



Marxism and Totality

*The Adventures of a Concept
from Lukács to Habermas*

Martin Jay

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
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Acknowledgments

It is never easy to pinpoint the moment when a book is conceived, but if one could be singled out for *Marxism and Totality*, it would have to be the day in September, 1969, when *Barron's*, the Dow Jones weekly newspaper, emblazoned its front page with the headline "Total Break with America." These defiant words were quoted from a talk at the fifth annual Social Scholars Conference held earlier that month at Hofstra University. The full quotation, which was repeated several times in the article and placed in a special box alongside equally inflammatory remarks by Ralph Schoenman and Robin Blackburn, read: "Our movement is a movement which, in effect, is a total break with America." Sentiments of this kind were, to be sure, not very unusual in the late 1960s, but what made them catch my eye was the fact that they were attributed to "Socialist Scholar Martin Jay."

To be featured so prominently in *Barron's* pathetic attempt to depict the handful of leftist academics at the conference as a serious threat to the American way of life was something of an honor. But, alas, it was an undeserved one. For although the words "total break with America" had indeed passed my lips, they were uttered in reference to an earlier remark by one of my predecessors on a panel devoted to the work of Herbert Marcuse. Rather than boasting that "our movement" was a "total break with America," I was in fact voicing my concern with the counter-productive rhetorical excess I saw in so global and sweeping a repudiation of everything that the word "America" suggested. The befuddled reporter from *Barron's* had thus credited me with upholding precisely the view I was trying to challenge.

The upshot of this episode was relatively harmless: unearned praise from my more radical friends and a few tense moments with one of my professors at Harvard, whose confidence in my scholarly promise had to be gradually restored. But in retrospect, *Barron's* blunder does seem to have had a long-term impact on my intellectual career. For in evoking the apocalyptic power of the image of a "total break," both for the radicals who espoused it and the conservatives it so frightened, the misquotation alerted me to the importance of totality in Marxist (and anti-Marxist) discourse. Thus, my first acknowledgment of gratitude must be extended to the stalwarts of responsible journalism at the Dow Jones weekly.

In the years since that headline appeared, I have incurred considerably more substantial debts that require a far less whimsical word of thanks. To begin where Marxist analyses traditionally do, with my material base of support, I have received generous financial assistance from the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the University of California Committee on Research. St. Antony's College, Oxford, graciously provided me a physical and collegial home when I was doing my initial research in 1974–75, and the University of Denver History Department was no less hospitable when I began to write in 1979–1980. The staff of the Institute of International Relations at Berkeley, most notably Peggy Nelson, cheerfully and competently typed the manuscript when the writing was done.

My personal debts are even more extensive and pleasing to record. Over the years, excellent research assistance has been provided by Herick Chapman, Steven Light, Stephen Treuer, Michael Bess, and Lois Pryor. My colleagues in the Berkeley History Department have been unflinchingly supportive of my work in a wide variety of ways. The shifting cast of characters in the Berkeley *Telos* group has helped me sharpen my ideas about many of the issues raised in the book. And I have benefited from my association with *Theory and Society*, whose founding editor, the late Alvin Gouldner, would have discovered many of his ideas scattered through my pages.

Several of the figures about whom I have written, Lucio Colletti, Michel Foucault, and Jürgen Habermas, kindly answered my questions either by mail or in person, as did Annie Goldmann, the widow of another. Friends who are themselves among the leading scholars of Western Marxism have read either part of or, in several especially hardy cases, the entire manuscript. In the former group are Alison Brown, Jean Cohen, Fred Dallmayr, Andrew Feenberg, Mary Evans, Maurice Finnochiaro, David Gross, Wayne Hudson, Barry Kätz, Paul Rabinow, Robert Resch, Gian

Enrico Rusconi, Gershon Schafir, Paul Piccone, Trent Schroyer, and Richard Wolin. The latter include Eugene Lunn, Mark Poster, and Paul Thomas. Their keen analytic scrutiny and remarkable knowledge of the material helped spare me many embarrassments. A special acknowledgment, however, must go to a deeply valued friend who read the entire manuscript not only with the eye of a scholar, but also with the passionate interest of someone who had participated in the intellectual events it recorded. What Herbert Marcuse wrote in the acknowledgments of his last book, *The Aesthetic Dimension*, can be repeated here without any emendation: "Leo Lowenthal has again proved his reputation as a fierce reader and critic."

I also would like to thank Alain Hénon of the University of California Press for his enthusiasm and encouragement from the moment I contacted him about the project. Not the least of his contributions was his assigning the manuscript to two extremely helpful readers, Walter Adamson and Paul Breines, whose astute comments helped refine my argument in important ways. No less helpful was the U.C. Press copyeditor, Kate Gross. I am also deeply grateful to Michael Bess and Lawrence Frohman for the arduous task of preparing the book's index.

Far less intellectual or professional in nature, but no less essential, is the debt I have incurred over the long gestation period of this book to members of my family. My parents, Edward and Sari Jay, and sister, Beth Jay, were consistently supportive in the ways that fortunate sons and brothers know so well. Although my father did not live to see the book's completion, I think he knew that I count myself in that company. My stepdaughter Shana, who was present when the research began, and daughter Rebecca, who arrived halfway through its completion, found other means of lightening my load, if on occasion they may have seemed to be doing the opposite. I hope they will come to forgive me for all the times totality prevented me from responding to their particular needs.

Finally, I have to record a unique debt that is at once material, intellectual and deeply personal. Catherine Gallagher, to whom this book is lovingly dedicated, has been its companion as well as my own ever since it began. Those who know her will see many of her strengths reflected in its pages.

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Introduction:

The Topography of Western Marxism

There are no easy ways to map the rugged and shifting terrain of the intellectual territory known as Western Marxism. Indeed, its very boundaries and most prominent features have themselves been the source of heated dispute.¹ Most commentators have followed the lead of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who in his 1955 study *Adventures of the Dialectic* popularized the term to designate the body of thought generated thirty-two years earlier by Georg Lukács' heterodox masterpiece, *History and Class Consciousness*.² For Merleau-Ponty and those who adopted his usage, Western

1. Much of the controversy was sparked by Perry Anderson's *Considerations on Western Marxism* (London, 1976). See, for example, the critical reviews by Jeffrey Herf in *Socialist Revolution* 7:5 (September–October 1977); Richard D. Wolff in *Monthly Review* 30:4 (September 1978); and Paul Piccone in *Telos* 30 (Winter 1976–77). See also my response to Piccone in *Telos* 32 (Summer 1977) and the rebuttal by Piccone and Andrew Arato in the same issue. With all of the confusion over its meaning, it is not surprising to find Stanley Aronowitz conclude in his recent book, *The Crisis in Historical Materialism: Class, Politics and Culture in Marxist Theory* (New York, 1981):

The term "Western" Marxism is a signifier that connotes no particular body of doctrine. Its historical function has been linked to the anti-Leninist movements of this century both as the object of accusation and, less often, a self-description of a melange of dissenters. Its theoretical status is not only ambiguous, it is problematic. (p. xiii)

An even clearer expression of uncertainty over the term's meaning appears in an article by Tom Long, "Marx and Western Marxism in the 1970s," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 24 (1980), where the author uses "Western Marxism" to include figures like Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida with the explanation:

I shall use "Western Marxism" to refer to certain self-proclaimed Marxists as well as certain self-proclaimed non-Marxists since Lukács who have in some important way taken up the challenge of Marx by probing the strengths and weaknesses of his theory from the perspective of the possibility of human emancipation. (p. 57)

2. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Adventures of the Dialectic*, trans. Joseph Bien (Evanston, 1973). The term's first use can be traced back to the polemical attack on Lukács and Korsch in 1923 by the Comintern. See the reference in Karl Korsch, *Marxism and Philosophy*, trans.

Marxism was thus identified solely with a subterranean tradition of humanist, subjectivist and undogmatic Marxism that was the negation of its official Soviet (or Eastern) counterpart. The latter had been turned into a doctrinaire ideology of legitimation by a tyrannical regime, whereas Western Marxism, nowhere in power, had retained the libertarian, emancipatory hopes of the socialist tradition.

In its Merleau-Pontyan version, the reason Western Marxism had preserved those hopes lay in its challenge to the scientific self-understanding of its orthodox rivals. Rather than trying to ape the methods of bourgeois science, Western Marxism recognized its true origins in the tradition of philosophical critique that began with Kant and German Idealism.³ In the vivid language of one of its most celebrated founders, Antonio Gramsci, Western Marxism demanded a revolution “against *Capital*,”⁴ that is, against the false belief that objective economic laws would automatically bring about the collapse of capitalism and the victory of the proletariat. Philosophical critique showed instead that radical change could come only when human action overthrew the man-made structures oppressing mankind.

Western Marxism, in this reading, was therefore opposed not only to the fatalistic economism of the Second International, but also to the voluntarist vanguardism of the Third. In contrast to both, it insisted that true praxis was a collective expression of self-emancipation involving all of mankind. The reawakening of the potential for such a collective subject was thus a central preoccupation of the Western Marxists who represented what another early exponent, Ernst Bloch, liked to call the “warm” rather than “cold” current of socialism.

Because Lukács, Gramsci, Bloch and others in the Western Marxist camp insisted on the importance of Marx’s debt to Hegel, Western Marx-

with intro. Fred Halliday (New York and London, 1970), pp. 119–20. But it was not until Merleau-Ponty’s work that the term became widely used. Here, too, there was some controversy over its meaning. See, for example, Raymond Aron, *Marxism and the Existentialists*, trans. Helen Weaver et al. (New York, 1969), p. 64, where it is claimed that “Western Marxism was in fact the Marxism of the Second International.”

3. For an identification of Western Marxism exclusively with Critical rather than Scientific Marxism, see Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Two Marxisms: Contradictions and Anomalies in the Development of Theory* (New York, 1980); for a critique of some of the problems with this identification, see Martin Jay, “For Gouldner: Reflections on an Outlaw Marxist,” *Theory and Society* 11:6 (November 1982).

4. Antonio Gramsci, “The Revolution Against *Capital*” in *History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci*, eds. Pedro Cavalcanti and Paul Piccone (St. Louis, 1975). Gramsci, it should be noted, was not contrasting “Western” and “Eastern” Marxism in this essay, which in fact is about the Bolshevik Revolution. His real target was the political quietism of the Second International.

ism in this view has often been equated with Hegelian Marxism. The recovery of Marx's early writings in the late 1920s and the subsequent publication of the *Grundrisse* a generation later helped strengthen this equation, as they demonstrated for many that Marx had indeed been what Lukács and the others had said he was: a radical Hegelian. Accordingly, such terms as alienation, mediation, objectification, and reification were understood to have a special place in the lexicon of Western Marxism. Culture, defined both widely as the realm of everyday life and narrowly as man's most noble artistic and intellectual achievements, was also a central concern of the tradition, which tended as a result to neglect the economy and, at times, politics. Western Marxism, therefore, meant a Marxism that was far more dialectical than materialist, at least as those terms were traditionally understood.

Defined in this way, Western Marxism was created by a loose circle of theorists who took their cue from Lukács and the other founding fathers of the immediate post-World War I era, Antonio Gramsci, Karl Korsch and Ernst Bloch. Included in their number were the members of the Frankfurt School, notably Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Lowenthal and Walter Benjamin; the French Hegelian Marxists Henri Lefebvre and Lucien Goldmann; and the existentialist Marxists, Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Certain other figures were frequently admitted to their ranks, in particular Bertolt Brecht, Wilhelm Reich, Erich Fromm, the Council Communists in Holland, the *Arguments* group in France, and second-generation Frankfurt School members like Jürgen Habermas and Alfred Schmidt. And still others like Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Leo Kofler, Franz Jakubowsky, Claude Lefort and Cornelius Castoriadis were sometimes candidates for inclusion.

This traditional conception of Western Marxism has generally been held by both its friends and enemies.⁵ Or at least it was until the publication of Perry Anderson's *Considerations on Western Marxism* in 1976.⁶ For Anderson, who writes from an Anglo-Trotskyist perspective outside the tradition, Western Marxism should also include the anti-Hegelian critics of Marxist Humanism who came to prominence in Italy and France after World War II, the schools of Galvano Della Volpe and Louis Althusser. Rather than contending that critical and scientific Marxists are two sepa-

5. For examples of its enemies who use it in this way, see Lucio Colletti, *Marxism and Hegel*, trans. Lawrence Garner (London, 1973), p. 189; and Neil McInnes, *The Western Marxists* (London, 1972), which twists many of Colletti's arguments in a crudely anti-Marxist direction, thus anticipating Colletti's own later use of them.

6. See note 1. Anderson's book was intended as the opening essay for a collection of articles on Western Marxism, which the *New Left Review* then published independently as *Western Marxism: A Critical Reader* (London, 1977).

rate breeds, one calling for a revolution against *Capital* and the other defending its continued relevance, Anderson argues that certain shared characteristics allow them to be placed roughly in a common camp.

Although one might justifiably question Anderson's choice of precisely who belongs to this enlarged camp—he ignores, for example, Bloch, Reich and Habermas, as well as all English Marxists⁷—his general point does seem to be well taken. Far too much has occurred both in theory and in practice since 1955 to permit us to remain content with Merleau-Ponty's initial definition. To help us decide who should be included under the rubric now, Wittgenstein's notion of “family resemblances” tells us that no perfectly uniform set of characteristics need be found to identify members of a collective entity. Insofar as both neo-Hegelians and anti-Hegelians share certain other traits that cut across their antagonism over Marx's debt to German Idealism, they can be understood as cousins, if not brothers, in an extended family. When compared with other Marxist traditions, such as Social Democracy, Austro-Marxism, Stalinism, Trotskyism or Maoism, these commonalities become more obvious. In acknowledging them, we can discern certain unexpected alliances that cut across the boundary determined solely by their attitudes toward Hegel or humanism. We will also avoid the petty sectarianism of those who jealously guard the purity of their version of the tradition against all the rest.

The most obvious common denominator among Western Marxists is that all were born or came of intellectual age in continental Western Europe. This sets them apart from the generation of Marxist intellectuals maturing directly before World War I, typified by Lenin, Luxemburg, Hilferding, Bukharin, Trotsky, and Bauer, who had less direct contact with Western European intellectual traditions. Apparent exceptions, such as Lukács, born in Hungary, and Goldmann, originally from Rumania,

7. The exclusion of English Marxists like Maurice Dobb, Christopher Caudwell, Maurice Cornforth, Eric Hobsbawm, Christopher Hill and Raymond Williams is a source of particular chagrin to Richard Wolff in his review of Anderson in *Monthly Review* 30:4 (p. 56). Insofar as the introduction of continental thought to England by Anderson and his *New Left Review* colleagues was intended as, and understood by its targets to be, a corrective to the insularity of British Marxism, it is appropriate to distinguish Western from Anglo-Marxism, at least until the 1970s. The ongoing polemic between Anderson and E. P. Thompson demonstrates many of the tensions between the two traditions. See E. P. Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays* (New York, 1978) and Perry Anderson, *Arguments Within English Marxism* (London, 1980).

One very important distinction between continental and English Marxism was, in fact, the far greater importance accorded by the former to the concept of totality. Aside from several suggestive references to culture as a “whole way of life” in the early work of Williams, totality did not really enter the English debate until the Althusserian wave of the 1970s. Many English Marxists were historians with that discipline's characteristic distaste for generalizing concepts.

can be included by virtue of the German and French contexts in which they matured intellectually. Although the influence of Hungarian intellectuals, such as the poet Endre Ady and the syndicalist Ervin Szabó, can be detected on the early Lukács, his most formative philosophical experiences occurred in Heidelberg in the 1910s. And even though he spent most of his later life in Budapest and Moscow, the impact of his work was felt far more keenly in Western than in Eastern Europe. As for Goldmann, his most significant intellectual training took place in Paris and Geneva, not the Bucharest which he left when he was only twenty. A third possible exception to the rule, Louis Althusser, was born in Algeria, but he was schooled in Marseilles and Paris. The other major Western Marxists, both Hegelian and anti-Hegelian, were born and intellectually nurtured in France, Italy, and Germany, although a number came to spend several years in American exile during the fascist era. (Significantly, of those forced to emigrate only Lukács went eastward.)

The impact of that period combined with subsequent translations of major works meant that American outposts of Western Marxism had developed by the 1960s. But on the whole, their occupants merely absorbed and adapted ideas that had been developed in Europe over the previous half century. A similar situation prevailed in England, where the *New Left Review* was the major conduit of continental ideas. The same derivative status may be accorded the reception of Western Marxist ideas in the countries under Soviet control after the Second World War. Although such thinkers as the Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski (during this Marxist Humanist phase) and the Czech philosopher Karel Kosík were certainly important in their own right, their work was nonetheless built upon the earlier thought of Western Marxists, as was that of the Yugoslav theoreticians published in the journal *Praxis*.⁸

Western Marxism also earned its name through the doggedly consistent Eurocentrism of most of its adherents, both Hegelian and anti-Hegelian. Walter Benjamin's suicide on the brink of his departure from Europe for America in 1940 may be seen as an idiosyncratically extreme expression of that inclination. But many of those who did emigrate

8. The concept of totality was particularly important in the work of Kosík. See especially Karel Kosík, *Dialectics of the Concrete: A Study on Problems of Man and World*, trans. Karel Kovanda with James Schmidt (Dordrecht, 1976). It was also frequently used by contributors to *Praxis*. See the discussion in Gerson S. Sher, *Praxis: Marxist Criticism and Dissent in Socialist Yugoslavia* (London, 1977), p. 84f. One should also mention the so-called Budapest School that developed around Lukács in his later years, the members of which, in most cases, were forced into exile after his death. Its most notable figures are Agnes Heller, Ferenc Feher, György Márkus, Maria Márkus, Mihály Vajda and Andras Hegedüs. As would be expected, the concept of totality often played a key role in their work.

to America—Horkheimer, Adorno, Bloch, Brecht—returned home at the first opportunity.

Although impressed and troubled by the example of the Russian Revolution, whose implications they heatedly debated for decades, the Western Marxists remained true to Marx's expectation that a genuine socialist revolution could succeed only in the most advanced capitalist societies. If occasionally finding something to praise in the Chinese Revolution, they rarely derived anything of real theoretical substance from the thoughts of its revered leader.⁹ And even though they staunchly supported the process of decolonization, few believed global revolution could be led by the emerging Third World.

Geographically, then, Western Marxism can be located in continental Western Europe, even though certain of its members spent considerable amounts of time elsewhere. Temporally, the pattern is somewhat more complicated. Anderson suggests that it may be divided into two or possibly three generations: those born in the fifteen years before the turn of the century, who were radicalized by the First World War and its aftermath—Lukács (b. 1885), Bloch (b. 1885), Korsch (b. 1886), Gramsci (b. 1891), Benjamin (b. 1892), Horkheimer (b. 1895), Reich (b. 1897), Brecht (b. 1898) and Marcuse (b. 1898); those born after 1900 and radicalized in the interwar period or during the Second World War—Lowenthal (b. 1900), Lefebvre (b. 1901), Adorno (b. 1903), Sartre (b. 1905), Merleau-Ponty (b. 1908), Goldmann (b. 1913), and Althusser (b. 1918); and those born after the First World War and whose political education came after the Second—Colletti (b. 1924) and Habermas (b. 1929). The only major exception to this pattern is Della Volpe, who was born in 1897 but became a Marxist only near the end of World War II. As might be expected, each generation tended to concentrate on the different issues central to their life histories, such as the Bolshevik Revolution, the rise of Fascism, or the political significance of the Resistance. Similarly, each was open to influences from non-Marxist schools of thought such as psychoanalysis, existentialism, and structuralism, according to the coincidence of those competing systems with their own intellectual development.

One of the generalizations Anderson attempts to make about generational uniformity is that the earliest group tended to find a closer link between its theory and political practice than the later ones. From the eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach onwards Marxism has, of course, been preoccupied with the necessity of forging that link. During the era of the Second Interna-

9. The only exception to this generalization was Althusser. See *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York, 1970).

tional, many Marxists thought they had discovered the means to do so, although of course there were serious clashes over the organizational and tactical form which theoretically directed practice was to take. Western Marxism, like Leninism, grew out of a disillusionment with the results of the Second International's theory-practice nexus. But whereas Leninism tended to change its practice without seriously questioning the theory it had inherited, Western Marxism understood the need to revise both. For while recognizing that there had indeed been a connection between theory and practice before 1914, the Western Marxists argued that it was a most unfortunate one. The scientific, determinist economic theory of Engels, Kautsky, Plekhanov et al. had contributed to the bureaucratic, non-revolutionary, and ultimately impotent politics of the Second International's mass parties, most notably the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). In fact, if there is anything on which Western Marxists, neo-Hegelian and anti-Hegelian alike, completely agreed, it is the utter repudiation of the legacy of the Second International. Only towards the work of Rosa Luxemburg, whose political radicalism seemed more attractive than her theoretical orthodoxy, did they make an exception.

Less uniform was their response to the new attempts to unify theory and practice after World War I, when the bureaucratic model of the Second International was discredited. Schematically put, these attempts were reducible to the Bolshevik model of small, disciplined vanguard parties and the alternative, more "leftist" council-communist model of soviets or *Räte*. Initially, it seemed to some in the first generation that there was no real contradiction between the two, but ultimately a choice had to be made. A few like Lukács and, somewhat less decisively, Gramsci chose the party; others like Korsch opted for the councils, even though they realized the impracticality of their choice in the short run.¹⁰ In the subsequent generations, fewer were drawn to the Leninist alternative, although at times Althusser, Della Volpe, Lefebvre and Colletti found it enticing. The majority were attracted to more libertarian modes of political activism like the councils out of a sober realization that the Soviet Union's sorry history had compromised Leninism irreparably. In some cases, this insistence on a Marxism that would not surrender its theoretical purity and

10. For a discussion of the importance of the councils in the origins of Western Marxism, see Russell Jacoby, *Dialectic of Defeat: Contours of Western Marxism* (Cambridge, 1981). Although the main theoretician of Council Communism, Anton Pannekoek, seems to have derived much of his inspiration from the vulgar Marxist philosophy of Joseph Dietzgen, he was nonetheless hostile to crude materialism in ways that have earned him a tentative comparison with the early Western Marxists. See the discussions in Serge Bricianer, *Pannekoek and the Workers' Councils*, intro. John Gerber, trans. Malachy Carroll (St. Louis, 1978); and D. A. Smart, ed., *Pannekoek and Gorter's Marxism* (London, 1978).

high aspirations meant a tenacious, even desperate search for historical “subjects” who would regain the momentum lost when the councils were defeated after the First World War. The so-called “existentialist Marxists” in France and Marcuse in America thought they found a possible surrogate in the counter-cultural student movement of the late 1960s, but they came to recognize the prematurity of their optimism. Others such as Goldmann sought an alternative in the “new working class” of technicians and white collar workers defined by Serge Mallet and André Gorz in France and Victor Foa and Bruno Trentin in Italy. Still others, primarily Adorno and Horkheimer, retreated from the hope that such a subject could be discovered in the near future and fell back on a nuanced defense of theory as itself a form of non-resigned practice.

However they may have “resolved” their dilemma, Western Marxists rarely, if ever, deluded themselves into believing that theirs was a time in which the unity of theory and practice was easily achieved. In fact, after the early 1920s Western Marxism was marked by a growing pessimism. Although moments of renewed hope appeared during the Resistance era and in the late 1960s, by and large Western Marxism never regained the confidence characteristic of its most utopian period, after the end of World War I. It experienced instead what one recent commentator has called a “dialectic of defeat.”¹¹

None of its major figures, however, underwent the kind of extreme “God that failed” disillusionment so frequent among more orthodox Communist defectors. Except for the former Althusserians who became leaders of the “New Philosophy” in France after 1975, and perhaps the later Horkheimer, Western Marxists did not move radically to the right. Instead, they directed a great deal of their intellectual energy towards investigating the means by which advanced capitalism prevented the unity of theory and practice from being achieved. The critical role of culture in this process was affirmed as it could not have been during the era of the Second International, when the primacy of the economy was an unchallenged article of faith. Having originally come to Marxism in the hope that it would address the crisis in bourgeois culture, many Western Marxists continued to be preoccupied with cultural questions.

Marxist aesthetics, in fact, came of age during the Western Marxist era in the writings of Lukács, Brecht, Bloch, the Frankfurt School, Benjamin, Sartre, Goldmann, Della Volpe, and Althusser. Their work went well be-

11. Jacoby, *Dialectic of Defeat*, which sets out to challenge “the ethos of success that has drained off the critical impulse of Marxism” and to “salvage a Western Marxism that rarely knew victory” (p. 4).

yond the scattered observations of Marx and Engels¹² on cultural questions, and was a major advance over the reductionist theories of Plekhanov, Mehring and others in the Second International. If one adds the name of Raymond Williams,¹³ perhaps the only English Marxist able to hold his own with his continental peers, it can be plausibly argued that Western Marxism has enriched cultural theory more than economic or political theory. Hegelian and non-Hegelian Marxists alike have recognized that the problem of “cultural hegemony,” as Gramsci called it, was key to understanding the staying power of capitalism. Furthermore, many understood that a purely “scientific” theory gives little indication of the potential advantages of socialism beyond the abolition of economic exploitation.

In its efforts to understand the resilience of capitalism, Western Marxism was also generally open to psychological explanations of the unexpected turns taken by advanced capitalist society, in particular the advent of Fascism in the interwar period. Although a few of the older generation, most notably Lukács and Korsch, remained absolutely anti-psychological, Western Marxists tended to take the challenge of Freud and his successors very seriously. Some added forms of psychological estrangement to the other expressions of alienation in the experience of everyday life. Others argued that emancipatory praxis had to include a form of collective, and perhaps even individual, radical therapy. Still others, who were less impressed by the direct therapeutic benefits of psychology, claimed that psychoanalysis could be used on a purely theoretical level to enrich Marxism’s sensitivity to the subtle nature of human needs and gratification. Yet another group teased out the linguistic implications of Freudian theory to bring to life an entire dimension of Marxism hitherto underdeveloped; even anti-subjectivist theorists such as Althusser were able to find in Freud an inspiration for their work. Those who felt Freud was insufficient in certain ways found Gestalt psychology or Piaget’s genetic structuralism useful instead.

Western Marxism’s openness to psychology in general and psychoanalysis in particular was, in fact, only one manifestation of its essential readiness to draw on non-Marxist intellectual currents to make up de-

12. For a selection of their thoughts on aesthetics, see *Marx and Engels on Literature and Art*, ed. Lee Baxandall and Stefan Morawski, intro. Lee Baxandall (St. Louis, 1973).

13. For a recent retrospective analysis of Williams’ remarkable career, see the interviews he gave the *New Left Review* in *Politics and Letters* (London, 1979). One of his former students and a frequent critic, Terry Eagleton, might also be included in the list of major Western Marxist aestheticians. Or at least so Eagleton confidently tells us. See his *Walter Benjamin: Or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism* (London, 1981), p. 96. For an analysis of some of the problems in both Williams and Eagleton, see Catherine Gallagher, “The New Materialism in Marxist Aesthetics,” *Theory and Society* 9:4 (July 1980).