普通高等教育“十一五”国家级规划教材

教育部推荐教材

大学专业英语系列教材

人文科学专业英语教程（第二版·上）

ENGLISH

张卫平　郭庆民　编著

中国人民大学出版社

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图书在版编目（CIP）数据

人文科学专业英语教程. 上 / 张卫平，郭庆民编著. —2版
北京：中国人民大学出版社，2007
（大学专业英语系列教材）
普通高等教育“十一五”国家级规划教材
教育部推荐教材
ISBN 978-7-300-08604-0

Ⅰ. 人…
Ⅱ. ①张…②郭……
Ⅲ. 英语—高等学校—教材
Ⅳ. H31

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字（2007）第157308号

普通高等教育“十一五”国家级规划教材
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出版发行	中国人民大学出版社		
社　　址	北京中关村大街31号	**邮政编码**	100080
电　　话	010-62511242（总编室）		010-62511398（质管部）
	010-82501766（邮购部）		010-62514148（门市部）
	010-62515195（发行公司）		010-62515275（盗版举报）
网　　址	http:// www. crup. com. cn		
	http:// www. ttrnet. com（人大教研网）		
经　　销	新华书店		
印　　刷	北京市易丰印刷有限责任公司		
规　　格	185 mm × 240 mm　16开本	**版　　次**	1999 年 9 月第 1 版
			2007 年 10 月第 2 版
印　　张	21.25	**印　　次**	2007 年 10 月第 1 次印刷
字　　数	471 000	**定　　价**	33.00 元

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第二版

前言

《人文科学专业英语教程》自1999年出版以来，深受读者欢迎，被许多高校用作专业英语教学阶段的教科书。2006年，它又被教育部评为普通高等教育“十一五”国家级规划教材，这无疑体现了专家和学者们对该教材的肯定。新的荣誉带来了新的要求，在试用了七八年后，我们觉得有必要对原教材进行较大规模的修订，以便使教材内容和语言都更好地反映时代的要求。

其次，修订这本教材还基于以下的原因：2004年初，教育部颁发了《大学英语课程教学要求》,用以替代原来的《大学英语教学大纲》。它在“较高要求”和“更高要求”中，对学生的专业英语能力提出了比原来的教学大纲更高的要求；根据大纲制订者的解释，这是为了适应我国改革开放新形势的要求而采取的举措。

形势的确在变化，但是，这并不意味着学习英语的规律完全变了。而许多这类教材编写者所追求的目标和境界就是如何使教材既反映时代的变化又保持传统的优势。在新修订的这本教材中，我们采用经典和时文相结合的方式，力图实现这一目标。如果说原教材在选材上侧重著名学者的经典著作的话，那么，新修订的版本则是一方面保留了内容和文字皆佳的经典之作，另一方面又补充了相当数量的上个世纪后半期至今的著作，这样不仅可以体现语言的时效性，也能够使读者接触到新知识和新论点。

本教材有如下特点：

一、按照人文学科特点，上册共涵盖四大学科领域：哲学、历史学、宗教学和文学，下册涵盖社会学、文化学、语言学和新闻学四个领域。上册主要涉及文史哲学科，下册则侧重社会、语言和文化等领域。在原教材中，考虑到我国对学科领域的分类，社会学领域的内容没有包括在内，但在修订版中，我们决定添加社会学领域的内容，因为社会学知识与语言和文化知识有着密不可分的关系。

二、考虑到我国大学生学完两年大学英语后所达到的实际水平，课文的选材、注释和练习基本上都以《大学英语课程教学要求》的“一般要求”为基础。

PREFACE

三、每册教材涉及的四个领域按上文提到的顺序依次循环排列，每册循环三次，形成十二个单元——即：哲学、历史学、宗教学、文学；哲学、历史学、宗教学、文学……这种安排主要是便于我们贯彻教材在选材难度上的循序渐进原则。

四、从知识的角度，我们也注意到了知识的循序渐进性，因此，涉及某个专业领域的第一个单元基本上只涉及这个专业领域里的基础知识和基本原理。其后再次涉及这个专业领域时则选择比较新的专业知识或应用知识。

五、考虑到《大学英语课程教学要求》对英语学习质和量上的要求，我们采用“主、副”课文制：对主课文从注解和练习两个方面都进行了重点处理，用作教师课堂内重点讲解的内容；副课文主要供学生课后自学，以便对主课文从语言和知识两方面起到巩固作用。当然，教师也可以根据情况对这三篇文章的教学进行适当的安排。

六、本教材强调培养学生准确理解文章内容的能力，相应地，每单元三篇文章都配有阅读理解练习。这些练习有的指向语篇的宏观理解，有些则涉及对文章重要的具体内容的把握。英译汉翻译练习一般都是文章中的疑难长句，词汇、完形填空、汉译英和写作练习则是希望藉此使学生每学一个单元在语言上都有所积累，学会用新词语表达自己的思想。为了方便广大师生，书后的附录中提供了主课文的参考译文和练习答案。

我们意识到，编写一本涵盖面如此之广的英语教材很不容易，其中最大的问题莫过于如何体现本书内容的系统性。因此，我们在考虑到不同专业领域话题的同时，也力图找出人文科学的共性，以便最大限度地保障这套教材在知识上的系统性。

本书在编写过程中得到包洁和刘扬的大力协助，特此表示感谢。

由于作者水平有限，本书错误在所难免，欢迎广大师生提出宝贵意见。

编　者

2007年9月

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

Unit One

Text: The Reality of the External World

Reading Passage One: Philosophers' Doubts

Reading Passage Two: Philosophy in Education: The Allegory of the Cave

About the Author

Around the beginning of the twentieth century there was a strong reaction among many philosophers, especially in the Anglo-American world, to metaphysical idealism in all its various forms. These new realists, as they were called, were motivated to a considerable extent by what they regarded to be the inability of metaphysical idealism to make sense out of science, with its implicit faith in the existence of an independent, real world. They wanted to show how perception does give us genuine knowledge of objects.

Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872—1970) was a British philosopher, mathematician, and Nobel laureate, whose emphasis on logical analysis influenced the course of 20th-century philosophy. Russell was among the strongest realist voices of the time. He developed his realism from a so-called phenomenalistic（现象学的）theory of perception and the adoption of what he took to be "the logical-analytic method". He believed that our direct experiences have primacy in the acquisition of knowledge, and that the main task of the philosopher was to illuminate the most general propositions about the world and to eliminate confusion.

The main problem that philosophical realism faces is how to account for errors in perception and how to avoid the possibility that all of perception is systematically misleading regarding the actual state of the world insofar as all our knowledge is necessarily partial and incomplete.

In the selection from *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914), Russell formulates his arguments in a very lucid（透彻的）manner.

Text

THE REALITY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD

Bertrand Russell

In every philosophical problem, our investigation starts from what may be called "data", by which I mean matters of common knowledge, vague, complex, inexact, as common knowledge always is, but yet somehow commanding our assent as on the whole and in some interpretation pretty certainly true. In the case of our present problem, the common knowledge involved is of various kinds. There is first our acquaintance with particular objects of daily life—furniture, houses, towns, other people, and so on. Then there is the extension of such particular knowledge to particular things outside our personal experience, through history and geography, newspapers, etc. And lastly, there is the systematization of all this knowledge of particulars by means of physical science, which derives immense persuasive force from its astonishing power of foretelling the future. We are quite willing to admit that there may be errors of detail in this knowledge, but we believe them to be discoverable and corrigible by the methods which have given rise to our beliefs, and we do not, as practical men, entertain for a moment the hypothesis that the whole edifice may be built on insecure foundations. In the main, therefore, and without absolute dogmatism as to this or that special portion, we may accept this mass of common knowledge as affording data for our philosophical analysis...

The first thing that appears when we begin to analyse our common knowledge is that some of it is derivative, while some is primitive; that is to say, there is some that we only believe because of something else from which it has been inferred in some sense, though not necessarily in a strict logical sense, while other parts are believed on their own account, without the support of any outside evidence. It is obvious that the senses give knowledge of the latter kind: the immediate facts perceived by sight or touch or hearing do not need to be proved by argument, but are completely self-evident. Psychologists, however, have made us aware that what is actually given in sense is much less than most people would naturally suppose, and that much of what at first sight seems to be given is really inferred. This applies especially in regard to

our space-perceptions. For instance, we instinctively infer the "real" size and shape of a visible object from its apparent size and shape, according to its distance and our point of view. When we hear a person speaking, our actual sensations usually miss a great deal of what he says, and we supply its place by unconscious inference; in a foreign language, where this process is more difficult, we find ourselves apparently grown deaf, requiring, for example, to be much nearer the stage at a theater than would be necessary in our own country. Thus the first step in the analysis of data, namely, the discovery of what is really given in sense, is full of difficulty. We will, however, not linger on this point; so long as existence is realized, the exact outcome does not make any very great difference in our main problem.

The next step in our analysis must be the consideration of how the derivative parts of our common knowledge arise. Here we become involved in a somewhat puzzling entanglement of logic and psychology. Psychologically, a belief may be called derivative whenever it is caused by one or more other beliefs, or by some fact of sense which is not simply what the belief asserts. Derivative beliefs in this sense constantly arise without any process of logical inference, merely by association of ideas or some equally extra-logical process. From the expression of a man's face we judge as to what he is feeling: we say we see that he is angry, when in fact we only see a frown. We do not judge as to his state of mind by any logical process: the judgment grows up, often without our being able to say what physical mark of emotion we actually saw. In such a case, the knowledge is derivative psychologically; but logically it is in a sense primitive, since it is not the result of any logical deduction. There may or may not be a possible deduction leading to the same result, but whether there is or not, we certainly do not employ it. If we call a belief "logically primitive" when it is not actually arrived at by a logical inference, then innumerable beliefs are logically primitive which psychologically are derivative. The separation of these two kinds of primitiveness is vitally important to our present discussion.

When we reflect upon the beliefs which are logically but not psychologically primitive, we find that, unless they can on reflection be deduced by a logical process from beliefs which are also psychologically primitive, our confidence in their truth tends to diminish the more we think about them. We naturally believe, for example, that tables and chairs, trees and mountains, are still there when we turn our backs upon them. I do not wish for a moment to maintain that this is certainly not the case, but I do maintain that the question whether it is the case is not to be settled off-hand on any supposed ground of obviousness. The belief that they persist is, in all men except a few philosophers, logically primitive, but it is not psychologically primitive; psychologically, it arises only through our having seen those tables and chairs, trees

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and mountains. As soon as the question is seriously raised whether, because we have seen them, we have a right to suppose that they are there still, we feel that some kind of argument must be produced, and that if none is forthcoming, our belief can be no more than a pious opinion. We do not feel this as regards the immediate objects of sense: there they are, and, as far as their momentary existence is concerned, no further argument is required. There is accordingly more need of justifying our psychologically derivative beliefs than of justifying those that are primitive.

New Words and Expressions

profound /prə'faund/ *a.* thorough, far-reaching 意义深远的；深刻的
vague /veig/ *a.* not clear in meaning or intention 含糊的，不清楚的
command /kə'mɑ:nd/ *vt.* deserve and get 应得，博得
assent /ə'sent/ *n.* agreement with a statement, opinion, etc.; mental acceptance 同意，赞成
acquaintance /ə'kweintəns/ *n.* knowledge 知识；认识
systematization /ˌsistimətai'zeiʃən/ *n.* action or process of systematizing 系统化
immense /i'mens/ *a.* very large in extent or degree 极大的
persuasive /pə'sweisiv/ *a.* capable of or skilled in persuading; tending or fitted to persuade 有说服力的；劝导性的 **persuade** /pə'sweid/ *vt.* 劝说
foretell /fɔ:'tel/ *vt.* tell of (an event, etc.) before it takes place; predict 预言，预示
corrigible /'kɔridʒəbl/ *a.* able to be corrected 可改正的，可纠正的
entertain /ˌentə'tein/ *vt.* keep or maintain in the mind; cherish 怀着，持有
hypothesis /hai'pɔθisis/ (*pl.* hypotheses /hai'pɔθisi:z/) *n.* proposition put forward merely as a basis for reasoning or argument, without any assumption of its truth 假设；前提
edifice /'edifis/ *n.* building, esp. a large and stately one 大厦
in the main for the most part; mainly 基本上；主要地
dogmatism /'dɔgmətizəm/ *n.* positive assertion of opinions; system of philosophy with principles based on reasoning alone, not experience 武断；教条主义 **dogma** /'dɔgmə/ *n.* 教义，教条
derivative /di'rivətiv/ *a.* derived or obtained from another; coming from a source; not original 被引出的，衍生的 **derive** /di'raiv/ *vt.* 取得；衍生出
perception /pə'sepʃən/ *n.* state of being or process of becoming aware or conscious of a thing through any of the senses 感觉；知觉 **perceive** /pə'si:v/ *vt.* 感觉；发觉
instinctively /in'stiŋktivli/ *ad.* in an instinctive manner, by instinct 本能地 **instinct** /'instiŋkt/ *n.* 本能
sensation /sen'seiʃən/ *n.* perception by the senses 感觉 **sense** *n.* 感官；感觉
inference /'infərəns/ *n.* action or process of inferring; (logic) the drawing of a conclusion from data or premises 推断，推理；推论 **infer** /in'fə:/ *vt.* 推断；推论
linger /'liŋgə/ *vi.* spend a long time 徘徊，驻留；详谈

entanglement /in'tæŋglmənt/ *n.* action of entangling; the condition or an instance of being entangled 纠缠；纠纷 **entangle** /in'tæŋgl/ *vt.* 缠住；牵连
assert /ə'sə:t/ *vt.* declare formally and distinctly 宣称，断言
deduction /di'dʌkʃən/ *n.* conclusion reached by applying the rules of logic to a premise 推论，演绎推理 **deduce** /di'dju:s/ *vt.* 推论，推演出
innumerable /i'nju:mərəbl/ *a.* too many to be counted 无数的，数不清的 **number** *n.* 数
diminish /di'miniʃ/ *vi.* become less or smaller 减少；减小
off-hand *ad.* at once or straightaway 立刻，不加准备地
forthcoming /fɔ:θ'kʌmiŋ/ *a.* about or likely to come forth or appear 即将到来的，即将出现的 **come forth** 出现，涌现
pious /'paiəs/ *a.* characterized by or showing respect to God or gods; heartfelt 虔诚的；诚恳的
as regards 至于，关于
momentary /'məuməntəri/ *a.* lasting only a moment 瞬息间的，短暂的
accordingly /ə'kɔ:diŋli/ *ad.* in accordance with what has been said or done 据此，因此
justify /'dʒʌstifai/ *vt.* give a reason or explanation 证明……有正当理由；为……辩护

Study & Practice

I. Comprehension Questions

Answer the questions either by providing your own answers or by making a choice from the four suggested answers.

1. Why should our study of any philosophical problem start from the analysis of "data" according to Russell? What are the data?
2. What might happen if we did not analyze matters of our common knowledge?
   A. We would be unable to know them at all.
   B. Our conclusions would lack proper foundations.
   C. Science would stop its progress.
   D. There would be no extension of our knowledge.
3. Knowledge that we believe "on its own account, without the support of any outside evidence" (Para. 2) is _____.
   A. primitive
   B. derivative
   C. psychologically primitive
   D. logically primitive

4. Why is it difficult to identify what is really perceived by our senses? Does this difficulty make our knowledge of the external world impossible?
5. The conclusion we reach about a person's state of mind from his facial expression is _____.
   A. logically sound
   B. psychologically derivative
   C. primitive
   D. unfounded
6. The separation of psychologically primitive knowledge from logically primitive knowledge is important because _____.
   A. we then find that a lot of our beliefs are built on insecure foundations
   B. logically primitive knowledge constitutes a larger part of our knowledge of the external world
   C. we know then psychologically primitive knowledge is never to be readily trusted
   D. such a separation enables us to know better the true nature of our knowledge
7. Why is the belief called "logically primitive" that a mountain is still there even if we do not see it at the time? Give one example of our beliefs which might be regarded as not "logically primitive".
8. One of the major differences between primitive beliefs and derivative beliefs is that _____.
   A. the latter need more argument for their truthfulness
   B. the former need more explanation for their truthfulness
   C. the latter are always true beyond any doubt
   D. the former are always true beyond any doubt

Ⅱ. Word Study

Study how the following words or phrases are used in the text. Then fill in the blanks with their appropriate forms.

vague	command	in the case of	acquaintance
immense	give rise to	entertain	primitive
perceive	in regard to	assert	deduction

1. Common Sense _____ the existence of a reality.
2. The relation between perception, the perceiver, the object _____, and the knowledge that results from this process gained special attention in the early 20th century.

3. This is a form of _____ that consists of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion.
4. Students received a basic training to gain a(n) _____ with materials and processes.
5. In 1793 John Quincy Adams published a series of articles that defended President George Washington and his policy of neutrality _____ war between France and Great Britain.
6. This human consciousness generates increasingly complex social arrangements that in turn _____ a higher consciousness.
7. Rousseau believed that the natural, or _____, state is morally superior to the civilized state.
8. Jefferson wrote his most famous document, the Declaration of Independence. It, then, had a(n) _____ impact in both America and Europe.
9. Settlement by one people can also result in the native people becoming a minority, as _____ Native Americans.
10. He could not _____ my sympathy nor even my interest.
11. It sounds fantastic that such beliefs could be seriously _____.
12. He stated that only abstract reasoning yields genuine knowledge, whereas reliance on sense perception produces _____ and inconsistent opinions.

Ⅲ. Cloze

Fill in the blanks with the correct prepositions.

All sciences, in the broadest sense, aim at uncovering truths, but in doing so what are they aiming at? The question, "What is truth?", or "What makes anything true?" belongs not ___1___ any particular science but to philosophy. Philosophers themselves are fundamentally divided ___2___ the meaning and importance of the question: some regard it ___3___ philosophy's distinctive question, towards answering which all their more specific enquiries are ___4___ essence directed; others count the issue as confused, or ___5___ so general that nothing useful can be said. Asking "What makes it true that cyanide（氰化物）is poisonous?" will call forth one answer; "What makes it true that Mozart is a greater composer than Mendelssohn?" demands another. It hardly seems likely that there will be anything common ___6___ both answers that reflects a common concern with truth, in addition ___7___ their diverse concerns ___8___ medicine and music. Philosophers thus persuade that there is no real question of truth. We can make

little ___9___ the continuing opposition ___10___ the two major traditional answers to that question: the correspondence and coherence theories of truth. The correspondence theory holds that the truth of a statement or belief lies ___11___ a relation of congruence（一致）or conformity to the fact or state ___12___ affairs it describes. The coherence theory denies that the truth of any of our beliefs can be a matter of matching up to completely independent facts, emphasizing instead the interdependence and organization of our total system of beliefs.

Ⅳ. Translation

Translate the following sentences into English.

1. 虽然我们承认，对我们所有的普通知识提出疑问是可能的，但是我们必须基本上（in the main）接受这种知识，否则哲学也就不存在了。
2. 我们对某些感官材料越是进行反思，我们就越能意识到它们究竟是什么，意识到对它们的质疑究竟意味着什么，它们也变得更确定。
3. 如果我们把对"硬"材料和"软"材料的区分应用于心理上是派生的信念，而不是逻辑上派生的信念，我们发现其中的大部分——虽然不是全部——要被归作软材料。
4. 我们不能理解我们对外间世界的知识这一问题，原因是我们不能清除各种各样的误解，这些误解使这个问题的含义变得模糊不清。
5. 虽然罗素是科学方法的信奉者，相信来源于实证研究的知识，但他也认为科学只能提供一些尝试性的答案。

Ⅴ. Writing

According to Russell, our common knowledge is always "vague" and "inexact". Give one example of common knowledge and analyze why it is vague and inexact. Write your composition in no less than 250 words.

Reading Passage One

PHILOSOPHERS' DOUBTS

D. Z. Phillips[1]

What is philosophy about? Before I went to university, but knowing that philosophy was going to be one of the subjects I was to study there, I read a well-known introduction to philosophy in the hope of answering that question. My first impression was that the philosopher is an ultra-cautious person. Philosophers do not rush into saying that we know this or that, as most people do. They step back and think about things. Although we say we know all sorts of things, strictly speaking—philosophers conclude—we do not.

Given this view of philosophy, it seemed to me that the usefulness of philosophy was evident. Philosophy is a way of sharpening our thinking. It teaches us to be cautious, and not to be over-hasty in reaching our conclusions. By imposing its strict demands philosophy tightens up our standards of knowledge. Our day-to-day assumptions are shot through with contradictions and inconsistencies. A great deal of reflection is necessary before we can arrive at what we really know. Philosophy is an indispensable guide in this reflection. This view of the usefulness of philosophy was reflected in the views of many educationalists, and this is still the case. They favor introductory classes in philosophy, even for those whose primary intentions are to study other subjects. The pencil needs to be sharpened before it can write with sufficient care about other topics.

This straightforward view of philosophy was given a severe jolt, however, when I read further and discovered two kinds of things that many philosophers were prepared to doubt. They doubt things that we ordinarily would not doubt. The list that I read in the introduction to philosophy was surprising, to say the least. The philosopher told me that it seemed to him, at a certain moment, that he was sitting in a chair at a table which had a certain shape, on which he saw sheets of paper with writing or print on them. By turning his head he could see buildings, clouds and the

1 Dewi Zephaniah Phillips (1934—2006), leading proponent of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, who had a long academic career spanning five decades. He is also editor of the Blackwell Journal *Philosophical*.

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