

DICTIONARY OF MODERN CULTURE

**EDITED BY
JUSTIN WINTLE**



A

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With over 300 entries from more than 200 contributors, this is the most comprehensive and informative survey of twentieth century ideas ever published. You will refer to this dictionary time and time again, not only for information and facts, but for stimulation and enjoyment. From Freud to R D Laing, from Proust to Garcia Marquez, from Picasso to Warhol, from Chaplin to Godard, from Debussy to Stockhausen, from Shaw to Pinter, from Wittgenstein to Popper, from Durkheim to McLuhan, from Yeats to Ginsberg, from Wells to Castaneda.

JUSTIN WINTLE

Justin Wintle was educated at Stowe and Magdalen College Oxford, where he graduated in Modern History. He has worked as a freelance writer and editor in London, New York and the Far East. His books include *The Dictionary of Biographical Quotation*, *Makers of Nineteenth Century Culture* and *The Dragon's Almanac*.

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Preface

'More than half of modern culture depends upon what one shouldn't read,' says Algernon in *The Importance of Being Ernest*. The difficulty today, almost ninety years after Wilde wrote his comedy, is in knowing what one should read, even how one should read. There is simply so much to get through, so much to see, so much to listen to; and so many different ways of interpreting it all. Indeed, it is precisely because culture has become unmanageable that the need to supply it with guides arises; and yet any such guide must inevitably be seen and treated as part of the diversity, an increment of the plurality of creeds, faiths and non-faiths.

This *Dictionary of Modern Culture*, containing 320 articles, is an abridgement of *Makers of Modern Culture* (RKP 1981), which contains 537 articles. Both books share one aim: to provide an introduction and encouragement to those people (like myself) who wish to explore the world of thought, literature and the arts beyond their immediate concerns and interests. Neither book can claim to be comprehensive (nor I think should any book of its kind). The period presented runs from around the turn of the century to the present. That is to say, the figures included are men and women who have made key contributions to our culture (and by culture I mean, in essence, how we see ourselves) since 1900. This of course is not to suggest that 'modern' culture owes no debt to earlier achievements; but every reference work must have its parameters, and having decided what the parameters of this one should be it would have been folly to infringe them. Had I given in to a persistent temptation to include Marx and Darwin the claims of innumerable other figures would have to have been considered. The correct solution was to observe the chronological sequence; and this has been done in *Makers of Nineteenth Century Culture* (RKP 1982), the 'sequel' volume.

In preparing this abridgement I have opted to reduce the number

of entries rather than shorten or retaylor them. The reason for this is that I wished to preserve the essayistic style of the enterprise. As culture is itself interpretative it seems proper that its interpretation should be decently argued. What follows then is a selection from what was already, and necessarily, highly selective. Inevitably I have tended to discard those figures whose importance is more local than international; and certain categories of culture-maker have suffered more than others. I have, for example, retained very few politicians, and only those theoretical scientists whose work seems to have an immediate bearing on my definition of culture. Notwithstanding these constrictions, however, it is my belief that this book, with its many distinguished contributors, identifies the main areas of intellectual enquiry in our century and will give the reader sufficient routes into the jungle to make further exploration a possibility. Which is, perhaps, as much as any editor should dare submit within the confines of a single volume.

A more detailed explanation of my editorial procedures can be found in the Introduction to *Makers of Modern Culture*. I would like to take this opportunity however to express once again my thanks to the contributors, with special acknowledgments to Dr John Cottingham, Professor Bernard Crick, Dr Ann Jefferson, Professor José Guilherme Merquior, Annwyl Williams, Karel Williams and Christopher Wintle, who each gave me good advice during the original compilation. I must also reiterate my gratitude to Dr John Carroll, Dr Brian Powell and Dr Charles Webster; to Clare Alexander, Carol Taplin, Eileen Wood and Carol Gardiner at Routledge & Kegan Paul; and to Mrs Jennifer Martin for her gallant typing.

Justin Wintle
September 1983

A

1 **ADLER, Alfred 1870–1937** Austrian psychiatrist

Alfred Adler was born on 7 February 1870, the second of six children in the family of a merchant named Leopold Adler. He was brought up in a suburb of Vienna, and suffered so severely from rickets in early childhood that he did not walk until he was four years old. This early infirmity not only dictated his choice of medicine as a career, but also convinced him of the importance of organic, physical defects as determinants of personality. Since he was unable to join other boys in sport, he read extensively, and, in later life, became an eloquent speaker who could quote the Bible and who drew upon an extensive knowledge of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Kant. His favourite authors were Homer, Goethe and Shakespeare. He studied medicine at the University of Vienna, obtaining his degree in 1895. After three years working in hospital, he launched into private practice as an eye specialist, but soon turned to general practice. Finally, as a consequence of attending lectures by the neuropsychiatrist Krafft-Ebing, whose writings had steered Jung* in the direction of psychiatry, Adler decided to specialize in the study and treatment of nervous disorders. During his early years in practice, Adler developed a passionate concern with social problems, became a socialist, and published a pamphlet on the health of tailors, who often had to work in deplorable conditions, and who seemed particularly prone to develop eye complaints. Adler's interest in the problems of society remained with him all his life, and shaped his later psychological concepts. In 1909 he wrote a paper on the psychology of Marxism which, unfortunately, has disappeared. His Russian wife was a friend of Trotsky* and other revolutionaries.

In 1902, Adler's early advocacy of Freud* brought him an invitation to join Freud's discussion group; and, in 1910, he was made president of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society into

which that group had developed. However, Adler's ideas became increasingly at variance with what were then the fundamental tenets of psychoanalysis, and, in 1911, Adler and a few followers parted company with Freud and his disciples. Adler was the first major dissenter amongst the early psychoanalysts. In 1912, he founded his own 'Society for Individual Psychology', and, after the First World War, started a large number of child guidance clinics in Vienna. Adler's 'Individual Psychology' reached its peak of popularity during the 1920s and early 1930s. At one time there were thirty-four local associations promoting Adlerian ideas, the majority of which were in central Europe, but others of which were founded in the USA and Great Britain. Adler himself edited a journal in German; and there were also journals in English on both sides of the Atlantic which served to promulgate the Adlerian point of view. However, the advent of Hitler* caused the disappearance of most of the associations in Europe, and the majority of Adler's followers were compelled to emigrate. Adler himself died of a heart attack on 28 May 1937 in Aberdeen. With his death the German and American journals ceased publication, and the English journal was also discontinued at a later date. For a time, Adler's ideas and even his name faded from sight; but, in recent years, it has been increasingly recognized that he did make important contributions to psychological medicine, and that he was the originator of ideas which have been appropriated or taken over by others.

Adler's original point of view was first made manifest in 1907 when he wrote a paper on 'The Inferiority of Organs' and the way in which individuals compensated or over-compensated for such defects. This was clearly based upon his own experience of rickets in childhood. Adler's insistence upon the psychological importance of birth order was as clearly derived from the fact that he himself was a second child. Adler believed that second children tended to be particularly ambitious because they were always striving

to surpass their elder sibling. He considered that Freud's resentment of his own divergence from psychoanalysis was typical of an eldest son who felt threatened by dethronement by younger siblings.

In Adler's view, 'aggression', in the sense of self-assertion and the will to power, took precedence over sex as the prime mover of human conduct. Adler pictured the child as feeling itself to be weak and inferior, and therefore motivated towards achievement in order to overcome such feelings. Since, in Western society, men have more power than women, the feminine position is one of weakness; and both sexes exhibit a 'masculine protest' in so far as they strive to overcome a sense of inferiority to those they envy and try to emulate.

Very early in life, the child develops a particular 'style of life' in accordance with his genetic endowment, position within the family, and type of upbringing. Thus, the clever child tries to achieve superiority through his intellect, whilst his physically more agile brother develops his muscles. Adler used often to ask his patients to recall their earliest childhood memory, alleging, with some justification, that such memories often revealed what 'style of life' the individual had adopted from the beginning. If this point of view is adopted, it follows that personality is more determined by the goals toward which the individual is striving than by what had happened to him in the past, as Freud supposed. Adler freely acknowledged a teleological viewpoint; and with it linked the notion of fictional goals, based upon misconceptions, which he derived from Hans Vaihinger's book *The Philosophy of 'as if'*. Vaihinger advanced the notion that men lived by a number of fictional ideas which had no basis in fact, but which nevertheless provided guides toward living or goals at which to aim. If one believes in hell and heaven, for example, such a belief is bound to have a profound effect upon one's conduct. Neurotics are often motivated by fictional goals, of which the desire to gain power over others rather than the wish to achieve co-operative relations on equal terms is the most important.

As Adler grew older, his concept of striving for superiority became modified into something analogous to self-actualization or self-realization; a goal of completion which was always sought, but never quite achieved. However, this ideal was never a matter of the perfection of the individual in isolation, but was always firmly anchored within a social context. Freud regarded society as a limitation upon the individual, restraining him from the uninhibited expression of his instincts. Adler, true to his socialist princi-

ples, thought of social interaction and co-operation as essential to mental health. Adler's later work repeatedly refers to *Gemeinschaftsgefühl* or 'social interest' as it has been rather lamely translated. No one could be healthy unless he had replaced the goal of dominating his fellow men with the goal of an ideal community. As Adler himself wrote: 'Individual Psychology has uncovered the fact that the deviations and failures of the human character - neurosis, psychosis, crime, drug addiction etc. - are nothing but forms of expression and symptoms of the striving for superiority directed against fellowman-ship. . . . Never can the individual be the goal of the ideal of perfection, but only mankind as a co-operating community. A partial community of any kind - perhaps groups that are associated through certain political, religious, or other ideals - is also not sufficient. Neither do we mean the existing society, but an ideal society yet to be developed, which comprises all men, all filled by the common striving for perfection. This is how the Individual Psychology concept of social interest (*Gemeinschaftsgefühl*) is to be understood.'

Adler was essentially a teacher and publicist rather than a theoretician. His books, which are generally written in a popular style, are often repetitive, because they nearly all took origin from lectures. Many of Adler's ideas, like the famous 'inferiority complex', have been incorporated into the teaching of schoolchildren and the counselling of adults without recognition being given to their originator. Adler was a man with considerable force of character and charm of personality. The virtual eclipse of his school of Individual Psychology after his death bears witness not only to his persuasive powers as an individual, but also to his failure to present his ideas in other than a popular form. Whilst Jung and Freud are both represented by *Collected Works* in many volumes of varying degrees of profundity and erudition, Adler has left no such corpus of scholarly work behind him. In spite of this, his influence has probably been underestimated. His early insistence upon the importance of aggression has been fully vindicated. His recognition of 'organ inferiority' and its consequences provided a springboard for the development of psychosomatic medicine. He founded the first child guidance clinic; and his theories have provided inspiration to several generations of teachers. In addition, his emphasis upon the individual's need to be a part of, and play a part in, society was a valuable antithesis to Freud's negative view of altruism and Jung's concentration upon the development of the individual in isolation.

Anthony Storr

Translations of Adler's works include: *The Neurotic Constitution* (1921); *The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology* (1925); *What Life should mean to you* (1932). See also: Phyllis Bottome, *Alfred Adler: a Biography* (1939); H. L. and Rowena R. Ansbacher, *The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler: a Systematic Presentation and Selection from his Writings* (1956); H. L. and Rowena R. Ansbacher, *Superiority and Social Interest: A Collection of Later Writings* (1965); Hertha Orgler, *Alfred Adler; the Man and his Work* (1973).

2

ADORNO, Theodor Wiesengrund
1903–69

German social theorist

One of the century's most complex thinkers, Theodor W. Adorno was born into the wealthy half-Jewish Wiesengrund family in Frankfurt. While still at school, he was befriended by the journalist and critic, Siegfried Kracauer, who opened up problems ranging from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* to the mass media. At the age of twenty-one, under the illustrious neo-Kantian, Hans Cornelius, Adorno received his doctorate from Frankfurt University for a thesis on Husserl's* phenomenology. Meanwhile this brilliant scholar had acquired from his half-Corsican ex-opera-singer mother not only the surname of Adorno, but also an inextinguishable interest in music. With his doctorate secured, Adorno joined Alban Berg* in Vienna to undertake an intensive study of piano technique in the circle around Arnold Schoenberg*, the originator of atonal music. But Adorno never abandoned his theoretical pursuits, and after leaving Vienna he became increasingly involved with the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research, particularly after the appointment of his friend Max Horkheimer as Director in 1930 ushered in the Institute's 'Frankfurt School' era.

Adorno's Marxism owed most to Georg Lukács*'s *History and Class Consciousness* of 1923, with its key concept of 'reification' showing how social relations of production come to appear as qualities of things; this, what Marx called 'commodity fetishism', proved the cornerstone of Adorno's entire work. In the first volume (1932) of the Institute's *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* (Journal of Social Research), he located the socially critical function of music in its refusal to 'represent', that is, be equivalent to anything,

even the political struggle against capitalism; this isolation was painful, but to do 'more' meant reification. musical hara-kiri.

Although Adorno was able, perhaps due to a combination of his Italian surname and idiosyncratic style, to visit Germany as late as 1936, the revocation of his right to teach in 1933 had driven him to try and establish himself at Oxford. This was apparently unsuccessful, and in 1938 he crossed the Atlantic to work as musical director in Paul Lazarsfeld's Princeton Radio Research Office. Adorno's crusade against reification hardly equipped him for what Americans understood by 'media research', however, and he took refuge in Horkheimer's newly established Institute in New York, contributing to its journal, which eventually appeared in English as *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*. When the latter was discontinued in 1941, Adorno moved to California, to find himself in a community of distinguished exiles, including Thomas Mann*, who drew on his musical expertise heavily (plagiaristically, in Adorno's estimation) for the technical details of *Doctor Faustus*. Greatly influenced by Husserl's *Crisis of European Science*, Adorno now devoted himself to a joint undertaking with Horkheimer, the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (trans. 1972): the 'Light of Reason' (symbolized by Bacon, but prefigured in Greek philosophy) had stopped short of a critique of its own structure, thereby becoming a new and dangerous mythology, subjecting the world to the totalitarian command of technological domination. For Horkheimer, this book seems to have been a farewell to Marx, who was indicted as a spell-bound accomplice of this tradition; Adorno, on the other hand, though equally critical of Marx's techno-centrism, was in many ways only extending to philosophy and science the never-to-be-forgotten message of 'commodity fetishism' that he had learned (via Lukács) precisely from Marx.

Adorno also worked on Horkheimer's *Studies in Prejudice*, contributing to the volume on *The Authoritarian Personality*. But by the time this appeared in 1950, Adorno had followed Horkheimer back to Frankfurt, to teach at the University, help re-establish the Institute for Social Research, and still engage in a prolific output of theoretical writings. As the *enfant terrible* of the German Sociological Society, he even found time to provoke the 'Positivism Dispute' at its 1961 Conference. Karl Popper*, himself a critic of positivism, argued that knowledge advanced by rejecting accepted theories as incompatible with the facts and advancing new theories capable of subsuming these facts. Adorno in turn rejected this 'critical rationalism' of Popper's as itself a

variant of positivism: the incompatibility of theories with 'facts' was the necessary expression of an objectively antagonistic social reality, and it was the latter, rather than isolated theories, that had to be criticized and overturned.

This, as Adorno rightly stressed, constitutes the project of a 'critical theory of society' as formulated by Horkheimer in the 1930s. Ironically, however, as this theory (now dubbed 'Frankfurt School') assumed concrete political force in the student anti-authoritarian movement, Adorno found himself in the position of seeing his genuine reservations *vis-à-vis* that movement used by the authorities to justify an armed repression that was even more distasteful to him. He collapsed and died in the tumultuous days of 1969. By then, however, 'Frankfurt School' theory was making its mark on Anglo-Saxon intellectual life via Herbert Marcuse*, and this brought in its wake a string of translations of Adorno's works. These have left their mark in many forms: in a generalized antipathy to 'disciplines' such as sociology; in institutions like the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Study at Birmingham; in American journals such as *Telos* and *New German Critique*; and in a growing understanding that Marx's value theory is not a question of 'economics', but a critique of capitalist relations of production.

Phil Slater

Adorno's *Collected Works* (Frankfurt 1970 onwards) will fill over twenty volumes. The English reader is best advised to start with the selected essays entitled *Prisms* (1967), and then tackle the joint work with Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1972; German original 1947). The most difficult but logically constitutive book is *Negative Dialectics* (1973; German original Frankfurt 1966). See also: *Philosophy of Modern Music* (1973; German original 1949) and *The Positivism Dispute in German Sociology* (1976; German original Darmstadt 1969). A partial intellectual autobiography is available in the uncharacteristically readable 'Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America' in D. Fleming (ed.), *The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930-1960* (1969). Gillian Rose, *The Melancholy Science* (1978), provides a tightly structured survey and level-headed critique of Adorno's vast intellectual production.

3

ALBERS, Josef 1888-1976

German/US teacher, painter

Born in Bottrop in 1888 Josef Albers prepared himself early for what was to be a long career in education. He gained his teaching certificate in 1908 and began teaching in his home town. He became more interested in art and in 1920, after studies in Essen and Munich, he began, as a student, his thirteen-year association with the influential school of Art and Design, the Bauhaus, founded by Walter Gropius* in 1919. As a teacher first at Weimar then at Dessau, where the school transferred in 1925, Albers became a major figure, running the famous Preliminary Course which all students took before opting for later specialization.

When the school was forced to close in 1933 he left for America, continuing his advocacy of Bauhaus concepts for sixteen years at Black Mountain College, North Carolina, and later at Yale University where he was head of the Design Department from 1950 to 1958. Between his retirement and his death at the age of eighty-eight he was much honoured by art institutions and universities in the USA and Germany.

In America his influence as an art educator has been particularly extensive and the course he established at the Bauhaus, which attempted to instil a discriminating respect for the singular physical properties of a wide range of art and craft materials, was much imitated. He extended this idea to include colour, treating it too as a material from which structures could be made. In his publication *The Interaction of Colour* (1963) he charts at great length the different perceptual effects caused by modifying the area, proximity and chromatic intensity of several flat colours within a simple abstract format.

Much of Albers's graphic work is weakened by a didactic desire to trap the unwary viewer. A typical series of drawings of 1964, *Structural Constellations*, for instance, consists of linear structures which at first sight suggest an interlocking pattern of isometric cubes. However on closer examination it becomes clear that because of deliberate anomalies the pattern cannot be consistently interpreted as a three-dimensional construct and so the casual response to 'see' volumes on a flat surface is intentionally penalized. However, pedagogy is largely absent from his famous series of geometric colour paintings, started in 1949, entitled *Homage to the Square*. With only minor variations all these paintings use the same simple centred schema of four squares of diminishing size, one inside the other, flatly painted in different colours which are

adjusted to associate or disassociate visually in many subtle chromatic exchanges.

In particular these works have had a marked influence on painters in the 1960s, such as Frank Stella* and Kenneth Noland, and in general though Albers does not approach the rigour of comparable Europeans like Max Bill, his procedural discipline and the uncompromising nature of his abstraction have made him a useful counterbalance to the emotional and imagist excesses of other American artists.

David Sweet

Other writings: *Search Versus Research, Three Lectures* (1969); *Despite Straight Lines* (1977). See also *Poems and Drawings* (1958). About Albers: François Bucher, *Josef Albers: An Analysis of his Graphic Constructions* (1961); Eugen Gomringer, *Josef Albers* (1968).

4

ALTHUSSER, Louis 1918–

French Marxist philosopher

Born in Birmandreis, near Algiers, Althusser studied philosophy at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris, where he has remained a teacher ever since. As a young man he was active in Catholic youth organizations, but a few years after the Second World War he joined the Parti Communiste Français. In the late 1960s his attempt to redefine Marx's historical materialism made him the star of the moment within left-wing intellectual circles. Already, however, the most significant outcome of Althusserianism would seem to be Marx's *Capital* and *Capitalism To Day* (1977, ed. Antony Cutler), a collection of essays in post-Marxist economic theory by ex-Althusserians.

In *For Marx* (*Pour Marx*, 1965, trans. 1969) and *Reading Capital* (*Lire le Capitale*, 1965, trans. 1969), Althusser tried to legislate on the distinction between sciences and ideologies. Earlier positivist philosophers of science, like Carnap or Popper*, had similar legislative pretensions, but Althusser's position in 1965, when these texts were first published, was different in a number of respects.

Althusser developed an anti-empiricist epistemology. He criticized a conception of knowledge as abstraction; 'empiricism' supposed that a knowing subject abstracted the essence of a real object. This established a problem of knowledge which was insoluble because possible knowledge was circumscribed by the predicates

of the subject. Althusser proposed an alternative conception of knowledge as production; this 'theory of theoretical practice' described how knowledge of the real was produced inside theory by applying theoretical means of production to specific raw materials. The empiricist problem of knowledge was displaced because a knowing subject did not foreclose the Althusserian knowledge process.

On the basis of this anti-empiricist epistemology, Althusser was able to propose new criteria of scientificity. The corollary of the theory of theoretical practice was a new technical practice of reading, 'symptomatic reading', which disclosed the theoretical means of production in different discourses. These means of production were systems of concepts which Althusser termed 'problematics'. Ideologies and sciences, the vicious and virtuous forms of knowledge, were separated by a difference in the systematic form of their problematics. This difference provided a criterion of scientificity which was then applied to the specific task of defining Marxist scientific theory and demarcating that discourse from its ideological competitors. Unlike earlier positivist philosophers of science, Althusser was not preoccupied with rationalizing the success of the natural sciences.

Marxist theory, or 'historical materialism', interrelated a regional theory of economy and a global theory of society or 'the social formation'. Marx theorized the economy as the sphere of dominance of a mode of production which was a historically variable combination of invariant elements. Engels and Mao* theorized the social formation as so many practices (economic, political, ideological and theoretical) which made up a complex totality irreducible to one level. The theoretical systems of the regional and global theories were complex and exemplary. Marx's theory of the economy established 'structural causality' whereby phenomena were subject to determination by structural relations. Marxist theory of the social formation established 'over-determined contradiction' whereby phenomena developed according to their conditions of existence in a complex whole. This complexity of articulation justified Althusser's claim that historical materialism was the science of history.

Various bourgeois theories of society and of the economy competed with historical materialism. All bourgeois theories of society were 'historicist' in that they presumed society was reducible to one essential level. All bourgeois theories of the economy were 'humanist' in that they departed from the assumption of economic man. The theoretical systems of historicism and humanism were simple and vicious. Bourgeois

theories of society established an 'expressive causality' whereby the phenomena of an historical epoch were reducible to the inner essence of that epoch. Bourgeois theories of the economy established a 'mechanical causality' whereby economic phenomena were the effects of the existence of economic man. This simplicity of articulation justified Althusser's claim that all bourgeois theories of society and of the economy were ideological.

Althusserian legislation required a first difference between the theory of theoretical practice and empiricism and a second difference between historical materialism and its competitor discourses. The problem was that both these differences were unsustainable.

The theory of theoretical practice did not avoid what Althusser had criticized in empiricism. According to Althusser's epistemology, a 'knowledge effect' was produced inside scientific theory by theoretical practice, but the produced knowledge referred to and 'appropriated' the real. As Glucksmann argued, this presupposed that there was some kind of mysterious correspondence between the categories of (theoretical) reason and the structure of reality. In this respect, Althusser's new epistemology was like old Kantianism or Spinozism. Althusser had not evicted or demoted the subject but only changed the identity of the subject by substituting a rationalist reason for the empiricist's experience. The theory of theoretical practice only re-posed the problem of knowledge in a variant form using many neologisms.

As for the difference between the complexity of historical materialism and the simplicity of its competitor discourses, this difference was a surface effect which was compatible with similarity of organization at an underlying level. Economic man acted as a substantial essence in bourgeois theories of the economy. The relations of production, established by a determinate mode of production, acted as a kind of relational essence in Marx's theory of the economy. Even if the structures of Marxist theory established a complex system of relations, there was still a theoretical essence. When analysis disclosed the same complexity of organization at every point inside the Marxist theory of the social formation, complexity itself acted as a kind of theoretical essence. A theoretical essence is defined not by substantial identity or simplicity, but by the relation of expression from essence to theoretical epiphenomena. By this criterion, there is no difference of form between historical materialism and its competitor discourses.

Althusser's characterization of historical materialism and its competitor discourses was also

thoroughly uninformative. It encouraged dismissive criticism of ideological discourses like Hegelian philosophy or classical political economy. Everything which came before Marx and Freud* could be written off as humanist and historicist. Althusser's praise of Marx's scientificity was equally unfortunate because it promoted a discussion of Marx's achievement and development in comparative static terms. His analysis simply antithesized the young humanist Marx of the 1844 *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* and the old historical materialist Marx of *Capital*.

If Althusser has never accepted the necessity for rereading Marx and redefining historical materialism, since 1967 he has accepted that his earlier texts are complicit in the philosophy which they criticize. In *Lenin and Philosophy* (various essays, trans. 1971) and *Essays in Self-Criticism* (various essays, trans. 1976) he reacted by jettisoning the theory of theoretical practice and proposing a second definition of philosophy as a double intervention in political practice and theoretical practice. The Marxist's 'materialist philosophy' is no more scientific than idealist philosophy, but it can and must be used to defend historical materialism. Thus, materialist philosophy is 'in the last instance, class struggle in the field of theory'. Althusser's erstwhile epistemological legislation is now transformed into theoretical opportunism for the good of the cause; the existing resources of Western philosophy can be used to help everything come right (that is, left) in the end. This post-1967 position neither resolves nor transcends the problems posed by the failure of the earlier differentiations.

Karel Williams

Other works: *Politics and History* (various essays, 1972); *Positions 1964-75* (1976). See: A. Glucksmann, 'A Ventriloquist Structuralism' in *New Left Review* (issue 72, 1968); N. Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes* (1973).

5

ANDERSON, Sherwood 1876-1941

JS writer

As Irving Howe points out in his study of Sherwood Anderson, the educated American reader of the 1920s admired Anderson's work almost as much as his counterpart of today admires Faulkner's*. It took twenty years for some of the excitement to wear off and even in the early 1940s,

when Lionel Trilling* dared to attack Anderson's reputation (in the *Kenyon Review*, 1941), it created a minor literary sensation. Anderson, in fact, is one of those writers whose stories have an especial validity for Americans because of some area of peculiarly American experience which they lay bare – in this case the hidden longings of small-town Middle Westerners. Judged by less parochial standards, however, Anderson's work leaves something to be desired. Only in, perhaps, half a dozen of his short stories, among them 'I Want to Know Why', 'I'm a Fool', 'The Egg' and 'Death in the Woods', does he achieve the very highest quality.

Anderson was a mystic in the Lawrentian mould, although he lacked Lawrence's* intellectual grasp and moral strength. He reacted against the narrowness and religious bigotry of the Middle West, as a number of late-nineteenth-century writers (Edgar Watson Howe, for example, and Hamlin Garland) had done before him. But, unlike them, Anderson had the benefit of Freud*, and he used him unmercifully. He joined the band of rather selfconscious 'bohemians' (Carl Sandburg*, Floyd Dell, Ben Hecht) who flaunted their differentness in the face of materialistic Chicago in the 1920s.

His career both before and after this decisive event in his life was colourful. He was born in Camden, and brought up in Clyde, Ohio, one of seven children of an itinerant sign-painter and harness-maker. In a childhood without much schooling he grew up to know the farm hands, the local printers and the race-meeting touts about whom he writes in his stories. When he was nineteen his mother died, and Anderson worked in Chicago and various parts of the Middle West. In 1898, he joined the National Guard and was sent to Cuba at the end of the Spanish-American War. On his return, at the age of twenty-three, he spent a year at a high school in Springfield, Ohio, then became a successful writer of advertising copy in Chicago. In 1907, he formed the Anderson Manufacturing Company in Elyria, Ohio, but, although he made a very successful living manufacturing paint for five years, he suddenly, in the middle of dictating a letter to his secretary, walked out of his factory. He was discovered some days afterwards in a hospital in Cleveland. The nervous breakdown which followed this event afforded him, according to his own account, a means of escaping, at the age of thirty-six, from middle-class respectability into the world of 'art'. He went to Chicago to become a writer, leaving his wife and three children behind. The marriage did not break up until four years later, but Anderson was to be married three times after that.

Windy McPherson's Son (1916) is the story of a poor country boy who became a successful manufacturer and then gave up his business in order to seek the 'truth'. This was followed in 1917 by *Marching Men*, a novel about the Pennsylvania coalfield, in 1918 by a book of verse, *Mid-American Chants*, and in 1919 by the 'novel' which made his reputation, *Winesburg, Ohio*. *Winesburg, Ohio* is a series of psychological studies of small-town life, some of them, like 'Hands', delicately and poetically told, but others marred by that sense of grievance which runs through Anderson's work. Like his fellow 'bohemians', he believed that organized society stood in the way of human fulfilment. In the Anderson view of existence an individual will be awakened and try to break out, but for the most part he and his fellow human beings wander frustrated and lonely through a life from which they extract no joy.

In 1921, after the appearance of his novel *Poor White*, Anderson went to Europe and met Joyce*, then to New Orleans, where he 'discovered' William Faulkner. *The Triumph of the Egg and Horses and Men*, two of his best books of stories, appeared in 1921 and 1923. He continued writing novels, stories and autobiographical accounts but he became increasingly interested in politics in his later years, and in the end settled down in Marion, Virginia, where he edited both the Democratic and Republican newspapers.

Anderson's contribution to American literature lies in the skill of his story-telling. 'Story-teller' in fact is what he called himself in his autobiography. Like the men and boys of his youth in Ohio, he liked to spin tales, and he developed the raconteur's art into a literary method. This method is diametrically opposed to that of such subtle and sophisticated literary artists as Hemingway* and Faulkner, for where they imply, Anderson 'talks about' in the traditional manner. There is no colourful evocation, no 'sensuous immediacy' through the use of carefully selected physical details, yet, as in 'The Egg', he manages to convey a sense of tension and of the sadness of the human predicament. He is equally good in his first-person stories, of which 'I Want to Know Why' is one of the most powerful. This device for conveying verisimilitude, used first in a great way by Mark Twain in *Huckleberry Finn*, is in fact the triumph of American short-story writers. Here they seem to feel most at home. The slang may be dated, but the sense of sincerity is powerful. Out of a small human incident a parable of human life is created. There are few more poignant stories than 'I Want to Know Why' about a boy's loss of

innocence and initiation into the world's corruption.

Geoffrey Moore

See: Irving Howe, *Sherwood Anderson* (1951); James Schevill, *Sherwood Anderson: His Life and Work* (1951); C. B. Chase, *Sherwood Anderson* (1977); W. D. Taylor, *Sherwood Anderson* (1977); R. L. White, *Sherwood Anderson* (1977).

6 APOLLINAIRE, Guillaume (Wilhelm Apollinaris de Kostrowitzky) 1880–1918

French poet

Illegitimate and of mixed parentage – his mother Polish, his father Swiss – Apollinaire's education took place mainly in the south of France. After short periods in Paris and Belgium, he spent the year 1901–2 as a private tutor in Germany, before launching himself into the literary and artistic life of Paris. He made the acquaintance of many of the major artists of the time and, over the years, established himself firmly as an influential figure in the avant-garde. Although not of French nationality (his naturalization was granted only in 1916) he joined up at the outbreak of war, and saw active service until 1916, when he was wounded in the head by a shell fragment. In the remaining two years of his life he returned to his former existence in Paris. He died on 9 November 1918, a victim of the Spanish 'flu epidemic.

Apollinaire's lasting reputation is based mainly on his work as a poet, but his importance during his own lifetime owed much to his activity as an art critic who, between 1902 and 1918, a particularly fertile period for painting in Paris, defended and promoted new tendencies as well as the work of individual artists (Fauves, Cubists, Futurists; Picasso*, Matisse*, Derain, Braque* . . .). In 1913, he published *Cubist Painters* (*Les peintres cubistes, méditations esthétiques*, 1913, trans. 1976). As evidence of the position he occupied, it is worth noting that he wrote the programme note for the ballet *Parade* (1917), written by Cocteau*, setting and costumes by Picasso, music by Satie*, choreography by Léonide Massine, performed by Diaghilev's* Ballets Russes.

Apart from his critical writing, his prose works include *L'Enchanteur pourrissant* ('The rotting charmer', 1909), with characters such as Merlin, Helen of Troy, the Sphinx; *L'Hérési-*

*arque et C** ('Heresiarch & Co.', 1910), a collection of strange, fantastic stories; *The Poet Assassinated* (*Le Poète assassiné*, 1916, trans. 1968), a further collection of stories; and the best-known of his three excursions into the theatre: *Les Mamelles de Tirésias* ('Tiresias's breasts') produced in 1917, and celebrated, amongst other reasons, for its sub-title, *drame surréaliste* – one of the earliest uses of this epithet.

He began publishing poetry as early as 1898, but his main period of activity dates from 1902, when he settled in Paris and came into contact with men like Alfred Jarry, Max Jacob, André Salmon, and Picasso. The poems of his earlier years were collected in *Alcools* ('Alcohol', 1913); in a lecture on 'La Phalange nouvelle', delivered the same year, he defined his poetry as 'the search for a lyricism at once humanist and new' ('la recherche d'un lyrisme neuf et humaniste à la fois'). The summary is apt in that his revolutionary aspirations (partly under the influence, at this time, of Blaise Cendrars, and involving startling juxtapositions of images, the use of free verse and the suppression of punctuation) are tempered by a lyricism of a traditional nature (inspired, for example, by unrequited love). His second collection of poems, *Calligrammes* (1918), as its name suggests, is noteworthy for the attempt to manipulate the text of the poem in order to produce the visual representation of an object.

Views have differed on the question of Apollinaire's originality, and precedents can indeed be found for many of the techniques he exploited. But he remains a figure of importance: by bringing together within his work the diverse notions and practices of his day, he succeeded in focusing the poetic movement of his time; the more so, perhaps, since he was sensitive to established poetic qualities, and therefore set his innovations in the context of a tradition.

Keith Gore

See: P. Pia, *Apollinaire* (1974); R. Little, *Guillaume Apollinaire* (1976); D. Oster, *Guillaume Apollinaire* (1978).

7 ARENDT, Hannah 1906–75

German/US philosopher and political theorist

Hannah Arendt was one of that generation of German-Jewish refugees who did so much, perhaps no one more than she, to rescue American

intellectuals from an excessive parochiality. She was born in Hanover and studied philosophy together with theology and Greek at Heidelberg, completing her doctoral dissertation at the age of 22 years on St Augustine's concept of love, studying under Jaspers* and Heidegger*, whose existentialism had a lasting influence. After being arrested briefly by the Gestapo, she fled to Paris in 1933 and worked for Zionist bodies sending Jewish orphans to Palestine, though she hoped that an unnationalistic Arab-Jewish state would emerge. She fled to the United States in 1940, gladly becoming a citizen but living mainly among émigrés in New York. She worked for Jewish organizations and for publishers until a remarkable series of articles on the basic issues of modern politics led to her first great book, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951). Thereafter she moved in the university world until she was able to devote her time entirely to writing. She was a wholly serious and modest private person but died a controversial and famous public figure.

It is disputable whether her central concern was political theory or pure philosophy. Some see *The Origins of Totalitarianism* as her main achievement. She was the first to argue, on such a scale, that there were common elements in Nazism and in Stalinism such as created a wholly new kind of government based upon the systematic use of terror for the purposes of comprehensive and world-changing ideologies, those of race and of economics, both of which enjoyed genuine mass support. Their origins lay deep in the breakdown of European political tradition which followed the French Revolution, in the discrediting of liberalism by the irrationality of the First World War, and specifically in anti-semitism, European imperialism, and the vulnerability of nationalism to racialism. Her later books can all be seen as attempting either to extend these empirical arguments or to resolve difficulties in them. *The Human Condition* (1958) is then seen as tracing the decay of the Greek ideal which links thinking to political action and as pointing out that liberals quite as much as Marxists view *labour* (what we need to stay alive and what we consume) as an end in itself, a restless and self-defeating cycle, debasing *work*. Work is the distinctively human world of created objects made to last. The worship of labour also debases *action*, all things that are newly done, individual and spontaneous. To her the essence of the human condition is the public *vita activa* where men interact, neither the *vita contemplativa* of the philosophers nor the view of man as *animal laborans*, the creature of necessity. She attacks modern liberalism for valuing the realm of pri-

vacy above that of public action. She is often thought of as a modern Aristotelian, but in fact she argues that Aristotle's view of political action is teleological and purely instrumental, whereas to her political action, debate and decisions made freely and spontaneously among equals are ends in themselves to be valued irrespective of consequences.

Eichmann in Jerusalem, A Report on the Banality of Evil (1961) is then a case study of what happens in the most extreme conditions when there is no political tradition in a persecuted people and when resistance, pragmatically speaking, is hopeless. *On Revolution* (1963) tries to sustain hope, by pointing to the original ideal of free political action in both the French and the American Revolutions, before that became debased by the imposition of attempted equality in Russia. Both *On Revolution* and subsequent editions of the *Origins* put great stress on the emergence, however briefly, of self-governing workers' councils in the Hungarian revolt of 1956, like the short-lived soviets of 1917. Many critics found her scepticism of egalitarian socialism and her enthusiasm for anarchist-like councils a pair of strange bedfellows. And in her unusually terse *On Violence* (1970) she argued that *power* must always be 'acting in concert' and that *violence* is a mere instrumentality, never something, like her view of *action*, good in itself. Violence can only be justified, when at all, for limited ends, never as the vehicle of general ideas like social transformation.

However, if Arendt is viewed as a pure philosopher (in the German manner) then *The Human Condition* becomes her central book. Her preoccupations are then seen as primarily ontological. Mankind make their own world out of nature by work, capable of emancipating themselves from mere labour but also, and above all else, capable of memorable actions, whether in speculative thinking or in politics. Pragmatic judgments are replaced by aesthetic. In her last years, she turned to Kant's theory of aesthetics, not of practical reason, to try to develop a theory of judgment that might have formed a volume of her posthumous 'The Life of the Mind', of which only *Thinking and Wishing* (1978) were completed. Ultimately it is judgment that mediates between thought and action.

Philosophy and politics came closest together in her controversial and much misunderstood *Eichmann in Jerusalem*. Some fellow Jews, especially, objected to her account of Eichmann as not a monster of irrational evil, but a rational, pragmatic bureaucrat, a typically modern figure accepting evil commands in a banal and routine manner. Many challenged her assumption that