General of the 5th Air Force, General Barcus.

On the following day, May 25, General Jerome outlined the new stage of bacteriological operations to the Wing staff at a meeting in his office at which I was present in my capacity as Chief of Staff.

The other staff members of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing present were: General Lamson-Scribner, Assistant Commanding General; Colonel Stage, Intelligence Officer (G-2); Colonel Wendt, Operations Officer (G-3) and Colonel Clark, Logistics Officer (G-4).

The directive from General Barcus, transmitted to and discussed by us that morning, was as follows:

A contamination belt was to be established across Korea in an effort to make the interdiction programme effective in stopping enemy supplies from reaching the front lines. The Marines would take the left flank of this belt, to include the two cities of Sinanju and Kunuri and the area between and around them. The remainder of the belt would be handled by the Air Force in the centre and the Navy in the east or right flank.

Marine Squadron 513 would be diverted from its random targets to this concentrated target, operating from K8 (Kunsan), still serviced by the 3rd Bomb Wing using F-7 Fs (Tiger Cats) because of their twin engine safety. The Squadron was short of these aircraft but more were promised.

The responsibility for contaminating the left flank and maintaining the contamination was assigned to the Commander of Squadron 513 and the schedule of operations left to the Squadron's discretion, subject to the limitations that:

The initial contamination of the area was to be completed as soon as possible and the area must then be recontaminated or replenished, at periods not to exceed 10 days.

Aircraft engaged on these missions would be given a standard night armed reconnaissance mission, usually in the Haeju Peninsula. On the way to the target, however, these planes would go via Sinanju or Kunuri, drop their bacteriological bombs and then complete their normal missions. This would add to the security and interfere least with normal missions.

Reports on this programme of maintaining the contamination belt would go direct to 5th Air Force, reporting normal mission number so and so had been completed "via Sinanju" or "via Kunuri" and stating how many "Super-propaganda" bombs had been dropped.

五一三中隊得到指示，要比尋常更為精確地在夜間「點數載重汽車」，以便決定或探索在其活動地區車輛交通有無任何重要的改變。

巴克斯將軍也指示說，海軍陸戰隊第一空軍聯隊第十二空軍大隊要準備參預細菌戰計劃。起初是AD型（空中侵略者式）飛機，其後是F4U型（海盜式）飛機，都要參加擴大的計劃，但是最初祇是替代F7F型飛機。在被指派任務時，這些飛機從它們在朝鮮平澤的K—6基地起飛，在K—8（在羣山的空軍基地）裝載炸彈。其後，如要用成隊的飛機，則專門的轟炸機可在飛赴目標時與編隊中的其他飛機聚集在一起。這是要儘可能地延遲在K—6基地建立一個細菌炸彈供應的必要。

傑羅姆將軍又報告說，第五航空隊要海軍陸戰隊第一照相中隊繼續它們目前的細菌戰行動，自K—3（浦項）起飛。同時，在K—3的海軍陸戰隊第三十三空軍大隊被置於隨時待命的「萬不得已」的基礎上。由於K—3距離目標地區遙遠，因此海軍陸戰隊第三十三空軍大隊大規模地參加這個計劃是不相宜的。由於F9F型（豹式）飛機祇是在緊急的時候使用，因此不再特別建立起照相偵察飛機所需要的炸彈供應。假如有必要，炸彈可以在幾小時內自蔚山運到。

這些計劃及其枝節都在傑羅姆將軍的會議上討論了，並作了佈置來把這個指示傳達給與執行這個新計劃有關的一些軍官。

當時決定先由溫特上校把這個情報傳達給有關的指揮官，一旦細節制定以後再由知情的參謀部軍官加以討論。

海軍陸戰隊第一空軍聯隊的作戰行動

海軍陸戰隊第五一三夜間戰鬥機中隊。

次日，五月二十六日，溫特上校與五一三中隊的指揮官，我相信還有K—8空軍基地指揮官以及第三轟炸機聯隊的司令，舉行會議，並討論了各項細節。

第五航空隊的人員已直接由第五航空隊總部通知，因此已經知悉這個計劃。

Squadron 513 was directed to make a more accurate "truck count" at night than had been customary in order to determine or detect any significant change in the flow of traffic through its operating area.

General Barcus also directed that Marine Aircraft Group 12 of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was to prepare to enter the bacteriological programme. First the ADs (Skyraiders) and then the F-4Us (Corsairs) were to take part in the expanded programme, initially, however, only as substitutes for the F-7 Fs. When called upon, these planes were to fly out of K6, their base at Pyongtaek, Korea, and bomb up at K8, the Air Force base at Kunsan. Later, if formations were involved with special bombs, planes could then rendezvous with the remainder of their formations on the way to the target. This was to delay as long as possible, the need of establishing a bacteriological bomb supply at K6.

General Jerome further reported that 5th Air Force required Marine Photographic Squadron One to continue their current bacteriological operations, operating from K3 (Pohang). At the same time, Marine Aircraft Group 33 at K3 was placed on a standby, last resort, basis. Owing to the distance of K3 from the target area, large-scale participation in the programme by Marine Aircraft Group 33 was not desired. Because the F-9 Fs (Panthers) would only be used in an emergency, no special bomb supply would be established over and above that need to supply the photographic reconnaissance aircraft. Bombs could be brought up from Ulsan in a few hours if necessary.

These plans and the ramifications thereof were discussed at General Jerome's conference and arrangements made to transmit the directive to the officers concerned with carrying out the new programme.

It was decided that Colonel Wendt would initially transmit this information to the commanders concerned and that details could be discussed by the cognizant staff officers as soon as they were worked out.

First M.A.W.s Operations

Marine Night Fighter Squadron 513.

The next day then, 26th May, Colonel Wendt held a conference with the Commanding Officer of Squadron 513 and, I believe, the K8 Air Base Commander and the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Bomb Wing and discussed the various details.

The personnel of the 5th Air Force were already cognizant of the plan, having been directly informed by 5th Air Force Headquarters.

由於這個計劃對五一三中隊來說只是改變了一下目標，並額外負責保持清潔它們的地區的時間表，因此沒有什麼真正要解決的問題。

在六月的第一週，五一三中隊就用毒氣彈在集中的污染地帶開始行動。（根據傑羅姆將軍所得到的計劃，在日後一個未具體規定的日期——視所得的效果，或毫無效果——可能在污染地帶次第試用黃熱病及斑疹傷寒。）

在六月整個月直到我尚在聯隊的七月第一週，五一三中隊就是這樣行動的，並無異常的事件。

通常每夜平均有五架飛機針對沿朝鮮西海岸直到清川江的主要供應綫，但是特別着重於平壤以南的地區。為了保持十天重新補充一次的週期，它們視必要而轉向新安州和軍隅里以及兩城之間的地區。

我們估計，如果每一架飛機帶兩枚細菌彈，兩個好晚上就足以解決新安州和軍隅里，第三個晚上就可以解決兩城周圍和之間的地區。

按我記憶所及，約在六月中旬，中隊通過第三轟炸機聯隊自第五航空隊接到了對計劃的一個修改。這樣新指示把兩個主要城市周圍約十哩的地區包括在中隊的日程表中，特別着重於在供應綫上的及在任何支路上的城鎮或鄉村。

海軍陸戰隊第十二空軍大隊。

其後，溫特上校在 K-6（平澤）舉行了一個會議，出席的有海軍陸戰隊第十二空軍大隊的指揮官蓋洛上校，行政官員及作戰官員。溫特上校通知他們作準備，以便參預細菌戰行動，並籌劃保密問題，因為如果他們參加日間的行動並在他們的 K-6 基地裝載炸彈的話，保密問題將嚴重起來。他們要通知有關的中隊指揮官們，但是此外只能通知絕對最少數目的人員，還要製定一個有限數目的特選的駕駛員名單，以便臨時準備使用。溫特上校告訴他們，不久會派一隊空軍人員來在後勤問題上予以協助。這一隊人實際上在六月的最後一週就來到了。

Since the plan constituted, for Squadron 513, merely a change of target and additional responsibility to maintain their own schedule of contamination of their area, these were no real problems to be solved.

During the first week of June, Squadron 513 started operations on the concentrated contamination belt, using cholera bombs. (The plan given to General Jerome indicated that at a later, unspecified date—depending on the results obtained, or lack of results—yellow fever and then typhus in that order would probably be tried out in the contamination belt).

Squadron 513 operated in this manner throughout June and during the first week in July that I was with the Wing, without any incidents of an unusual nature.

An average of five aircraft a night normally covered the main supply routes along the western coast of Korea up to the Chong Chon River but with emphasis on the area from Pyongyang south-wards. They diverted as necessary to Sinanju or Kunuri and the area between in order to maintain the 10-day bacteriological replenishment cycle.

We estimated that if each aeroplane carried two bacteriological bombs, two good nights were ample to cover both Sinanju and Kunuri and a third night would cover the area around and between these cities.

About the middle of June, as best I remember, the Squadron received a modification to the plan from the 5th Air Force via the 3rd Bomb Wing. This new directive included an area of about 10 miles surrounding the two principal cities in the Squadron's schedule, with particular emphasis on towns or hamlets on the lines of supply and any by-pass roads.

Marine Aircraft Group 12.

Colonel Wendt later held a conference at K6 (Pyongtaek) at which were present the Commanding Officer, Colonel Gaylor, the Executive Officer and the Operations Officer of Marine Aircraft Group 12. Colonel Wendt informed them that they were to make preparations to take part in the bacteriological operations and to work out security problems which would become serious if they got into daylight operations and had to bomb up at their own base, K6. They were to inform the Squadron commanders concerned but only the absolute barest number of additional personnel, and were to have a list of a limited number of handpicked pilots ready to be used on short notice. Colonel Wendt informed them that an air force team would soon be provided to assist with logistic problems, this team actually arriving the last week in June.

在我於七月八日被俘前，海軍陸戰隊第十二空軍大隊的AD型（空中侵略者式）及F4U型（海盜式）飛機都以極少的架數參加過一次或兩次日間的細菌戰行動，作為正規的、按日程表進行的、正常日間任務的一部分，在K-8（羣山）裝載炸彈，並在飛赴目標途中與編隊中的其他飛機聚集在一起。這些任務是針對朝鮮西部沿着從軍隅里向南的一條主要公路上的一些小市鎮的，也是通常阻擊計劃中的一部分。

海軍陸戰隊第三十三空軍大隊。

約在五月二十七至二十八日，溫特上校把聯隊參加細菌戰行動的計劃轉告了海軍陸戰隊第三十三空軍大隊的指揮官康登上校。

既然這個大隊在浦項基地上的豹式（F9F）飛機只是萬不得已才使用的，因此就由康登上校來決定究竟把這個情報傳達給那些人員，但是必須是絕對的少數。

在我尚在聯隊的時期內，這些飛機中沒有一架被交給了細菌戰的任務，雖然這個大隊的VMJ-1中隊的照像偵察機繼續從這個基地起飛以進行其任務。

安排日程表及保密

由於細菌戰的作戰行動方面以及其他作戰行動都是由第五航空隊控制的，因此與海軍陸戰隊第一空軍聯隊有關的最為緊迫的問題就是保密。

關於這個問題，絕對不許有書面的東西。「細菌」字樣是不得在任何情況下在朝鮮提及的，除非是最初為了識別「超級宣傳」或「超宣」。

除了五一三中隊日常的重新補充的行動不需要安排日程表之外，細菌戰的任務是由單獨的、絕密的、關於任務的命令來安排的（這些命令也稱「分令」）。這些命令祇說，在關於當天行動的例行秘密「分」令中所提到的第某某次任務中，要攜帶「超級宣傳」或「超宣」。

關於任務的報告用同樣的辦法傳回去，就是用單獨的、絕密的公文，說明在某一次任務中所投下的「超級宣傳」彈的數目。

除此以外，五一三中隊報告其細菌戰任務的辦法是在其通常的任務報告中附加「途經軍隅里」或「途經新安州」。

Before my capture on July 8, both the ADs (Skyraiders) and the F-4Us (Corsairs) of Marine Aircraft Group 12 had participated in very small numbers, once or twice, in daylight bacteriological operations as a part of regular scheduled, normal, day missions, bombing up at K8 (Kunsan) and rendezvousing with the rest of the information on the way to the target. These missions were directed at small towns in western Korea along the main road leading south from Kunuri and were a part of the normal interdiction programme.

Marine Aircraft Group 33.

Colonel Wendt passed the plan for the Wing's participation in bacteriological operations to Colonel Condon, Commanding Officer of Marine Aircraft Group 33, on approximately 27th, 28th May.

Since the Panthers (F-9Fs) at the Group's base at Pohang would only be used as last resort aircraft, it was left to Colonel Condon's discretion as to just what personnel he would pass the information on to, but it was to be an absolute minimum.

During the time I was with the Wing, none of these aircraft had been scheduled for bacteriological missions though the photographic reconnaissance planes of the Group's V.M.J. One Squadron continued their missions from that base.

Scheduling and Security

Security was far the most pressing problem affecting the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, since the operational phase of bacteriological warfare, as well as other type combat operations, is controlled by the 5th Air Force.

Absolutely nothing could appear in writing on the subject. The word "bacteria" was not to be mentioned in any circumstances in Korea, except initially to identify "Super Propaganda" or "Suprop."

Apart from the routine replenishment operations of Squadron 513, which required no scheduling, bacteriological missions were scheduled by separate, Top Secret, mission orders (or "Frag" Orders). These stated only to include "Super Propaganda" or "Suprop" on mission number so and so of the routine, secret "Frag" order for the day's operations.

Mission reports went back the same way, by separate, Top Secret dispatch, stating the number of "Suprop" bombs dropped on a specifically numbered mission.

Other than this, Squadron 513 reported their bacteriological missions for adding "via Kunuri" or "via Sinanju" to their normal mission reports.

採用一切辦法來欺騙敵人並且不使友方人員知道關於這些行動的消息。而後者是更重要的，因為聯隊中每月有三百至四百人輪換回美國。

已經發出了命令：細菌彈祇能與普通的炸彈或凝固汽油彈一起投下，以便襲擊顯得是通常的對供應綫的襲擊。爲了在敵區上空時的額外保密，在投細菌彈前要在飛機上保留一枚凝固汽油彈，以便萬一飛機墮毀，就幾乎一定可以焚燬證據。

所有的軍官都被禁止討論這個問題，除非是正式的並且是關起門來談。每次發簡令時都要強調，這不但不是軍事秘密，並且有關國家政策。

我個人從來沒有在辦公室之外聽到提及或甚至涉及這個問題，我一天三餐都是在司令官的私人小飯廳吃的，而在那裏是常討論許多被列爲秘密的事項的。

估計效果

在聯隊中，我們一致的意見是，這些細菌戰行動的效果是不能精確地加以估計的。通常估計的辦法是（據推測）使用間諜，審詢戰俘，很仔細地注意每夜載重汽車的數量，以觀察是否與通常的數量有異，並觀察朝中當局的公開宣告。對於這些公開宣告是予以極大的信賴的，因爲我們認爲，發生了大的流行病是不可能不被外界知道的，因此朝中當局就會自行宣佈。從以上來源所取得的情報是由在東京的遠東總司令這一級來加以聯系和研究的，但是對於效果的總的估計，是不傳達到聯隊這一級來的，因此聯隊對於效果並不完全知道。

當我接替賓涅上校的時候，我曾問他迄今已知的效果或反應，他明白地說：「屁都不值」。

我所認識的人中，沒有一人說我們的努力、冒險和詐欺已經取得了絲毫相稱的效果，雖然朝中當局對於早先的使用細菌彈的行動曾大大地作過一次公開報告。據我所知，總的效果是令人失望和不佳的。

個人反應

我不是要爲任何人，包括我在內辯護而作如下的敘述。作爲絕對的直接觀察所得，我祇是據實報

Every means was taken to deceive the enemy and to deny knowledge of these operations from friendly personnel, the latter being most important since 300 to 400 men of the Wing are rotated back to the United States each month.

Orders were issued that bacteriological bombs were only to be dropped in conjunction with ordinary bombs or napalm, to give the attack the appearance of a normal attack against enemy supply lines. For added security over enemy territory, a napalm bomb was to remain on the aircraft until after the release of the bacteriological bombs so that if the aircraft crashed it would almost certainly burn and destroy evidence.

All officers were prohibited from discussing the subject except officially and behind closed doors. Every briefing was to emphasise that this was not only a military secret, but a matter of national policy.

I personally have never once heard the subject mentioned or even referred to outside of the office, and I ate all of my meals in the Commanding General's small private mess where many classified matters were discussed.

Assessment of Results

In the Wing, our consensus of opinions was that results of these bacteriological operations could not be accurately assessed. Routine methods of assessment are by (presumably) spies, by questioning prisoners of war, by watching the nightly truck count very carefully to observe deviations from the normal traffic, and by observing public announcements of Korean and Chinese authorities, upon which very heavy dependence was placed, since it was felt that no large epidemic could occur without news leaking out to the outside world and that these authorities would, therefore, announce it themselves. Information from the above sources is correlated at the Commander-in-Chief, Far East level in Tokyo, but the over-all assessment of results is not passed down to the Wing level, hence the Wing was not completely aware of the results.

When I took over from Colonel Binney, I asked him for results or reactions up to date and he specifically said, "Not worth a damn."

No one that I know of has indicated that the results are anywhere near commensurate with the effort, danger and dishonesty involved, although the Korean and Chinese authorities have made quite a public report of early bacteriological bomb efforts. The sum total of results known to me are that they are disappointing and no good.

Personal Reactions

I do not say the following in defence of anyone, myself included, I merely report as an absolutely

告說，每一個軍官在第一次聽說美國正在朝鮮使用細菌戰時，都是既震驚又羞慚。我相信，我們作為軍官到朝鮮來，都是毫無例外地效忠於我們的人民和政府的，關於細菌戰，我們也相信我們經常被告知的——那就是，細菌戰祇是爲了在第三次世界大戰中作報復之用才加以發展的。

這些軍官來到朝鮮後，發覺他們自己的政府徹底地欺騙了他們，仍然向世界宣稱它沒有使用細菌戰。這樣就使他們在思想上懷疑政府一般地關於戰爭所說的所有其他事情，特別是關於朝鮮的戰爭。

我們之間沒有一人相信，在戰爭中細菌戰有任何地位，因爲在一切設計出來的武器中，祇有細菌彈是以在平民大眾中製造傷亡爲主要目標的——而這是每一個人都在良心上都知道是徹底錯誤的。疾病的蔓延是不可預測的，一個充分展開了的流行病，可能是漫無邊際的。此外，偷偷地以一種武器來對付赤手空拳、而又事先未獲警告的人民，令人有一種可怕的陰毒和不公正的感覺。

我具體地記得問過溫特上校，當蓋洛上校第一次得到通知時的反應如何，他向我報告說，蓋洛上校吃驚得目瞪口呆，並且說他真想「退還他的制服」。每人在第一次聽說的時候，都有同樣的感覺，而他們的反應也正是一個正直和自尊的國家的人民所可能有的反應。

從戰術上說，這種武器是完全不必要的——它甚至不是海軍陸戰隊的一種武器——，從道義上說，它本身就是永劫不復之罪，從行政上和後勤工作上說，按照目前計劃的使用辦法，它是毫無希望的，從自尊和忠誠的觀點來說，它是可恥的。

弗蘭克·赫·許威布爾（簽名）
（軍號）04429
美國海軍陸戰隊上校

一九五二年十二月六日
北朝鮮

（一九五三年二月二十四日「人民日報」）

direct observation that every officer when first informed that the United States is using bacteriological warfare in Korea is both shocked and ashamed. I believe, without exception, we come to Korea as officers loyal to our people and government and believing what we have always been told about bacteriological warfare—that it is being developed only for use in retaliation in a third world war.

For these officers to come to Korea and find that their own government has so completely deceived them by still proclaiming to the world that it is not using bacteriological warfare, makes them question mentally all the other things that the government proclaims about warfare in general and in Korea specifically.

None of us believes that bacteriological warfare has any place in war, since of all the weapons devised bacteriological bombs alone have as their primary objective casualties among masses of civilians—and that is utterly wrong in anybody's conscience. The spreading of disease is unpredictable and there may be no limits to a fully developed epidemic. Additionally, there is the awfully sneaky, unfair sort of feeling dealing with a weapon used surreptitiously against an unarmed and unwarmed people.

I remember specifically asking Colonel Wendt what were Colonel Gaylor's reactions, when he was first informed and he reported to me that Colonel Gaylor was both horrified and stupefied and said he'd like to "turn in his suit." Everyone felt like that when they first heard of it, and their reactions are what might well be expected from a fair-minded, self-respecting nation of people.

Tactically, this type of weapon is totally unwarranted—it is not even a Marine Corps weapon—morally it is damnation itself; administratively and logistically as planned for use, it is hopeless; and from the point of view of self-respect and loyalty, it is shameful.

F. H. Schwable, 04429, Colonel, U.S.M.C.,
6th December, 1952, North Korea.

(Daily News Release, February 23, 1953)

(第二號)

許威布爾供詞之二：傑羅姆將軍召開的會議

一九五二年十二月十九日

SCHWABLE'S SECOND DEPOSITION: GENERAL
JEROME'S CONFERENCE

December 19, 1952

一九五二年五月二十五日，海軍陸戰隊第一空軍聯隊司令，傑羅姆准將召集了第一聯隊參謀部官員，舉行了一次會議。這是在第五航空隊司令巴克斯將軍指示傑羅姆將軍把海軍陸戰隊第一空軍聯隊所進行的細菌戰擴大到作戰階段的次一日舉行的。

這次會議是在聯隊總部司令辦公室內，關起門來舉行的。沒有作記錄，也沒有牽涉到書面的材料。討論是以有節制的聲調進行的。出席的人，除傑羅姆將軍之外，有：萊姆遜一斯克里布納准將，副司令；我本人，參謀長；斯特奇上校，情報官員；溫特上校，作戰官員；克拉克上校，後勤官員。

會議是極其非正式的。正如我已說過，並沒有作記錄，但是以下所述是七個月後按我記憶所及對當時發生的事情一個大體上正確的報告。

傑羅姆將軍開始時說：「昨天我和巴克斯將軍談了相當的時候，另外只有麥遜上校（第五航空隊作戰官員）在場。我要告訴你們的，將使你們震驚，正如它使我吃驚一樣，但是在我們還以朝鮮陸地為基地時，我們必須繼續執行第五航空隊的命令。」

他於是檢查了一下在場的每一人，對於當前用「超級宣傳」彈轟炸任意選擇的目標的細菌戰計劃，是否熟悉。所有在座的人不是點頭就是說：「是的，長官。」他繼續說：「你們知道，F7F型（虎貓式）飛機自今年年初就執行了超級宣傳計劃，今春，我們的F2H型（照相偵察的女妖式）飛機參加了計劃，此外還有某些我不大熟悉的空軍中隊也參加了。這個計劃到現在為止，是在用隨意轟炸的辦法來包括所有各種地形。」

Brigadier General Jerome, Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, called a conference of staff officers of the Wing on 25th May, 1952. This was on the day after General Barcus, Commanding General, 5th Air Force, had directed General Jerome to extend the bacteriological warfare conducted by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing into its operational stage.

This conference was held behind closed doors in the Commanding General's office at Wing Headquarters. No notes were taken nor written material involved and discussion was in moderate tones of voice. Present, in addition to General Jerome, were: Brigadier General Lamson-Scribner, Assistant Commanding General; myself, Chief of Staff; Colonel Stage, Intelligence officer; Colonel Wendt, Operations officer and Colonel Clark, Logistics officer.

The conference was extremely informal. As I have said, no notes were taken, but the following is a substantially correct account of what took place as best I remember it seven months later.

General Jerome opened by saying: "Yesterday I talked for some time with General Barcus, with only Colonel Mason (5th Air Force Operations officer) present. What I have to tell you will shock you as it did me; nevertheless we have to continue to carry out 5th Air Force orders while shore based in Korea."

He then checked whether everyone present was familiar with the current bacteriological warfare program of "super-propaganda" (or "suprop") bombing of random targets. All hands either nodded or said, "Yes, Sir," and he went on:

"You are aware that F7F's (Tiger Cats) have been carrying out a suprop program since early this year, and that this spring our F2H's (photographic reconnaissance, Banshees) entered the program as well as certain other Air Force Squadrons with which I am not familiar. The program, up to this point, has been using random bombing in an effort to cover all types of terrain feature."

「現在已經有指示使這些行動來一個激烈的轉變！巴克斯將軍說，要橫貫北朝鮮中部建立一個沾染地帶，由海軍陸戰隊第一空軍聯隊負責左翼，包括新安州及軍隅里以及這些城市周圍和之間的地區。空軍負責中部較大的地區，自軍隅里到距離東海岸約三十英里的地方，而海軍負責右翼。先生們，這就是說，在這樣一種倒霉的戰爭中，我們正在轉入作戰行動的階段！」

將軍停了一下，沒有一個人作聲。他繼續描述細節，大致如下：「在這個計劃中由海軍陸戰隊負責的一部分，最初由VMF513進行——對他們來說，這只是轉移一下目標，從散漫零星的轟炸轉為在一個集中地區轟炸。他們還有責任保持把該地區重新加以沾染，其間隔期間不得超過每十天一次。

「VMF513將須自己負責維持這樣一個週期表，在『分』令中將不提具體的任務（『分』令只是全部作戰命令中的片斷，但是其中包含個別作戰單位的詳細任務）。VMF513在關於日常飛行任務的報告中，只需報告他們通常的夜間武裝偵察，如在執行任務中攜帶了特殊武器，就附加『途經新安州』或『途經軍隅里』字樣。VMF513要儘早開始這種行動，並像他們所已經作的一樣，利用K-8（在羣山的空軍基地）的一切通常的設備，同時視需要與第三轟炸機聯隊配合。只有雙引擎的F7F型（虎貓式）飛機將被使用，而以前關於安全的所有預防措施將繼續有效，例如，儘可能飛經水面，只能與其他炸彈同時投下超級宣傳彈，等等。」

傑羅姆將軍又繼續說大致如下的話：「計劃的這一部分不產生什麼特殊問題。它是轉移了一下目標。對於F2H型（女妖式）飛機，將和過去一樣，繼續在『分』令中指派一些計劃中的不經常的任務。

「真正的問題，雖然不是迫在目前，但却是嚴重的，這些問題之產生是因為這個迄今為止有限的計劃現在將牽進來一些大隊、它們的空軍基地以及許多被涉及的人員。」在到會的所有軍官中顯然起了一個騷動，因為這個意味着擴大細菌戰的消息來得像一個晴天霹靂。

傑羅姆將軍接着概括地指出了一些進一步的措施，這些措施是為實行擴大細菌戰計劃中指派給聯隊的

“Now a radical shift of operations has been directed! General Barcus stated that a contamination belt is to be established across the central part of North Korea with the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing assuming responsibility for the left flank, to include Sinanju and Kunuri, and the area around and between these cities. The Air Force will take the larger centre area from Kunuri to within about 30 miles of the east coast, and the Navy will take the right flank. Gentlemen, this means we are shifting to the operational stage in this miserable kind of warfare!”

The General paused for a moment and no one uttered a word. He went on to describe the details, which went like this: “The Marine part of this program will be conducted initially by V.M.F. 513—for them, it is actually only a snift of target, from miscellaneous bombing to bombing in a concentrated area. They have the additional responsibility of maintaining the recontamination of the area at intervals not to exceed once in every 10 days.

“V.M.F. 513 will be responsible for maintaining this schedule on their own, and specific missions for this contamination program will not show up on ‘Frag’ orders.” (Frag orders are merely fragments of a complete operation order, but contain the detailed missions for individual units). “V.M.F. 513 mission reports for these routine flights will merely report their normal night armed reconnaissance, adding the words, ‘via Sinanju’ or ‘via Kunuri,’ for those missions which include special weapons. V.M.F. 513 is to commence these operations as soon as possible using all the normal facilities at K-8 (air force base at Kunsan) as they have been doing, and coordinating as necessary with the 3rd Bomb Wing. Only twin-engine F7F’s (Tiger Cats) will be used and all previous safety precautions will continue in effect, like flying over water where possible and dropping suprop bombs only in conjunction with other bombs and so on.”

General Jerome continued, in effect; “that part of the program presents no particular problems. It is a shift of targets. The F2H (Banshee) aircraft will continue to be assigned intermittent missions in the program in the ‘Frag’ orders as in the past.

“The real problems, while not immediate, are nevertheless critical and are occasioned by the fact that this hitherto confined program will now involve the Groups, their air bases and the many personnel concerned.” There was a decided stirring around by all officers present as this information of the meaning of extended bacteriological warfare hit like a bolt of lightning.

General Jerome then outlined the further arrangements needed to carry out the part of expanded bacteriological warfare program assigned to the

那部分任務時所必需的。他說，海軍陸戰隊空軍第十二大隊必須準備以數目有限的A D 型機（空中侵略者式）和F4U型機（海盜式）去參加，不過，在得到別的命令之前，這些飛機將只是用來替代F7F型機。至於海軍陸戰隊第三十三空軍大隊，它們將在待命的基礎上，只在緊急情況中萬不得已時方予使用。

「在目前，」傑羅姆將軍說，「我們將繼續僅在夜間活動，但日間的行動已為時不遠，我們可能在將來受到命令把『超級宣傳』彈包括在日間的襲擊中。關於這一點，巴克斯將軍曾明確地向我說：『如果政府公開宣佈使用細菌戰，那麼它將成為所有主要襲擊的一部分，同時也將如此宣佈，目的在使工人害怕進入污染地區從而阻止工人修復轟炸所致的損毀。』所以你們自己就能看出這種行動及其所需要的準備工作的可能的廣闊程度。」

不過，傑羅姆將軍繼續說，「我想在一個相當長的時期以內我們還不必為這樣大規模的行動擔心，我所已經概括告訴你們的便是新計劃的主要內容。」然後他轉向溫特上校說：

「正如我所已經指出的，VMF 513的行動將成為經常性的，中隊指揮官掌有執行的責任，第五航空隊已經，或將要，把這個新計劃直接通知他，並告訴他『分』令上將不會提及這個計劃。不過，我還要你親自去找一找那位指揮官，告訴我我已接到通知，雖然我並不喜歡這個計劃，但是必須要按照指示執行。告訴他，他有特別的責任來保證污染區必須按照十天的週期予以維持，如果他遇到困難或需要援助，可以找聯隊。」

他還對溫特上校說：「我要你儘早與蓋洛和康登談話，以便他們一旦接到『分』令提到『超級宣傳』時，他們不致措手不及。」蓋洛和康登兩個上校那時分別是海軍陸戰隊第十二和第三十三空軍大隊的指揮官。

這便是傑羅姆將軍在談到新計劃時開頭一些話的主要內容，接着便是一陣自由討論。

萊姆遜—斯克里布納將軍詢問保持這區域在污染狀態中的計劃會不會妨礙非常重要的第五一三中隊通常的夜間武裝偵察任務。溫特上校說，他覺得這工作將減輕五一三的問題，因為在此以前，五一三一直

Wing. He said that Marine Aircraft Group 12 had to prepare to take part with a limited number of AD's (Skyraiders) and F4U's (Corsairs) but that, until otherwise directed, these planes would only be used as substitutes for the F7F's. As to Marine Aircraft Group 33, they were to be placed on a standby basis to be called on only in an emergency as a last resort.

"For the time being," General Jerome said, "our operations will continue at night, but daylight operations are in the offing and we may be called on to include 'suprop' bombs in daylight strikes later. In this connection, General Barcus specifically said to me: 'If the government decides to announce the use of bacteriological warfare publicly, then it will become a part of all major strikes, and will be so announced in an effort to keep workers away from repairing bomb damage through fear of entering contaminated areas.' So you can see for yourselves the possible extent of such operations and preparations necessary."

However, General Jerome went on, "I do not believe we have to worry about such large-scale actions for some time and what I have outlined to you is the essence of the new program." Then he turned to Colonel Wendt and said:

"As I have pointed out, V.M.F. 513's operations become routine with responsibility for their execution in the hands of the Squadron C.O. He has been, or will be, notified of the new plan direct by 5th Air Force and warned that the 'Frag' orders will make no mention of it. However, I want you to go and see the C.O. personally and tell him that I have been informed and that, while I do not relish the program, it must be carried out as directed. Tell him that he has been given special responsibility for seeing that the contamination of the area is maintained in the 10-day cycles, and if he runs into any trouble and needs help, he is to call on the Wing."

Still addressing Colonel Wendt, he said: "Then as soon as convenient, I want you to talk to both Gaylor and Condon so that if they get a 'Frag' order specifying 'suprop' some day, they won't be caught short." Colonels Gaylor and Condon were the then Commanding Officers of Marines Aircraft Groups 12 and 33 respectively.

This was the main substance of General Jerome's opening remarks on the new program and they were followed by an open discussion.

General Lamson-Scribner inquired whether the program of maintaining the contamination of the area would not interfere with Squadron 513's normal night armed reconnaissance missions which were so important. Colonel Wendt said that he felt it would ease up 513's problems because formerly

在北朝鮮的南半部各地執行細菌轟炸的任務，有時在盡力保持海州半島一帶的巡邏同時，還一直飛到東海岸。現在，他說，雖然將牽涉到更多的特別炸彈，五一三所有的力量將集中在北朝鮮的西南部，因此便應該產生更為有效的結果。

溫特上校估計，在五一三中隊作初步的污染後，如果五架飛機每架每晚攜帶兩枚細菌彈，那麼每十天中，大約只須三夜或四夜便可對這區域維持補充細菌，而在其餘的幾夜裏就不必再受超級宣傳的麻煩。並且即使在作超級宣傳的夜裏，飛機也只是暫時地飛離它們負責的主要路線。

在這時，傑羅姆將軍插進來強調巴克斯將軍會說，橫跨朝鮮建立一個污染地帶「將保證阻擊計劃的成功。」這句話的含義是細菌活動不但不會妨礙武裝偵察飛行，它並將為中斷供應線的全部努力增加效力。

上面所引述的巴克斯將軍的話，引起了所有在座的人關於在阻擊計劃中使用細菌武器的廣泛討論。如果我的記憶是正確的話，討論是由我開始的。我說，如果空軍必須乞靈於特別武器來使它們的阻擊計劃生效，那麼，無論如何，空軍的情況一定是很困難的了。我還坦白地表示我的意見，即：一個有決心的敵人，對於污染地帶是不難應付的；把戰略性的武器作戰術性的使用，是一種污瀆；把無法控制的細菌和疾病在一場大規模的戰爭中戰略地用來對付巨大的工業區，已經是一件可怕的事；若為了要達到把公路運輸終止這樣一個渺茫而不可靠的希望，把疾病撒佈到橫跨整個國家的地區中去，那就更加殘忍而肆無忌憚了。

最後我說，如果我們建立了一個有效的疾病區，我相信敵人將採取各種他們可能有的安全措施，不顧一切地仍把他們的給養衝過那地區，結果很可能把疾病帶到前綫，並傳佈到我們自己這一邊來，因為傳染病在感染誰這一點上是不認人的。

溫特上校接着說，如果將我們的夜間戰鬥飛機翼上的兩枚超級宣傳彈用兩枚大的普通炸彈來替代，並能直接擊中一座橋樑的話，那將比整個中隊在朝鮮散佈疾病的努力，收到遠為巨大的功效。

513 had conducted bacteriological bombing missions all over the southern half of North Korea, clear over to the east coast at times, while still trying to maintain patrols over the Haeju Peninsula. Now, he said, although more special bombs would be involved, all the efforts of 513 would be concentrated in the south western part of North Korea and this should produce more efficient results.

Colonel Wendt estimated that, after the initial contamination by 513 Squadron, if five aircraft each carried two bacteriological bombs a night, they could maintain the replenishment of the area with bacteria in about three or four nights out of each 10, leaving the remaining nights free from the bother of suprop. Even on those nights the aircraft would only be temporarily diverted from the main routes they had to cover.

General Jerome intervened at this point to stress that General Barcus had stated that the establishment of a contamination belt across Korea "would assure the success of the interdiction program." This implied that, far from interfering with the armed reconnaissance flights, the bacteriological operations would increase the effectiveness of the total effort to stop the lines of supply.

This remark of General Barcus started a whole field of discussion by all hands in the use of bacteriological weapons in an interdiction programme. If my memory is correct, I led off this discussion. Anyway, I said that the Air Force was getting pretty hard up if they had to turn to special weapons to make their interdiction programme work. I expressed frankly my ideas that a contamination belt could easily be countered by a determined enemy; that it was a prostitution of a strategic weapon to use it tactically; that it was a dreadful thing to use uncontrollable germs and sickness against large manufacturing areas in a major war, but it was even more ruthless and wanton to spread disease clear across the width of a whole country with the meagre and indefinite hopes of stopping truck traffic.

Finally, I said that if we established an effective disease area, I believed the enemy would rush their supplies through with whatever safeguards they have, but with the effect that the disease might well spread to our side since an epidemic is quite impersonal as to whom it affects.

Colonel Wendt added that two large conventional bombs, in place of two suprop bombs, on the wings of our night fighters, could do much more effective work if they could be dropped accurately on a bridge, than the whole squadron's efforts to spread disease in Korea.

克拉克上校指出任何在某一地區集中使用超級宣傳彈的事實將只會引致完全暴露美國並未運用細菌戰的神話，這樣我們將使自己成為撒謊者，並因而得不償失。

每人都同時開始搶着講話。大家指出：海軍陸戰隊的空軍並非為進行細菌戰而組織、訓練和裝備起來的，因為細菌戰並不是兩棲登陸作戰的一部分；因此，若因為我們暫時在作戰上受空軍的控制，便要求我們在朝鮮使用細菌武器，似乎並不是一件正確的事情。最後傑羅姆將軍發言，他說他真正感覺的空軍方面在阻擊計劃一事上已窘迫萬分。

好幾個軍官接着說，如果我們必須在這裏使用這種東西，我們的政府應該承認這件事，因為通過被俘人員，敵人很快便會發現的。把朝鮮的人民和市鎮來試驗細菌物品已經足夠惡劣，而在朝鮮戰爭這樣一個規模的戰爭中把它從實驗的階段推進到作戰行動的階段，實在是荒唐的，因為細菌戰是一種戰略武器，專門以密集的人口為目標——這便意味着大部分是平民——以停止戰時生產。這一點在朝鮮是不適用的。

大約是在這時候，傑羅姆將軍提醒我們：我們不是到這裏來討論在朝鮮進行細菌戰一事的是非的——這決定早已由上級作出來了——我們是來討論計劃本身以及聯隊實行這計劃時的必要措施的。

克拉克上校於是發問，為A.D.型機（空中侵略者式）準備炸彈供應和設備的意圖何在。傑羅姆將軍說，他曾告訴巴克斯將軍他將盡力之所及避免在K-6基地（海軍陸戰隊第十二空軍大隊在平澤的基地）大規模上炸彈，並希望在擬訂「分」令時巴克斯將軍將記住那一點。他還曾要求巴克斯將軍從空軍中派一隊有訓練的人來管理開始初期從K-6基地掛用的炸彈。他說，海軍陸戰隊第三十三空軍大隊離在蔚山的基本炸彈供應區很近，如果該大隊在不得已時方予使用，那麼他便不在它們的K-3基地（浦項）建立任何超過F2H型機（女妖式）使用數量以上的任何炸彈供應。

溫特上校接着說，如果單架的空中侵略者式機在夜間替代虎貓式機，它們無論如何將必須飛赴K-8基地（羣山）去聽取簡令，因此它們可以在那邊上炸彈。即使在進行少量飛機的白天襲擊中，把它們送到

Colonel Clark argued that any concentrated use of suprop bombs in an area could only lead to complete exposure of the myth that the United States was not using bacteriological warfare. We would make liars out of ourselves and get nothing worthwhile in exchange.

Everybody started to talk at one time. It was pointed out that Marine Aviation is neither organized, trained, nor equipped to use bacteriological warfare since it is not a part of amphibious operations, and that it did not, therefore seem right that we should be required to use it here in Korea merely because we were under the operational control of the 5th Air Force temporarily. Finally General Jerome held the floor to say that he honestly felt the Air Force was desperate over the interdiction programme.

Several officers added that if we had to use the stuff here, our government should admit it since through P.O.W.s, the enemy would find out soon enough. To use Korean people and towns to test bacteriological materials was bad enough, but to progress to the operational stage in a war the size of the Korean war, was simply outrageous because bacteriological warfare is a strategic weapon directed solely on human mass populations—that means mostly civilians—in an effort to stop war production, which does not apply in Korea.

It was about this point that General Jerome reminded us that we were not there to discuss the pro's and con's of using bacteriological warfare in Korea—that decision having already been made "higher up"—but we were to discuss the plan itself and the measures required of the Wing to implement it.

Then Colonel Clark asked what were the intentions regarding bomb supplies and facilities for the A.D.'s (Skyraiders). General Jerome reported that he had told General Barcus he would do all in his power to avoid large-scale bombing-up at K-6 (Marine Aircraft Group 12's base at Pyongtaek) and hoped that General Barcus would keep that in mind when "Frag" orders were written up. He had asked General Barcus for a trained team from the Air Force to handle the bombs initially from K-6. He said that if Marine Aircraft Group 33 was only to be used as a last resort, and was near the basic bomb supply area at Ulsan, he was not going to establish any bomb supply at their base at K-3 (Pohang) over and above that which was being used by the F2-H's (Banshees).

Colonel Wendt added that if single Skyraiders were substituted for Tiger Cats at night, they would have to go to K-8 (Kunsan) for briefing anyhow and could bomb up there. Even in daylight strikes of a small number of aircraft, there would be no

K-8 基地去取特別炸彈然後在赴目標的途中和其他飛機會合一事，也不會有什麼困難的。

傑羅姆將軍說，海軍陸戰隊第十二空軍大隊中非常小的一個數目的參謀人員應當知道空中侵略者式飛機可能參預計劃，並使少數幾個特別合格的、精選過的、可靠並忠心的駕駛員得知此事，以便他們能在立刻被召參加時不致迷惑混亂。至於海軍陸戰隊第三十三空軍大隊，他將完全交由康登上校去決定究竟告訴那些人，不過那數目必須很小，並且必須經常保持一張特別合格的駕駛員的名單。

溫特上校問及我們自己的工作人員中有那些人應當知道，並特別提到了醫務官。我竭力反對讓醫務官知道，反對的根據是，為使計劃適當進行，他並沒有「知道的必要」。我建議，沒有我和司令官的特別的和個別的批准，便不得讓那天不在場的人知道，不過作戰官員和後勤官員（但是情報官員除外）應有權告知一些為要在他們的部門中有效執行任務所必需的極少數的軍官，並且這些軍官必須是少校和少校以上，可能的話，必須是正規的而不是後備的，以及在朝鮮還須服役若干時日的軍官。

這就提出了一般的保密事項，我們都承認這是主要問題中的一個。

傑羅姆將軍說：「告訴所有有關的人，自上而下，包括巴克斯而現在也包括我，每人都說這是國家政策，不僅是軍事保密。」他報告說，巴克斯將軍會說，關於這個計劃不得有書面的東西，禁止使用「細菌戰」或類似的名詞，除非是最初為了與這個計劃識別起見。

關於保密的討論是長而詳盡的，討論結束時，傑羅姆將軍說，保密是「所有人的事」，每人都要負責，每人都要起作用——這是一條有許多環節的鍊子，斷了一環就能毀壞這條鍊子。某一個軍官指出，中國人已經聲稱美國使用細菌戰，而自從B-29 型飛機早先進行了細菌戰以來，許多駕駛員已成為戰俘，因此，到現在敵人一定已經知道使用了細菌戰。

strain in sending them to K-8 for their bacteriological bombs and then having them rendezvous with the rest of the planes en route to the target.

General Jerome said that a very small number of Marine Aircraft Group 12's staff officers were to be made cognizant of the possibility of the Sky-raiders entering the programme, and a handful of specially qualified, hand-picked, reliable and loyal pilots informed, so that they could participate at a moment's notice without confusion. As to Marine Aircraft Group 33, he would leave it up to Colonel Condon as to whom he would inform but that the number must be small and a list of specially-qualified pilots must be kept current.

Colonel Wendt asked as to whom on our own staff should know and referred particularly to the medical officer. I opposed violently letting the medical officer know on the basis that he did not have a real "need-to-know" in order for the programme to function properly. I proposed that no one not present be informed without specific individual clearance by me and the commanding general, except that both operations officer and logistics officer, but not the intelligence officer, should be authorised to inform the barest minimum number of officers required for efficient functioning of their own sections; that these officers must be majors and above, regulars and not reserves if at all possible, and officers who had some time still to do in Korea.

This brought up the matter of security in general which we all recognised as being one of the main problems.

General Jerome said: "Tell all those involved that everybody from the top on down, including Barcus and now me, says that this is a matter of national policy, not just military security." He reported that General Barcus had said that nothing must appear in writing on this programme and that the use of the words "bacteriological or germ warfare" or similar terms, was forbidden except for initial identification with the programme.

The discussion on security was long and detailed and ended by General Jerome saying that security was an "all hands affair," that everybody was responsible and everybody had to play their part—that it was a chain of many links and one broken link could destroy the chain. Some officer pointed out that the Chinese had already claimed that the United States was using bacteriological warfare and that since the early days of its use by the B-29's, many pilots had become prisoners of war and that surely, therefore, the enemy must know by now of its use.