


American Foreign Relations

A History • To 1920

VOLUME I



THOMAS G. PATERSON

J. GARRY CLIFFORD

KENNETH J. HAGAN

F O U R T H E D I T I O N

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D. C. HEATH AND COMPANY

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Address editorial correspondence to:

D. C. Heath and Company
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Acquisitions Editor: James Miller
Developmental Editor: Patricia Wakeley
Production Editor: Elizabeth Gale
Designer: Jan Shapiro
Photo Researcher: Nancy Hale
Production Coordinator: Charles Dutton
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Preface

Even a casual look at the chapter endnotes and bibliographies of this Fourth Edition of *American Foreign Relations* reveals that we have thoroughly revised the book. It represents the most recent work of both American and foreign scholars in history, political science, and international relations. We include the most influential approaches and interpretations, especially those advanced by younger scholars. This book also reflects the findings of our own archival research as we discover and re-discover the past.

Readers familiar with the last edition will notice that we have changed the title from *American Foreign Policy* to *American Foreign Relations*. We have made this change because the field has evolved in emphasis, interpretation, and research to encompass the myriad interactions of peoples, cultures, economies, national governments, nongovernmental organizations, regional associations, and international institutions. The term "*foreign policy*" seems inadequate to describe these multifaceted intersections because it focuses largely on governmental decisionmaking and on policy itself. "*Diplomacy*" falls short because it refers primarily to negotiations or communications among states or organizations. "*International history*" is so broad a term as to lose meaning, while also underplaying an appropriate emphasis on *American* foreign relations. The phrase "*foreign relations*" comes closest to explaining the totality of interactions—economic, cultural, political, military, environmental, and more—among peoples, organizations, states, and systems.

An historical overview such as this book must draw upon the scholarly work of many colleagues in the United States and abroad. Their expertise informs this book throughout and helps to lend it the authority that instructors and students expect. Our chapter endnotes and Further Reading sections are one way to thank them for their books, articles, and conference papers. We also appreciate their recommendations for revising the text and their suggestions for teaching the courses for which this book is intended. We thank them, too, for challenging us to consider many different approaches and theories, among them world systems, corporatism, dependency, culture, psychology and personality, medical biography, lessons from the past ("thinking in time"), bureaucratic politics, public opinion, executive-legislative competition, gender, national security and power, impact of foreign aid on recipients, the physical environment and ecology, and ideology. As both teachers and writers, we have learned from the lively debates stirred by these different approaches and interpretations. The pages of *American Foreign Relations* demonstrate our participation in these instructive discussions.

We continue to emphasize the theme of expansionism and explain its many manifestations, and we show that on almost every issue in the history of American foreign relations, alternative voices unfailingly sounded among and against official policymakers. Americans have always debated their place in the world, their wars, their overseas commitments, and the status of their principles and power, and they

have always debated the people of other nations about the spread of U.S. influence. In this book, we not only engage the ideas of other scholars but also explore the revealing disputes that Americans have frequently had with themselves and with foreigners.

We have reexamined every aspect of this book—every Diplomatic Crossroad section, paragraph, interpretation, quotation, example, illustration, caption, map, chart, endnote, and bibliography. Although retaining the basic structure of previous editions, we have rewritten and reorganized section by section, chapter by chapter. We have updated the story through the Clinton administration, including the tumultuous events following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The more traditional topics of diplomacy, war, economic relations, and politics are still covered at length, but we have made this edition more comprehensive by extending the discussion of cultural relations, including sports, dress, film, television and popular images, values, and shared memories. Global environmental damage—acid rain, polluted water, industrial waste, pesticides—and the international conferences convened to deal with these phenomena also receive more emphasis in this edition. The ending of the Cold War and the gradual declassification of documents in foreign archives—Russian, East German, Cuban, and Chinese, for example—have permitted new perspectives and more textured discussion of many topics, including U.S. intervention in the Bolshevik Revolution, origins of the Cold War, the Korean War, and the Cuban missile crisis. Because scholars have increasingly explored medical health as a factor in decisionmaking, we have integrated this subject—as in the lives of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and John F. Kennedy. In this edition, readers will find greater coverage of the nuclear arms race and U.S. relations with Japan, the Philippines, Germany, Puerto Rico, Central America, Cuba, Israel, and the Middle East. We have also expanded our attention to questions of race and gender.

In preparing this edition, we again immersed ourselves in the memoirs, diaries, letters, speeches, recorded tapes, and oral histories of U.S. and international leaders. We often let them speak for themselves in the frankest terms, guarded and unguarded. We have sought to capture their anger and their humor, their cooperation and their competitiveness, their truths and their lies, their moments of doubt and times of confidence, their triumphs and setbacks. *American Foreign Relations*, in short, strives to capture the erratic pulse of international relations through peoples' struggles to plan, decide, and administer policy. We study not only the leaders who made influential decisions but also the world's peoples who welcomed, resisted, or endured decisions that profoundly influenced their lives.

Each chapter opens with a Diplomatic Crossroad section that highlights a significant and dramatic event. This introductory section illustrates the chief characteristics of the period and establishes the themes carried through the chapter. Illustrations, many of them new to this edition, from collections around the world, are closely tied to the narrative in image and caption description. The revised maps, graphs, and Makers of American Foreign Relations tables in each chapter provide

essential information. The completely updated bibliographies provide guidance for further reading on the many topics listed and a starting point for term or research papers. The General Bibliography includes reference works, bibliographies, and overviews of U.S. relations with other countries and regions, as well as works on specific subjects such as the Air Force and air power, Congress, cultural relations, drug trade, economic sanctions, food diplomacy and relief, human rights, intelligence, CIA and covert action, nuclear arms, terrorism, isolationism, and the United Nations.

In the late 1970s, the People's Republic of China adopted a new system for rendering Chinese phonetic characters into the Roman alphabet. Called the Pinyin method, it replaced the Wade-Giles technique, which had long been used in English. Use of the Pinyin method has become widespread and we use it in *American Foreign Relations*. Many changes are minor and pose no problem—Shantung has become Shandong and Mao Tse-tung has become Mao Zedong, for example. But when we have a possibly confusing Pinyin spelling, we have placed the Wade-Giles spelling in parentheses—for example, Beijing (Peking) or Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek).

Instructors and students who want to continue their study of foreign relations history are invited to join the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). This organization publishes a superb journal, *Diplomatic History*, and an informative newsletter; offers book, article, and lecture prizes and dissertation research grants; and holds an annual conference where scholars present their views and research results. Dues are very reasonable. For information, contact the SHAFR Business Office, Department of History, Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio, 45435.

Many colleagues, friends, students, and editors contributed to this edition of *American Foreign Relations* by providing research leads, corrections of errors, reviews of the text, library searches, documents and essays, and editorial assistance. We give our heartiest thanks to Philip J. Aвило, Jr., Ralph DiCarpio, Irwin Gellman, Hope M. Harrison, Ted Hitchcock, Wang Li, Terrence J. Lindell, David McFadden, Charles McGraw, Matt McMahon, Robert McMahon, Shane Maddock, Elizabeth Mahan, Carl Murdock, Brian Murphy, Arnold Offner, Jerry Padula, Carol Petillo, Carol S. Repass, Kent M. Schofield, Kenneth R. Stevens, Mark A. Stoler, Kathryn Weathersby, and Lawrence Wittner. We especially appreciate our reciprocal research agreement with John Rourke. Alexandra Nickerson, as always, has prepared an excellent, comprehensive index. The excellent D. C. Heath staff who guided this edition to publication deserve special mention: James Miller, Sylvia Mallory, Pat Wakeley, Elizabeth Gale, Jan Shapiro, and Nancy Hale.

We also take this opportunity to acknowledge the many people who helped us in previous editions: Richard Baker, Ann Balcolm, Michael A. Barnhart, Kenneth J. Blume, Robert Beisner, R. Christian Berg, Richard Bradford, Kinley J. Brauer, Richard Dean Burns, Charles Conrad Campbell, Chen Jian, John Coogan, Carol Davidge, Mark Del Vecchio, Justus Doenecke, Xavier Franco, Paul Goodwin, James Gormly, Eric Hafter, Alan Henrikson, Gregg Herken, George Herring, Joan

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We welcome comments and suggestions from students and instructors.

T. G. P.
J. G. C.
K. J. H.

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Chapter 1

EMBRYO OF EMPIRE: AMERICANS AND THE WORLD BEFORE 1789



French Snuffbox. Benjamin Franklin's reputation as a representative of frontier America is captured in a contemporary French snuffbox. In this compliment the revered gentleman from Pennsylvania joins two other philosophers, Rousseau and Voltaire. (The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Gift of William H. Huntington, 1883. All rights reserved.)

✱ *Diplomatic Crossroad*

JAY, FRANKLIN, ADAMS AND INDEPENDENT NEGOTIATIONS, 1782

Two disgruntled Americans rode the same carriage from Versailles to the Parisian suburb of Passy on the afternoon of August 10, 1782. John Jay and Benjamin Franklin had just spent a frustrating two hours with the French foreign minister, the Comte de Vergennes. These American peace commissioners, seeking to end the revolutionary war for independence waged since 1775, had asked for French advice on two troublesome problems that had arisen in their concurrent negotiations with British and Spanish representatives. Because the Continental Congress had instructed them to make no decisions without the knowledge and counsel of the French, Jay and Franklin had asked Vergennes whether or not the United States should insist on explicit recognition of independence from England *prior* to a final peace treaty with the “mother country,” and whether the western boundary of the new American nation should be the Mississippi River. On both points Vergennes and his secretary, Gérard de Rayneval, made suggestions that seemed to deny American interests. Do not worry about technicalities, Vergennes advised. If independence were made an article of the final treaty, as the British were proposing, Americans should not make a fuss about formal titles during the negotiations. Regarding the western boundary, according to Jay, Vergennes and Rayneval made it clear that “we [Americans] claimed more than we had a right to,” and that Spain and England had valid claims to territory east of the Mississippi.¹

Jay and Franklin wondered why their French ally proffered such negative advice. Jay was particularly suspicious, telling his older colleague that Vergennes was plotting to delay negotiations with England so that Spain, having captured West Florida, could acquire the whole Gulf Coast and additional territory to the north. Franklin agreed that Spain wanted to “coop us up within the Allegheny Mountains,” but he did not think that the French were deliberately sacrificing American interests in order to gratify Spain.² The discussion then became extremely animated, and when the carriage reached Passy, Franklin invited Jay inside his apartment to continue their conversation. “Have we any reason to doubt the good faith of the King of France?” inquired Franklin. “We can depend on the French,” Jay rejoined, “only to see that we are separated from England, but it is not in their interest that we should become a great and formidable people, and therefore they will not help us to become so.” Franklin asked on whom the United States should rely. “We have no rational dependence except on God and ourselves,” Jay solemnly answered. The Pennsylvanian shot back: “Would you deliberately break Congress’s instructions [on not negotiating separately]?” “Unless we violate these instructions the dignity of Congress will be in the dust,” Jay asserted. The seventy-five-year-old Franklin pressed further: “Then you are prepared to break our instructions if you

intend to take an independence course now." Jay stood up. "If the instructions conflict with America's honor and dignity I would break them—like this!" The dignified New Yorker threw his clay pipe hard into Franklin's fireplace. The pipe shattered.³

Nothing that occurred in the diplomacy of the next several weeks elevated John Jay's opinion of Europeans in general, or of the French and Spaniards in particular. In early September, after further discussions about a western boundary, Rayneval gave Jay his "personal ideas" to expedite peace negotiations with England as well as a boundary settlement with Spain. Again Rayneval urged the Americans not to press for the Mississippi. Jay correctly assumed that Rayneval reflected Vergennes's sentiments. A few days later Rayneval disappeared from Paris, having been dispatched on a secret mission to London. Jay became immediately suspicious. Paris buzzed with rumors. Even the usually unflappable Franklin became worried. Perhaps Rayneval's mission was designed to bring the same arguments to the British that he was making to the Americans; perhaps France sought the role of arbiter in North America, supported British claims north of the Ohio River, and wanted to give Spain full control over the Mississippi. The next day Jay received from a British agent in Paris an intercepted French dispatch, in cipher, which urged a strong stand against American claims to the Newfoundland fisheries. Franklin cautiously pointed out that this dispatch, sent by a French envoy in America, did not necessarily reflect the views of Vergennes or King Louis XVI. It was enough for Jay, however. On September 11, without first even informing Franklin, Jay boldly sent his own secret emissary to London with the proposal that secret and separate negotiations for peace begin at once. The British jumped at the chance to split the Franco-American alliance. When he learned what his younger colleague had done, Franklin protested. But he went along.

By late October, when the third American peace commissioner arrived in Paris, private talks with the British had gone on for several weeks. John Adams had just successfully negotiated a commercial treaty with the Dutch. He had been in Paris earlier in the war and did not like the French; nor did he like Dr. Franklin, a man of "cunning without wisdom" who was too cozy with the French.⁴ The cantankerous New Englander found it difficult to trust anyone, but he immediately found a kindred spirit in Jay, who apprised him of the state of the negotiations. He warned Jay that Franklin was hopelessly subservient to Vergennes. Like Jay, Adams thought that Vergennes opposed American expansion and kept "his hand under our chin to prevent us from drowning, but not to lift our heads out of the water."⁵ Adams dallied for four days before making a courtesy call on Franklin. Once at Passy, Adams immediately launched into a lecture. Everything Jay had done was correct. Jay was right in his suspicions toward Vergennes. Jay was right to insist on prior independence, access to the fisheries, and extensive western boundaries. Adams waxed enthusiastic about the decision to ignore Vergennes and negotiate separately with the British on these issues. To do otherwise would be leaving "the lamb to the custody of the wolf."⁶ His conscience unburdened, Adams returned to his apartment in the Hôtel du Roi.

Franklin hardly replied to Adams's outburst. Suffering from the gout, the old philosopher listened patiently and tolerantly to the person he later described as



John Adams
(1735–1826). Native of Braintree (Quincy), Massachusetts, graduate of Harvard, Boston lawyer, colonial rebel, and diplomat, Adams became the second president of the United States in 1797. (The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Purchase, 1960. Harris Brisbane Dick Fund. All rights reserved.)

“always an honest man, often a wise one, but sometimes, and in some things, absolutely out of his senses.”⁷ Franklin agreed that the United States should remain firm on both the fisheries and the Mississippi boundary. Access to the Newfoundland fishing grounds was vital to New England’s economy, while the “Father of Waters” stood as an indispensable highway for trans-Allegheny commerce. As for giving up the Mississippi, “a Neighbor might as well ask me to sell my Street Door,” Franklin said.⁸ What exercised Franklin most was the failure to consult Vergennes. French loans had kept America solvent through six long years of war, and French ships and troops had contributed mightily to the decisive victory at Yorktown in 1781. Franklin valued the French alliance. “If we were to break our faith with this nation,” he warned, “England would again trample on us and every other nation despise us.”⁹ Unlike his younger colleagues, Franklin did not believe that the French were dealing with Spain and England behind American backs. Nonetheless Franklin recognized the importance of a united American front in negotiations. Always a pragmatist, he had written in his *Autobiography*: “So convenient a thing it is to be a *reasonable creature*, since it enables one to find or make a reason for everything one has a mind to do.”¹⁰ Franklin decided to be reasonable. Just prior to meeting with the British commissioners, he startled John Jay: “I am of your opinion, and will go with these gentlemen in the business without consulting this [French] court.”¹¹

Franklin remained true to his word, and on November 30, 1782, England and the United States signed a “preliminary treaty” of peace. The terms, enumerated in a comprehensive treaty some ten months later, guaranteed American independence

“Blessed Are the Peacemakers.” In this critical British cartoon of 1783 a Spaniard and Frenchman lead George III by the neck while Lord Shelburne carries the “Preliminaries of Peace.” The procession is commanded by an American wielding a whip and tugging a sulking, boorish Dutchman. (British Museum)

