# Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China

edited by

Frederic Wakeman, Jr.

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Carolyn Grant

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

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*To*
John K. Fairbank

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## MAPS



# FOREWORD

In June 1971, the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and the Committee on Studies of Chinese Civilization of the American Council of Learned Societies jointly sponsored a conference on local control and social protest during the Ch'ing period. The topic for the conference was first suggested by John K. Fairbank, who proposed that such a symposium probe beneath the surface of China's nineteenth-century political response to the West and explore the social history of the entire Ch'ing. Local control and social protest were chosen as governing themes because of their dialectical conjunction at the very point where polity and society converged. The shift of perspective from China's reactive "modernization" was thus designed to expose the endogenous social forces governing historical change long before the Opium War actually began.

Fourteen papers were presented at the conference, for which John Fairbank, Roy Hofheinz, and William Skinner served as discussants: Frederic Wakeman, Jr., "Localism and Loyalism during the Ch'ing Conquest of Kiangnan: The Siege of Chiang-yin"; Kanda Nobuo, "The Role of *San-fan* in the Local Politics of Early Ch'ing"; Jerry Dennerline, "Fiscal Reform and Local Control: A Tradition Survives the Conquest"; Silas Wu, "Trade, Intelligence, and Coastal Control: Li Wei in Chekiang, 1725–1732"; Ch'en Chieh-hsien, "Ch'ing Policies regarding the Maintenance of Manchu Traditions"; Muramatsu Yūji, "Banner Estates and Banner Lands in Eighteenth-Century China: Evidence from Two New Sources"; Fu-mei Chang Chen, "Local Control of Convicted Thieves in Ch'ing China Prior to 1800"; Randle Edwards, "Ch'ing Control of Aliens prior to the 'Treaty System' "; Ira Lapidus, "Hierarchies and Networks: A Comparison of Chinese and Islamic Societies"; Jonathan Spence, "Opium Smoking in Ch'ing China"; James Polachek, "Gentry and Local Control in Su-Sung-T'ai, 1830–1884"; Jerome Ch'en, "Modernization of Local Protest: A Study of the P'ing-Liu-Li Rebellion of 1906"; C. K. Yang, "Notes on Statistical Patterns of Mass Actions in Nineteenth-Century China"; Philip Kuhn, "Local Control and Local Self-Government."

The first eight papers analyzed the early Ch'ing local control system and its maintenance throughout the eighteenth century. Wakeman's and Denner-

line's essays explored the Ming–Ch'ing transition in terms of loyalism and localism. Professor Kanda's paper then analyzed the social structure of the three feudatories (*san-fan*), to better explain the military and social mechanisms of the Manchu conquest. Ch'en Chieh-hsien and Muramatsu Yūji subsequently showed that, imperial efforts notwithstanding, the Manchu elite was in time culturally and economically absorbed by the society it ruled. The legal aspects of Ch'ing control were discussed in Fu-mei Chang Chen's paper on the probation of thieves and in Randle Edwards' careful analysis of the supervision of foreigners during the eighteenth century. The relationship between inner and outer control systems was more specifically delineated by Silas Wu's study of a crisis in Sino-Japanese relations during the Yung-cheng period.

As a midpoint consideration, Ira Lapidus compared the historiography of Islamic and Ch'ing societies. Lapidus' paper stimulated a fundamental reevaluation of the metaphors which inform our study of late imperial Chinese history, thereby clarifying its dichotomous nature: a highly stratified, regulated, and orderly world vision, on the one hand, and on the other a complicated, asymmetrical landscape of networks, disorderly cellular units, and competing interests.

The awareness naturally raised the conference's second theme—local disorder—which dominated the latter set of meetings. Spence's study of opium addiction demonstrated the breakdown of local control from the late eighteenth century onward. It also connected China's inner social process with the western intrusion, and thus served to introduce the last four discussions. First was James Polachek's account of the reestablishment of gentry control in Soochow just after the Taiping Rebellion. Polachek affirmed Muramatsu's thesis concerning the fusion between rent and tax collection, and further proposed that this merging so popularly identified the gentry with the state as to account for the radicalization of the peasantry in the twentieth century. An obvious corollary to this conclusion would be an increasing incidence of local protest, and this was verified by C.K. Yang's statistical study of all entries in the Ch'ing *Veritable Records* concerning mass movements during the nineteenth century. Yang's tentative discovery of a transformation in the tenor of local protest movements was specifically corroborated by Jerome Ch'en's paper on the 1906 revolt in Hunan. Finally, Philip Kuhn's study of the connections between statecraft (*ching-shih*) and the local self-government movement of the twentieth century demonstrated how the gentry continued to dominate rural administration long after the dynasty had fallen.

As the conference evolved, several themes became salient. First was a sense of the exceptional fragility of early Ch'ing rule, especially during the civil war of the 1670s. That in turn reinforced our appreciation of the stability of central power during the 1700s, with the legal system one of its most crucial components. Another important support of central power during the High



Ch'ing was the alien origin of the Manchu rulers. The Manchu language, for instance, served as an instrument of confidentiality which forwarded the development of both a palace memorial system and the Grand Council. Some participants also argued that the foreignness of Ch'ing emperors permitted a more flexible *Realpolitik* in foreign and domestic affairs than might have characterized a purely Han ruler.

On the other hand, a single dynastic rubric failed to embrace all of the social processes which ran through the Ch'ing and on into the republican period. However mnemonically convenient 1644—the year of the Manchu conquest—might be as a date, we came to feel that its significance should be reconsidered. Knowing the historian's illusion to be the perpetual continuum, we nonetheless found it impossible to discuss the fiscal policies of the 1880s without referring to the cadastral schemes of Ming ministers in the 1570s. Thus secular trends sometimes prevailed over dynastic epicycles, so that Ming, Ch'ing, and early republic came to be viewed as an entire late imperial period.

One example of this secular continuity was the ideology of statecraft (*ching-shih*). Statecraft represented the real interests which bridged the entire period, as the research of Dennerline and Polachek proved for both ends of the dynastic cycle. Just as gentry-statesmen protected their interests in the 1660s in the name of statecraft, so did a new urban-based landlord class ensconce itself in nearly identical terms at the end of the nineteenth century. The gentry's role during the Manchu conquest betrayed its social dependence upon central control, its natural tendency toward political collaboration, and its ambivalence toward local officialdom. Yet because this gentry determined local fiscal conditions and developed such a firm ideology of local elite control, it possessed a striking capacity for endurance over the centuries. Although this picture was complicated by the gentry's activities during the last half-century of the dynasty, when complex personal networks substituted for bureaucratic differentiations, one factor remained consistent. The lower-ranking gentry, whether Ming *sheng-yuan* or republican ward chiefs, crucially occupied the interstices between formal government and the society at large. Central political power shifted dramatically after 1911, but the role of the lower gentry changed more slowly. Evolving along lines which could be traced back to the Taiping Rebellion, these kinds of power brokers gradually continued to entrench themselves in rural China at the expense of the central government. They, the *t'u-hao* (local bullies) and *lieh-shen* (evil gentry) of the 1930s and 1940s, would ultimately be overthrown by Communist revolutionaries, but for a time they ruled supreme.

The articulation of all these themes was truly a collaborative effort. Local arrangements were entirely and gracefully handled by the staff of the East-West Center in Honolulu, where the meetings convened. Our rapporteur, Jonathan Grant, was formally commended by the conference for his excellent work. Planning before and after the conference was coordinated in the Cen-

ter for Chinese Studies by Jane Kaneko and Josephine Pearson, who also helped with much of the final manuscript preparation, coordinated by Susan Alitto. The glossary was prepared with the help of Karl Slinkard, who also provided map information for our cartographer, Evelyn Prosser. During portions of the editorial time, Frederic Wakeman held fellowships from the American Council of Learned Societies, the Humanities Research Institute of the University of California, and the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation. Professors Joseph Fletcher, Irwin Scheiner, and John Wills provided critical advice for certain portions of the manuscript, while an editorial committee composed of Professors Fairbank, Kuhn, Spence, and Wakeman undertook the difficult task of choosing a few among so many excellent conference papers for inclusion in this volume. The final copy was scrupulously edited by Marjorie Hughes. The above deserve our deepest thanks, but this book owes its greatest debt to all those scholars whose discussions and deliberations during the symposium did so much to shape our concept of social process during the late imperial period of Chinese history.

F.W.
C.G.
Berkeley, 1975

# CONTRIBUTORS

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# ABBREVIATIONS

## USED IN THE NOTES

| | |
|---|---|
| Boulais | Gui Boulais, *Manuel du code chinois*, Variétés sinologiques, ser. 55 (Shanghai, 1924), reprint (Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966). |
| *Ch'ing code* | *Ta-Ch'ing lü-li hui-t'ung hsin-tsuan* [Comprehensive new edition of the Ch'ing code] (Peking, 1873), reprint (Taipei: Wen-hai ch'u-pan-she, 1964). |
| CL | Ch'ien-lung reign |
| *CSL* | *Ta-Ch'ing shih-lu* [Veritable records of the Ch'ing dynasty] (Mukden, 1937), reprint (Taipei: Hua-wen shu-chü, 1964). |
| *CYHC* | Teng Ch'uan-k'ai, comp., *Ying-yin Chiang-yin hsien-chih* [Photoreprint of the Chiang-yin district gazetteers], 1878 and 1919 editions, plus the supplement, *Chiang-yin chin-shih lu* [Record of recent events in Chiang-yin] (Taipei, 1968). |
| *HAHL* | Chu Ch'ing-ch'i, *Hsing-an hui-lan* [Conspectus of penal cases], 1869 ed. (Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1968). |
| *HAHLF* | Chu Ch'ing-ch'i, Pao Shu-yun, and Hsu Chien-ch'üan, *Hsing-an hui-lan, fu hsu-tseng Hsing-an hui-lan, hsin-tseng Hsing-an hui-lan* [Conspectus of penal cases, with two supplements], 1886 ed. (Taipei, Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1968). |
| *HCCSWP* | Ho Ch'ang-ling, comp., *Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien* [Selected essays on statecraft of the Ch'ing |

dynasty], 1821 ed. (Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chü, 1964).

*HCTC* — Feng Kuei-fen, *Hsien-chih-t'ang chi* [Collection from Hsien-chih hall] (Soochow, 1876).

HF — Hsien-feng reign

*HFC* — *Ch'ing-shih-kao hsing-fa-chih chu-chieh* [Legal treatise from the Ch'ing draft history with annotations] (Peking: Legal Research Division, Bureau of Legal Affairs, Council of State, 1957).

*HMCSWP* — Ch'en Tzu-lung, comp., *Huang-Ming ching-shih wen-pien* [Selected essays on statecraft of the Ch'ing dynasty], 1638 ed. (Taipei: Kuo-lien ch'u-pan-she, 1964).

*Hopei SCKP* — *Ho-pei sheng-cheng-fu kung-pao* [Hopei provincial government gazette].

*HTSL* — *Ch'in-ting ta-Ch'ing hui-tien t'u shih-li* [Collected statutes of the Ch'ing dynasty, with cases supplemented], 1899 ed. (Taipei: Chung-wen Publishing Co., 1963).

IMC — Imperial Maritime Customs

*ITC* — *Chia-ch'ing ch'ung-hsiu i-t'ung-chih* [The Chia-ch'ing revision of the imperial gazetteer] (Taipei: Commercial Press, 1966).

KH — K'ang-hsi reign

KHS — Kuang-hsu reign

*Kiangsu SCKP* — *Chiang-su sheng-cheng-fu kung-pao* [Kiangsu provincial government gazette).

*NCIS* — Wen Jui-lin, *Nan-chiang i-shih* [Successive histories of the southern realm], 1830 ed. (Taipei: T'ai-wan wen-hsien ts'ung-k'an, 1959).



*PAHP* — Ch'üan Shih-ch'ao et al., comp., *Po-an hsin-pien, fu hsu-pien* [Collection of reversed cases, with supplements], 1784 ed. (Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1968).

*PGT* — *Translations of the Peking Gazette,* annual volumes (Shanghai, 1872–1890).

*RoyCom* — *The Minutes of Evidence and the Final Report of the Royal Commission on Opium*, 7 vols. (London, 1894–1895).

SC — Shun-chih reign

*SPPY* — *Ssu-pu pei yao* edition of 351 historical works (Shanghai, Chung-hua shu-chü, 1927–1935; western-style ed., 1937, 100 vols., reprint Taipei, 1966).

Staunton — *Ta Tsing Leu Lee, Being the Fundamental Laws of the Penal Code of China,* trans. George T. Staunton (London, 1810).

TC — T'ung-chih reign

*TCHT* — *Ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li* [Compendium of Ch'ing institutional law and precedents] (Taipei: Ch'i-wen ch'u-pan-she, 1963).

TK — Tao-kuang reign

*TLCA* — Sun Lun, comp., *Ting-li ch'eng-an ho-chien* [Established regulations and precedents combined], original preface dated 1707.

*TLHP* — *Nieh-ssu ting li hui-pien* [Established regulations, as collected by the office of the provincial judicial commissioner] (Kiangsi, 1905).

*TLTI* — Hsueh Yun-sheng, *Tu-li ts'un-i* [Concentration on doubtful matters while perusing the special provisions of the code] (Peking, 1905).

*WHC* — Ts'ao Yun-yuan, comp., *Wu-hsien chih* [Wu district gazetteer] (Soochow, 1922).

| | |
|---|---|
| YC | Yung-cheng reign |
| *YPCC* | Ch'i Ssu-ho, Lin Shu-hui, and Shou Chi-yü, eds., *Ya-p'ien chan-cheng* [The opium war], 6 vols. (Shanghai: Shen-chou kuo-kuang she, 1954). |

## MING AND CH'ING REIGN TITLES

| MING | |
|---|---|
| Hung-wu | (1368–1398) |
| Chien-wen | (1399–1402) |
| Yung-lo | (1403–1424) |
| Hung-hsi | (1425) |
| Hsuan-te | (1426–1435) |
| Cheng-t'ung | (1436–1449) |
| Ching-t'ai | (1450–1456) |
| T'ien-shun | (1457–1464) |
| Ch'eng-hua | (1465–1487) |
| Hung-chih | (1488–1505) |
| Cheng-te | (1506–1521) |
| Chia-ching | (1522–1566) |
| Lung-ch'ing | (1567–1572) |
| Wan-li | (1573–1619) |
| T'ai-ch'ang | (1620) |
| T'ien-ch'i | (1621–1627) |
| Ch'ung-chen | (1628–1644) |

| CH'ING | |
|---|---|
| Shun-chih | (1644–1661) |
| K'ang-hsi | (1662–1722) |
| Yung-cheng | (1723–1735) |
| Ch'ien-lung | (1736–1795) |
| Chia-ch'ing | (1796–1820) |
| Tao-kuang | (1821–1850) |
| Hsien-feng | (1851–1861) |
| T'ung-chih | (1862–1874) |
| Kuang-hsu | (1875–1907) |
| Hsuan-t'ung | (1908–1911) |




# Introduction:

## THE EVOLUTION OF LOCAL CONTROL IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA

Frederic Wakeman, Jr.

Until recently Ch'ing historians have devoted most of their attention to the last century of imperial rule. What existed before the Opium War (1839–1842) was almost accepted as a given, a static world order which had so encyclopedically catalogued its past and so complacently frozen its institutions as to be incapable of reacting flexibly to the impact of imperialism. The Ch'ing was ruled by sinified Manchus, but that seemed to make its cultural conservatism all the more explicable. As a studied and self-conscious replica of earlier regimes, the Manchu dynasty rigidly encased the uniform persistence of Chinese culture. Some modern Chinese did, in the early 1900s, divorce the barbarian Ch'ing from the mainstream of their history. To radical nationalists like Chang Ping-lin (1868–1936), the Ch'ing emperors had usurped the past in 1644, adorning themselves with Confucian trappings to exploit the conquered Han race.[1] But once the Ch'ing fell in 1911 and cultural iconoclasts began to attack the patriarchal authority of Confucian monarchies in general, the Ch'ing was once more viewed as the embodiment of an entire, unchanging social and cultural order.

Marxist historiography carried that transformation a step further by identifying the Ch'ing with all the other feudal dynasties that had held progress in check. Chinese history then became "a lopsided story with a beginning and an end but hardly any middle. The vast stretch of some two thousand years from the formation of the Han states to the mid-nineteenth century constitutes a feudal embarrassment that seems safer left alone for the time being."[2] But the Marxist concern with "nodal points" of change also helped single out social changes ("sprouts of capitalism") during the late Ming and early

1. Chang Ping-lin, preface to Tsou Jung, *The Revolutionary Army*, trans. John Lust (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), p. 52.

2. Harold Kahn and Albert Feuerwerker, "The Ideology of Scholarship: China's New Historiography," in Albert Feuerwerker, ed., *History in Communist China* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969), p. 10.

Ch'ing which lent the late imperial era of Chinese history a certain uniqueness.

Gradually, social historians began to realize that the entire period from the 1550s to the 1930s constituted a coherent whole. Instead of seeing the Ch'ing as a replication of the past, or 1644 and 1911 as critical terminals, scholars detected processes which stretched across the last four centuries of Chinese history into the republican period. The urbanization of the lower Yangtze region, the commutation of labor services into money payments, the development of certain kinds of regional trade, the growth of mass literacy and the increase in the size of the gentry, the commercialization of local managerial activities—all these phenomena of the late Ming set in motion administrative and political changes that continued to develop over the course of the Ch'ing and in some ways culminated in the social history of the early twentieth century.[3] One such process, visible in several of the essays collected in this volume, was the evolution of rural government and local control.

### RURAL GOVERNMENT AND THE AMBIVALENT ROLE OF THE GENTRY

Because the vigor of rural government depended upon the wary collaboration of formal administrators and members of the local elite, the development of local control was inseparable from the evolution of the Chinese gentry after the T'ang period. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the old military aristocracy was replaced by a new elite whose primary status derived from bureaucratic office.[4] By middle Ming times such rank was acquired by passing the civil service examinations. Competition for this honor was intense. Even though the quota of district degrees (*sheng-yuan*) was enlarged at least

3. The novelty of these developments has been contested by historians who argue for a fundamental social and economic "revolution" in the Sung period, and insist that the late Ming changes were merely quantitative increments to, not qualitative advances beyond, the Sung urban, technological, and commercial improvements. See Mark Elvin, *The Pattern of the Chinese Past* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1973). However, because of the late Ming changes from estate to family farming, from state to private production, and from regional marketing to an integrated national market, Ramon Myers believes that "one can argue convincingly that Ming and Ch'ing China experienced changes as profound and far-reaching as those of the Sung." Ramon H. Myers, "Transformation and Continuity in Chinese Economic and Social History," *Journal of Asian Studies* 33.2:274.

4. As far as local control was concerned, this was not yet the "gentry" of the Ming and Ch'ing periods.

> In the Sung there were men with official status, and there were various groups possessed of miscellaneous privileges, and there were the rich, but it seems fair to say that there were no gentry. The more aristocratic society of earlier times in which local political influence tended to remain in the hands of certain families for generation after generation was dead, and the gentry society of later times had not yet been born. As a result the local elite consisted, not of the hereditarily influential or of the indoctrinated gentry, but simply of the rich.

Brian E. McKnight, *Village and Bureaucracy in Southern Sung China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 6.



tenfold between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries,[5] an average of thirty aspirants continued to vie for each degree awarded. Yet a successful *sheng-yuan* still had to pass at least the provincial (*chü-jen*) and metropolitan (*chin-shih*) examinations in order to be eligible for office. As the lower ranks swelled without a corresponding increase in the quota of higher degrees, the hundreds of thousands of *sheng-yuan* who failed to climb the upper rungs constituted a literate body whose capacity for discontent alarmed sixteenth-century imperial authorities toward the end of the Ming period.[6] Prominently involved in the urban demonstrations and "party" movements of the late Ming,[7] *sheng-yuan* were also frequently associated with peasant rebellions.[8] However, most members of the lower gentry eschewed such extravagant forms of protest, prefering to secure a livelihood as tutors, secretaries, rural relief managers, and tax agents engaged in proxy remittance (*pao-lan*). In some ways, therefore, the *sheng-yuan* belonged less to the world of the upper gentry than to the realm of district clerks (*hsu-li*) and yamen underlings who lived off the petty corruption that characterized the local government of late imperial China.[9]

This distinction between lower and upper degree-holders helps explain the ambivalent role of the gentry in a civilization where local control meant imposing a systematic blueprint upon a complex and resistant society which did not always live up to its governors' orderly expectations. For, beneath the centrally-ordered pattern of local administration there existed another China—out of control, disorderly, and unruly. As Ira Lapidus points out in his essay, lineage wars, smuggling rings, and secret societies were as characteristic of the empire as the *pao-chia* (mutual responsibility) public-security apparatus and the ideally serene surface of upper-gentry society. Conse-

5. By the late nineteenth century there were approximately 600,000 regular *sheng-yuan*, along with another 600,000 lower degree-holders who purchased their rank.

6. See, for example, *Ming shih-lu* [Veritable records of the Ming dynasty], Lung-ch'ing reign, chüan 24, cited in Fu I-ling, *Ming-tai Chiang-nan shih-min ching-chi shih-t'an* [An investigation of bourgeois economy in Kiangnan in the Ming] (Shanghai: Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1963), p. 110.

7. One of the best known examples of this kind of activity was the 1593 riot at Sung-chiang when the city dwellers and gentry from the three surrounding districts united in major demonstrations to keep their prefect from being dismissed from office. "Not only were there those who came to the city as a mob to present to the military defense circuit [intendant] at the surveillance office [a demand] to retain [Li Hou as prefect]; there were also degree-holding gentry and young first-place examination winners who came as well." Fan Lien, *Yun-chien chü-mu ch'ao* [Copied from hearsaying eyewitnesses], cited in Fu I-ling, *Ming-tai*, pp. 115–116.

8. For an exposition of this thesis, see Muramatsu Yūji, "Some Themes in Chinese Rebel Ideologies," in A. F. Wright, ed., *The Confucian Persuasion* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 241–267.

9. Chung-li Chang, *The Income of the Chinese Gentry* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962), pp. 43–73; Ping-ti Ho, *The Ladder of Success in Imperial China* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), pp. 34–35. Ho classifies *sheng-yuan* as "scholar-commoners." The real distinction between *sheng-yuan* who were "gentry" and those who were not was probably a matter of self-conception. Obviously, some members of the *sheng-yuan* group saw that status as a transitional ranking and early set their aims on an official career.

quently, those who favored methodical control were often infuriated by the discrepancy between their neat administrative solutions and the cluttered world beyond the yamen wall.

> If we take the district of Soochow as an example [one Ch'ing official noted], we see that the disposition of the people of Wu is weak and brittle. The well fed are few; the indigent, many. Those styled as "scholars" by and large teach outside the home, leaving two or three dependents alone. The poor work as servants or peddlers, leaving early and returning at dusk, and [still] find that their livelihood is insufficient. The wealthy are only attentive to their own security and do not become involved with outsiders. The marketplace people are confined to their own occupations, fearing the juvenile delinquents in their wards as if they were tigers. If you wish to restrain this sort of people, then you would have to investigate by day and patrol by night. They would assuredly be vocal in their discontent.[10]

The gentry did not make the task of legislating order any easier. As C. K. Yang's essay suggests, the local elite led much of the mass dissent of the nineteenth century. Like the yamen officials who dominated criminal activities, the *sheng-yuan* protected a status quo which included both order and disorder, control and conflict.

A similar paradox characterized the higher gentry. A gentryman might well serve as an incorruptible magistrate outside his native place, but once retired (the average tenure of office was remarkably brief),[11] that same person was likely to use his bureaucratic influence and social status to acquire property, finagle favorable tax rates, and protect his kin's interests. The gentry's public interest in waterworks, charity, and education also accompanied a private interest in corporate trusts and income. Local social organizations therefore embodied contrary principles: integration into the imperial system and autonomy from it. The dynamic oscillation between these poles created the unity of Chinese society, not by eliminating the contradictions but by balancing them in such a way as to favor overall order. The balance was expressed in ideal terms as a Confucian compromise between Legalist intervention and complete laissez-faire. In political theory, this meant recognizing a self-regulating society whose private interests were tempered by moral enlightenment. As an administrative guide, however, such a notion actually set the local gentry and the district government somewhat at odds, the one preventing the corruption or overweening power of the other.

10. Huang Chung-chien, "Pao-chia i" [A discussion of *pao-chia*], in *HCCSWP*, 14:2b.

11. John R. Watt, *The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 59–68.



### COMMUNITY RESPONSIBILITY AND LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

During the Sung period the bureaucratic gentry's influence had not yet permeated rural society, and village government was formally in the hands of wealthy peasants who were appointed as regular service officers to manage tax collection, militia organization, and the *pao-chia* networks.[12] By the fourteenth century rural government was not so neatly dominated by any single group. Local gentry and the former service officers now shared responsibilities and influence in an elaborate control system (*hsiang-chia*) whose basic unit was the *shuai* (command): a group of 100 families registered in a covenant (*yueh*). Normally only commoners joined a *shuai*, but reliable degree-holders were asked to help supervise it.

The *shuai* combined control and indoctrination. Two officers led the unit. An elected *yueh-cheng* was charged with legal mediation and control, while an appointed *yueh-shih* (who had to be literate) was supposed to exhort (*ch'in*) the householders with Confucian texts. Because exhortation was viewed as a kind of collective moral reinforcement, the *shuai* was expected to be something between a voluntary and an involuntary association. The combination was not easy to maintain. When the officers became police functionaries, the group lost its solidarity and ceased being a true constituency. When the *shuai* grew too independent, on the other hand, its leaders vitiated the authority of the magistrate. Consequently, two safeguards were written into the system: householders were theoretically able to petition the magistrate if their *yueh-cheng* abused his privileges, and the *shuai* officers were forbidden to collude with the regular yamen sub-bureaucracy.[13]

The *shuai* was only the first of many different rural control mechanisms organized during the Ming period. Its successors—the *tsung-hsiao-chia* of the 1440s, the *shih-chia-p'ai-fa* of the early 1500s, and the regular *pao-chia* of the 1600s[14]—varied in name, but they continued to fuse ideally normative rural communities with coercive state control networks. Usually the latter prevailed over the *Gemeinschaften* they were supposed to supplement, so that *pao-chia* was eventually designed to ensure adequate public security[15] without

12. McKnight, *Village and Bureaucracy*, pp. 178–185.

13. Wen Chün-t'ien, *Chung-kuo pao-chia chih-tu* [The Chinese *pao-chia* system] (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1935), pp. 171–185, 193–200.

14. Sakai Tadao, "Mindai zen-chūki no hokkōsei ni tsuite" [On the *pao-chia* system of the first half of the Ming period], in *Shimizu Hakushi tsuitō kinen: Meidaishi ronsō* [In memory of Dr. Shimizu Taiji: Studies on the Ming period] (Tokyo: Daian, 1962), pp. 577–610. The Ming did initiate a form of village service officer using elders to adjudicate minor offenses, but that system was abandoned by the 1440s. Wada Sei, *Shina chihō jichi hattatsu shi* [History of the development of Chinese local self-government] (Tokyo: Chūō Daigaku, 1939), pp. 113–117.

15. One European visitor to China during the late Ming period remarked in astonishment that "Nobody can leave the districts of his own city, even if it is for another place in the same province, without a written permit; and if he does so, he is forthwith flung into prison and

increasing government law-enforcement expenses. For, the aim of all these institutions was the rotational assignment of rural service and management duties to a populace which, by regulating itself, would reduce the number of regularly appointed civil administrators throughout the empire. The actual savings, however, were partly illusory. Though yamen expenses were formally low, the magistrate still had to employ policemen who lived off petty bribes, and clerks who peddled their influence to the highest bidder.

This kind of venality ironically inclined the government all the more toward the principle of conferring administrative responsibilities upon community leaders. The early Ming tax system was the best example of this practice.

> When the present dynasty first acquired the empire [a Ming writer explained], [the emperor] was disturbed by the officials' oppression of the common people. The high ministers then suggested that since the [local] officials were all natives of other provinces, they were ignorant of local conditions, and were surrounded by unscrupulous clerks and entrenched magnates. It was no wonder that the people were misgoverned. It would therefore be better to appoint as collectors those magnates who were trusted by the people and to make them responsible for the land taxes of the common people and for their delivery to the government. Thereupon the magnates were appointed tax collectors.[16]

In 1371, after an accurate cadastral survey, the Board of Revenue divided the cultivated areas of central China into tax-paying units of ten thousand piculs per annum and named the largest landowner in each unit a tax collector (*liang-chang*). It was the duty of these *liang-chang* to collect and deliver to the capital the more than one million tons of barley, wheat, and rice which were needed every year by the central government. In this way Ming T'ai-tsu hoped both "to use good people to rule good people"[17] and to secure the good will of local magnates by honoring them with a semi-official post.[18]

The magnates initially welcomed appointment as *liang-chang* because they were allowed to petition for tax remissions and routinely hand down the post from father to son. Indeed, they used these privileges to their own private profit by arbitrarily seizing property and assessing other households unfairly. The throne responded by abolishing the post of *liang-chang*. But

punished." C. R. Boxer, ed., *South China in the Sixteenth Century. Being the Narratives of Galeote Pereira; Fr. Gaspar da Cruz, O.P.; Fr. Martin de Rada, O.E.S.A. (1550–1575)* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1953), p. 303.

16. Translated in Liang Fang-chung, "Local Tax Collectors in the Ming Dynasty," in E-tu Zen Sun and John De Francis, eds., *Chinese Social History, Translations of Selected Studies* (Washington, D.C.: American Council of Learned Societies, 1956), p. 250.

17. Translated in ibid., p. 249.

18. Supported by one accountant, twenty treasurers, and one thousand transport coolies, each *liang-chang* had an opportunity to go to Nanking each year and receive his tally sheets and instructions from the emperor in person.



that left tax collection in the hands of irresponsible yamen clerks who were not even on the official payroll. The government therefore tried to replace the *liang-chang* of central China with the *li-chang* used elsewhere. In the *li-chia* system ten households formed a *chia* (tithing). Every year by rotation one of these households guaranteed the corvee and tax payment of the other nine units. Ten *chia* constituted a *li* (hamlet or canton), which was supervised by ten more households of the village's wealthiest families who were enrolled in the district land registers (Fish-scale Illustrated Books) that were supposed to be revised decennially. Each of the wealthy households, once again by rotation, served as a *li-chang* responsible for the corvee and land tax of the entire *li-chia* unit of 110 households. The *li-chia* system therefore reflected the same Ming reliance upon wealthy households that characterized the *liang-chang* system, but added to it the principle of rotational responsibility.

The merging of the *li-chia* and *liang-chang* systems curbed the power of the magnates at the expense of the entire tax collection system, by emphasizing coercive responsibility rather than the rewards of local office.[19] Because the *li-chang* was less a rural agent of the emperor than a tax hostage for his community, the magnates bolted from the system, using their influence to foist responsibility upon village headmen. The latter were not always even the wealthiest landowners of their *li-chia* unit. The land registers had failed to keep up with the rapid turnover of landed property in areas like Kiangnan, and no longer reflected the actual distribution of wealth. Modest commoner households designated as *li-chang* were thus saddled with the tax responsibility for their entire village, without either the social sway to collect payments from others or the financial means to stand good in their stead. The hapless *li-chang* therefore either fled the land or became the tenants of more influential families which had managed to have their holdings removed from the land registers. In the meantime, gentry households entitled to at least limited land-tax exemption had learned to fragment their holdings and place each piece of property in a different *li-chia* unit, thus paying no taxes at all. As these sorts of evasion became more common, the burden on the remaining commoner households grew heavier. District quotas increased while the actual tax base narrowed, rendering appointment to the post of *li-chang* tantamount to a sentence of bankruptcy.

### TAX REFORM

By the 1580s the central government was running an annual tax deficit of approximately one million taels. Local officials therefore tried to reform the

19. The move of the capital to Peking in 1421 also damaged the position of *liang-chang:* first, by making it impossible for the tax collectors from Kiangnan to present themselves at court (though that custom had practically lapsed anyway); and second, by adding on the further costs of purveying tribute grain up the Grand Canal from central China. For a listing of some of these costs, see Ray Huang, "The Grand Canal during the Ming Dynasty" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1964), pp. 143–148.

tax system by combining corvee (*i*) and land tax (*fu*) obligations into a single payment. This new Single Whip Tax (*i-t'iao-pien*) divided the land in a given district into ten equal parts. Each year one of these parts was subject to both *i* and *fu*—a practice which hopefully would use the more reliable corvee or household registers (Yellow Books) to prevent tax dodging and apply the principle of rotational responsibility to the land itself.[20]

That hope was disappointed. The Single Whip Tax reform simply identified evasion all the more strongly with gentry tax exemptions. Under the old system, influential landowners had manipulated the land registers. Now land and service quotas were amalgamated by billing taxpayers registered in the corvee register.[21] Since the gentry was excused from corvee, its members were not liable in the Yellow Book and consequently escaped the amalgamated tax altogether. Other landowners therefore evaded payment by falsely registering (*kuei-chi*) their households under gentry names. The ultimate effect of the Single Whip Tax reform was to make gentry privilege seem the root cause of the government's fiscal difficulties.

Many historians are familiar with the late Ming practice of false registry, but Jerry Dennerline is the first to show that landlords frequently did this without the knowledge of the gentrymen whose names they used. According to his essay in this volume, the seventeenth-century rural crisis in China was not solely a matter of poor peasants being forced by a constantly increasing tax burden to turn their land over to the gentry (*t'ou-shen*) in exchange for protected tenant status. Rather, resourceful landlords without legal privilege manipulated the household registers behind the gentry's back.

Dennerline's research has important implications. First, there was a noticeable distinction between the social interests of landlords and gentry. At times of fiscal crisis, in fact, "statesmen" gentry felt morally obliged to collaborate with the state by attacking landlord tax evasion, even though the statesmen's ulterior motivation was undoubtedly the protection of gentry privilege. Second, landowners were as much a part of the historical model of dynastic decline as the gentry is sometimes taken to be. Historians broadly argue that the gentry wanted a government which was lax enough to allow the elite to line its own pockets, yet not so debilitated as to neglect the social and economic services which kept potential peasant rebels from arising. This middle ground was hard to hold. As the gentry loosened government controls, removing more and more of the land from the tax rolls, the fiscal burden was shifted to peasant freeholders. A "critical level of disparity," as James Polachek's paper notes, was thus eventually reached, at which point the farmers' misery reached such proportions as to threaten political control altogether, helping topple the reigning dynasty. What Dennerline's piece suggests is that had the gentry acted alone, it might have been able to hold that middle ground

20. Liang Fang-chung, "The 'Ten-Parts' Tax System of Ming," in Sun and De Francis, eds., *Chinese Social History*, pp. 271–280.

21. By then, of course, the corvee was actually commutated into silver payments.



indefinitely during the late imperial period. But the additional inroads of less politically responsive landlord elements pushed the situation to an extreme, setting the scene for the fall of the Ming in 1644.

### THE 1661 TAX CASE

The brief interregnum of the Southern Ming in central China made the literati all the more aware of their reliance upon central control. Political insecurity and social disorder brought them face to face with other local competitors for power, in a situation where strength of arms mattered more than civil arts. Constitutionally unable to transform its informal local control into regional political government, the seventeenth-century gentry finally acknowledged that even an alien imperial government suited its social interests best.

The gentry's political submission to the Ch'ing was rewarded by the new dynasty's spirit of compromise during the first fifteen years of its rule. First Dorgon (1612–1650), then later the Shun-chih emperor, recognized the need to come to agreeable terms with the local gentry. To be sure, the higher gentry no longer possessed the great political power which it had held toward the end of the Ming. That influential cluster of literati, which was symbolized in contemporaries' eyes by the Kiangnan political club called the Fu-she, had once been able to command the highest bureaucratic support for its policies, as well as fill local posts with its official friends. All of that, including even the right to form such literati associations, was swept away by the new rulers, who made certain that Kiangnan's magistrates were strangers to the old-boy circles so prominent in the late Ming.[22] But generally speaking, the court did agree that its own long-term stability depended upon the support of the gentry, which was gradually drawn back into the fold by the K'ang-hsi emperor and permitted to reacquire political influence in the metropolis. The one exception to this policy was the troubling decade of the 1660s when the Oboi regency decided to attack the fiscal privileges of the gentry of Kiangnan.[23]

At that time the government was ostensibly concerned about covering the military expenditures of its Yunnan campaigns. Three weeks after the Shun-chih emperor's death on February 5, 1661, the regents ordered the boards of civil appointments and revenue to make every effort to collect the great amount of taxes then in arrears throughout China. Officials at all ranks would be denied promotion until the tax quotas for which they were responsible had been fulfilled; and if those officials had still not met their obligations within a limit prescribed by the boards, they would be dismissed or reduced in rank.

22. Lawrence D. Kessler, "Chinese Scholars and the Early Manchu State," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 31:179–200.

23. The statutory basis for this attack after the cadastral surveys of 1659–1660 is described in Dennerline's essay in this volume.

As long as the government devoted its primary effort to Chihli (the region around the capital), it continued to employ sanctions upon bureaucrats. But once its attention turned to Kiangnan, which represented both the empire's major source of grain tribute[24] and the most glaring example of *pao-lan* and false registry, the government shifted its attack to the taxpayers.[25] Since many of the latter were members of the gentry, the new policy was interpreted by contemporaries as an effort to humble and punish the scholar-officials of the lower Yangtze—some of whom had revealed their continuing loyalty to the Ming when Cheng Ch'eng-kung (Koxinga, 1624–1662) attacked Nanking in 1659. One scholar even likened the Manchu regents to the Mongols, and compared the Kiangnan tax case to the Yuan dynasty's deliberate debasement of southern *ju* (literati) four centuries earlier.[26]

The Manchu regents certainly did harbor animosities toward the Kiangnan gentry, but the indictment of that group was actually the work of the province's governor, Chu Kuo-chih (d. 1673), who had already urged the gentry to make up its arrears. Convinced that stronger measures were needed, Chu compiled a 13,757-name register of tax resisters (*k'ang-liang ts'e*) which included approximately ten thousand members of the gentry.[27] Chu's register did far more than simply name tardy taxpayers; it denounced those who had fallen behind in their payments as willful criminals. Consequently, public proclamation of the list created a panic throughout all of Kiangnan.

Some literati used their influence with local officials to play for time. The

24. By the late Ming the single prefecture of Soochow, which had 1 percent of the cultivated land of the empire, provided 10 percent of its revenue. Within that area Sung-chiang, which held 0.25 percent of the cultivated land of China, provided 5 percent of the national revenue. Roughly speaking, the Su-Sung-T'ai circuit, along with the northern part of Chekiang, provided about one-quarter of the normal tax quota of the entire country. Chou Liang-hsiao, "Ming-tai Su-Sung ti-ch'ü ti kuan-t'ien yü chung-fu wen-t'i" [The question of severe taxes and official land in the Su-Sung region during the Ming dynasty], *Li-shih yen-chiu* [Historical research] 10:64 ff.

25. Chou Shou-ch'ang, *Ssu-i t'ang jih cha* [Daily letters from the Ssu-i lodge], cited in Meng Sen, *Hsin-shih ts'ung-k'an* [Collected writings of Meng Sen] (Hong Kong: Chung-kuo ku-chi chen-pen kung-ying she, 1963), p. 9. My account is based almost entirely on Meng Sen's careful collection of materials about the tax case. As he himself has pointed out, the development of the tax case is traced in the official record (the *Shih-lu* and the *Tung-hua lu*) up through the implementation of the regents' proposals in Chihli. Once Governor Chu published the list, the official record becomes silent and one has to depend upon the many private (*pi-chi*) accounts, which Meng cites *in extenso* in his own compilation with commentary.

26. Tung Han, *San wang chih-lueh* [A summary record of the three nets], cited in Meng Sen, *Hsin-shih*, p. 9.

27. Ch'u Hua, *Hu-ch'eng pei-k'ao* [A complete investigation of Shanghai], in *Shang-hai na-ku ts'ung-shu* [A collection of reprints of snatches of the past of Shanghai] (Shanghai: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1936), 6:3b. Chu's action was incited by a demonstration on March 4, 1661, of Soochow gentry. The gentry marched into the Confucian temple during a funeral ceremony for the Shun-chih emperor and denounced the local magistrate for forcing them to pay taxes. All told, twenty-two of the demonstrators in the Temple Lament Incident (*k'u miao an*) were arrested. Since their leader, Chin Jen-jui, called to the spirits of the Ming emperors under torture, Ch'ing suspicions of loyalism were enhanced. Eighteen of the men were found guilty of tax resistance and rebellion, and executed. For an excellent account of this aspect of the affair, see Robert B. Oxnam, "Policies and Institutions of the Oboi Regency, 1661–1669," *Journal of Asian Studies* 32.2:279–280.



prefect of Ch'ang-chou, for instance, was persuaded by a noted local professor to delay posting the list for three days, so that several hundred of the "tax resisters" could mortgage or sell their land in order to make up their taxes.[28] Even that was a hardship, however, because land prices immediately dipped. Shao Ch'ang-heng (1637–1704), the famous poet of Wu-chin, had to unload half of his eight hundred *mou* of land at a great loss. "I simply handed it over to others," he explained, and added bitterly that it was rapacious officials who "shamefully took advantage of the rescript" to bilk their charges.[29]

Those who had neither time nor means to sell were usually arrested and thrown into cells so crowded that "there was no place for the scholars to put their feet."[30] Theoretically those on the list were to be uniformly punished. If they held office, they were to be demoted two ranks and transferred. Degree-holders would be stripped of rank. The 240 yamen employees who were indicted would be sentenced according to the amount of bribes taken. In fact, however, the severity of punishment depended upon the official in charge. Governor Chu was the harshest of all. Gentrymen arrested by his agents were trussed in his presence and roughly packed off to his yamen for interrogation by judicial officials. To many the treatment seemed quite arbitrary.

> At the time the gentlemen of Wu could not comprehend the laws of the realm. Some really were in arrears and had not yet remitted [their taxes]. Some had paid in full, but the chief clerk had not completely recorded the cancellation [of their debt]. Some were actually not in arrears but rather among households falsely accused by other people. Some were natives of one district without arrears who were falsely accused by others for deficits in the latter's district. Some were 100 percent paid in full, but were indicted by chief clerks because of resentment. One incrimination followed another—too numerous to be counted singly. The four prefectures of Su-Sung-Ch'ang-Chen, along with the district of P'iao-yang, had altogether 3,700 members of the gentry who were reported to the court. The ministers of the capital deliberated and reported. The Board of Civil Appointments first decided that since degree-holders received an official salary, they should not refuse to pay taxes. Those currently holding office would be demoted two ranks and transferred. Those on the [gentry] lists would be remanded to the capital and delivered to the Board of Justice for a severe deliberation of penalty.[31]

28. This is from the funeral eulogy of Kuo Shih-ying by Chang Yun-chang, cited in Meng Sen, *Hsin-shih*, p. 24.

29. There is a biography of Shao Ch'ang-heng in Arthur Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1944), p. 636. The tax case debarred him from taking any future examinations. He did finally become secretary to the influential grand secretary, Sung Lao, when the latter was governor of Kiangsu. The account is drawn from Shao Ch'ang-heng, *Ch'ing-men lü-kao* [Boxed drafts from the green gate], cited in Meng Sen, *Hsin-shih*, p. 22.

30. This is from the funeral eulogy of Huang Chen-lin by Chang Tuan-ying, cited in Meng Sen, *Hsin-shih*, pp. 25–26.

31. *Yen t'ang chien-wen tsa-chi* [Random records of things heard and seen in the Yen lodge],

Whether or not a debtor was actually remanded to Peking for punishment depended upon the energy with which his prefect pleaded for custody. But even though many gentrymen escaped final judgment and were released after payment, the experience of arrest was frightening and painful. The prisoners (one of whom happened to be a descendant of Confucius) were frequently flogged and humiliated by yamen underlings who felt that their own tenure depended upon the alacrity with which they carried out the arrests. Others were summarily cashiered or forced to wear the cangue. Eighteen were executed. As Shao Ch'ang-heng remarked later:

> As I view those two years, the new laws were like frost withering the autumn grass. The district magistrate was like a voracious tiger. The lictors were like rapacious dogs. Scholars were flogged with bamboo in order to make up the taxes. This became a constant occurrence in the capital. Yours truly could not endure to [see] his parents pass away [without proper mourning rites, but at that very time] the district police hauled me into the law court. Bent down before tyrannical yamen officers, my body was stripped naked and beaten. I escaped from this [disaster] resolved to avoid calamity [in the future].[32]

Ch'ü Ssu-ta, a student of Ch'ien Ch'ien-i (the famous defector to the Ch'ing), was actually driven mad by his interrogation, and shortly after his release slaughtered his entire family in a homicidal frenzy.[33]

The tax case may even have provoked a momentary aversion to landholding among the gentry, who were soon to have their serf-owning privileges rescinded by imperial decree. A contemporary wrote that "After it [the tax case], the gentry of the rural areas regarded landed property as the greatest encumbrance. Thus it can be seen that the Ch'ing court used the land tax [issue] to terrify the Kiangnan gentry."[34] An entire generation was so affected —ranging from the Grand Secretary Ts'ao Ch'i to Ku Yen-wu's nephew, Hsu Yuan-wen (first in the metropolitan examinations of 1659).[35] Men like these remained under a cloud for years, until pardoned by the K'ang-hsi emperor in the 1670s. Others gave up an official career altogether, or even fled south to join Wu San-kuei's entourage when he later rebelled against the Ch'ing.[36]

The opinion of contemporaries notwithstanding, the 1661 tax case was not merely a matter of Manchu resentment of the Kiangnan literati; it represented a more extreme version of the familiar attack on gentry privileges by the central government. As Dennerline's study shows, similar measures had been proposed thirty years earlier under the Ming, when some of the gentry had responded to government pressure by allying with their local magistrates against the large landlords in order to change the tax system. Their reform, which was perfected by the statecraft (*ching-shih*) writer, Hsia Yun-i, was called *chün-t'ien chün-i* (equal field, equal service) because it equalized the tax burden by attaching the corvee portion to the land. While the former household registers were retained by the magistrate so that he could meet his tax quota, landowners were simultaneously urged to enroll in the new *chün-t'ien chün-i* system which absolved its members from being responsible for other taxpayers in their unit. The reform succeeded momentarily because, on the one hand, the magistrates realized that they had to find some way of restricting the privileges of the local elite without undermining it altogether and, on the other, because the gentry realized that if they would retain something, they must give a portion of their rights away by registering all land in standard units in order to share the tax burden more fairly.

The same kind of compromise prevailed after the 1661 tax case frightened the gentry into surrendering some of its economic leverage. The solution, which hearkened back to Hsia Yun-i's reform, did not solve the problem of proxy remittance and false registry, but it did for a time remove some of the inequities of the original *li-chia* system.

### MANCHU CONTROL

The Manchus originally conquered China with the aid of Chinese defectors like Li Ch'eng-tung (d. 1649) and Wu San-kuei (1612–1678). These militarists also helped the throne overcome the conciliar power of the Manchu princes who opposed imperial sinification because it enhanced patrimonial power at their own aristocratic expense. But the nobles' Manchuness, the preservation of their identity among the Han Chinese, seemed crucial to the throne when those original Chinese defectors turned against the Ch'ing during the 1673–1681 revolt of the three feudatories (*san-fan*).[37] Then it seemed that as long as the Manchu banner troops remained an elite, poised apart from the Chinese, military control would hold. But the throne soon discovered how difficult it was to keep the Manchus in a favored and separate economic position. The land enclosures awarded to bannermen in north China between 1645 and 1647 gradually fell back into Chinese hands.[38] The Manchus

which is apparently taken from the *Lo-tung tsa-chu* [Random writings from Lo-tung], preface dated 1839, cited in Meng Sen, *Hsin-shih*, p. 19.

32. Shao Ch'ang-heng, *Ch'ing-men*, p. 22.

33. This is from the *Chia-pien lu* [Record of household changes], supposedly compiled by Ch'ien Ch'ien-i's consort, Liu Ju-shih, after his death. It is cited in Meng Sen, *Hsin-shih*, pp. 21–22.

34. This is a comment by Shao's biographer (see note 29), Ch'en Yü-chi, cited in Meng Sen, *Hsin-shih*, p. 23.

35. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p. 327.

36. Chou Shou-ch'ang, *Ssu-i t'ang*, p. 9.

37. However, as Kanda Nobuo's Honolulu paper showed, the dynasty could not rely on Manchus alone to suppress the three feudatories. In a sense, the K'ang-hsi emperor had to relearn the lesson of his ancestor, Abahai; he would have to rely upon Chinese generals and viceroys to conquer the South. Kanda Nobuo, "The Role of *San-fan* in the Local Politics of Early Ch'ing."

38. Muramatsu Yūji, "Banner Estates and Banner Lands in Eighteenth-Century China: Evidence from Two New Sources," paper delivered at the Honolulu conference.