

The Tragic Art of
ERNEST
HEMINGWAY



WIRT WILLIAMS

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INTRODUCTION

The Tragic Field and Ernest Hemingway



I

In 1927, Ernest Hemingway wrote a poem to certain reviewers called "Valentine." Smarting under attacks on his earliest published work, he mocked them by apparent quotation: "sordid small catastrophes / stack the cards on fate."¹ A little later, he declared, "*The Sun Also Rises* is a damn tragedy with the earth as hero abiding forever."² And he called *A Farewell to Arms* "my Romeo and Juliet."³ More at the heart of things, perhaps, is his remark to the Old Lady in one of those marvelous conversations in *Death in the Afternoon*: "Madame, all stories, if continued far enough, end in death, and he is no true story-teller who would keep that from you."⁴ How much do these and other often oblique invocations of the tragic mean in suggesting he saw himself clearly as a writer of tragedy? Maybe nothing, maybe everything. Certainly the ultimate identification of him as a writer of tragedy or of anything else is and must be in his work. But it is significant that a great many of his interpreters have strenuously urged that identification.

In 1952, Carlos Baker declared unequivocally that since *The Sun Also*

1. Ernest Hemingway, "Valentine," *Little Review*, XII (May, 1929), 42.

2. Ernest Hemingway to Maxwell Perkins, November 19, 1926, quoted in Carlos Baker, *Ernest Hemingway: The Writer as Artist* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 91.

3. Quoted in Edmund Wilson, "Ernest Hemingway: Bourdon Gauge of Morale," reprinted in J. K. M. McCaffery (ed.), *Ernest Hemingway: The Man and His Work* (Cleveland and New York: World, 1950), 236-57.

4. Ernest Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon* (New York: Scribner's, 1932).

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Rises "all of Hemingway's novels have been tragedies." The same year, Philip Young wrote that the great achievement of *The Old Man and the Sea* was as a tragedy in the Greek mold, and comparable views were expressed at the time or developed subsequently by others. Some psychological explorations of author and work produced conclusions completely compatible with this perception of Hemingway as tragedy-maker. Young's view that the author's protagonists, like the author, are seeking to regain wholeness after the trauma of severe wounds of body and mind closely parallels the tragic design—where the hero seeks reconciliation and harmony after the great blow of catastrophe. Later, J. J. Benson saw tragedy as Hemingway's resource for resolving his deep inner divisions. Thus, there seems to be a critical consensus that Hemingway wrote tragedy consistently or on occasion, and many appear to hold with Baker that his residual and enduring statement is that of the tragic.⁵

What does this mean? Certainly it means that Hemingway saw man as born to lose for one reason or another—because he is fated to do so in unequal battle with some force in the universe, or because he always carries something in himself that brings the universe crashing down upon him, or both. It might mean, too, that the battle he loses in the flesh can be one he wins in the spirit, and he thus gives himself the only patent of nobility and heroism a mortal may truly possess. This is the highest emotional effect and philosophical statement of tragedy; in one sense, it may be both beginning and end of the tragic idea.

But there is much more inside the circle. If we are to think about Ernest Hemingway as a writer of tragedy, we ought to have a reasonably full understanding of what tragedy is. And arriving at such an understanding is an undertaking of some complexity.

Most recent critics have been concerned with the philosophical nature of the tragic attitude, its ultimate emotional and epistemological communication. Broadly, they seem to share the conviction that the tragic protagonist must wrest from an external disaster some triumph of the

5. Baker, *Hemingway: The Writer as Artist*, 152. Philip Young, *Ernest Hemingway: A Reconsideration* (State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1966), 129. This is a revised edition of Young's *Ernest Hemingway* (New York: Rinehart, 1952), and unless otherwise specified, quotations will be from it rather than the 1952 book. J. J. Benson, *Hemingway: The Writer's Art of Self-Defense* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), 102.

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spirit, an awareness of the nature of the universe that reconciles him to it. Joseph Krutch writes, "We accept gladly the outward defeats which (tragedy) describes for the sake of the inward victories which it reveals . . . the idea of nobility is inseparable from the idea of tragedy." And Robert Corrigan says, "Man's tragic condition is that he is doomed by Fate to defeat. The affirmation of tragedy is that it celebrates a kind of victory of man's spirit over his fate." Among many others, Richard Sewall, Karl Jaspers, Herbert Weisinger, and Max Scheler suggest the same conception. Tragedy assumes that it is impossible to win except through total defeat and even destruction; such a victory is itself transcendental.⁶

Indeed, "transcendence" is the term usually given to this inner victory through outer defeat. It is closely related to "reconciliation," that acceptance of the world whole, and all its injustice, that the tragic protagonist may attain through his catastrophe. This reconciliation carries with it inalienably a final sense of universal harmony and even serenity, such as notably concludes *Oedipus at Colonus* and *The Old Man and the Sea*. Many see this as a necessity of tragedy: Murray Krieger insists upon "the need in tragedy to have dissonance exploded, leaving only the harmony of serenity behind."⁷

However, these concepts essentially explore the ultimate transmissions of tragedy, the very nature of the vision; also needed is some formulation of the inner workings of its projections. Looking for these has been a pastime of some popularity since Aristotle, and lately the popularity has been high. As we examine the systems of dramaturgy or architecture that various students have proposed, and as we look closely at a reasonable number of tragic works themselves, we are apt to conclude that there are several different branches of tragedy. Yet they all have a way of coming together, of getting in the end to the same place.

6. Joseph Krutch, "The Tragic Fallacy," reprinted in Mark Schorer, Josephine Miles, and Gordon McKenzie (eds.), *Criticism: The Foundations of Modern Literary Judgment* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1958), 79; Robert Corrigan, *Sophocles* (New York: Dell, 1965), 15; Richard Sewall, *The Vision of Tragedy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 1-8; Karl Jaspers, *Tragedy Is Not Enough* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952), 41-56; Herbert Weisinger, *Tragedy and the Paradox of the Fortunate Fall* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1953); Max Scheler, "On the Tragic," trans. Bernard Stambler, reprinted in Robert Corrigan (ed.), *Tragedy: Vision and Form* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), 3-18.

7. Murray Krieger, *The Tragic Vision* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), 4.

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Aristotle's basic, that tragedy is "an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude,"⁸ seems simplistic at a glance but is not so at all; its usefulness is apt to be felt increasingly as one broods on it, particularly its requirement of magnitude. Yet the heart of Aristotelian tragedy as we speak of it today is the "fatal flaw": a quality in or even an action by the protagonist which brings catastrophe down upon him. Reducing still more, Aristotelian tragedy is tragedy in which the character himself brings about his catastrophe.

Friedrich Hegel, the other "classic" writer on tragedy, sees tragedy as a collision between opposite ethical absolutes or states of being—between characters or forces of any kind that must in the nature of things collide with the opposite, opposing quality.⁹ Both should be "good." Thus in *Antigone*, Antigone as family loyalty must collide with Creon, the personification of loyalty to the state, with foreseeable catastrophe resulting. Friedrich Nietzsche's conflict of the Apollonian and Dionysian is, fundamentally, a case of this Hegelian collision.¹⁰ It should be remembered constantly that both Hegel and Aristotle were attempting to generalize empirically from the example of Greek tragedies, Aristotle's chief specimen being Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* and Hegel's being the same poet's *Antigone*.

Closely related to this species is the tragedy of division and choice, suggested briefly by A. C. Bradley in his essay on Hegel and developed by Robert Heilman into a thorough and sophisticated system.¹¹ Thus Antigone herself is presumably divided between family loyalty and civic duty: the conflict is *inside* herself, and she must make the fateful, tragedy-creating choice. So must John Dryden's protagonists in his love versus honor heroic tragedies.

Arthur Miller has seen tragic catastrophe as the result of an individual asserting the inviolability of his personality against a universe

8. Aristotle, *The Poetics*, trans. S. H. Butcher, reprinted in Schorer *et al.*, *Criticism: The Foundations of Modern Literary Judgment*, 202.

9. Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of Fine Art*, trans. F. P. B. Osmaston, reprinted in part in Corrigan (ed.), *Tragedy: Vision and Form*, 428–42.

10. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Francis Golping, excerpt reprinted in Corrigan (ed.), *Tragedy: Vision and Form*, 443–50.

11. A. C. Bradley, "Hegel's Theory of Tragedy," reprinted in Schorer *et al.*, *Criticism: The Foundations of Modern Literary Judgment*, 55–56; Robert Bechtold Heilman, *Tragedy and Melodrama* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968). See particularly "Tragedy and Disaster," 3–31.

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determined to break it:¹² his own *The Crucible* is an impressive example of his theory. This kind of tragedy is, perhaps, a case of a supreme moral virtue become a pragmatic, operating flaw, finally a fatal one and hence, permissively viewed, an Aristotelian one. Generically, the sub-species might be seen also as Hegelian—the assertion of individuality is one absolute and society's or the cosmos' insistence on the abandonment of that individuality is another. The last may not be "good," so the sub-species may not be a perfect collision tragedy. Yet the example shows how different kinds of tragedy seem to merge, to coalesce. The difference is really one of stress, of which aspect is the heaviest in the work.

It may be that the most consistently encountered quality in tragedy from the Greeks on is that of *hubris*. This we once experienced as a flaw of mad vanity, or megalomania. Now we know better. As Corrigan and others have pointed out, we read *hubris* now as an attempt to transcend the human possibilities, to take more from life than life has to give. This noble attempt is always overpunished, but the principle of over-punishment, and gigantic overpunishment, is one of the immutables of tragedy. The tragic hero steps on the toes of tragic necessity; necessity bashes his brains out with a mace.

In some tragedies the hero need not even tread the toes of his cosmic adversary. The adversary bashes him *anyway*. This seems the very antithesis of the fatal flaw, but perhaps the fact of being human, of being born, is in these tragedies the flaw, and flaw enough for the great enemy.

What is that enemy? It is in the very nature of things, certainly, a mysterious X that assaults men and either thwarts or destroys them; inevitably, the destruction is more evident in the literary work than in literality, but it must be to show its power. Is the X irony? No. Irony may be part of that X, or it may be a loose agent descending where it will, or it may simply be one view of the X in action. Irony is a wanton violation of probability, what ought not to be, and it is much easier to see than to define satisfactorily. Examples arise: the unforeseeable detaining of the priest in *Romeo and Juliet*, as he carries the message that would save the lovers; the circumstance that Oedipus should meet and kill his real father on the road when he is fleeing Corinth to avoid kill-

12. Arthur Miller, "Tragedy and the Common Man," reprinted in Corrigan (ed.), *Tragedy: Vision and Form*, 148–51.

ing the man he thinks is father; the fact so obvious to Thomas Hudson, that his death and the death of the men he is pursuing will result from their massacre of the villagers—a stupid and wasteful mistake they have committed in trying to *save* their own lives. Tragic irony is most powerful when it embodies waste and misunderstanding.

Is it finally, then, simple bad luck? It is much more. It is the universe in action in a way that cannot be fully understood or explained. It changes and smashes the lives of men, like its senior, fate; it is felt, yet never truly comprehended.

The paradoxes and differences among types of tragedy have brought many to the view that it is impossible to reach a single satisfactory definition for tragedy—and their tantalizing closeness has kept students of the form trying. Nowhere has the dilemma been more directly posed, nor a more satisfactory solution to it suggested, than by Northrop Frye in "The Mythos of Autumn." Frye writes, "There are two reductive formulas which have often been used to explain tragedy. Neither is quite good enough, but each is almost good enough, and as they are contradictory, they must represent extreme or limiting views of tragedy. One of these is the theory that all tragedy exhibits the omnipotence of an external fate. . . . The other . . . is that the act which sets the tragic process going must be primarily a violation of *moral* law, whether human or divine; in short, that Aristotle's hamartia or 'flaw' must have an essential connection with sin or wrongdoing."¹³

This insistence that the first cause of the tragedy of flaw be a *moral* transgression does narrow the field, for what we might term the tragic transgression may be an affirmation of moral value even as it violates a social norm (*The Crucible*), or even another moral principle (*Antigone*); it might simply be an error in judgment. Yet if we accept what seems to be the heart of his definition of that wing of tragedy—that it originates and has its cause in a quality or an action of the protagonist himself—then Frye's boundaries indeed contain all tragedy between them.

Rephrased, at one edge tragedy originates in fate and shows the helplessness of man against that fate; at the other tragedy originates in man himself and demonstrates that he is the ultimate author of his own downfall.

13. Northrop Frye, "The Mythos of Autumn," in *The Anatomy of Criticism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 209–10.

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A single tragedy may demonstrate one extreme, or the other, or both. Overwhelmingly, most tragedies partake of both.¹⁴

It will be noted that this definition is philosophic. It is in its way complete, for it is not for the moment concerned with the possible transcendent triumph. However, for a working view of tragedy in action—achieved tragedy—certain dramaturgic postulates must be added. One concerns its structure; the other involves its effect.

First, the tragic protagonist must sustain a catastrophe that is irreversible and irremediable *on its own plane of being*.

Second, tragedy must have a sufficient impact upon the beholder to move his emotions very powerfully.

The first of these considerations is clearly objective; equally clearly, the second is subjective.

Catastrophe: As we understand and use the word today, it is more than Aristotle's Scene of Suffering: it is the *ultimate blow* the protagonist receives, whether from fate, the gods, or tragic necessity and his own actions. It is also rock bottom in the trajectory of the tragic hero: it represents the final destruction of those hopes and desires that have motivated him from the beginning—and the final ordeal or punishment of the hero himself.

In his valuable and unjustly forgotten *Form in Literature*, Harold Weston designates as catastrophe that phase of the dramatic action in which the protagonist falls the greatest distance from the putative attainment of his objective, his "intention."¹⁵ This is, it would seem, simply the traditional catastrophe viewed in another perspective: when the final blow is being received, the protagonist is manifestly the greatest distance from his objective.

Obviously, catastrophe, so viewed, occurs in forms other than tragedy. But in these, the protagonist may rebound from it to achieve his desire. The absolute necessity for the tragic catastrophe is that it be final: *on its own plane of being* it may not be reversed or remedied. The protagonist may rise from this absolute defeat, usually material or physical, to a

14. Cleanth Brooks (ed.), *Tragic Themes in Western Literature* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955). Brooks takes an apparently opposite view (p. 5): "On the tragic hero, suffering is never imposed; he incurs it by his own decision."

15. Harold Weston, *Form in Literature* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1936), 5–31.

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triumph *on another plane*. Out of the material, outward defeat, he may achieve that spiritual, inward triumph described by so many, but this triumph is manifestly in a different dimension from the catastrophe. It is again transcendence; he transcends catastrophe and, in doing so, perhaps may achieve a larger awareness and the reconciliation to the universe and to life in their totality. Transcendence and reconciliation are, jointly, the distinguishing property of the most elevated, the "noblest" tragedies. But they are not indispensable to all tragedy.¹⁶ The irreversible catastrophe is.

Impact: We are almost confronting again Aristotle's catharsis—his arousing of pity and fear in order to purge them. Yet "catharsis" in its long currency has accreted about itself so many conceptions and counter-conceptions, so many psychic biases, that it is probably better to move on to an equivalent, to avoid "pity and fear." Emotional impact is clear enough; as a term it is incomplete, of course, but it will serve. Tragedy must move the emotions of the beholder very powerfully; the work must have a sufficiently powerful impact upon the beholder, or it is not tragedy. Even though the work's theme is clearly in the tragic field, even though the protagonist sustains the irreversible catastrophe, it is not tragedy if it is short of the requisite impact.

What is the measure of the "requisite impact"? How powerful is "sufficiently powerful"? These are unanswerable questions, in the absolute sense. Impact will not be exactly the same for any two communicants, and the subjective character of this necessity simply cannot be altered. It is nonetheless a necessity. Works that do not affect the emotions of a beholder strongly enough are not tragedies so far as that

16. Louis L. Martz, "The Saint as Tragic Hero. Saint Joan and Murder in the Cathedral," in Brooks (ed.), *Tragic Themes in Western Literature*, 150–53; Charles L. Glicksburg, *The Tragic Vision in Twentieth Century Literature* (New York: Dell, 1970), 4, 70, 148. It is on precisely this point that some of the most acute interpreters of tragedy divide. Martz, who otherwise expresses a considerable admiration for the book, rejects *A Farewell to Arms* as tragedy because it offers no such clear triumph of psyche. Glicksburg gives an excellent example of the counter view: "Though the modern tragic vision affirms no principle of moral or spiritual transcendence, it does exhibit the drama of unjustified and unrelieved suffering. Though the tragic visionary catches no glimpse of significance that would redeem his suffering, he is not without a measure of greatness when he is brought face to face with disaster." Hemingway's Frederic Henry, he feels, is an example of this modern "unheroic" tragic hero and says that Hemingway's heroes, presumably thus typical of the modern tragic hero, refuse to submit meekly to the absurd and its tyranny.

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beholder is concerned. Most of Hemingway's short fiction exemplifies this. Although the stories in question at least approach the tragic philosophy and their protagonists sustain the irreversible catastrophe, their author has deliberately kept them short of the tragic impact for most readers: thus for most readers they are outside the condition of tragedy. These not-quite-tragic stories demonstrate, too, that magnitude is indeed a modulation of tragic impact, and thus of the tragic condition itself. Thus we again acknowledge Aristotle. Those who insist on his importance do not err if they do not stop with him—if they do not take the view, as a surprising number of nonspecialists do, that he described tragedy once and for all.

In a working approach to tragedy, then, and this is somewhat more than a definition, the critic assumes a tragic philosophy that sees man as born to suffer and to sustain a massive defeat, either through the nature of the universe, or his own actions, or both. He assumes as an absolute dramaturgic necessity a protagonist who sustains a catastrophe that is irreversible on its own terms, whether or not it is transcended in another dimension. And he assumes a work that effects a profound emotional impact on its beholder, though he is aware that this impact will be different for each beholder. When all are fused in one work—the tragic philosophy, the irreversible catastrophe, the stunning impact—tragedy is fully achieved.

One must routinely ask, and try to answer, the question, "is tragedy possible in our age?" Krutch and later George Steiner have said that it is not, citing chiefly a paucity of spirit on our part. It is an entertaining hypothesis and both make it brilliantly, but the best refutation of it is the simple recalling of works of tragic stature—in drama, film, and fiction. We all have our own lists. It is not that the tragic spirit has left us; it is, rather, that its forms have changed. Corrigan aptly declares that it is necessary "to distinguish between the form of tragedy, which constantly changes . . . and *the tragic*, which is a way of looking at experience that has persisted more or less unchanged in the western world from the time of Homer to the present."¹⁷

It has been frequently said that the chief preoccupation of our mid-

17. Krutch, "The Tragic Fallacy"; George Steiner, *The Death of Tragedy* (London: Faber and Faber, 1961); Corrigan, *Sophocles*, 12–13.

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century's literature is the confrontation of a universe without apparent meaning, one that is, consequently, hostile in aspect and function. This need not produce tragedy, but it sometimes produces splendid tragedy—there is no better example than Jean-Paul Sartre's own, *The Flies*. The existential man encounters the void as the tragic hero encounters catastrophe, and both define themselves by their response and action. But they are not the same, though sometimes they coincide. The tragic situation virtually always contains the existential situation, but the existential situation need not even approach tragedy. If it does enter tragedy, however, it is likely to do so at a point very near Frye's boundary of hostile fate.

It is about here that Hemingway enters. But he continues to move, to progress inside the field, and his later work is located where most great tragedy is located—approximately midway between the boundaries, where the universe and the man are jointly responsible for his fall, but where his transcendence depends upon himself.

II

Hemingway's first book, *In Our Time*, is not tragic and its author is not yet functioning with a fully tragic view of life; yet the stories approach tragedy even if the author keeps them short of it. All depict protagonists in confrontation with an overpowering universe, the protagonists sustain an irreversible catastrophe, and many achieve a spiritual transcendence of it in another dimension. Yet the requisite impact is not there, and the author does not wish it to be there: by ellipsis, understatement, and what might be called the miniaturization of his material, he has made his statement in minor key. The stories, with one exception, and the larger chronicle of which they are a part thus meet all the conditions of tragedy except impact, but not meeting that, they are not tragic. Quite unilaterally, this study calls them subtragic, perhaps a useful word for any work that has the form and something of the attitude of tragedy but not its impact, its capacity for Krieger's "exploding dissonance." Their primary statement, both individually and in aggregate, might be put, "The world is hard; one must be hard to survive it." This is not yet the equation of tragedy.

A case can be made for *The Sun Also Rises* as Hemingway's first major projection of the tragic. Certainly the case is not unchallengeable;

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yet it has its persuasions. As protagonist, Jake Barnes suffers a catastrophe that is indeed irreversible on its own grounds, and it is possible to see in the symbolic ambiguity of its end a transcendent, spiritual triumph for him. The overriding question as to its tragic status is, "Does it have the tragic impact?" and the answer must be subjective. Baker goes straight to that question and gives a negative answer,¹⁸ and few critics since have put the book forward as tragedy. The view here is that it is indeed Hemingway's first big tragedy, though it insists that the only way to confront catastrophe is with heroic passivity, to triumph by accepting with grace.

A Farewell to Arms stresses the immutable, total destruction of catastrophe and does not really suggest the possibility of even the psychic victory over it. Yet its stunning impact makes it a clear tragedy for most; it may be one of the most convincing examples in literature of a powerful tragedy without transcendence or reconciliation. There is another way of reading it, in which the triumph over catastrophe precedes catastrophe, but all the elements of the end seem to urge unrelieved doom.

Like those of *In Our Time*, the author's stories in his next two collections, *Men Without Women* and *Winner Take Nothing*, are virtually all subtragic. Only one in the two volumes, "The Undefeated," seems authentic tragedy. Its protagonist, the matador Manuel Garcia, brings himself to catastrophe by persevering in his attempt to define himself by bullfighting despite the limitations of age and physical equipment: his resolution to continue to death is unaltered by a goring. Of the four stories of the late thirties included in *The Fifth Column and the First 49*, however, at least three approach closely or even attain full tragic stature. "The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber" shows its protagonist breaking out of his life-long fear into freedom and self-esteem, deliberately risking and ironically receiving death in his psychic victory. "The Snows of Kilimanjaro" has a protagonist come to the finish of his life partly from "bad luck" but more from the long operation of his moral weakness. It offers a unique, even bizarre transcendence. "The Capital of the World" presents a romantic busboy who brings about his death when he tries to prove his bravery in a simulated bullfight in

18. Baker, *Hemingway: The Writer as Artist*, 96.

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his cafe. Its status as tragedy may be ambiguous, one depending again on that subjective response, but the case for it is a good one.

All three of these later stories show the protagonists as at least equally responsible with the universe for their catastrophes, and they suggest that Hemingway has moved a considerable distance from Frye's omnipotence of fate boundary which he approached so closely in the first two novels. As, in fact, he has. *To Have and Have Not* (1937), Hemingway's third novel, is his first one in which Aristotelian flaw is invoked:¹⁹ Harry Morgan brings himself to catastrophe, in part, by his misapprehension of the nature of reality, his fatal determination to wrest a life from the universe on something like his own terms. But the nature of the universe, and the overpunishment it administers, make the novel partake of both tragic extremes and lie between them, though clearly closer to the boundary of the flaw. In *Green Hills of Africa*, the author gives both tragic design and tragic theme an *allegro* treatment: the unfairness—and the incongruity—of the universe are demonstrated, yet the tone of the book is light hearted and the very antithesis of tragic gravity. The author hunts the greater kudu desperately, through three-hundred-odd pages, and after killing one he finds that his friend, a bad hunter, has killed a bigger one. This is presented unflinchingly as catastrophe, and the author-protagonist reacts with catastrophic anguish—though he treats it, fortunately and effectively, as comic. This and the attendant self-deprecation preserve some proportion. But though the book is far from tragic, its postulation is a postulation of tragedy: catastrophe is inevitable; one may palliate it only by the rewards of consolation.

Death in the Afternoon, of course, has no unified dramatic narrative, but incidents, tales, and authorial judgments saturate it with a tragic perspective. Matadors come to grief through their own shortcomings—and their "bad luck"; a young man succumbs to homosexuality (in 1930 a considerably bleaker destiny than at present) through a conjunction of circumstance and personal weakness. Often ironically, but sometimes gravely, the author enunciates tragic inevitability with great frequency.

19. Jerry Brenner, "To Have and Have Not as Classical Tragedy: Reconsidering Hemingway's Neglected Novel," in Richard Astro and J. J. Benson (eds.), *Hemingway In Our Time* (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 1972). Brenner offers a different interpretation from that projected here.