



THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPAGANDA

The Ideological Instrument and World Public Order

by B.S. MURTY

NEW HAVEN PRESS

New Haven



MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS

Dordrecht / Boston / London

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Murty, B. S. (Bhagevatula Satyanarayana)
The international law of propaganda.

(New Haven studies in international law and world
public order)

Includes index.

1. Propaganda, International. 2. Crimes against
peace. I. Title. II. Series.
JX4079.P7M79 1989 327.1'4 88-28881

ISBN 0-89838-904-6

ISBN 0-89838-504-0 (series)

ISSN 0738-2812

Published by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
P.O. Box 163, 3300 AD Dordrecht, The Netherlands.

Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada
by Kluwer Academic Publishers,
101 Philip Drive, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A.

In all other countries, sold and distributed
by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group,
P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, The Netherlands.

Kluwer Academic Publishers incorporates the publishing programmes of
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

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06507, USA.

This book was originally published by Yale University Press in 1968, under
the title "Propaganda and World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of the
Ideological Instrument of Coercion."

Printed in the Netherlands

To my teacher

MYRES S. MCDOUGAL

Foreword by Harold D. Lasswell

AMONG the major tasks of decision-makers, advocates, and commentators who specialize in the law of the world community is that of clarifying or applying authoritative prescriptions that harmonize the several instruments of national policy with the goals of minimum or maximum public order. In common parlance the instruments are diplomatic, economic, military, and ideological. It is not far wide of the mark to say that confusion is greatest when controversies relate to ideological policy, or the use of managed communication to influence large audiences. No small part of the difficulty is to be found in a conception of law that fails to locate official decision-makers and claimants in the social process, or to distinguish between the communicative and other dimensions of a collective act. Professor Murty has successfully dealt with these basic matters.

Professor Murty distinguishes the process of claim and decision within the context of the whole social process. Hence it is clear from the beginning that law, defined as authoritative and controlling decision, is a component of the larger process. It is made explicit that a continuous gradation leads from an interaction whose principal feature is communication to an interaction whose significance is something else, such as trading or fighting. The illuminating point is that, to some degree, communication is always present, since communication is understood to occur whenever words, gestures, and their equivalents are employed as mediators between the subjectivities of the initiator and the recipient of messages. It is demonstrated that in certain circumstances the use of communication is coercive. Murty's analysis shows that if a decision-maker is to make reliable inferences about the content of any sequence of communication, including its causes and consequences, the total context must be scrutinized by systematic methods.

Working within this framework it is possible for Professor Murty to demonstrate why piecemeal, noncontextual approaches have so often led to unsatisfactory results: they have been divorced from the guiding principles required to ascertain when ideological strategies facilitate or block results that are compatible with world public order. For example, it has often been suggested that the trend of official decision is to affirm the impermissibility of "war propaganda," and that this negative prescription

ought to be embodied in a formal treaty. Murty throws persuasive doubt on the occurrence of the alleged trend and indicates that a formal treaty would inhibit rather than foster the realization of the basic goals of public order.

The author's contextualism enables him to propose criteria that aid in disentangling past claims, decisions, and recommended norms from one another in delimiting the responsibility of official and of private wielders of the ideological instrument; past commentators have been remarkably unenlightening in their discussion of these issues. Another example—one of many—of Professor Murty's success is his outline of a workable conception of one of the most treacherous and highly sloganized doctrines in the entire repertory of international law, namely, "ideological aggression."

The fascinating question is why Professor Murty's predecessors have been relatively unsuccessful in bringing systematic discipline to the field. It is fair, I think, to assert that the chief source of difficulty is intellectual, not from incapacity, of course, but from the over-incorporation of certain latent assumptions and sentiments that are tightly linked with both ordinary and professional language. The remarkable fact about language, when considered as a component of culture, is that it conveys so much more than it says.

The manifest content of every message—the seemingly "plain and natural meaning"—is a small fraction of the designative and evocative significations of the whole, whether on the part of the senders or the receivers. For instance, in many societies ordinary and professional languages often contain statements to the effect that law itself is words. Thus, law is a "rule," or it is a "clause of the constitution" or a "statute." Such lexical conceptions are so patently absurd—since, at most, words are *among* the bases of inference relevant to authoritative expectations—that it is hardly astonishing to find that ordinary discourse declares or implies many other definitions. We are sometimes told that whatever is enforced is law—which is a monstrosity, since the definition includes naked power along with authoritative control.

Professor Murty is able to thread his way confidently among existing connotations because his scientific standpoint is sufficiently comprehensive to put each assertion in its appropriate place, either as an unofficial interaction or as part of a process of official claim or decision. We underline the point that a commentator's position in the flow of communicative and noncommunicative events must be clearly defined before he can *deal with* rather than *succumb to* an unrecognized use of the ideological instrument.

Whatever imperfections of detail there may be in the execution of Professor Murty's formidable undertaking, it is as sure as any prognosis

can be that his work will be accepted as the landmark treatise on an elusive topic. The timing is fortunate, since we are gingerly entering the era of satellite-expedited employment of the ideological instrument, and a host of new technological innovations must soon be evaluated in terms of the minimum and maximum goals of world public order.

Acknowledgments

THIS BOOK would not have been possible without the generous help and encouragement I have received from various sources, of varied character, and over a period of years. Of the debt owed Professors Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, the book itself speaks with sufficient eloquence. But for the interest evinced by them, I perhaps would have abandoned the project at a very early stage, and its completion is a product of their inspiration and guidance. I am further indebted to Professor Lasswell for writing the foreword and to Professor McDougal for accepting the dedication of the book.

My study of this subject began in 1954 when I was a graduate student at Yale Law School. My doctoral thesis, *The International Regulation of the Ideological Instrument of Coercion*, was accepted in June 1957 and awarded the Carolinda Waters Prize in the Law School that year. In October 1957 I had to return to my own country, and, due to other pre-occupations, revision of the text for publication could not be completed for several years.

At the stage of writing the thesis, Mr. William T. Burke, professor of law at Ohio State University, who was then on the Yale Law School faculty, spent a great deal of time reading the drafts, discussing the issues, and making many helpful suggestions. At that stage I also received assistance from other faculty members: Dr. Gerhard Bebr, Associate Dean Jack Bernard Tate, and Professor Ralph Sharp Brown. After submission and acceptance of the text, Professor Leon Lipson, Professor Quincy Wright, and Mr. Charles Runyon gave generously of their penetrative and constructive criticism, which helped a great deal in the revising process. The kind interest of Dean Eugene V. Rostow was abiding throughout.

I am grateful to all the officers of the Yale University Press who in various ways have contributed to the task of publication. The suggestions made by reviewers for the Press were very helpful, and I am profoundly thankful to Mrs. Ruth D. Kaufman for her highly valuable editorial assistance. However, I assume full responsibility for the shortcomings in the book and for the views expressed therein.

On the material side, I am indebted to the United States Department of State, as it was a Smith-Mundt and Fulbright grant in 1954 that enabled me to go to Yale. The Yale Law School was generous in financing

my stay there during the years 1955 to 1957. The Asia Foundation and the Law School financed my trip to the United States and stay at Yale during 1965-66, in connection with a companion study on the diplomatic instrument, and the occasion was utilized to effect some changes in the present text. The Andhra University, where I am now professor of law and head of the Department of Law, was generous in granting leave to spend long periods at Yale and in financial assistance to support my family at home.

Finally, I wish to express my appreciation of the sacrifice made by my wife, children, and aged mother in permitting me to stay abroad for fairly long periods of time in pursuit of this study.

Waltair, India
August 1967

B. S. M.

Abbreviations

A.J.I.L.	<i>American Journal of International Law</i>
Brit. Parl. Papers, Cmd.	British Parliamentary Papers, Command
B.Y.B.I.L.	<i>British Yearbook of International Law</i>
Dept. of State Bull.	<i>Department of State Bulletin</i>
E.S.C.O.R.	Economic and Social Council, Official Records
For. Rel. of U.S.	<i>Foreign Relations of the United States</i>
G.A.O.R.	General Assembly, Official Records
Hague Recueil	Academy of International Law (The Hague), <i>Recueil des Cours</i>
I.C.J.	International Court of Justice
Int'l and Comp. L.Q.	<i>International and Comparative Law Quarterly</i>
Int'l. Conciliation	<i>International Conciliation</i>
Int'l. Org.	<i>International Organization</i>
Law and Contemp. Problems	<i>Law and Contemporary Problems</i>
L.O.N. Doc.	League of Nations Document
L.N.T.S.	League of Nations Treaty Series
Mich. L. Rev.	<i>Michigan Law Review</i>
Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l. L.	<i>Proceedings of the American Society of International Law</i>
S.C.O.R.	Security Council, Official Records
Trans. Grot. Soc.	<i>Transactions of the Grotius Society</i>
U.N.C.I.O.	United Nations Conference on Interna- tional Organization, Documents
U.N. Doc.	United Nations Document
U.N.T.S.	United Nations Treaty Series
Yale L.J.	<i>Yale Law Journal</i>

Introduction to the Reissue

THIS BOOK was published over two decades ago. Events that have happened since then call for updating and some revision of its contents. After briefly exploring these developments, the more pertinent changes relevant to each section of the original study will be discussed section by section.

The more significant events since its appearance do not call for far-reaching alterations. Yet the past couple of decades have witnessed tremendous advances in technology, increasing manifold the size, speed, and efficiency of mass communication to the great advantage of propaganda strategists. Contentious debates have raged over a New International Information and Communication Order in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) which, in some measure, have contributed to the departure of the United States from UNESCO. Issues such as the regulation of direct television broadcasting by satellite have not advanced very far. Steps have been taken toward defining *aggression*, *ideological aggression*, and *war propaganda*.

GREAT ADVANCES IN COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY

Communication technology has advanced most dramatically during the past few decades and the advance is still in progress. As a result of the advance there has been a great upsurge in the means for point-to-point and mass communication, and for preparing material for dissemination by the mass media. The new devices render the conduct of operations of ideological strategy tremendously swift, efficient, and massive.¹

The speed of the printing process has risen to unimaginable levels. In the past, composing by hand could be at the rate of a line a minute, and now, with the help of computerized machines, 15,000 lines can be

1. The operations are described below on pp. 26 and 53.

composed per minute.² Some newspapers have moved to computerized page make up systems.³

Computers have revolutionized information gathering, processing, and distribution. Information can be fed into them, coded and stored (*memory*) and taken out for use when needed (*retrieval*). Information can be processed, the computer applying arithmetical and logical processes, using the information stored, according to instructions with impressive speed and accuracy. The information sought is obtained in print, on video disc, cassette, tape, or visual screen. When the computer first appeared in 1944, it was bulky with only moderate speed. Technology advanced first by the invention of transistors, which replaced vacuum tubes and then of microchips capable of substituting hundreds of thousands of transistors.⁴ As the chip technology progressed, it became possible to greatly reduce the size of the computer, while increasing its memory capacity, its speed of computation, its variety of operations,

2. By linotype five news paper lines can be set per minute and by teletype six lines. In 1960, adding the type of computer then available, the speed was increased to fourteen lines. In 1964 there was a leap forward when phototype setting was devised for off-set printing, and the rate rose to 80. Two years later, with the aid of the RCA typesetting device the rate attained was 1800 lines. In the following year, a CBS-Mergenthaler Linotron phototype setting was installed in the U.S. Government Printing Office, and it possessed the capacity of 15,000 lines. See Wilbur Schramm, *Men, Messages and Ideas* (New York; Harper & Row Publishers, 1973) p. 168.

3. Metal makeup process was in vogue for over a century, and was replaced by pasteup for phototype setting. Pasteup is now being replaced by computer setting. See Leo Bogart, "How U.S. Newspaper Content is Changing," *Journal of Communication*, Spring 1985. See also *Many Voices One World* (Report of the International Commission for the Study of Communication problems, generally called MacBride Commission, UNESCO, London: Kogan Page Ltd., 1980, hereafter cited as MacBride Report), p. 87.

4. Information reduced to the form of binary code, a code which uses only two digits, 0 and 1, can be easily transmitted by, or recorded on, a semiconductor silicon chip in the form of electrical impulses or bits of information. At one time a silicon chip carried only eight bits and around 1970, sixteen bits. There are now in use chips that can store 256,000 bits. Development is envisaged of 1 million bit chips of one micron thickness (1/100th of the thickness of a human hair). Such a one megabit chip performs the role of a million transistors. Logic chips, which compute rather than store information, are also advancing rapidly. A new Intel microprocessor runs seventeen times faster than that used in IBM's first personal computer (PC). Whereas PC can address 1 million characters, the Intel can address 4,000 million characters. Chips made of gallium arsenide have three to six times the speed of silicon chips. Superlattices have higher speed than chips of either of these kinds, and semiconductors immersed in supercooled liquids such as of helium lose nearly all resistance to electrical current and function at much higher speeds. See Staley N. Wellborn and Manuel Schiffres, "Computers," reprinted from *U.S. News and World Report*, August 21, 1985, in *Span*, January 1986, p. 28. Superconductors that offer no resistance at room temperatures are in the process of development. Computers that use optical transmission of impulses, instead of electronic transmission, will increase computer speed manifold. They are expected to be available in the 1990's.

and reducing its price and cost of operation.⁵ Coded information can be transmitted to distant places swiftly and accurately, by telegraph or radio, directly or by a satellite. The coding and decoding is done almost instantaneously.⁶ Signals can be mixed together at the point of transmission and automatically separated at the point of receipt.

By the 1960's, point-to-point communication was possible by telegraph, telephone, teleprinter, and, in facsimile, by wire or radio wave. The carrying capacity of the wire increased strikingly with the advent of the co-axial cable in the 1950's, which was then capable of furnishing up to 40 channels.⁷ The radio frequency spectrum expanded from low, medium, and high frequencies (used for long, medium, and short distance communication and radio broadcasting) to very high (VHF), ultra high (UHF), super high (SHF), and extremely high frequencies (EHF), from 3 kilohertz (KHz) to 300 gigahertz (GHz).⁸ There is scope for further expansion. Communication by microwave started during World War II for communication from point to point within a visible range using UHF and SHF wavelengths. It acquired great distance (or range) with the advent of satellites.

In 1964, only seven years after the first satellite was put in orbit, the first commercial service satellite was launched by the Communication Satellite Corporation of the United States (COMSAT) for use by the

5. The size has been reduced since the 1940's by a factor of 10,000. Whereas the 1944 model performed 1 million operations per second, some present ones can perform 1 billion operations per second. See MacBride Report note 3 above, p. 64. The Cray-2 computer, developed by Cray Research, completes a computational cycle every 4.1 nanoseconds – the amount of time taken by light to travel 1.5 meters. Computerized gadgets can manage these speeds. They can also sense changes such as heat, gas leak, entry of intruders, human fatigue, and respond with signals. See Wellborn and Schiffres, cited above. The cost of a computer fell from \$1 million to \$300 and the cost of 1 million calculations fell in a decade from \$10 to 2 cents. See MacBride Report, note 3 above, p. 66. O.H. Ganley and G.D. Ganley, *To Inform or to Control* (New Delhi, Hindustan Publishing Corporation, 1982) p. 16 reports: In 1953, the computer (with a capacity of a little hand-held calculator now) cost \$3 million, weighed 1 ton, filled a large room, and used the energy of an electric locomotive. The price of a desk model computer is now under \$10,000. In 1952, one hundred thousand computer calculations cost \$1.25, whereas in 1982, they cost \$0.0025. Robert Jastrow, "Strategic Defense Initiative, the Rationale," *Span* March 1986 (reprinted from *The Washington Times*) pp. 10, 12, states that the American Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (AT&T) employs 50 million lines of programme code, with 14,000 nodes to operate the nation's telephone system.

6. See Ganley and Ganley, note 5 above, p. 14, for an explanation of the *analog* code used earlier – the code uses something analogous to the information to be coded, and the binary code which uses only 0 and 1. See also *MacBride Report*, cited above in note 3, p. 65.

7. *Ibid.* p. 74.

8. See Ganley and Ganley, note 5 above, pp. 98–99, furnishing information from U.S. State Department Special Report No. 57, August 1979.

members of the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT)⁹, followed by several others. These geosynchronous satellites facilitate transmission by microwave signals from an earth station via satellite to another earth station across an ocean. The several systems of INTELSAT form a global communication network.¹⁰ INTELSAT is not the only one in the field. There are also the INTERSPUTNIK system of the communist countries, and several national systems.¹¹

This communication network is far more elaborate than ocean cable systems. The carrying capacity of the satellite systems increased progressively and dramatically. INTELSAT-I provided for 240 voice circuits and one television circuit. INTELSAT-III, orbited in 1968, provided 1200 voice circuits and four televisions circuits. When such capacity was acquired, satellite communication gained the capacity to compete with cable transmission, in respect to rates. INTELSAT-VI was designed to have 40,000 voice circuits and two television circuits.¹² As a result of these technological advances, news agencies can now transmit news in larger quantities at much greater speed.¹³

Satellite transmission now encounters serious competition from another technological development – transmission by the optical cable. Optical cables carry electrical impulses converted into lightwaves. The experimental record shows that 4,000 million bits of information – equivalent to the contents of 30 volumes of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* – can be transmitted per second over a distance of 117 kilometers.¹⁴ An optical fiber of the thickness of a human hair can provide a bandwidth

9. See L. Pollak and H. Weiss, "Communication Satellites: Countdown for INTELSAT-VI," *Science*, Feb. 10, 1984, p. 553. The INTELSAT was started with COMSAT and communication entities in 15 nations, and the membership has increased to 109. See also *MacBride Report*, note 3 above, p. 288. See also p. 271, below.

10. The INTELSAT has systems over the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans. See Pollak and Weiss, note 9 above, p. 556. See also *MacBride Report*, note 3 above, pp. 60, 288.

11. In 1980, more than 33 communication satellites were functioning, national, regional and international, and there were ground stations in 120 countries. *Ibid.* pp. 63–64; Robert R. Lovell and C.L. Cuccia, "A New Wave of Communication Satellites," *Aerospace America*, March 1984, p. 43.

12. Whereas marine cables have a few landing points, there can be access to a satellite from any earth station within the geographical range of the satellite. For a comparison of the marine cable and satellite, from communication and economy points of view, see Pollak and Weiss, note 9 above, pp. 556 and 558.

13. See Michael H. Anderson, "Emerging Patterns of Global News Cooperation," in Jim Richstad and Michael H. Anderson, Eds., *Crisis in International News: Policies and Prospects* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1981) pp. 318, 323: It is mentioned that whereas on a ticker about 60 words were transmitted per minute, with the devices available in 1981, it was possible to transmit 1200 words per minute.

14. See *MacBride Report*, note 3 above, p. 11; Robert W. Lucky, "A Burst of Light Worth a Hundred Million Words," *Span*, March 1986, 2 (reprinted from *Science*,

which is a million times greater than that provided by a radio channel. At present each fiber is used for a single channel, but by using different colors of light, the channels can be interleaved into one at the point of transmission and automatically separated at the point of receipt. The TAT-8 trans-Atlantic cable, scheduled to be operative in 1988, is designed to have 40 fibers.¹⁵

Television has progressed considerably. It can now be received from the air, by cable,¹⁶ from a satellite directly,¹⁷ or by a video recorded disc, cassette or tape.¹⁸ An event can be televised live around the world, and a version of it can be edited at the place of the event or at a central studio within a few hours.¹⁹ Cable transmission is useful to obtain a clearer television picture. Cable systems have developed enormously, and apart from their utility for television reception, they can furnish individuals, who can bear the cost, the latest information collected at data banks.²⁰ By cable transmission or by radio transmission via satellite, an entire newspaper or magazine, composed at one place, can be carried expeditiously to a distant place for printing and distribution.²¹

November 1985, p. 85); also Ganley and Ganley, note 5 above, pp. 19–20. New England and Washington, D.C. were connected in 1984 by a half-inch optic telephone cable.

15. See Lucky, note 14 above, p. 4; Robert A. Weeks, a lecture on electro-optic fibers, *The Hindu*, March 23, 1986, p. 16. The cable is expected to have the capacity to carry 565 megabits per second, and provide 40,000 telephone channels.

16. *MacBride Report*, note 3 above, p. 88, mentions that there are nearly 14,000 cable systems in the United States. See also Schramm, note 2 above, p. 169.

17. With a small disc antenna added to the receiver, the television broadcast can be directly received from the satellite. This device is used even by some individuals. Ganley and Ganley, note 5 above, p. 22, mentions that Canada and Japan were planning to use such broadcasting for domestic purposes. *Id.* p. 108, states such broadcasting is highly vulnerable to jamming. *Id.* p. 110 reports that the United States has no intention of broadcasting directly internationally. See also David Webster, "The Era of Direct Broadcasting by Satellites", *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1984, reprinted in *American Review*, Summer 1984, p. 25.

18. *MacBride Report*, note 3 above, pp. 11, 171.

19. See Peter Marshall, "Visnews: TV News Flow and Satellites," in Richstad and Anderson, note 13 above, p. 279; Jonathan King, "Visnews and UPITN: News Film Supermarkets in the Sky," *id.* p. 283. See also Ganley and Ganley, note 5 above, pp. 65–66.

20. See Schramm, note 2 above, p. 170. The British Postal Administration operates the PRESTEL system, which supplies the latest information on many matters, including market information to subscribers. See *MacBride Report*, note 3 above, p. 71.

21. *Time* magazine transmits the entire edition by satellite to Hong Kong, and there it is printed, and this edition appears even before the New York edition. *The Wall Street Journal* is likewise published both from New York and Hong Kong. The Paris based *International Herald Tribune* is published and delivered on the same day as in the United States. See Ganley and Ganley, note 5 above, pp. 64–66. *The New York Times* brings out a Chicago edition every day. In India, *The Hindu* transmits by satellite in facsimile from Madras to Delhi to bring out its Delhi edition at the same time as at Madras.

SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE PREDICTABILITY AND MEASURABILITY OF THE IMPACT OF MASS COMMUNICATION

The premise laid at the outset of this study is that the ideological instrument of coercion can be effective in changing the attitudes and behavior of mass audiences. It can also produce coercive effects on ruling elites who expect their power to decline as a result of attitudinal or behavioral changes on the part of audiences.²² Reference was made in the original work to the different views on the effectiveness of propaganda and psychological warfare – that the operations may or may not have an effect; that it is difficult to predict the long-term effects but not the short-term ones; and that it is not easy to estimate the effectiveness of strategic operations during a war, though tactical operations are effective.²³ It was stated that it was not possible to draw precisely the line that separates persuasion from coercion both with respect to mass audiences and ruling elites. Some indices were suggested which could be of help to decision-makers to estimate the probable outcome of particular uses of the instrument, whether persuasion or coercion, and the expected degree of coercion.²⁴ The question of great interest at any time is whether it is possible to define precisely the line that separates impermissible coercive uses from permissible ones.

History furnishes ample evidence that ruling elites have always feared communication of facts and ideas in their capacity to destabilize the established order. Heretics were burned at the stake, and revolutionary books of high scientific merit were banned from circulation. In the 1930's, when national and transnational radio broadcasting became common, there was great fear that radio broadcasting could be used to subvert national governments and could be a serious source of danger to international peace. There emerged a theory, now referred to as the *hypodermic theory* or the *bullet theory*, which then gained considerable support.²⁵ It was thought that a skillful communicator could *inject* into the minds of audiences safe ideas and control their behavior. The bullet theory viewed the audience as an open target bombarded by words (the propaganda) which would control their behaviour as desired. Around 1950, however, there appeared expressions of doubt about the effectiveness of propaganda and the bullet theory was countered by what may be referred to as the *no-effect theory*.²⁶

22. See below pp. 27–34.

23. Ibid. pp. 60–61.

24. Ibid. pp. 27–34 and pp. 60–68.

25. See Schramm, note 2 above, pp. 52 and 243.

26. The “no-effect” theory is referred to below p. 60. See also Schramm, note 2 above, p. 243.

As a result of systematic studies carried out from 1940 onwards by sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, and mass communication specialists, a better understanding of the effect of mass communication has evolved.²⁷ But there is much still to do before we are able to state scientifically maintainable propositions. What we are able to say about the effects of communication, says Wilbur Schramm, is “below the reliability of exact science and above the reliability of science fiction”.²⁸ He states that the complexity of the matter is realized, and there is an effort to identify as many relevant variables and forces at play as possible. We are on the way toward a usable theory of communication effect, although we are still like blind men trying to describe the elephant, feeling each part separately but never seeing the whole. As Walter Weiss stated in 1969: “Hovland wrote in 1954 that no satisfactory or theoretically derived classification scheme was available for categorizing media effects. Not only was it true then, but unfortunately it still is. . .”²⁹

Scientific enquiries to understand the effect of communication on human attitudes and behavior have proceeded along two principal lines. First, psychologists have tried to explain how the human organism “learns” to respond to external stimuli, verbal stimuli included. Second, scholars of different disciplines interested in the study of the effect of mass communication have studied what features of communication affect its persuasive efficacy. Both groups have used the techniques of laboratory experimentation as well as field study. Inquiry into the learning process has proceeded in three different directions: the Freudian, the behaviorist and the cognitive. If the standard theoretical model is S-O-R, the stimulus acting on the organism produces the response, Freudians explained what transpires in the organism in terms of inner drives, inhibitions, repressions, aggressions, symbolic gratifications, etc. For behaviorists, the Freudian approach was not convincing since it did not admit of laboratory experimentation and measurement.³⁰

The behaviorist approach, initiated by I.P. Pavlov in Russia and E.L. Thorndike in the United States, conceived of learning as the result of conditioning the organism to respond in a particular manner to ex-

27. For an account of the vast literature on these studies, see Schramm, note 2 above, chaps. 11 to 14; Walter Weiss, “Effects of Mass Media of Communication” in G. Lindzey and E. Aronson, Eds., 5 *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, (2nd ed., Menlo Park, Calif. Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1969).

28. Schramm, note 2 above, p. 198.

29. Weiss, note 27 above, p. 80.

30. See e.g., B.F. Skinner, “Why I am not a Cognitive Psychologist,” in his *Reflections on Behaviorism and Society* (Englewood Cliffs, N.Y., Prentice-Hall Inc., 1978), p. 97.