The UN Secretary-General and the maintenance of peace

by Leon Gordenker

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The UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

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FOREWORD

Professor Gordenker's study of the role of the United Nations Secretary-General in the maintenance of peace was initially undertaken as a study of the Secretary-General's total role in the organization. He soon discovered, however, that this was too large a subject for one book and chose to concentrate on what undoubtedly has been the most publicized, if not the most important aspect of the Secretary-General's work. The Secretary-General's role in the maintenance of peace has received a great deal of attention from scholars during recent years, particularly since Dag Hammarskjöld took a conspicuous role in connection with the establishment of UNEF. Though a considerable amount of scholarly writing on the subject has accumulated, up to now no one has attempted a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the Secretary-General's peace-keeping role in its manifold aspects over the total period of the United Nations' existence. It is with a view to meeting this real need that Professor Gordenker undertook the preparation of this book.

That the role of the Secretary-General in the maintenance of peace should be considered sufficiently important to justify the attention it has received, and more particularly the writing of a book, is one striking indication of the difference between the United Nations' approach to peace and that of the League of Nations. No scholar in the thirties would have seriously thought of undertaking this kind of study for the League Secretary-General. Quite apart from the consideration that the materials for such a study would not have been readily available because of the manner in which the Secretary-General performed his more limited responsibilities, the Covenant did not explicitly place on the League's chief administrative officer the responsibilities that the Charter accords to the United Nations Secretary-Ceneral, nor did the practice of the League in the

only now in the light of the striking development of the role of the United Nations Secretary-General—carried to its highest point by Hammarskjöld but maintained with quiet determination and substantial success by his successor—has the attention of scholars been turned to a reexamination of the role of his League counterpart. Even access to materials not hitherto available is not likely to alter to any great extent the contrast between the peace-keeping roles of the two Secretaries-General, they exponsibilities placed upon them and assumed by them, the powers they exercised, and the

manner in which they discharged their responsibilities.

Over a period of less than a half-century, a great change has taken place in the conception of the role of the top-ranking international civil servant in the keeping of peace, and in the practical importance attached to his work in this field. Professor Gordenker's study contributes to the elucidation of this development.

LELAND M. GOODRICH

Cokanbia University New York, N.Y. November, 1966

PREFACE

The United Nations and the whole generation that lived through World War II as children and young men and women have grown to maturity together. The world organization has been their familiar companion in times of international political strife and, for an increasing number, a friend in the effort to gain economic and social well-being and the rights of man Above all, the United Nations still functions in its limited and erratic way to foster the maintenance of international peace.

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Yet the United Nations often displays a curiously insubstantial quality. Its organs sometimes deal with crises and conflicts only by discussing procedure, and sometimes fail to deal with them at all. Sometimes enthusiastic resolutions substitute for real cooperation among governments, and sometimes cool, logical argument masks hot irrationality outside the United Nations. Representatives of member countries sometimes win a dash of fame in the United Nations, only to retire into diplomatic obscurity elsewhere. The governments of member states often change, and the leading statesman of yesterday's General Assembly is today's political cipher or tomorrow's villain.

In such circumstances, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as was anticipated at the San Francisco Conference and before, does symbolize the world organization and gives a concrete quality to its lengthy decision process. The three men who have held the post until now have on a number of occasions exerted dramatic leadership. They spoke to and perhaps for the peoples of the world. They sought and carried out important work in efforts to maintain the peace. And they managed the routine functions necessary to any political organization.

As a member of the wartime generation who was associated closer

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than most with the United Nations during its formative years, I have felt an interest, as natural as breathing and thinking, in the world organization and the maintenance of peace. That is one motive for writing this book. Another is the intellectual and practical need to seek understanding of the official who so often symbolizes the United Nations.

My interest in this subject was fired even more by the contrasts between the sullen atmosphere around the office of Secretary-General when Trygve Lie left it in 1953, and its brilliance after Dag Hammarskjöld carried off the complicated maneuver that helped to end the Suez crisis in 1956. It was after that that the Secretary-General often was compared (with whatever scant basis) with the President of the United States. Later Hammarskjöld himself suggested such a comparison.

A concept developed by Richard Neustadt for his study of the United States presidency, *Presidential Power*, gave me much help when work on this book began in 1961. His work suggested the idea of "influence" which I have employed throughout the following pages. A concept which emphasizes process rather than formal, legal characteristics, it has been far more useful than a comparison of the office of Secretary-General with that of the United States President.

My other intellectual debts are even greater. I owe much to Professor Leland M. Goodrich of Columbia University, and to my colleagues in the Center of International Studies and the Department of Politics at Princeton University. Dr. Gabriella Rosner Lande and Professor Samir Anabtawi were kind enough to give me extensive comments.

I am also indebted to a long list of former colleagues in the United Nations Secretariat, whose ideas, advice, and sometimes opposition, have contributed to this book. The late William M. Jordan of the Department of Political and Security Affairs was particularly helpful in making suggestions for improving an early version. To publish other names here perhaps would embarrass some of the international civil servants; I am therefore preserving the anonymity of those who so kindly put up with my questions and patiently criticized my views. It need hardly be said that the mistakes here are mine.

Financial and clerical support for this study came from Columbia

University, the Center of International Studies of Princeton University, and the Princeton University Committee on Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences. I am greatly indebted to all of them. Miss M. Bos Bakker of Leiden University and Mr. H. Gajentaan, then a student at Utrecht University, gave me valuable research assistance at an early stage. Mr. Taylor Reveley, then a student at Princeton University, provided indispensable help at a later stage. My gratitude is also due Mrs. A. van den Elshout and Mrs. Gloria Mason for expert typing.

My wife and children bravely bore the burdens of living with an author and deserve full credit for a major contribution.

LEON GORDENKER

Princeton, N.J. February, 1967

INTRODUCTION

This study deals with the office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the influence of its incumbent on the process taking place when the international organization becomes involved in issues relating to the maintenance of peace and security. It concentrates on those issues in which the use of armed force either has occurred or may not be far distant. It leaves aside such long-term factors as the control of armaments, or economic and social development.

The underlying proposition for research is that the Secretary-General can act within narrow but undefined and shifting limits, and his independent actions influence the course of international politics but never at a constant level. The configuration of international politics always modulates his actions and his influence. So do his character, energy, intelligence, and style. His independent actions may generate precedents that have dual results. In similar circumstances he may attempt similar actions and achieve equal or even greater influence. Or he may reach a limit which can provoke attack from opponents who might derive other conclusions from the precedents.

Taking as given the existence of an international political environment, this study also accepts as a fact the imperfection of the United Nations as an authoritative organization of states and men. It aims at finding out how the Secretary-General fits into the context of international politics and influences its course and that of the organization, and concentrates on activities centering in his office.

The United Nations possesses a unique quality as the only international organization with general purposes and worldwide membership. It therefore mirrors the problems of the vast and the miniscule nations, the powerful and the weak, the contentious and the

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quiescent, the rich and the poor. But the United Nations is a complex organization that has no real existence except as an outgrowth of the agreement of its members, which are states and not individual persons. Individuals usually have importance in the work of the United Nations only as representatives of member governments.

Yet the office of Secretary-General has a personal flavor. The man who holds that office stands alone as an elected official who serves the international organization in all its activities. He receives his post by means of a special process involving both the Security Council, always nervous with great-power contention, and the General Assembly, ponderous, encompassing, sometimes monotonous in its endless diplomatic maneuver and yet always alive with the variety of its composition.

The selection process and the Charter place this person at the head of a main organ of the United Nations, the Secretariat. At times the Secretary-General and his immediate entourage take actions which hardly involve the rest of the Secretariat. On other occasions, the Secretary-General's work takes on meaning only because his subordinates can execute decisions. But he bears full responsibility for their actions, and for this reason this study concentrates on the Secretary-General, rather than on the Secretariat as a whole.

In a unique organization, the Secretary-General holds an office unique among international bodies. It has no precise contemporary or historical counterpart. But if the office of Secretary-General can be taken as the direct descendant of its forerunner in the League of Nations, it differs as a son may from his father. The scope of the League's activities was narrower, especially in the field of peace and security, than that of the United Nations. Nor did the League have to cope with the consequences of a Cold War, an unarrested expansion of new means of destruction, or a colonial revolution. For the Secretary-General of the United Nations, all of these developments provide the background against which he works.

The breadth of subject matter with which the United Nations deals provides a source of contrast between the office of Secretary-General and those of the heads of Specialized Agencies, which perform expressly limited duties in what are presumed to be nonpolitical fields. The Secretary-General, moreover, heads a bigger staff than any in the Specialized Agencies.²

The office of Secretary-General differs sharply from familiar high posts in national governments. The Secretary-General has few functions in the creation or recitation of the myths which underlie nationalism and patriotism. Nor does he have a constituency to give strength to his views and contest those of a rival. His administration collects no taxes, bears no arms, and issues almost no orders having general effects. The Secretary-General, in short, heads neither state nor government.

Even superficial acquaintance with the office of Secretary-General and the work of its holders leads readily to the conclusion that it is a source of influence on the formation of international organization policy. Such a conclusion, however, begs the question of how this influence is exerted, when, and in what circumstances. Clearly the constitutional provisions of the Charter for suppressing the use of violence give him a role. Furthermore, the history of the United Nations, marked by such incidents as the Korean conflict and the interventions in Suez and the Congo, contains persuasive examples of the Secretary-General's influence on high politics.

In this analysis of the development of the office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and its influence, emphasis has been placed on matters of peace and security not because no other issues have importance, but because even a study limited to the influence of the Secretary-General in these matters involves a massive record and a great variety of political and administrative techniques.

The many activities of the Secretary-General, each of them offering opportunities for influence, can be classified under headings which provide a convenient analytical framework. They are the idea of the office, the routine and representational activities of the Secretary-General, his political functions, and the general administrative functions of his office.³

By tracing the origins of the office of Secretary-General and the expectations of those who designed and held it, the first step toward understanding his influence can be taken. This historical investigation will give depth and form to the present, for the past holds the present office partly in bondage, and the expectations of yesterday soon begin to resemble the norms of today.

The activities of the Secretary-General which fall under the rubric of routine administration on the whole have mainly technical content and significance. But even those administrative matters which seem most routine, such as budgeting operations on which the members have agreed, as in Suez or the Congo, involve important political judgments.

In carrying out his representational functions, the Secretary-General speaks or acts publicly on behalf of the organization. Such representational activities may be inspired by a hope of influencing the course of events and policy decisions. Other representational acts have a purely formal character but nevertheless may bear on the decision-making process.

The direct political functions of the Secretary-General derive in the first instance from the "quite special right" ⁴ given the Secretary-General under Article 99 of the Charter. This right may put him in at the beginning of any peace-breaking incident which could come to the Security Council. The implications of this right make the Secretary-General an integral part of the entire discussion and action on any matter of peace and war in the Security Council.

The Secretary-General's general administrative duties also may have effects on the formation of United Nations policies. He has been given administrative tasks far beyond the expectations of the drafters of the Charter or the experience of the League of Nations. Under Article 98, the deliberative organs may assign "other duties" to the Secretary-General. In carrying out these assignments, the Secretary-General has given new breadth and political content to the general administrative category of his functions.

Each of the men who has held the office of Secretary-General has left his imprint on it. Because the Secretaries-General were human beings, their records include elements of impulse, lack of logic, and imperfect knowledge. No student can be confident of his explanations of these human manifestations, but to omit observing them would leave as false a picture as would a reading only of the Charter in attempting to understand the work of the United Nations.

This endeavor to provide an orderly view of an office which has caught the imagination of millions of people and of many of their leaders must then take into account the complexity of individuals, of governments, and of political aspirations and failures. The record of two decades of development and change provides a firm basis for

study. But the past provides no reason to believe that the office of Secretary-General is now permanently molded. It provides every reason to believe that the office will be subject to further development and redefinition.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TEXT

ANC	Armée Nationale Congolaise
ILO ·	International Labor Organization
ONUC	L'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo
OPI	Office of Public Information
UNCACK	United Nations Civil Assistance Command
UNCOK	United Nations Commission on Korea
UNCURK	United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNFICYP	United Nations Force in Cyprus
UNIPOM	United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission
UNKRA	United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOGIL	United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
UNSF	United Nations Special Force
UNTEA	United Nations Temporary Executive Authority
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission

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PART ONE

The Idea of the Office

CHAPTER I

MODELS FOR SAN FRANCISCO

The delegates at San Francisco had some choice of concepts from the past when they set about designing the office of the United Nations Secretary-General. These concepts were divided along two main lines. The first pointed to the Secretary-General as the humble servant of the assembled delegations. The other indicated his office as a fount of ideas and a vigorous arm for executing decisions.

In the first view, the office of the Secretary-General is identified with the concept of the passive secretariat, an idea that has deep roots in national political practice. Civil servants in modern states do not formally participate in policy decisions unless bidden to do so by ministers of the government who bear responsibility for policy recommendations and decisions. Civil servants may prepare material for policy decisions, but they seldom decide matters by themselves. After decisions are made they execute the policy, again under the direction of a responsible minister.

The concept of an initiating secretariat has even less foundation in traditional diplomatic practice than in national governments. Servants of national governments sometimes do influence policy formation. The Under-Secretary in the British Foreign Office consults closely with his chief, makes suggestions regarding policy, and frequently takes part in negotiations. The role of civil servants in the formation of French government policies certainly was at least as great under the Third and Fourth Republics as in Britain. In the United States government, civil servants participate even more directly in the policy process. In part, this results from the appointment of leading officials for political reasons. In part it reflects the special nature of the office of the President, which both initiates national policies and actively directs the entire federal civil service. And in part it derives from the practices of Congress, which involve civil servants in appearances before committees and in lobbying for decisions acceptable to the President.

Diplomatic practice lacks the clarity and completeness of a national governmental scheme. Typically, a diplomatic conference has available no permanent civil service to prepare its documents and do such tasks as translating and printing. These services must be organized on an ad hoc basis and usually require the participation of technicians from several foreign offices and governments. In addition, the diplomatic conference consists only of formally equal representatives of formally equal sovereigns. It cannot take corporate decisions but only reach agreements, which activate no organized administration. Rather, execution is left to national governments. Frequently, diplomatic conferences end with agreements that require no execution and no continuously functioning civil service but only the announcement of attitudes on an important issue.

The delegates at San Francisco who relied primarily or exclusively on traditional diplomatic practice favored a Secretary-General who was an amanuensis. This attitude was reinforced by the usual diplomatic view that the politics of the national government, with its ability to interfere with the lives of its citizens, differs in kind from international politics with its emphasis on independence of action for all states.

Yet national governments had increasingly bound themselves with commitments to international organizations during the previous century. These organizations ranged from primitive to sophisticated in the design of their deliberative bodies and executive organs. Many of them had permanent secretariats engaged in carrying out international work in the months and sometimes years between meetings of representative organs. The League of Nations and the International Labor Organization created well-developed, skillful secretariats, independent of any national service. They exerted influence on the policy process far beyond the limits of a traditional diplomatic conference. Their histories, experiences and examples were available at San Francisco as the basis for an active, leading secretariat for the new organization.²

The Model of the League of Nations 3

The conferees at Versailles who drafted the League of Nations Covenant regarded such administrative questions as the nature of a secretariat as distinctly secondary and subordinate. That this should be so was hardly surprising, for the conferees broke much new ground in outlining an international organization to maintain peace. There was little to guide them in creating a secretariat. The earlier international public unions had developed no clear and undisputed appreciation of the role of their staffs. And the extensive unofficial discussions which took place in Great Britain and the United States during World War I failed to restate scattered earlier activities of international experience into a doctrine for an international secretariat of the kind that developed under the League Covenant.

Official study groups produced textual suggestions for the League Covenant, mainly during the summer and autumn of 1918. Perhaps the earliest definite suggestion relating to a secretariat came from a French governmental commission, which showed more interest in a military staff than in a civil service. The first official British draft of the Covenant, the product of the Phillimore Commission, did not even mention the subject of a secretariat. Nor did the first attempts by Colonel Edward H. House and President Woodrow Wilson. The most influential suggestion before the Versailles conference came from General Jan Christiaan Smuts. In his seminal proposals for the League of Nations he projected a permanent secretariat, which was to keep alert to disturbances anywhere and to acquire firsthand information about them. A secretariat always appeared in subsequent drafts but not in well defined terms.

As the peace conference got under way in January, 1919, the idea of endowing the proposed secretariat with leading responsibility in political affairs was talked about seriously. The Greek statesman, Eleutherios Venizelos, was approached about taking the post of "chancellor of the League of Nations." Venizelos declined and the grandiose title of chancellor disappeared, to be replaced with the more mundane Secretary-General, a literal translation from the French terminology of diplomatic conferences. Most of the texts proposed to the conference looked to the creation of a much less ambitious office than was envisaged for Venizelos. The idea and scope of the projected secretariat caused no real controversy at the peace conference, and as a result the delegates accepted a plan the implications of which scarcely had been fully explored.

The terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations regarding

the Secretariat were cast in uninformative and rather indefinite language. Nevertheless, the earlier discussion of a chancellor with political responsibilities, and the French suggestion of a general staff, indicated that the thinking of the conferees had not been completely cast in traditional molds. Against this background, the laconic terms of the Covenant meant that the nature of the office of Secretary-General and its development was to be determined by the character, ideas, and activities of its first occupant, quite as much as by its constitutional framework. Moreover, the office had not been so defined as to exclude proponents of novel ideas. This was shown by the offer of the post to Sir Maurice Hankey, who had been the master organizer of wartime cooperation around meetings of experts. He could have been expected to organize the Secretariat on intergovernmental, representational lines, in accordance with his war experience, rather than as an independent international civil service. In the end, Hankey rejected the invitation and the nomination went to Sir Eric Drummond.

The first Secretary-General had come to the attention of the inner circle of the peace conference because of his competence and because of his interest in the League. He was eager for the appointment and accepted it at once. Drummond remained at the head of the League Secretariat for 13 years, shaped its structure and character, and left a model that had to be taken into account in planning any future international organization.

Sir Eric Drummond had won the admiration of his diplomatic colleagues in Britain and abroad at a time when Foreign Office standing was at its pinnacle. He was a member of a civil service that understood how it could be influential and how responsibility was distributed within a government. This civil service helped to protect its own independence by discretion in word and in action: these were public servants, but not public personages.

From this concept it was but a step to Drummond's idea of the international civil service. Nothing like it had ever existed in an international organization, but it was scarcely revolutionary in the light of the independence and integrity of the British civil service. The new Secretary-General planned a secretariat which would be made up of the most qualified men of all countries. These Secretariat members would not take instructions from any government.

They and he were to be public servants for the world community. His plans established him as master in his office and his independent Secretariat was accepted by his masters, the Assembly and the Council. If every government did not always loyally support the independent civil service as it operated, none was able to destroy the principle.⁴

While Drummond behaved with the circumspection and intelligence of an Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, he also had to act in some limited respects as a minister. There was no one else to do so. The Secretary-General was appointed by and reported to international bodies whose functions in regard to the operations of the Secretariat were legislative. Drummond found himself acting as prime minister when the Assembly and the Council dealt with matters of concern to the administration and operation of the staff but not when it shaped substantive policy. Furthermore, as soon as the Secretary-General offered his budget or his suggestions on an administrative policy, he lost his prime minister's status and once again was a civil servant, for he had no organized party to support him in the legislative organs. He alone answered his critics and defended his plans and budgets. His ministerial role included leadership and responsibility, but excluded real political power.

To lack political power did not necessarily mean that the Secretary-General would lack political influence. In a number of ways, the provisions of the Covenant and the rules of procedure of the organs provided a framework within which he could express opinions, make choices, and direct work. With these possibilities he could exert some influence on the work of the League.

The Covenant assigned certain ministerial duties to the Secretary-General, such as registering treaties, summoning emergency meetings of the Council at the request of a member, or collating documentation submitted by members in connection with a dispute not submitted to third-party settlement. These duties offered chances for discussions with governments regarding their precise intentions. A request for clarification is an old diplomatic device for opening up discussion of a question. Drummond did use such opportunities as occasions on which his advice could be sought. When it was sought, he offered it.

More highly charged with political content was the provision of

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the Covenant that in connection with the submission of a dispute to the Council, the Secretary-General should arrange for a full investigation. In making such arrangements, the Secretary-General and his staff could shape the entire investigation. They could select the personnel, devise the methods, establish the limits of action, and control the drafting of the report. This provision of the Covenant did not result in the blossoming of Secretariat influence. In part this was because the Council usually met so promptly that there was no time for a full investigation, and in part it was because the rapporteur system and informal consultations made an independent, formal investigation by the Secretariat unnecessary.

The Secretary-General did exercise his rights under this provision of the Covenant when China applied to the Council early in 1932 for assistance against the Japanese onslaught. Drummond immediately organized a committee of consuls at Shanghai, where one of his trusted subordinates was on a mission at the time. The information received passed into the hands of the Council members, although it did not have a marked influence on them.

By far the most important base on which the political influence of the League Secretariat could be built rested in the provision of the Covenant instructing the Secretary General to act in that capacity at all meetings of the Assembly and the Council. Symbolically, at least, the Secretary-General took part in all of the political and administrative discussions of the League's decision-taking organs. From the point of view of members, the Secretary-General could be consulted as an expert on the deliberations, and if his talents extended to political advice, this too might be sought with a degree of eagerness that depended on his abilities.

Both the Council and the Assembly adopted rules of procedure which gave some definition to the function of the Secretary-General. With the approval of the President of the Council or the Assembly, the Secretary-General drew up provisional agendas. Since the Secretariat had expert knowledge of the functioning of the organization and the presidencies shifted from one delegate to another, a real opportunity to exercise influence was available to the Secretary-General.

The Assembly also extended to the Secretary-General a marked

and important opportunity to exercise direct pressure on the proceedings. He was given the right to speak on his own initiative in any committee or subcommittee, and could address the plenary session of the Assembly on invitation from the President. In the Council the rules of procedure gave the Secretary-Ceneral no such right. But his presence at the Council table clearly indicated that he might find opportunities to address the meeting, as did his duty of investigating disputes. In addition, the rules of procedure of both organs provided for several classes of communications which could be sent by the Secretary-General to the member states. If he could address them, even if only when instructed to do so, the clear inference of a high standing in international affairs could be drawn.

Finally, the Assembly decided that the Secretary-General should submit to it an annual report on the work of the organization. This report soon became the basis for general debate. Here again was a point at which the Secretary-General could intervene in discussion, since it would be his report which served as a base for the proceedings. Furthermore, the report itself could be the vehicle by which the Secretary-General made known his views.

These procedural features were designed with the assistance and advice of Drummond and his small corps of aides during the first weeks of the League's infancy. Thus the Secretary-General had an early influence on the functioning of the Assembly and the Council. Presumably the Secretary-General faced his work with full awareness of the potentialities for influencing the conduct of League business.

Drummond could invariably be seen at sessions of the Assembly and the Council, but he was seldom heard. The interventions of the Secretary-General almost never fell outside of the field of budget and administration. And even on that subject, so important for the operation of the Secretariat, most of the work was confined to closed sessions.

Sir Eric's activities behind the scenes contrasted sharply with his public work. He viewed his role as that of a diplomatic adviser and confidant for those who sought him out. He regarded such work as effective and always more telling than a speech, which might convince no one and rob him of his diplomatic prestige. He managed to

maintain a reputation for impartiality and shrewdness. His own evaluation of these activities was that they were fully as successful as a more open and dramatic approach would have been.

There is no reason to suspect that a discreet approach to the secretary-generalship necessarily produced a generally weak and colorless influence on the proceedings of the League. On the contrary, Drummond took the initiative on some occasions, as in the Leticia dispute of 1933, when he permitted himself to give the British and Dutch representatives dealing with the matter a lecture on the responsibilities of their governments. But even here, he waited until the delegates had shown themselves reluctant to go farther.

Drummond's conduct of his office left some members of the League dissatisfied, notably Italy and Germany. For four years beginning in 1928, the Assembly debated the role of the Secretariat in the League's activities. In a sense, this debate was a tribute to the prestige that Sir Eric had built into the Secretariat. The Italian and German delegates opposed the manner in which the work of the Secretariat was guided, and suggested that a committee of undersecretaries-general, of which they would each name one, might form a governing board. They based their opinion on the view that "the political influence of the Secretariat, and especially of its principal officers, is, in fact, enormous and it would be a mistake to close our eyes to this fact." In the end, any alteration of the senior staff was refused by the Assembly before Sir Eric's expected retirement in 1933.

Ironically, Italy, one of the leaders in the attempt to restrict Sir Eric Drummond's political influence, later was involved in one of the most notable—and confused—attempts by a Secretary-General to exercise initiative. Drummond's successor, Joseph Avenol, tried in 1936 to bring Italy back to the League. To do so, he traveled to Rome on his own initiative and sounded out Mussolini, who set conditions. The Secretary-General subsequently made a notable intervention in the League Council, but failed to convince it of the usefulness of his efforts. At the same time, he brought himself under a cloud of suspicion as a trimmer, which his resignation in even more disturbing circumstances in 1940 did not dissipate.

Avenol, a French finance ministry official who had specialized in administration for a decade as Drummond's deputy, later com-

plained that his predecessor's pattern had thwarted his own conception of the office. Whatever the strength of the second Secretary-General's penchant for initiative, his first task with political overtones came with the reorganization of the Secretariat in 1933.

The reorganization, decreed by the Assembly, in fact tended to reaffirm the special rights that the great powers (originally France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan) had insisted on having in the nomination of leading officials of the League. In addition, several top posts now were given to officers from lesser countries, in effect emphasizing the principle of wide geographic representation. But neither the new officials nor the old credited Avenol's leadership as they had Drummond's. One former under-secretary flatly says that Avenol's record had been marred by grave faults and sympathy with French reactionaries. The final chapter of Avenol's incumbency remains somewhat murky, but it is obvious that he never attempted another démarche so dramatic as his visit to Mussolini.

The record of the two Secretaries-General of the League shows a mixture of innovation and unused capacity, developments partly based on the personal attributes of the officeholders, and partly a reflection of the confused political situation of a world skidding into war. Drummond had invented the international civil service for the League, but concentrated on indirect influence while leaving undeveloped the powers which might have given him a more leading public role. His successor claimed and perhaps sometimes showed more public flamboyance, but with insensitive timing. Drummond's indirect course had necessarily to be largely passive, for it depended on the willingness of delegates to bring problems to him. No longrange program could be developed through such procedures, although it is likely that the freedom he gave to his technicallyminded officials resulted in rapid and full development of the League's capacity in unexplored fields of economic and social cooperation. In proposing and directing a long-range program, Avenol certainly fared no better.

The Model of the International Labor Organization

While the League of Nations took shape in the negotiations of the statesmen at Paris, a group of labor leaders and social welfare spe-