


人文社科经典名著选读

Selections from Classics of Western **Philosophy** 西方哲学经典名著选读

赵敦华 选编 / 导读

 中国人民大学出版社

*the right frame has not, but
others, but unchanged, the
frame has it has been replaced
as the old, substituted by
new, the leading words, the
meaning, elements are the
changing ideas, to be the
even and the same feature, the
of the of the and permanent
order.*

*is a flight through the air
the first form, usually, is not
of our, the the the the
and to the we are not in our
of the, the the and the the
to be, with the the the
the, the the to accept the the*

*is a flight
and the*

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前 言

中国人把学习叫做“读书”，把讲课叫做“教书”。西方也有类似的语言现象，中世纪的大学里，lectio（讲课）的意思就是“读书”（reading text）。如此看来，不论是学还是教，都离不开读书。读书首先是读经典。经典是人类思想的精华，是全人类的共同财富。经典没有时间和空间的界限，一部经典在历史上出现了之后，就能够在任何时候，在世界上任何地方，被人们所阅读欣赏，成为滋养读者精神的养料。每一个学科都有自己的经典，越是古老的学科，经典越多，越精彩。有着2500多年历史的西方哲学的经典是西方文化的核心，任何想学习或理解西方文化传统的人不能不读西方哲学经典，任何学习西方哲学史的人也不能不读这些经典。用一个比喻说，如果只读西方哲学史而不读西方哲学经典，就好像是看了菜谱却还没有尝过菜的味道一样。

西方哲学的经典可谓汗牛充栋，即使是饱学之士，也不能读遍这些经典的全部。因此，读经典只能是选读。国外有不少西方哲学经典的选读本，所选内容各不相同。我在参考了多种选本的基础上，结合中国读者的情况，编了这本选读。我从西方哲学经典篇章中选择出这些著作篇章，是经过一番考虑的。

选编本书的初衷，是希望把最伟大的哲学家的最伟大作品介绍给读者。本书所选经典作品的作者，如柏拉图、亚里士多德、奥古斯丁、托马斯、笛卡儿、休谟、康德和黑格尔等，无疑都是西方哲学史上最伟大的哲学家。他们也是最有代表性的哲学家，其中，柏拉图和亚里士多德代表古代哲学传统，奥古斯丁和托马斯代表中世纪哲学传统（这是现代人常常忽视的传统），后四位分别代表了近代哲学的不同的传统——唯理论的、经验论的、先验论的和绝对唯心论的传统。

有三种情况需要说明。第一，休谟的代表作无疑是《人性论》，但其简写本《人类理智研究》更集中、精练地表现了他的认识论思想，我因而选了后一本书。出于同样的考虑，本书没有选康德的代表作《纯粹理性批判》，而选了他的简写本《未来形而上学导论》。第二，帕斯卡大概不能进入最伟大哲学家的行列，因为他的思想不属于西方哲学传统的主流。但非主流思想也应有所反映，因此也把他的代表作《思想录》选入本书。第三，本书没有收入现代西方哲学著作，一方面是篇幅所限，另一方面也是因为这些著作的历史较短，还不能与久经时间考验的经典相媲美。

我的另一个希望是用较少的篇幅表现尽可能多的思想内容。这就需要选代表作中的核心篇章。这些篇章是围绕着一定的问题和主题而选出来的。我在每一著作的“导读”中，把所选部分所要解决的问题和所论述的主题做了简明的解释，同时，在正文部分对各章的提要和一些专有名词做一些注解，希望这对于读者理解经典有所裨益。

即使有导读和注解，西方哲学经典仍然是难读难懂的。这不仅是因为语言上的障碍；即使对于母语是英文的读者来说，这些经典著作同样是难读难懂的。哲学经典的语言表达的是高度浓缩了的思想内涵，因此对哲学经典的理解需要高度的智慧。读懂经典对每一位读者的理解力都是一种挑战和一种智力训练。我相信，经历了这一挑战和训练的人的思想和精神境界都会有不同程度的改变，而正是这种改变让我们体会到读经典的奥妙和乐趣。

赵敦华

2003年9月

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柏拉图《理想国》导读




柏拉图（Plato，公元前 427—前 347 年）是西方历史上最重要的哲学家之一，有些人甚至认为他就是最重要的哲学家。如怀特海说，全部的西方哲学史只是柏拉图思想的注脚；海德格尔说，西方形而上学的传统就是柏拉图主义。柏拉图的著作主要以对话形式写成（除了对话外，他还有几封信流传下来）。我们现在看到的柏拉图作品主要是 40 多篇对话，其中 28 篇被确定为真品或可信程度很高的作品；现存 13 封信中，可能只有 4 封为真品。柏拉图的对话有很高的文学鉴赏价值，对话人物性格鲜明，场景生动，对话充满情趣，严密的论证配以优美的语言，行云流水的雄辩夹杂着隽永的格言，达到哲学与文学、逻辑与修辞的高度统一。

在柏拉图的对话中，最重要的代表作当属《理想国》。这本书内容全面系统，最能体现柏拉图的创作意图。读者可以从柏拉图的政治理想和当时希腊城邦的社会现实出发，理解柏拉图哲学思想的论证理由、现实针对性和历史意义。柏拉图的政治理想是“哲学家王”，论证这一政治理想的哲学基础是关于两个世界的区分。他认为在可感世界之外和之上，还有一个理念世界；每一个可感事物都在理念世界有一个理念（Idea）或型相（Form）作为其真实的本原，可感事物只是本原的模仿和影像，因而是不可靠的。柏拉图在他的一系列对话中，为这一理论提供了不同的论证。《理想国》第五卷后部和第六卷全部，以及第七卷前部关于两个世界区分的论证最为系统和精彩。本书选择了这些篇章，作为柏拉图对话的精华。

柏拉图的论证包括下列三个比喻。


一、日喻

日喻以太阳比喻善的理念。太阳、视觉、可见事物之间的关系，犹如善的理念、真理、可知的理念型相之间的关系，可用下图表示。



二、“四线段”比喻

“四线段”比喻说明两类不同的认识（意见和知识）与两类不同的认识对象之间的对应关系，每一类认识及其对象又进一步被分成两部分，由此形成下列四线段。



其中， $AB : CD : \frac{A}{B} : \frac{C}{D} = \frac{1}{2}$

(1) 幻想。这是个人的想像和印象。它们因人而异，一个可感对象向一个人的显现可能不同于向另一个人的显现，人们通过幻想只能认识事物向他自己的显现，即影像。按柏拉图的说法，诗和艺术作品都属于认识的这一阶段，艺术作品中的的人和事都是诗人和艺人个人显像的产物，不是实际的可感事物，只是可感事物的影像。


(2) 信念。这是关于可感事物的共同知觉。柏拉图承认信念是真判断，但仍把它排除在知识之外，原因在于，与信念相对应的可感事物是个别的、变化的，不能确定他说它们“是”什么，只能说它们“既是又不是”什么，这种处于不断流变之中的事物叫“活物”，例如，动物、植物、人工制品等。柏拉图把物理学（或自然哲学）归于信念。信念是对日常生活有用的经验，但缺乏知识必须具备的确定性。

(3) 数学。这是低级的知识。柏拉图说它“介乎意见和理智之间”。数学研究的数量和形状虽然是普遍的、不变的性质和关系，但却往往借助可感的图形和事物来说明不可感的数的规定性，心灵利用这些肖像，才能认识数的型相。数学方法的特点是从前提到结论的推理，推理的最高前提是这样一些公理和定义，它们想当然地被当做自明的原则，但却具有假设的性质。

(4) 理性知识。这是纯粹的知识，哲学就是这种知识。哲学的方法是辩证法，它和数学的推理不同，不是从假设下降到结论，而是由假设上升到原则。辩证法以假设的定义为出发点，在对话过程中，逐步剔除和修正定义中的假设成分，从一个定义过渡到另一个定义，最后达到最完善、最确定的定义。用柏拉图的话来说，辩证法把假设“当做梯子和跳板，暂时搭一脚”，一步一步往上爬，到达目标之后就不再需要假设的“梯子”了。柏拉图说，辩证法的“全过程不掺和任何可感事物，只在理念之中移动，最后到达理念。”(511b-c) 理智最终认识的本原即统摄一切的原则——善。

三、洞穴的比喻

柏拉图对两个领域的区分有着强烈的现实针对性，寄托着哲学家的使命感和政治理想。他在“太阳”的比喻和“四线段”比喻之后，又以“洞穴”比喻说明了他的学说的现实意义。这是一个意味深长的故事。有一群人世代代居住在一个洞穴里，他们从出生时起就被铁链锁在固定地点，犹如囚徒，甚至连脖子也被锁住，不能回头或环顾，只能面壁直视眼前的场景。在他们的身后，有一堆火，在火与囚徒之间有一堵矮墙，墙后有人举着各种各样的雕像走过，火光将这些雕像投影在囚徒面对的洞壁上，形成多样的、变动着的影像。囚徒们的一生都犹如在看皮影戏，他们不能相互观望，不知道自己的模样，也不能回头看到造成影像的原因，他们都以为眼前晃动的影像就是真实的事物，用不同的名字称呼它们，仿佛这些影像就是真实的人、动物和植物。洞穴的环境可用下图表示。



囚徒们已经习惯了这种生活，他们并不感到悲惨，也没有挣脱锁链的念头。但是，有一个囚徒偶然挣脱了锁链，他移动脚步，回过头来，生平第一次看到炫目的光亮，火光会使他感到刺眼的痛楚，使他看不清原先已经习以为常的影像。经过一段时间的适应，他终于能够分清影像和雕像，明白雕像比影像更真实，影像是火造成的投影。他不顾刺目的难受，逼近火光，走向洞口。后来有人把他从陡峭的洞口拉出洞外。当他第一次看到阳光下的真实事物时，再次眼花缭乱，甚于初见火光时所受的痛苦。他只能慢慢适应阳光的照耀，先看阴影，再看水中映像，进而看事物本身，抬头看天上的月亮和星辰，最后直接观察太阳，知道太阳是岁月和季节的原因，主宰着世间万物。

很明显，洞内和洞外分别比喻两个领域；洞内的影像和雕像分别相当于“四线段”比喻中的形象和自然物（活物），被锁住的囚徒的观看是幻想，自由的囚徒在洞内的观看是信念。洞内的火相当于“太阳”比喻中的太阳，洞外的太阳相当于“太阳”比喻中的善，洞外的自由人看见的是理念，他的观看是知识，获得知识的渐进过程相当于借助“阴影”和“映像”的数学推理，以及逐步上升的辩证法，最后认识到最高原则和万物本原是善。至此，柏拉图讲述的是一个囚徒解放的历程，但这个故事却有一个悲壮结局。

再说这个解放了的囚徒，当他回想往事时，他在庆幸自己解放的同时，怜悯他的囚徒同胞。这些囚徒中最有智慧者，充其量不过是敏于发现倏忽即逝的影像、善于记住它

们出现的惯例、正确推测将出现的影像的可怜虫。知道事物真相的人不会向往洞穴中的荣誉和奖赏，按照他自己的意愿，宁愿在外面做贫困的主人，也不愿回到洞穴里当高级囚徒。但是，为了解放他的同胞，这个解放了的囚徒还是义无反顾地回到洞穴里。他的失败却是不可避免的。他从光明处来到黑暗处，已不能适应晃动的影像。别人会因为他看不清影像而嘲笑他，说他在外面弄坏了眼睛不合算。没有人相信他在外面看到的东西，他不得不在法庭和其他场合与他们论争幻觉和真理、偶像和原型的区分，因此激起众怒，恨不得把他处死。他虽然最终失败了，但却经历过真正的幸福，值得赞扬，因为他失败的原因是光明不能适应黑暗。他的同胞因为黑暗不能适应光明而未获解放，则是可悲叹的。

很明显，柏拉图借解放囚徒失败的故事比喻苏格拉底的悲剧。他从失败中汲取教训，总结了哲学家的使命和工作。按照他的想法，哲学家的兴趣在可知的理念，最高的目标是追求善；除此之外，他们没有世俗的兴趣和利益，包括参与政治的兴趣。他说：“达到这一高度的人不愿参与公众事务，他们的心灵渴望停留在上方；那些从神圣的沉思下降到世间生活的人会认为自己犯了愚蠢的过错。”（517d）然而，柏拉图又说，哲学家如同返回洞穴的自由人一样，他们为了其他人的利益，不得不放弃个人兴趣和思辨的幸福而参与政治。启蒙和解救陷于悲惨境地而毫无自觉的人，乃是哲学家的公民义务。柏拉图提出“哲学家王”的主张并不是因为当王符合哲学家的兴趣、利益和目标，而是因为哲学家当王符合国家与公众的利益。他说：“除非哲学家成为这个世界的王，或者我们现在称之为王和统治者的人真正成为哲学家，否则，国家的灾难，人类的灾难将没有尽头。”为了国家和整个人类的利益，政治权力和哲学要被同样人来掌握，“用一个排斥另一个的做法要被有力地禁止。”（473d-e）柏拉图还说，他犹豫再三才说出这样的话，因为很难找到一条既符合公共幸福又符合个人幸福的道路。看来，哲学家的命运只能是放弃个人思辨的幸福而为公众谋幸福，哲学家为公众谋幸福的途径是启蒙教育。

Selections from Plato's *Republic*

BOOK V

“Now then,” I said, “I am faced with that which I likened to the greatest of the waves; yet shall the word be spoken, even though the wave break and drown me in laughter and discredit; and do you mark my words.”^①

“Proceed.”

I said: “Until philosophers are kings in their cities, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils, —no, nor the human race, as I believe, —and then only will this our ideal State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day. Such was the thought, my dear Glaucon, which I would fain have uttered if it had not seemed too extravagant; for to be convinced that in no other State can there be happiness private or public is indeed a hard thing.”

“Socrates, what do you mean? I would have you consider that the word which you have uttered is one at which numerous persons, and very respectable persons too, in a figure pulling off their coats all in a moment and seizing any weapon that comes to hand, will run at you might and main before you know where you are, intending to do heaven knows what; and if you don't prepare an answer and make good your escape, you will be 'pared by their fine wits', and no mistake.”

“You got me into the scrape,” I said.

^① 以下对话主要在苏格拉底和格老孔(Glaucon)之间进行。这一段是苏格拉底的话,下一段是格老孔的回应,以此类推。

“And I was quite right; however, I will do all I can to protect you; but I can only give you goodwill and good advice, and, perhaps, I may be able to fit answers to your questions better than another—that is all. And now, having such an auxiliary, you must do your best to show the unbelievers that you are right.”^①

“I ought to try,” I said, “since you offer me such invaluable assistance. And I think that, if there is to be a chance of our escaping, we must explain to them whom we mean when we say that philosophers are to rule in the State; having brought them to light, our defence will be that there are some natures who ought to study philosophy and to be leaders in the State; and others who are not born to be philosophers, and are meant to be followers rather than leaders.”

“Then now for a definition,” he said.

“Follow me,” I said, “and I hope that I may in some way or other be able to give you a satisfactory explanation.”

“Proceed.”

“I dare say that you remember, and therefore I need not remind you, that a lover, if he is worthy of the name, ought to show his love, not to some one part of that which he loves, but to the whole.”

“Apparently you must remind me, for I have not fully understood.”

“Another person,” I said, “might fairly reply as you do; but a lover like yourself ought to be well aware that all who are in the flower of youth do somehow or other raise a pang or emotion in a lover’s breast, and are thought by him to be worthy of his affectionate regards. Is not this a way which you have with the fair; one has a snub nose, and you praise his charming face; the hook-nose of another has, you say, a royal look; while he who is neither snub nor hooked has the grace of regularity: the dark visage is manly, the fair are children of the gods; and as to the sweet ‘honey-pale’, as they are called, what is the very name but the invention of a lover who talks in diminutives, and is not averse to paleness if appearing on the cheek of youth? In a word, there is no excuse which you will not make, and nothing which you will not say, in order not to lose a single flower that blooms in the spring-time of youth.”

“If you make me an authority in matters of love, for the sake of the argument,” I assent.

“And what do you say of lovers of wine? Do you not see them doing the same? They are glad of any pretext of drinking any wine.”

“Very glad.”

“And the same is true, you must have noticed, of ambitious men; if they cannot command an army, they are willing to command a platoon; and if they cannot be hono-

① 以上各段提出了“哲学家王”的主张，以下是对这一主张的论证。以下开始为“哲学家”下定义。

ured by really great and important persons, they are glad to be honoured by lesser and meaner people, —for honour of some kind they must have.”

“Exactly.”

“Once more let me ask: Does he who is said to desire something, desire the whole class to which it belongs, or a part only?”

“The whole.”

“Thus we shall say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not of a part of wisdom only, but of the whole?”

“True.”

“And he who dislikes learning, especially in youth, when he has no power of judging what is good and what is not, such a one we maintain not to be a philosopher or a lover of knowledge, just as he who refuses his food is not hungry, and may be said to have a bad appetite and not a good one?”

“Very true,” he said.

“Whereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is curious to learn and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a philosopher? Am I not right?”

Glaucon said: “If curiosity makes a philosopher, you will find many a strange being will have a title to the name. All the lovers of sights have a delight in learning, and must therefore be included. Musical amateurs, too, are a folk strangely out of place among philosophers, for they are the last persons in the world who would come to anything like a philosophical discussion if they could help; while they run about at the Dionysiac festivals as if they had let out their ears for the season to hear every chorus, and miss no performance either in town or country. Now are we to maintain that all these and any who have similar tastes, as well as the professors of quite minor arts, are philosophers?”

“Certainly not,” I replied; “they are only an imitation.”

He said: “Who then are the true philosophers?”

“Those,” I said, “who are lovers of the vision of truth.”

“That is also good,” he said; “but I should like to know what you mean?”

“To another,” I replied, “I might have a difficulty in explaining; but I am sure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to make.”

“What is the proposition?”

“That since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are two?”

“Certainly.”

“And inasmuch as they are two, each of them is one?”

“True again.”

“And of just and unjust, good and evil, and of every other form, ① the same remark

① 型相, 希腊文 *eidos*。

holds: taken singly, each of them is one; but from the various combinations of them with actions and bodies and with one another, they are seen in all sorts of lights and appear many?"

"Very true."

"And this is the distinction which I draw between the sight-loving, art-loving, practical class which you have mentioned, and those of whom I am speaking, and who are alone worthy of the name of philosophers."

"How do you distinguish them?" He said.

"The lovers of sounds and sights," I replied, "are, as I conceive, fond of fine tones and colours and forms and all the artificial products that are made out of them, but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty."

"The fact is plain," he replied.

"Few are they who are able to attain to this ideal beauty and contemplate it."

"Very true."

"And he who, having a sense of beautiful things, has no sense of absolute beauty, or who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty, is unable to follow — of such a one I ask, Is he awake or in a dream only? Reflect: is not the dreamer, sleeping or waking, one who likens dissimilar things, who puts the copy in the place of the real object?"

"I should certainly say that such a one was dreaming."

"But he who, on the contrary, recognizes the existence of absolute beauty and is able to contemplate both the Idea and the objects which participate in^① it, neither putting the objects in the place of the Idea nor the Idea in the place of the objects — is he a dreamer, or is he awake?"

"He is wide awake."

"And since he knows, it would be right to describe his state of mind as knowledge, and the state of mind of the other, who opines only, as opinion?"

"Certainly."

"But suppose that the latter should quarrel with us and dispute our statement, can we administer any soothing cordial or advice to him, without revealing to him that there is sad disorder in his wits?"

"We must certainly offer him some good advice," he replied.

"Come, then, and let us think of something to say to him. Shall we begin by assuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he may have, and that we are rejoiced at his having it? But we should like to ask him a question: Does he who has knowledge know something or nothing? (You must answer for him.)"

"I answer that he knows something."

① 分有, 希腊文 *metechein*。

“Something that is or is not^①?”

“Something that is; for how can that which is not ever be known?”

“And are we assured, after looking at the matter from many points of view, that the fully real is or may be fully known, but that the utterly unreal is utterly unknown?”

“Nothing can be more certain.”

“Good. But if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be and not to be, that will have a place intermediate between pure being [reality] and the absolute negation of being?”

“Yes, between them.”

“And, as knowledge corresponded to being and ignorance must obviously correspond to not-being, we have now to discover, for this intermediate between being and not-being, a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge, if there be such?”

“Certainly.”

“Do we admit the existence of opinion?”

“Undoubtedly.”

“As being the same faculty as knowledge, or another?”

“Another.”

“Then opinion and knowledge have to do with different things, each according to its faculty?”

“Yes.”

“And knowledge is relative to being and knows being as it is. But before I proceed further I shall have to make a division.”

“What division?”

“I will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves; they are powers in us, and in all other things, by which we do as we do. Sight and hearing, for example, I should call faculties. Have I clearly explained the class which I mean?”

“Yes, I quite understand.”

“Then let me tell you my view about them. I do not perceive that a faculty^② has colour or figure, or any of those marks which enable me, in numerous cases, to differentiate one thing from another. In speaking of a faculty I think only of its sphere and its result; and that which has the same sphere and the same result I call the same faculty, but that which has another sphere and another result I call different. Would that be your way of speaking?”

“Yes.”

① “所是的东西”或“所不是的东西”，“是”即希腊文 *einai*。英文翻译为 *is* 或 *being*。

② 希腊文 *dynamis*，能力。

“And will you be so very good as to answer one more question? Would you say that knowledge is a faculty, or in what class would you place it?”

“Certainly knowledge is a faculty, and the mightiest of all faculties.”

“And is opinion^① also a faculty? Or is it to be ranked in another class?”

“No,” he said; “opinion is just that faculty whereby we are able to form an opinion.”

“But now you were acknowledging a little while ago that knowledge is not the same as opinion?”

“Why, yes,” he said; “how can any reasonable man ever identify that which is infallible with that which errs?”

“An excellent answer, proving,” I said, “that we are quite conscious of a distinction between them.”

“Yes.”

“Then knowledge and opinion, having distinct powers, are meant to operate in distinct spheres?”

“That is certain.”

“Being is the sphere of knowledge, and the function of knowledge is to know the nature of being?”

“Yes.”

“And that of opinion is to form an opinion?”

“Yes.”

“About the same object which is known to knowledge? and will the same thing be both known and opined? Or is that not possible?”

“Nay,” he replied, “That has been already disproven; if difference in faculty implies difference in the sphere, and if, as we say, opinion and knowledge are distinct faculties, then the sphere of knowledge and of opinion cannot be the same.”

“Then if being is the sphere of knowledge, something other than being must be the sphere of opinion?”

“Yes, something else.”

“Well then, is not-being the sphere of opinion? or, rather, how can there be even an opinion about that which is not? Reflect; when a man has an opinion, does he not refer it to something? Can he have an opinion which is an opinion about nothing?”

“Impossible.”

“He who has an opinion has an opinion about some one thing?”

“Yes.”

“And not-being is not one thing but, properly speaking, nothing?”

① 希腊文 *doxa*, 指意见, 与“知识”(episteme)和“无知”(agnoia)相对照。