LANGUAGE CONTACT
AND
LANGUAGE CONFLICT

Edited by

MARTIN PÜTZ
University of Duisburg

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Foreword

Dell Hymes

Nothing could be more relevant than the theme of this symposium, intercultural communication. On the one hand, intercultural communication is increasingly a fact of life. People prepare for careers in it; 'global village' is a cliché. The international concentration and movement of capital is a major determinant of social life. On the other hand, we see communities closing ranks against outsiders, and the cynical and sometimes deadly manipulation of hostilities and stereotypes.

It would be naive to think that communication itself is a solution. The Americans who killed each other between 1861 and 1865 shared a language; some of them shared seats in the same legislative body, and had voted in the same election. Nor is a shared ideology likely to suffice. The American socialist Norman Thomas remarked that the First World War saw socialists killing each other as cheerfully as Christians.

Still, continued effort to maintain and understand processes of communication, and to build on what is learned, is vital. The crux of the problem, I think, is the tension between a desire to hear each story, grant seriousness to it, and a need to relate stories, not all of which can be simultaneously true, to each other.

For myself, it is difficult to take comfort in what may be universal in language, cognition, human nature. It has been universal as long as human hatred and war. The complex, emergent configurations of particular languages and ways of life are what need to be understood and shared. So much of anger as of joy is in the details. One can hope that more and more of us have come to recognize that humanity has no future if it does not work together to preserve both the earth and itself, and that outlooks which may have served survival in the past do so no longer. A viable future will require complex articulations between practices that bring us together and that allow us to be apart, access and privacy, what is shared and what unique in our identities, verbal repertoires that include both *lingue franche* and personal voice.

Introduction

Martin Pütz

This collection of papers is the result of the 17th International L.A.U.D. (Linguistic Agency University of Duisburg) Symposium, which was held at the University of Duisburg in March 1992. The present volume is a selection of papers, which focus on two aspects of Intercultural Communication: (i) Theoretical orientations: the interaction of language and culture; (ii) Case studies: the manipulation of language in intercultural contact. Unfortunately, not all the scholars who had proposed papers were able to attend the conference. I am, therefore, particularly grateful that the papers by Dutton and Wierzbicka could also be included in the volume.

The first part of the volume is devoted to theoretical aspects on the interaction of language and culture; it includes contributions by Keesing, Langacker, Heine, Wierzbicka, Bamgbose, and Ehlich, who deal with the issue from different perspectives.

In his contribution "Radical cultural difference: Anthropology's myth?", Roger Keesing sets out to suggest that the degree of cultural diversity in modes of thought and experience has been seriously and irresponsibly overstated in modern anthropology. Although Keesing does not deny cultural difference he adduces mounting evidence regarding the universals of embodied, experientially-based cognition that underlie and constrain variation. Keesing explores the experience and cultural conceptualization of time in the lives of the Kwaio, a remote Solomon Islands tribal people, and argues that human thought and experience, although culturally constructed in myriad local ways, reflects underlying commonalities.

From a particular linguistic perspective, Ronald Langacker investigates the relation between language and cognition. In his article "Culture, cognition, and grammar" Langacker argues that these terms are not to be considered separate or fully distinct non-overlapping entities: language and culture overlap extensively, and both are facets of cognition. Cognition is not to be viewed in static terms as a fixed inventory of concepts, but rather as a dynamic, developmental process. Langacker introduces his theory of a cognitive grammar which treats language as an integral facet of cognition and a central component of culture. The theory suggests that all grammatical elements are attributed some kind of semantic value and, furthermore, that lexicon and grammar

form a gradation which shows a significant correlation with the degree of importance of cultural knowledge.

In discussing the "Areal influence on grammaticalization", Bernd Heine also takes a cognitive point of view. He argues that there is a small set of cognitive patterns underlying the various comparative constructions to be observed in the languages of the world - referred to as event schemas - that determine the particular linguistic shape a given comparative construction is going to take. The choice between these cognitive patterns is determined primarily by areal factors so that it is possible to predict which particular schema will be found in a given Oceanic, as opposed to some Asian or African language. Heine concludes that compared to other languages world-wide, European languages are rather 'exotic' in that the type of comparative construction found in European languages is rarely found elsewhere in the world.

In her paper " 'Cultural scripts': A new approach to the study of cross-cultural communication" Anna Wierzbicka draws attention to the fact that there is a considerable level of intra-societal similarity in people's communicative styles. Most striking is the similarity in expectations reflected in a wide range of ethnographic and linguistic data. Wierzbicka suggests that every society has a shared set of quite specific cultural norms which can be stated in the form of explicit cultural scripts, i.e. a society's unspoken 'cultural grammar'. These scripts are formulated in a highly constrained 'natural semantic metalanguage', based on a small set of lexical universals, which allows us to compare culture-specific attitudes, assumptions, and norms from a neutral, culture-independent perspective.

Ayo Bamgbose's contribution examines the relationship between "Language and cross-cultural communication". The author refers to the need to disambiguate the concept covered by biculturalism into an awareness as opposed to a possession of the culture of a second language. Discussing the concepts of language-motivated and culture-motivated interference, Bamgbose concludes that in any cross-cultural communication, there is always a potential for cultural interference ranging from simple misinterpretation to more serious misunderstanding or even a complete breakdown of communication. Problems of intercultural communication are most obvious in many African societies where the dominance of European languages appears to hinder the development of indigenous languages as well as an awareness of cultural authenticity, an issue to be discussed and challenged in detail by several authors in Part II.

In his paper "Communication disruptions: On benefits and disadvantages of language contact" Ehlich describes recent developments

towards multiculturality in present-day Germany. He pleads for a thorough investigation of the consequences of multilingualism for and with regard to the actions of the multilingual speaker, in other words an analysis towards a pragmatics of multilingualism. Ehlich develops a short typology of language contact and distinguishes between ten different alternatives, e.g. contactlessness, sporadic contact, intrusion, ingression, imprehension, etc. He then goes on to focus on the consequences of language contact as well as on language functions and functionality which he believes have been significantly neglected in the literature. Ehlich concludes that language contact, both individual and societal, is of basic importance as an integrating factor for unifying the communicating world at large.

The second part of the volume is devoted to the issue of manipulation of language in intercultural contact; it includes contributions by Tengan, Adegbija, Brann, Webb, Clyne, Dutton, and Deprez.

The first four papers refer to case studies from Africa. In his paper entitled "European languages in African society and culture: A view on cultural authenticity", Tengan argues that in developing languages profiles and policies, the present distinction between indigenous (African) and exogenous (European) languages and the attribution of authentic cultural development to the former, can only be done based on a narrow understanding of cultural authenticity. The author states that the presumed pressure of imposition from the European cultures and the inability to resist or radically transform these norms and behaviour patterns by African society are often exaggerated or overemphasized by Africans and Africanists. Furthermore he suggests that the existence of unbalanced power relations and the imposition of European cultural values still do not much affect the historical movement towards a new authentic Black African culture.

In the same vein, but from a more detailed perspective, Adegbija discusses the status and use of the autochthonous languages in Africa. In his article "The context of language planning of Africa: An Ilustration with Nigeria" the author gives an account of the linguistic, socio-political, psychological, administrative, and educational context of language planning in Nigeria. Adegbija states that all the contextual factors duscussed are mutually compounding and complicating in their interactive potentials for demobilizing and frustrating language planning efforts in African multilingual countries. He concludes by saying that given the complex network of contextual profiles in African multilingual settings, it would seem, in most cases, that evolutionary, rather than revolutionary language planning changes would have greater promise for effectiveness.

In his article entitled "A prognosis for language management in the Third Republic", Conrad M. B. Brann sets out to emphasize that language planning models pertaining to multilingual nations such as in Africa must be based on a multi-dimensional model which takes various factors into account. In considering the likely role of languages in Nigeria, account must be taken, for example, of the three-tier administrative structure; of the activities, pressures and interests of ethnic or religious groups; as well as of the dynamics of urbanisation and possible retro-migration to the countryside. Brann gives a detailed survey of the triglottic configuration (mother tongue, other tongue, further tongue) pertaining to the language situation in Nigeria and ventures to make a prognosis for the three-tier-system of government of the Third Republic - federal, state and local - in the trilingual configuration of Nigeria.

Language planning and language policy issues are also taken up by Vic Webb in his article "Revalorizing the autochthonous languages of Africa". The present language situation in many African states is characterized by the functional dominance of the ex-colonial languages (English, French, Portuguese), which have become the main instruments of the secondary domain cluster, i.e. government and administration, the judicial system, education, etc. while the indigenous languages of Africa have become marginalized to the so-called primary domains of life (family, friends, local markets, religion, etc.). Webb discusses possible solutions to the problems of educational failure, loss of linguistic and cultural identity, etc. and proposes to revalorize the use of African languages by developing and promoting them.

Another multilingual area which has been a major concern of pidgin and creole studies for a long time is Melanesia. In his contribution "Intercultural contact and communication in South-east Papua New Guinea", Tom Dutton gives a fascinating sociohistorical and linguistic account of the Austronesian and non-Austronesian (Papuan) languages and discusses the status and use of pidgin languages such as Tok Pisin and Hiri Motu. Dutton clearly shows that intercultural contact is an important factor underlying the observed linguistic diversity in this part of the world and that isolation is not as significant as is often assumed. Needless to say that the recognition of the role of intercultural communication as a factor in linguistic diversity has important theoretical implications for comparative historical linguistics.

Michael Clyne's contribution entitled "Cultural variation in the interrelation of speech acts and turn-taking" is based on empirical research conducted in Melbourne (Australia) workplaces. Due to massive migration patterns, the wide cultural diversity in Australia provides quite unique intercultural communication situations between members of

groups such as Croats, Lebanese and Vietnamese, Maltese, Poles and South-east Asian Chinese, who have had no prior history of cultural contact with one another. Clyne explores the role of cultural variation in turn-taking rules in the successful or unsuccessful matching of communicative intent and communicative effects, especially in relation to directives, complaints, commissives, and apologies. Finally, an attempt is made to develop a typology of culture-based communication patterns, which, for example, supports earlier criticism of the universal claims of Grice's co-operative principle.

The last paper, written by Kas Deprez, focusses on the demographic, political and sociological situation of the Belgian province of Flanders and is entitled "Towards an independent and ethnically pure Flanders". Deprez gives a survey of the political situation after the day known as Black Sunday (24 November 1991), which saw the electoral rise of the extreme right Vlaams Blok. The Vlaams Blok, Deprez states, is not only an anti-migrant party; it is also the party of the ultranationalists, a separatist party which demands an independent Flemish state - which at a later stage might enter into a federation ('Commonwealth') with Holland. Deprez gives a detailed historical account of the origin and development of the Flemish Nationalist Parties up until the present time, i.e. the foundation of the Vlaams Blok in the summer of 1979. Since the 1920s, anti-Belgianism has been a core element of Flemish nationalism and since the 1930s it has irresistibly pushed the 'maximalists' in the Flemish Movement into an ultraright direction still to be witnessed today.

The editor of this volume would like to thank the organising staff of the symposium. Special thanks are due to Professor René Dirven for fruitful cooperation and encouragement as well as to Ms Birgit Smieja who typed the manuscript and took care of the laser print-out.

Part I

Theoretical orientations: The interaction of language and culture

Radical cultural difference: Anthropology's myth?

Roger M. Keesing

Recent North American anthropology has celebrated the radical uniqueness of culturally constructed universes of thought and experience.[1] In the Geertzian tradition, we have explorations of how personhood and self are culturally constructed, how Western takens-for-granted about time and causality and emotion and agency are inappropriate to other people's conceptual worlds. Paradigms that would seek to universalize human nature and view cultures as shaped and constrained by humans' evolutionary heritage and biological nature have been dismissed as sociobiology[2] and denounced as essentialist, sexist, racist, and worse. In postmodernist, poststructuralist and feminist writings, the premises of Western philosophy and Enlightenment rationalism and modernity - logocentrism, the mind-body dichotomy, the autonomous individual, a linear conception of time, phallocentrism, positivism - have been relentlessly subjected to deconstructive critique, as unique to our époque and cultural tradition, and as distortions of holistic realities more clearly understood in other times and places.

It has been anthropology's role to provide the exotic alternative culturally constructed universes that are the counters to Western ones: to find in the cultures of tribal peoples the radical Otherness - and the holistic Wisdom - these relativizing postmodern philosophies demand. As I have recently written, "if Radical Alterity did not exist, it would be anthropology's task to create it" (1990:46). We have been professional dealers in exotica, going to romantic and distant places and coming back to recount all manner of strange beliefs and practices as if they were unremarkable. We have done our job well, it would seem, in conveying to our colleagues in other disciplines the idea of extreme cultural differences. We have succeeded in introducing our once-peculiar concept of 'culture' into popular thought and lay usage; the once jarring idea that moving from one culture to another entails radical translation is now commonplace.

I will here play Devil's Advocate, suggesting that the degree of cultural diversity in modes of thought and experience has been seriously and irresponsibly overstated in modern anthropology - largely for ideological reasons. The powerful constraints inscribed on cultures by the

biologically evolved brains and bodies of the creatures that learn and use them have been ignored and denied. Our spurious exoticizations have been sustained by selective use of evidence, by sheer mistranslation and misinterpretation (see Keesing 1989), and by a refusal to attend to the evidence afforded by biology, cognitive sciences and linguistics. All this perpetuates a depiction of Otherness that hides our common humaneness and its sources.

Let me say at this stage that I am not seeking to deny cultural difference, but to situate it theoretically. For thirty years, I have been studying the culture and language of the Kwaio, a remote Solomon Islands tribal people who are still, in the 1990s, sacrificing to their ancestors and giving feasts using strung shell beads. The Kwaio believe that their souls wander in dream, that magical spells bend events, that ancestral ghosts watch over and impose strict taboos on the living (Keesing 1982). They read omens and divinations as messages from the ancestors; they foretell the future, carry on conversations with the dead. They take care lest their shadows fall on a ritually polluted place, which could cause them to sicken and die. Pollution may contaminate through a kind of retroactive contact: should a man see thatching being gathered for a woman's childbirth hut, he would be polluted when, weeks later, the hut is defiled by the blood of childbirth. My point is not to claim that their world of experience, their ideas of cause and agency and time and power, are the same as mine: it is to ask at what level the differences lie.

I will begin my argument with the experience and cultural conceptualization of time. I will have to condense radically an argument I have set out in some detail elsewhere (Keesing n.d.1). A distillation of that paper will allow me to illustrate my more general argument about discourses that relativize and exoticize Otherness, and in doing so, caricature our own cultural constructions. It will further allow me to introduce mounting evidence regarding the universals of embodied, experientially-based cognition that underlie and constrain variation.

Anthropology's relativizations of time have come in several versions, but they all have in common a contrast drawn between Us and Them, linearity and nonlinearity, history and cyclicity. One is the drawing of a contrast, expressed in various forms by Lévi-Strauss (1966), Sahlins (1976, 1981, 1985), and many others, between the cyclical, nonlinear, atemporal cosmologies of tribal peoples (Lévi-Strauss's 'cold societies' [1966]) and the world views of societies that situate themselves in terms of linear time, of history and change. A related line of argument has been taken by Whorf (1956), Hall (1984) and others, who contrast the Western view of time as ticking past on an endless belt with the nonlinear, space-time conceptualizations of non-Western peoples, of whom

Whorf's Hopi, conceptually situated in an Einsteinian world of relativity, can serve as exemplars. Another variant is Geertz's well known interpretation of Balinese conceptualizations of time, based on calendrical systems, in which he argues (1966:393) that "the cycles and supercycles are endless, unanchored, uncountable, and as their internal order has no significance, without climax. ... They don't tell you what time it is; they tell you what kind of time it is."

I will argue, using evidence from Kwaio language[3] and culture to illustrate, that all this is to confuse the cultural construction of history with the linguistic encoding and experiential cognition of duration. I will illustrate how the Kwaio lexicon and idioms for expressing relations of temporality are recognizably kindred to our own - although the kinship can only be that of a common humanity. I will show that Kwaio talk about duration and temporality in everyday life much as we do.

Let me first give you some glimpses of how Kwaio talk about temporality. The common Kwaio word referring either to points in time or periods in time is *alata*. To refer to the present time, Kwaio use *alata lo'oo*, literally 'time here'. *Lo'oo* is a deictic, a directional pointer, marking 'here' or 'this' (*wane lo'oo* is 'this man'; *lefu lo'oo* is 'this place' or 'here' - literally, 'place here'; the present, then, is 'time here'). A spatial term is also used for a time in the past: *alata i na'o*, literally 'time in front' is used to refer to 'the old days'[4]. I will explain below the metaphoric schemes that motivate these spatial characterizations of time, schemes that are turning out to be pervasive, and perhaps universal, in the languages of the world.

Kwaio use *alata* to talk about repeated instances, just as we use 'times': 'three *alata*' is 'three times'. *Alata* can be used to refer to hypothetical points in the future, as we do in English 'some time': *alata ngaai* is 'another time', *te'efuta alata* is 'any time'. *Alata* is used as well as equivalent to English 'when' or French 'quand', to introduce temporal clauses, as in: *alata miru nigi i 'Aoke*, "When we get to Auki". Clauses are intricately connected temporally using such temporal phrases and tense-aspect markers: *Alata nau ku nigi i 'Aoke, nau taku leka 'oofia faka* "When I get to Auki, I'll look for a ship."

Kwaio offers rich linguistic repertoires for talking about days and times of days: *tala'ina* is 'today', *gani* is 'tomorrow', *fule'e* is 'the day after tomorrow', *naaboni* is 'yesterday' - used in the same contexts and for the same purposes as temporals in European languages. Kwaio also uses a counter of days (*fue* plus a numeral, 'in X days'), that is highly productive: *fue fai* is 'in four days' (three in our counting system). Counting days is, in fact, a serious preoccupation for the Kwaio, since ritual sequences after important deaths and sacrifices are constructed in terms of ten day

units of mourning and later of desacralization, and the exact countdown of days is crucial; taboos requiring prolonged seclusion in childbirth similarly call for cycles of purification that entail a countdown of days.

Kwaio also abounds with terms (a dozen common ones and some less common alternative forms and intercalating devices) that mark times in the diurnal cycle. As interior-dwellers and landlubbers, the Kwaio have lost some of the wealth of ethnoastronomical knowledge their seagoing ancestors brought to the Solomons. Yet Kwaio talk is sprinkled with these markers of the daily cycle, based on angles of solar elevation diurnally (and such phenomena as dusk and subsequent insect noises, such as *keeani* 'crickets cry'), which allow precise planning and coordination of work, rendezvous, and travel. Talk about the passage of time (in reference to how long garden work will be done, or when the pork will be cooked, or how long someone will be gone) is, for the Kwaio as with us, a constant theme of quotidien experience and communication.

The Kwaio language, like other Oceanic Austronesian languages, has a relatively simple system marking tense, aspect, and mood. Temporal relations are grammatically marked with verbal particles, particularly ones that mark perfect aspect and irrealis mood (indicating events expected to happen in the future or hypothetical or unrealized events). More precise marking of temporality is achieved through temporal phrases, as I have illustrated. In this respect, Kwaio falls comfortably within the relatively limited worldwide spectrum of grammatical distinctions marking temporal/aspectual relationships on predicates (Hopper 1982; Bybee and Dahl 1989).

The Kwaio have a rich tradition of oral epics recounting historical events that extend back several centuries; and they recount genealogies that go back twenty generations and more. Yet their cosmology is quite undeveloped in relation to ultimate origins and the nature of the universe; Kwaio have no myths of origin or creation. Yet some of the neighboring peoples, close cultural cousins of the Kwaio to their north and south, have elaborate theories of cycles of creation and a multi-levelled cosmos. It could be argued, analyzing the cosmologies of these Lau or 'Are' are speakers in the manner exemplified by Geertz and Lévi-Strauss, that these peoples have a cyclical, nonlinear 'cold' view of history. Yet in addition to these metanarratives of cosmic creation and cycling, they have the same devices as the Kwaio, lexical and grammatical, to indicate quotidien relationships of temporality and duration.

All the evidence available on everyday talk in non-Western languages would indicate that other 'exotic' peoples, like the Kwaio, situate events precisely in time in complex ways, are concerned with duration, and have intricate linguistic devices for coordinating plans and activities. Indeed, it

is difficult to see how the mystical, timeless philosophers of nonlinear space/time and cyclical consciousness portrayed in the comparative anthropological and historical literature on time, unconcerned with past, present and future, could get dinner cooked according to plan - whether it be sweet potatoes, walruses or witchetty grubs - or manage to get home before dark or meet anywhere[5]. I will suggest, as Bloch (1977) did in a much-criticized and much-misunderstood critique of Geertz's account of time in Bali, that we have placed a spurious weight on cultural constructions of cosmology, ritual and myth, and paid insufficient attention to the everyday pragmatics of talk about and action in time. I will come back to examine some of the claims about exotic conceptions of time in which the future is conceived of as lying behind rather than ahead of the speaker, etc. We will see that metaphors that characterize time in terms of space and movement vary somewhat, but show striking commonalities and give no grounds for claims of radical difference.

Let me turn first to another side of the exoticization of Otherness: the depiction of a pre-modern (medieval, etc.) world view of our own European forebears strikingly different from that of post-Enlightenment and post-Industrial Revolution modernity. In regard to time, the argument has often been made by historians that concern with temporality in medieval Europe was very limited. It was the clock, we are often told, that transformed consciousness of temporality and laid the foundations for our view of time as a continuous belt ticking past us. Philippe Wolff (1962:1141) argued that "... the last centuries of what we call the middle ages marked the beginning of a transformation in human attitudes toward the unfolding of time. It is certain that this phenomenon was linked to a very profound development in our mentality and our conception of the world...." Marc Bloch (1939:119) commented on "une vaste indifférence au temps" in medieval Europe, and points to invention of the clock as opening the way to a modern concern with temporality; the centrality of the clock in revolutionizing Western consciousness has been even more strongly argued by Derek de Solla Price (1976:399). The work of Charles Frake, who has been painstakingly exploring the multiple systems for talking about and calibrating time - particularly in terms of navigation - in medieval Europe suggests that the conventional depiction of our own forebears presents a picture as spuriously exoticized as the one so often drawn of tribal peoples. Looking at maritime time reckoning, tidal hours, canonical hours, symbolic hours, measured hours, and other expressions of temporal concern and symbolic elaboration, Frake (n.d.) finds richness where the historians would lead us to expect poverty.

> Before the clock, Europeans not only had ideas about time, its divisions and how to name and count them, they also had, in their lives, abundant motivation to seek better measures of it. There was practical concern with time of day in such diverse callings as the computational scholar devising Easter Tables, the monk scheduling his daily devotions and labor, the astronomer modelling the heavens in his diagrams and instruments, the historian chronicling eclipses and other notable events of the day, merchants trying to cope with the strict temporal regulation of their activities by guilds and governments, astrologers calculating the hours suitable for medical treatment, musicians experimenting with polyphonic harmonies, and sailors predicting tides, allocating watches, and estimating distances made good.

Why, then, the spurious exoticism? Part of the process, as I suggested at the outset, is an ideologically guided search for the radical alterity demanded by the relativizing philosophies of our time. Of course, the philosophically grounded quest for radical Otherness is much older, with roots in Renaissance explorations of Utopia (Trouillot 1991), Enlightenment speculations about human nature, German cultural romanticism and Orientalism (Said 1978, Asad 1973). For five hundred years, the West has needed a primitive Other as its alter.

There is another and less obvious side to our discourses about alterity that is similarly well illustrated by the literature about time. As James Carrier (1992) persuasively argues, there has been a discursive process that is the complement of the exoticization of the Other - what he calls 'occidentalism'. We have caricatured *ourselves*, the culture and consciousness of the modern West, in distancing Ourselves from the Other. Thus, in modern social thought, we find endlessly repeated characterizations of ourselves in terms of the autonomous individual, linear thinking, the mind-body dichotomy, the commoditization of social relations, etc. We suppose Western consciousness to have been dramatically transformed by modernity. The narratives of transformation vary in the weight they accord to the Enlightenment celebration of reason (with Descartes as conceptual villain), the Reformation autonomization of the individual, the industrial capitalist commoditization and individuation of social relations. Whatever the special form of the narrative, We are assumed to have emerged with a radically different consciousness of self, agency, mind, body, time, etc., than that of the non-Western Other, or of Ourselves Before.

I will not develop this argument extensively, but it seems to me that we radically caricature ourselves by taking *ideologies* as if they were constitutive of our consciousness - as if our subjectivities were determined by the pronouncements of Enlightenment philosophers or Protestant theologians or factory owners[6]. Obviously, technological modernization, urbanization, and capitalist economy have changed our lives, and our consciousness and life experience. But it is a matter of degree, and the transformations have in my judgment often been radically overstated. The autonomy of the unitized individual as a Self, the separation of mind from body, the separation of commodities from social relationships, affect us as ideologies; but they do not construct us or directly represent our embodied, experiential engagement with the world.

The changes in our consciousness and our language are well illustrated by modern conceptualizations and ideologies of time. Time has been commoditized as well as measured and coordinated, in a modern era of punching clocks and wage labor; and ideologies that exhort us not to "waste time", metaphorized as a precious and finite substance, are obviously motivated expressions of capitalist uses of time (Thompson 1967). Again, my point is not to deny such transformations, but to ask about their depth and nature.[7]

Is the consciousness of contemporary young people in North America or western Europe, growing up in an era of computer-based high technology and virtual reality, radically different from the consciousness of those of us who grew up with the wonders of Bakelite telephones through which, via an operator, you could make out-of-town calls? Are we forever separated by a great and unbridgable gulf? I doubt it. My cyborg generation scientist children and I communicate well enough over the breakfast table to make it clear we live in the same experiential world, with the same senses of selves, at once separate and interconnected, at once whole and fragmented. And I communicate well enough in jungle huts to know that the same is true when I temporarily share the lives of my Kwaio friends. Moreover, just as I now take in stride the vast changes in my own lifetime, so my Kwaio friends increasingly ride in airplanes to town and watch videos, and later come back to their taboos and their ancestors.

I have argued that human thought and experience, although culturally constructed in myriad local ways, reflects underlying commonalities. It is incumbent on anyone making such an argument both to be more specific about these commonalities and to provide an account of where they come from - of what constrains and limits diversity. I will provide such an argument, although necessarily sketchily, again taking the conceptualization of duration and temporality as a domain with which to illustrate my argument.

The frontiers of research to which I turn have been given the broad label of 'cognitive linguistics'. This emerging international and interdisciplinary field has been formally established through the launching of the journal Cognitive Linguistics and the establishment of an association which recently held its second conference[8]. Recent work of particular

importance to my argument includes studies of image-based categorization (Lakoff 1987), studies of the metaphoric conceptual architecture of languages and its experiential grounding in the body and visual perception (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Lakoff & Turner 1989, Turner 1987, Brugman 1989, Sweetser 1989, Kövecses 1986, 1989, Johnson 1987, Lakoff 1990), studies of metaphor-based grammaticalization (Claudi & Heine 1986, Heine & Reh 1984, Langacker 1990, Traugott & Heine 1991, Heine, Claudi & Hünnemeyer 1991a and 1991b) and studies of the metaphoric, image-based foundations of grammar (Talmy 1988a, 1988b, Langacker 1989, 1991).

Briefly summarized, the studies of image-based cognition and its expressions in the metaphoric structures of language, are (as I read the cumulating evidence) pointing toward the following generalizations:

1. Languages encode and express iconic-image-based modes of cognition that are both more general than language (in the sense of being manifest in both linguistic and extra-linguistic realms) and evolutionary older. (This runs counter to the assumption of generative grammarians that language is a highly specialized and largely compartmentalized human faculty.)
2. Languages express hierarchical structures of metaphor in which experience-immediate and less abstract domains, grounded in the experienced body and perception of space and motion, serve to characterize more abstract and less experience-immediate domains. Hierarchies of metaphoric equivalence range from the highly general (PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, STATES ARE LOCATIONS, EVENTS ARE ACTIONS[9]) to the mid-level (LIFE IS A JOURNEY, PEOPLE ARE PLANTS) to the specific (TIME IS A REAPER).
3. Although the lower-level metaphors are likely to be language-specific, higher-level metaphors seem to be quite similar from language to language. The prioritization of domains vis-à-vis one another also seems to reflect universals. This suggests that there is an experientially-based naturalness (given the kind of creatures we are and the world we live in) in the metaphor-based character of language. These cross-linguistic regularities are expressed in the hierarchical metaphoric architecture Lakoff has explored (Lakoff & Turner 1989, Lakoff 1990); in universals and constraints on variation of grammar; and in cross-linguistic regularities in metaphor-based grammaticalization chains (that is, the processes through which lexical forms, nouns and verbs, progressively develop into grammatical elements).
4. A universal grounding of abstract reasoning (concepts of things, acts, events, causes, etc.) seems to be provided by visually conceptualized space and motion (Lakoff 1990) and by what Talmy (1988a, 1988b) calls 'force dynamics' - the bodily experience of pressure (pushing, pulling, gravity, weight). The subjectively experienced body provides the foundations for human conceptualizations not only through visual perception and force dynamics and other sensory modalities, but also through manual manipulation, the visceral experience of stress and other emotions, etc.[10] The relationship of iconic imagery to the phenomenology of experience remains largely unexplored territory (see Alverson 1991); but the questions now being asked will lead us in the right direction.

A more general implication of cognitive linguistics is that a foundational assumption of much modern philosophy - that we experience the world only in and through language - is fundamentally flawed. Language encodes, partially and selectively, modes of thought and experience that are evolutionarily older than language; and much of what we know about our worlds is not coded in language at all (Bloch 1991). Yet the separation between language and other cognitive realms cannot ultimately be drawn in these terms, partly because the cognitive processes on which language builds are more general modes of reasoning; and partly because language itself is turning out, at its heart, to be image-based and metaphoric, rather than logical, propositional, and algorithm-governed.

Although relativizing arguments have been advanced (see e.g. Howes 1991, Stoller 1989) to show that the privileging of vision as a sensory domain is a peculiarity of the modern West, I doubt that these arguments will withstand careful research. There is no doubt that the other sensory modalities - smell, sound, touch - have been more fully laden with symbolic importance in other cultural traditions (and indeed, in our own in an earlier époque). Cultural traditions can take ideological stances toward different sensory modalities, and can obviously elaborate them symbolically in a range of ways different from our own. But I would argue that that in itself does not constitute evidence for deep differences in sensory experience or indicate that in such societies humans are processing sensory information in different ways. Even in communities where the symbolic importance of smell is culturally celebrated, we can expect the inhabitants to recognize one another primarily by looking at one another, rather than smelling one another. Given the kinds of creatures we are, it could hardly be otherwise.

Moreover, an iconic image which 'resonates' in different sensory modalities seems to have an added power[11]. I have shown (Keesing 1992, n.d.2) that among the Kwaio, the irresistible attractive power of *scent* provides a dominant iconic image for attraction of wealth, people, atten-

tion, etc. The irresistible attraction is at once visual-spatial, olfactory and kinesthetic: a force-dynamic image operating in multiple modalities.

Leonard Talmy's analysis (1988b) of the relationships coded in *grammars* (as contrasted to lexicons) of languages serves to underline the centrality of visualized space in abstract thought. He distinguishes four major imaging modes used in grammar, noting that they almost exclusively encode topological, non-Euclidian relational information. Three of the four are fundamentally visual-spatial. A first imaging mode draws lines around entities or otherwise indicates their spatialized relationship to one another (as with 'this' vs. 'that', which draw an imaginary line across an imagined space and situate the entity being talked about either on the speaker's side or the opposite side). A second image mode establishes a perspective on an imagined scene (e.g., conceptualizing an event as moving across an imagined space, or as situated at a point within it). The third image mode establishes a focus within the scene (e.g., a figure-ground relationship, as with grammatical markers of focus and topic). The fourth mode, the only one which is not directly visualized and spatial, is his force dynamic image mode, which conceives a scene in terms of a field of forces (fundamentally grounded in the bodily experience of pressure - but again, seemingly visualized schematically; see Talmy 1988a).

It is becoming clear that a broadened conceptualization of the visual/spatial will be needed to comprehend the iconicity of cognition: we cognize spatially/visually through imagined spaces, objects and trajectories and their metaphoric projection. The work of R. L. Gregory (1966) and others makes clear that vision is a highly constructive process, in which we cognitively constitute three dimensional models of envisioned space and motion out of very fragmentary retinal cues. It is these cognitively constructed spatial landscapes, not retinal images, that I am talking about: I would suggest that the blind are more dependent on visual perception, in my sense, than the sighted. Perhaps visualization, then, would be a better term. My reading of the evidence is that we humans privilege visualization, in this broadened sense, because of our brains, not our culture. Our long evolutionary heritage (including millions of years spent by our arboreal ancestors in the conceptual playgrounds trees provide, with the attendant evolution of stereoscopic vision and an opposable thumb) predisposes us to privilege visualizing and manipulating as modes of engaging the world.

Lakoff (1990:57) observes that:

> the fact that time is understood metaphorically in terms of motion, entities and locations accords with our biological knowledge. In our visual systems, we have detectors for motion and detectors for objects/locations. We do not have detectors for time (whatever that could mean). Thus, it makes good biological sense that time should be understood in terms of things and motion (57).

That brings us back to time and the experience of duration. I will again use this conceptual realm to illustrate the universals that lie beneath surface cultural diversities.

A first and obvious source of uniformities in human experience, and hence representation, of temporality lies in the cycling of the physical and biological environment. The annual cycle of the sun and hence the seasons and its reverberations in animals and plants, the lunar cycle (and menstrual cycling) and the daily cycle all provide a pattern of cyclical temporality that provide one kind of template for human thinking about the passage of time.

A second kind of template for human experience of time is the sequence of birth, maturation, ageing and death (in animals and plants as well as in humans). It requires no great leap of imagination to articulate this linear progression with the cyclical template - to see lives following one another or reconstituting one another in the sequence of generations in terms of a continuous cycle akin to the passage of the annual cycle to which it is experientially articulated. That is, if the passage of solar and lunar sequences is in one sense comprehensible in terms of sheer cycling, the experiential engagement of individual humans with it is linear and unidirectional: a kind of path through cycles. This is precisely how, in wondrously variable local ways, humans have constructed and encoded temporality.

The conceptualization of time strikingly exemplifies a conceptual privileging of one experiential domain over another that is turning out to be universal. Time and space are always intricately interconnected conceptually, as transforms of one another: time is conceptualized in terms of space and motion. Wherever we have evidence of the processes of linguistic change, we find that it is spatial terms that acquire temporal senses, and never the reverse.

We need to look more closely at this representation of time metaphorically in terms of space. Lakoff & Turner (1989:44-45) explicate the metaphor that TIME MOVES:

> The TIME MOVES metaphor has two versions: in both, we are located at the present and are facing toward the future with the past at our back. The views differ on whether it is the future that is moving toward us, or whether we ... are moving toward it. In the most conventionalized view, we are stationary and moments of time move by us, approaching us from the future and going away from us into the past. ... When times are considered relative not to us but rather to other times, we use words like 'precede' and 'follow',

> and 'before' and 'after', in accordance with the orientation of the times as having their faces to their past (what precedes them) and their backs to their futures (what follows them). ...
>
> In the other view, the past and future are fixed and the present is in motion toward the future. There are two versions of this view. In one, we are always located at the present and we move toward scheduled future events. ... Alternatively, the present time itself can be seen as a point moving toward future points in scheduled time. ...
>
> From the point of view of our everyday experience, it is clear why both versions should be available to us: sometimes we move toward objects and sometimes they move toward us. It is clear that both versions of the metaphor of time as moving are natural, relative to two different kinds of normal experience.

Lakoff generalizes his argument in a subsequent paper (1990), noting that earlier analyses of the metaphoric conceptualization of time in terms of space had been insufficiently precise. In English, at least,

> Times are things. The passing of time is motion. Future times are in front of the observer; past times are behind the observer (1990:55).

Lakoff goes on to note that there are two perspectives that can be developed with regard to this metaphorization, each of which has conceptual entailments:

> Special case 1: The observer is fixed; times are entities moving with respect of the observer. Times are oriented with their fronts in their direction of motion.
> Entailments: ... The time passing the observer is the present time. Time has a velocity relative to the observer.
> Special case 2: Times are fixed locations. The observer is moving with respect to time.
> Entailment: Time has extension, and can be measured (1990:55).

Lakoff's analysis is framed in terms of English; but an inspection of the comparative evidence indicates that the same general metaphorization and its two variant forms are pervasively used in non-Western languages as well as European ones. Thus, in Kwaio, such expressions as *farisi ka riu kau* 'last year' (lit. "the year that passed by, and went away from the speaker") and *farisi ngai lolo'o mai* 'next year' (lit. "year coming down this way") transparently use the imagery of Lakoff's Special Case 1. So, too, does *farisi lofo'u* 'last year' (lit. "year down there"), even though in an earlier analysis (Keesing 1979) I had inferred that this represented a conceptual model of the past as *up* and the future as *down*.

I have noted that Kwaio use *alata i na'o*, literally 'time in front', to describe the past (as in English, 'the olden days'); here we see the metaphor of time as moving past the speaker. Terms for 'in front of' and

'behind' are used in Kwaio to characterize events relative to other events, as well as locations in space. Thus, *na'ona omea* 'before the feast', where *na'o-na* in its spatial sense is 'the (or in) front of'; and *burina usinga* 'after the market', where *burina* in its spatial sense is 'the (or at the) back of'.

In all these patterns, Kwaio talk about temporality follows metaphoric patterns that are turning out to be pervasive in a wide range of world languages - perhaps all of them. We do need, I think, to generalize the argument somewhat. The metaphoric scheme where the experiencing subject is stationary and time is moving past can be flip-flopped so that instead of time coming from in front of the observer, passing her in the present, and moving behind into the past, time is metaphorically conceptualized as coming from out of sight behind the observer and moving forward and away so as again to pass out of sight. Kwaio develops this image to a very limited degree. However, there are some languages, such as the often-cited Quechua and Maori, which characterize the future as 'behind', building directly and pervasively on this image (as well, I think, as the image in which the experiencing subject is moving forward through time conceived as a spatial field). There are no languages in which the observer is moving backward into the future. Nor, as I suggested, are there any languages (as far as we know) where time is not conceptualized through spatial metaphors, or where the spatial senses of words developed out of what originally were time senses (see Heine, Claudi & Hünnemeyer 1991a, 1991b).

When metaphors of time are systematically examined cross-linguistically, other widespread metaphoric patterns begin to emerge. Thus, although Thompson (1967) and others have argued that a conceptualization of time as a finite substance one may have more or less of is not only peculiarly Western, but an expression of capitalist political economy, such metaphors turn up in a wide range of world languages. Consider Kwaio *alata fai 'amoe no'o agu* 'I don't have time for it' (literally "time for it isn't in my possession").[12] It may be that metaphorizing time as substance-like is a quite natural, if not inevitable, way of grasping, conceptualizing and communicating about the subjectivities of duration.

I should emphasize that part of the confusion about cultural variation in the construction of time has come from ambiguity in the term 'time' itself. In arguing for universals and sharp constraints both in the experience of duration and in the linguistic encoding and metaphoric construction of temporal relationships, I do not mean to claim that all peoples conceive of 'the past' or 'the future' in the way we do, or share our philosophy of history. The cyclical world views described for Bali or for Lévi-Strauss's 'cold' societies reflect different ideological constructions of the

cycling, continuities and transformations in historical process. What cultural stance is taken toward 'the past' as an ideological construct - one that valorizes, denigrates, dismisses or ignores 'it' - will vary widely; so too with 'the future', similarly metaphorized as if it were an entity. The ideological stances taken toward them have varied in different times and places (either the mythicized past or the imagined future can be idealized as a Golden Age); and there is no reason to assume that such constructs are universal. So, too, with cycling, where the temporal zone a people are experiencing can be portrayed as repeating previous ones. Further, religions posit another world or order of existence as lying behind the visible one; and in this hidden world, time is not subject to the constraints of experienced duration and sequence[13]. It may be this world they characterize in myth and dramatize in ritual. Time in this sense of metanarratives of history, ultimate processual unfoldings and hidden powers of the cosmos, has little to do with what most interests me: how people plan and coordinate action, experience duration in their daily lives, and talk about the temporality and sequentiality of events.[14]

Bodily experience is emerging as a crucial site for a dialectic of inscription. The body is a biological system in which homeostatic functions and the autonomic nervous system - and indeed much of our brain - remain largely out of the reach of consciousness and cultural structuring. Yet at the same time, subjectivities of the body are heavily shaped by consciousness and symbolic - cultural - constructions. Consider the subjectivities of a Western anorexic, an Indian yogic mystic with extreme control over bodily functions, a New Guinea tribesman preoccupied with body substances and pollution: and consider how one's own - normally unconscious and automatic - bodily functioning can be disrupted if one consciously monitors one's breathing or one's pulse. An experienced body is both biologically given and culturally constructed (Keesing n.d.3). This dialectic in which biology is inscribed on culture and culture is inscribed on embodied experience is complex and little understood. But by overstating one side of this inscription and effectively denying the other, much recent symbolic anthropology has created spurious relativisms.

Experiential universals grounded in our bodies and commonalities in our environment may well be sufficient to account for the quite powerful universals and limited range of variation in the grammatical encoding of temporal and aspectual relationships (Hopper 1982, Bybee & Dahl 1989) and in the metaphoric construction of time. But there may be more to it than that. Some recent research by German cognitive psychologists and neurobiologists (Schleidt *et al.* 1987, 1988; Pöppel 1979, 1987, Lehmann 1990, n.d.) suggests there is a very specific (and presumably universal) mode of monitoring duration in human consciousness. This

research points to a perceptual 'time window' of some three seconds, quite constant under experimental conditions,[15] in which humans are conscious of and monitor a present experiential moment. Pöppel (1979:244) characterizes a cognitive mechanism that, as he puts it, "asks every 2-3 seconds what is in the center of my percept". The monitoring of duration through a perceptual 'time window' (if it is confirmed by further evidence) is presumably a reflection of neural processes and the constraints of short-term memory - an expression of our biology, not of our culture. Lehmann finds experimental evidence that when adults learn a second language that makes tense-aspect distinctions not drawn in their native language, they make initial 'mistakes' that seem to express the relating of events to an experiential present defined by this perceptual time window.[16]

Other constraints seem to come from the processes of *memory*, which in humans is selective, creative, highly visual. A 'future' (and hypothetical events) can be imagined, but not remembered; a remembered 'past' is always selectively encoded; and it is constructed, refashioned, reconstituted to fit the present situation. It seems likely, then, that the linear experience of duration in terms of a present moment that moves (as if through space) or that is continously moving past us is universally human and generated by the neurobiology of perception and information processing.

Let me sum up the constraints to which I have pointed. We engage a world of daily, monthly, and yearly cycles (where the daily and yearly cycling of the sun and the cycling of the moon follow regular and repetitive intervals, could we really expect our representation of time as a process divided into continuous, equal segments to be as culturally unique as Hall (1984), Whorf (1956) and so many others have claimed?)

Consider the bodies humans live in as sources of the experience of duration and temporal relationship. We live in bodies that grow, age, and die. We are upright walkers with eyes in the fronts of our heads, with free arms and opposable thumbs with which we manipulate objects. We encounter and engage the world pre-eminently by walking through it, seeing it, and exercising agency (to use jargon fashionable in social scientese) on it by manipulating it with our hands. What we have already seen and done lies behind us; what we will see and do lies in front of us. In perceiving the environment through vision and sound and smell, we are continuously monitoring it, apparently through a perceptual window of fixed duration. Moreover, the mechanisms of memory operate so that previously encountered experience is represented neurally and reconstituted cognitively; and not-yet-encountered experiences can only be envisioned in imagination (Hawking 1988:153ff)[17].