

剑桥政治思想史原著系列（影印本）

CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT

道德的谱系

On the Genealogy of Morality

Nietzsche

尼采

Edited by

KEITH

ANSELL—PEARSON

中国政法大学出版社

弗里德里克·尼采
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

道德的谱系
*On the Genealogy
of Morality*

EDITED BY
KEITH ANSELL – PEARSON
*Department of Philosophy,
University of Warwick*

中国政法大学出版社

图书在版编目(CIP)数据

道德的谱系/(德)尼采著. —北京:中国政法大学出版社,2003.5

剑桥政治思想史原著系列(影印本)

ISBN 7-5620-2389-1

I. 道... II. 尼... III. 尼采, F. W. (1844~1900)—基督教—宗教哲学—英文 IV. ①B516.47②B97

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字(2003)第 037297 号

* * * * *

书 名	《道德的谱系》
出 版 人	李传敢
经 销	全国各地新华书店
出版发行	中国政法大学出版社
承 印	清华大学印刷厂
开 本	880 × 1230mm 1/32
印 张	8
版 本	2003 年 5 月第 1 版 2003 年 5 月第 1 次印刷
书 号	ISBN 7-5620-2389-1/D·2349
印 数	0 001-2 000
定 价	18.00 元
社 址	北京市海淀区西土城路 25 号 邮政编码 100088
电 话	(010)62229563 (010)62229278 (010)62229803
电子信箱	z5620@263.net
网 址	http://www.cupl.edu.cn/cbs/index.htm

声 明

1. 版权所有,侵权必究。
2. 如发现缺页、倒装问题,请与出版社联系调换。

Friedrich Nietzsche is one of the most influential thinkers of the past hundred and fifty years and *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887) is his most important work on ethics and politics. A polemical contribution to moral and political theory, it offers a critique of moral values and traces the historical evolution of concepts such as guilt, conscience, responsibility, law, and justice. It is a text affording valuable insight into Nietzsche's assessment of modern times and how he envisaged a possible overcoming of the epoch of nihilism. Nietzsche himself emphasized the cumulative nature of his work and the necessity for correct understanding of the later work as a development of the earlier. This volume contains new translations of the *Genealogy* and of the early essay 'The Greek State' and sections from other of Nietzsche's work to which he refers within it (*Human, All Too Human*, *Daybreak*, *The Joyful Science*, and *Beyond Good and Evil*). Keith Ansell-Pearson's Introduction places the *Genealogy* in its intellectual context and includes a chronology of Nietzsche's life and a guide to further reading.

剑桥政治思想史原著系列

丛书编辑

Raymond Geuss

剑桥大学哲学高级讲师

Quentin Skinner

剑桥大学近代史讲座教授

在政治理论领域，“剑桥政治思想史原著系列”作为主要的学生教科丛书，如今已牢固确立了其地位。本丛书旨在使学生能够获得从古希腊到 20 世纪初期西方政治思想史方面所有最为重要的原著。它囊括了所有著名的经典原著，但与此同时，它又扩展了传统的评价尺度，以便能够纳入范围广泛、不那么出名的作品。而在此之前，这些作品中有许多从未有过现代英文版本可资利用。只要可能，所选原著都会以完整而不删节的形式出版，其中的译作则是专门为本丛书的目的而安排。每一本书都有一个评论性的导言，加上历史年表、生平梗概、进一步阅读指南，以及必要的词汇表和原文注解。本丛书的最终目的是，为西方政治思想的整个发展脉络提供一个清晰的轮廓。

本丛书已出版著作的书目，请查阅书末。

CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT

Series editors

RAYMOND GEUSS

Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Cambridge

QUENTIN SKINNER

Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge

Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought is now firmly established as the major student textbook series in political theory. It aims to make available to students all the most important texts in the history of western political thought, from ancient Greece to the early twentieth century. All the familiar classic texts will be included, but the series seeks at the same time to enlarge the conventional canon by incorporating an extensive range of less well-known works, many of them never before available in a modern English edition. Wherever possible, texts are published in complete and unabridged form, and translations are specially commissioned for the series. Each volume contains a critical introduction together with chronologies, biographical sketches, a guide to further reading and any necessary glossaries and textual apparatus. When completed the series will aim to offer an outline of the entire evolution of western political thought.

For a list of titles published in the series, please see end of book

Acknowledgements and note on the text

Keith Ansell-Pearson wishes to thank the two editors, Raymond Geuss and Quentin Skinner, for their support and guidance in bringing this project to fruition. He wishes to acknowledge a special debt of gratitude to Gillian Rose, who first confronted him with the 'genealogy of morality' and inspired him to embark on a philosophical engagement with Nietzsche. Carol Diethe wishes to thank Jürgen for his intellectual and moral support.

The notes which accompany the text were prepared by Raymond Geuss, who profited from editorial material supplied in the editions of G. Colli and M. Montinari (Berlin/New York, de Gruyter, 1967–1) and Peter Pütz (Munich, Goldman, 1988).

The essay 'The Greek State' was originally intended by Nietzsche to be a chapter of his first published book, *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872); together with the essay 'Homer on Competition', and three other essays – on the topics of truth, the future of education, and Schopenhauer – it formed part of the 'Five prefaces to five unwritten books' Nietzsche presented to Cosima Wagner in the Christmas of 1872. The German text of the two essays, newly translated here, can be found in volume 1 of *Nietzsche. Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe* (Berlin/New York, de Gruyter, 1988), pp.764–78 and pp.783–93.

Nietzsche's own italicization and idiosyncratic punctuation have been retained in the text.

Introduction: Nietzsche's overcoming of morality

On the whole, Nietzsche's place in the history of political thought has been little understood. A number of factors have ensured that his writings have played only a marginal role in debates among political theorists. One of the most important has been the historical association of his ideas with European fascism, in particular their appropriation by Nazism. The common response to this problem adopted by commentators after the Second World War was to deny that Nietzsche could be construed as a political philosopher and argue, as the late Walter Kaufmann did in his 1949 rehabilitation of Nietzsche, that his primary concern was an apolitical one with the fate of the existential individual who is far removed from the social world. Another reason is that Nietzsche's own description of himself as the 'last anti-political German' has been taken at face value rather than understood in its specific context where Nietzsche expresses his opposition to German nationalism and statism under the rule of Bismarck. The process of nazification his ideas underwent was the product of the distortion they suffered in the hands of his sister, who gained control of Nietzsche's literary estate a few years after his mental breakdown. She was an anti-Semite and used her control over Nietzsche's ideas to promote the imperialist cause of German nationalism and militarism.

There exists a widespread supposition that Nietzsche's overriding concern as a philosopher was to defend the values of individual self-realization against political structures. But this view rests on a mistaken understanding of his 'individualism', which can best be under-

Introduction

stood not as a 'liberal' individualism but as an 'aristocratic' one. As Nietzsche himself informs his readers: 'My philosophy aims at an ordering of rank, not at an individualistic morality' (*The Will to Power*, section 287). Nietzsche's political thinking remains a source of confusion and embarrassment, I would contend, because it fails to accord with the standard liberal ways of thinking about politics which have prevailed over the last 200 years or so. In his political thinking Nietzsche departs from liberalism in a number of ways. For example, he does not regard the human person as inviolable and human life as sacrosanct; neither does he believe that all persons should be treated with equal respect as moral beings. As in liberalism, Nietzsche's conception of politics is an instrumental one, but he differs radically from the liberal in his valuation of human life. Whereas for liberalism politics is a means to peaceful coexistence of individual agents, for Nietzsche it is a means to the production of human greatness. Nietzsche is committed to what he calls the 'perpetual self-overcoming' and 'enhancement' of 'man'. This 'enhancement' does not consist in an improvement of the conditions of life for the majority of human beings, but in the generation of a few, striking, superlatively vital 'highest exemplars' of the human species. The production of such magnificent specimens of the human species is possible, Nietzsche is convinced, only in a society politically organized along strictly hierarchical lines. 'Order of rank' (*Rangordnung*) is thus the central political concept and 'culture' is thought to be possible only by subjecting the majority to some form of economic servitude.

On the Genealogy of Morality

Nietzsche's aim in writing the book can be stated quite simply as one of presenting a novel critique of morality. He wants to show not only that morality has a history and that in the past there existed different types of morality but that a moral interpretation of life needs to be understood as the invention of a particular human type (chiefly the slave, but also the decadent who seeks revenge upon life). Today social existence is governed by a 'herd-animal morality' which stunts the growth of the 'plant, man' (*Beyond Good and Evil*, section 44), refusing to acknowledge that it is only a partial perspective on life and that there are other ways of interpreting it. He conceives his critique of morality in the wider context of carrying out a 'revaluation

of all values'. Nietzsche saw himself as writing in a period characterized by the death of the Christian God and the rise of European nihilism. Nihilism is the state reached when the highest values of humanity devalue themselves. He construes the reign of nihilism as a pathological transitional stage which Occidental humanity must pass through while old values are being transvalued and new ones being created. If we are to go 'beyond' nihilism and create new values, it is first necessary that the values and ideals that have defined and determined humanity so far be reassessed in order to discover their value. The specific contribution the *Genealogy* makes to this task of revaluation is to challenge the 'reactive' understanding of notions of the human self (essay 1) and of law and justice (essay 2) which, according to Nietzsche, dominates thinking about morality today. His aim is to counter the prejudices of the present age by revealing a forgotten aristocratic ancestry to legal and moral concepts.

The values Nietzsche wishes to subject to a revaluation are largely altruistic and egalitarian values such as pity, self-sacrifice, and equal rights. For Nietzsche, modern politics rests largely on a secular inheritance of Christian values (he interprets the socialist doctrine of equality, for example, in terms of a secularization of the Christian belief in the equality of all souls before God). To inquire into the value of moral values is partly to ask the critical question whether they reflect either an ascending or a descending mode of life, that is, either one which is superabundant and rich in its own self-affirmation, or one which is weak and exhausted. For Nietzsche, however, judgments concerning the value of life have significance only as symptoms (chiefly of physiological strength or degeneration), and not as claims to absolute, unconditional truth. He makes it clear in the preface that he is not simply concerned with proposing hypotheses on the origin of morality, but with something much more pressing; namely, the awesome question of the very value of morality. He asks us to overturn all that we have been led to believe about good and evil and to consider, for example, the proposition that the 'evil man' may, from the perspective of the 'general economy of life', be of higher value than the 'good man' praised by Christians and moralists (see also *Beyond Good and Evil*, section 44).

What the revaluation of values requires is 'a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which they [values] grew up, developed and changed'. Thus, Nietzsche says, we must consider

morality in all its various guises – as ‘tartuffery’, as ‘sickness’, as ‘cause’, as ‘remedy’, as ‘inhibition’, etc. It is this kind of knowledge of ‘conditions and circumstances’ which he seeks to develop in his polemical contribution to the subject. Several times in the book he refers to the way in which certain philosophers (those who undertake a ‘history of morality’) have ‘bungled their moral genealogy’ on account of lacking a genuine historical sense (*OGM* I, 2 and II, 4). The errors these thinkers have made come to light when one looks at the manner in which they have carried out their inquiry into the origin (*Ursprung*) and descent (*Herkunft*) of certain concepts (the examples Nietzsche gives are ‘good’ in the first essay and ‘guilt/debt’ in the second essay). If we take the concept and judgment ‘good’, he argues, we find that moral genealogists impose the altruistic prejudices of the modern age by arguing that, as a value judgment, ‘good’ originates in those to whom goodness is shown. Nietzsche counters by arguing that the noble and powerful established themselves and their actions as good out of their own sense of worth independently of any altruistic concerns (I, 4).

In the important section 12 of the second essay, Nietzsche sets out some of the methodological rules of a genealogy of morality. First of all, one must not confuse the ‘origin’ of a thing with its present ‘purpose’. The current ‘purpose’ of law, for example, may reveal nothing about its origins. Secondly, even an historical analysis of the ‘purpose’ and ‘utility’ of social customs or legal institutions will reveal little about their origin because purposes and utilities are only signs ‘that the will to power has achieved mastery over something less powerful and impressed upon it its own idea of a use-function’. The history of a thing can ‘to this extent be a continuous chain of signs, continually revealing new interpretations and adaptations’. By uncovering a will to power behind the positing of moral values, and by tracing the origin and descent of values in such terms, it is the aim of a genealogy of morality to undermine the universalist and humanist pretensions of moral values and judgments.

In his autobiography *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche says that the *Genealogy*, a work which is designed to supplement and clarify the earlier *Beyond Good and Evil*, represents ‘three decisive preliminary studies by a psychologist for a revaluation of values’. The first essay locates the birth of Christianity out of ‘the spirit of *ressentiment*’; the second inquiry develops a ‘psychology of the conscience’, where ‘conscience’

is conceived not in any metaphysical terms as the voice of God in man but as the instinct of cruelty which has been internalized after it is no longer allowed to express itself externally; the third essay inquires into the meaning of ascetic ideals by examining the problem of the meaning of human suffering.

Essay 1 Master morality and slave morality

Perhaps the principal aim of the first and second essays of the book is to show that one of the central ideas of modern political theory, that of the human subject or self which is in possession of conscience and a free will, is not a natural given but has to be seen instead as the result of an historical and psychological evolution. We moderns tend to presuppose the existence of a human subject which has the freedom to act. In this way we separate the 'doer' from the 'deed' and ascribe a value judgment to a person's actions in accordance with the good or bad intentions we detect behind them. But this, Nietzsche argues, was not always the case. In what he calls the decisive 'pre-moral period of man', the period of the 'morality of custom' (see *BGE*, 32), action was not judged on the basis of individual intentions. Instead, the rightness and wrongness of actions was judged in terms of their conformity to the authority of tradition and established custom. In societies or communities based on this morality of custom, to be an individual was to stand outside of and apart from the social group, so that 'one was sentenced to individuality' as a form of punishment (see *The Joyful Science*, section 117). In the first essay, he traces the evolution of the idea of the subject by analyzing the phenomenon of the 'slave revolt in morality', from which there first arises the idea of the 'soul'. The slave revolt consists in two things: first, replacing the non-moralistic distinction 'good/bad' made by the nobles or masters with the moralistic distinction 'good/evil'; second, creating the notions of 'soul', 'free will', and 'responsibility'.

Nietzsche had first introduced a typology of master and slave moralities in his work in section 45 of volume 1 of *Human, All Too Human*. He takes it up again in section 260 of *Beyond Good and Evil*, and it governs the analysis in the first inquiry of the *Genealogy*. The typology denotes distinct psychological types of human agency which first arise out of political distinctions made between social classes. Nietzsche makes it clear that what interests him about an aristocratic code of

Introduction

morality is not so much the political power a ruling class wields but rather the typical character traits by which it defines and affirms itself (*OGM*, I, 16). For Nietzsche, modern Europeans are the product of both types of morality. In all higher and mixed cultures, he argues, there are attempts at a mediation between the two. His main point is that the discrimination of values has originated either amongst the powerful, the rulers, or amongst the ruled (*BGE*, 260). In the first case, the possession of a consciousness of difference, which distances the rulers from the ruled, results in feelings of delight and pride. The nobles esteem life in terms of feelings of fullness, of overflowing power; they have a consciousness of wealth which seeks to give and bestow. By contrast, the slave type of morality, which characterizes the oppressed, and all those who suffer from life in some way, results in a pessimistic suspicion about the whole human condition. The eye of the slave turns unfavourably towards the virtues of the powerful; he esteems those qualities which will serve to ease his existence, such as pity, patience, industry, and humility (*BGE*, 260).

The first essay sets out to show that it is only through the act of a slave rebellion in morality that there is introduced into history the idea of a human subject who is free to act and whose existence is interpreted in distinctly moralistic terms. The slave revolt in morality refers largely, although not exclusively, to what Nietzsche understands and interprets as the Jewish revolt against the dominion of noble values. It is 'Israel with its revenge and revaluation of all former values' which has 'triumphed' over noble ideals. Jesus, the 'Redeemer' of the weak and the poor, represents the great seduction to this Jewish revaluation of noble values. For Nietzsche, such a revolt represents the 'great politics of revenge' (*OGM*, I, 8). In contrast to the triumphant self-affirmation of the master morality, which spontaneously affirms itself as 'good' and only after this self-ascription feels the need to extend the word 'bad' to what it considers lowly and inferior to itself, the slave morality is able to define itself as 'good' only by first negating others as 'evil'. In other words, the slave morality is not a morality of self-affirmation but is parasitic on what it must negate. To this end it invents the idea of a free-willing subject and a whole new moral vocabulary (of sin, guilt, redemption, etc.) so as to be able to attribute 'blame' to the masters for being what they are (strong and powerful), and to glorify the weak for 'freely' choosing to be humble, meek, and so on. The defining attitude of this slave

type of morality is one of resentment. In contrast to the master morality which affirms itself in its own uniqueness, the slave morality says 'No' to what is outside and different from itself: 'This reversal of the evaluating glance', Nietzsche writes, 'this *inevitable* orientation to the outside instead of back on to itself – is a feature of *ressentiment*: in order to come about, slave morality first has to have an opposing, external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all – its action is basically reaction' (I, 10).

Nietzsche's analysis of types of morality makes two important claims. Firstly, that moral designations were first applied to human beings and only later, and derivatively, to actions. Secondly, that a master morality is alien to the modern world and hard to empathize with today, even harder 'to dig up and uncover' (BGE, 260). The typical character traits of a master morality which modern human beings find so unpalatable include: that one has duties only to one's peers; that towards beings of a lower rank one should have the freedom to behave as one pleases and 'beyond good and evil'; a sophisticated concept of friendship.

Nietzsche does not simply condemn the triumph of this slave revolt in morality. Such an exercise, even if desirable, would be pointless because slave morality has become an essential part of what we are. As modern human beings, we are those individuals who consider themselves agents capable of free action, of exercising judgment, and of being held accountable for our actions. In fact, in the first essay he makes it clear that it is only with the development of the priestly form of existence, which is taken to ever greater depths through the spread of Christianity, that man becomes an interesting animal; only the priestly mode of life gives rise to a soul and hence to knowledge of good and *evil* (I, 6). For Nietzsche, there can be no question of wanting to go back (of a 'return to nature', for example); we can only go forward, and what he seeks to do is to point us in a certain direction, although exactly where is not clear. His goal is loosely, and provocatively, defined as the 'enhancement' and 'self-overcoming of man'.

Essay 2 Bad conscience

In the second essay, Nietzsche focuses on the psychological factors involved in the process by which the human animal becomes trained

and disciplined as a creature which is able to make promises and can thus be held accountable for its actions. What concerns him most is how Christian-moral culture cultivates a type of bad conscience which is unable ever to relieve itself of its feeling of guilt.

The successful breeding of an animal able to make promises requires a preparatory task by which man is made 'regular, reliable, and uniform'. It is 'the morality of custom' which cultivates in man a memory and makes his behaviour predictable. The disciplining of the human animal into a moral agent does not take place through any gentle methods of social control, but through the harsh and cruel measures of discipline and punishment associated with traditional morality. The potential 'fruit' of this labour of culture (*Kultur*) performed on man in the pre-historic period of the morality of custom is the 'sovereign individual', an autonomous and supra-ethical (*übersittlich*) individual who is master of a strong will and knows that he is able to keep promises. 'Conscience' is to be understood not simply as the superior moral faculty which makes each one of us uniquely human but as an interiorized form of social control, the disciplined product of the civilizing process of ancient morality. The paradox is this: the process by which man becomes moralized is one which, in its beginnings, operates by coercion and violence; but once the human animal has become disciplined it is, at least potentially, capable of living beyond morality (*Sittlichkeit*) and autonomously.

After these initial sections Nietzsche traces the deformation this cultivation of conscience undergoes with the advent of Christian-moral culture. In anticipation of Sigmund Freud, whose essay *Civilization and Its Discontents* is in many ways a psychoanalytical reworking of the *Genealogy*, Nietzsche develops an understanding of the evolution of civilization in terms of the repression of instincts. Thus, for example, in section 7 of the second essay he asserts that 'The heavens darkened over man in direct proportion to the increase in his feeling of shame *at being man* . . . the sickly mollicoddling and sermonizing through which the animal "man" is finally taught to be ashamed of all his instincts'. He illuminates how this moralization of the animal 'man' has taken place by showing how the notion of guilt (*Schuld*) has changed fundamentally from the ancient civil law relationship between a creditor and a debtor to the moral one of a Christian culture in which one feels guilt interpreted as resulting from sin: in other words, one is not in debt to a creditor because of a legal

obligation but because of some moral failing. This process reaches its climax in Christian teaching because here the guilt felt in a relationship between a creditor (God) and a debtor (man) is so great that an atonement equal to the sin cannot be conceived.

The rise of the bad conscience is to be seen as an inevitable outcome of the containment man undergoes when he becomes 'enclosed within the walls of society and peace'. In its origins, therefore, the bad conscience precludes all struggle and precedes resentment. It is to be understood in terms of 'an ineluctable disaster', a profound break with what went before. Nietzsche compares this evolutionary leap to the situation which must have faced sea animals when they were forced to exist on land or perish. The bad conscience evolves through a process Nietzsche calls 'the internalization of man', whereby the instincts are not discharged externally but are turned inwards. These instincts are those of 'wild, free, roving man' – 'animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing, destroying' (*OGM*, II, 16). The important point to note is that the bad conscience originates prior to the slave revolt in morality. It refers to what one might call a pre-moralized sense of obligation and accountability caused by aggression being redirected against the individual self, and the result of the walls of society being erected, preventing the immediate, outward discharge of aggressive energy. The psychical structure of pre-moral guilt created by the bad conscience, however, is certainly what makes the slave revolt in morality, and its creation of moral guilt, possible. For Nietzsche this leap in man's evolution transforms him from a limited, stupid animal of instinct into one with tremendous possibilities for development. The bad conscience is ugly and painful, but it is also 'the true womb of ideal and imaginative events' (II, 19). It is an illness only in the sense in which pregnancy is an illness.

It is significant that the second essay closes with a prefiguration of Zarathustra, for it is Zarathustra's teaching which Nietzsche presents in terms of a bridge which offers a 'way' beyond, or over, present-day crippled humanity:

For too long man has viewed his natural inclinations with an 'evil eye', so that they finally came to be intertwined with the 'bad conscience' in him. A reverse experiment should be possible *in principle* – but who has sufficient strength? . . . To whom should one turn with *such* hopes and claims today? (*OGM* II, 24)

Nietzsche's answer is 'Zarathustra', the 'Antichrist and antinihilist', the 'conqueror of God and of nothingness' – 'he must come one day'. It is at this juncture in the evolution of the animal 'man', therefore, that the figure of Zarathustra is to descend to man in order to teach the death of God and that the 'overman' (*Übermensch*) emerges as 'the meaning of the earth'.

It is in the second essay that Nietzsche speculates on the origins of the political realm and seeks to combat what he takes to be a 'reactive' view on this issue: chiefly, the view that the origins of social order lie in the passions of weak and insecure individuals. In contrast to this view, Nietzsche wishes to put forward the claim that law and justice are creations of strong and powerful individuals who seek to impose measure on the reactive feelings and to put an end to the 'senseless raging of *ressentiment* among the weaker powers' (II, 11). Nietzsche's position is not to be confused, as is often done, with that of Callicles who, in Plato's *Gorgias*, argues that it is the weak, the majority, who invented justice and the administration of law. Nietzsche also rejects the view that the origins of social order lie in a 'contract', dismissing this as sentimental, and instead speaks of a pack of 'blond beasts of prey' creating the state by suppressing a less well-organized nomadic race. Nowhere in the *Genealogy*, however, does Nietzsche provide a conception of what he considers to be the most desirable political order. For this we have to turn to his preceding book, *Beyond Good and Evil*, where he argues, first, that every enhancement of the type 'man' has so far been, and will again be, the work of an aristocratic order; and, second, that every healthy aristocracy justifies itself not as a 'function' (whether of monarchy or the commonwealth) but as the foundation and scaffolding on which 'a choice type of being is able to raise itself to its higher task' (*BGE*, 257, 259).

Essay 3 The ascetic ideal

Christianity had been a religion devoted to the propagation of what Nietzsche calls 'the ascetic ideal', an ideal of self-division and self-denial which results in a devaluation of life. Nietzsche wants to criticize the ascetic ideal, and the power it has exerted over humanity in different forms. It is an ideal which seeks redemption from reality, which is to be understood as perpetual change, destruction, illusion, deception, becoming, and death. At the same time, however, the