



中国发展模式 与失衡预警机制

—— 大国发展经济学

李德伟等著

人民日报出版社

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作 者: 李德伟 等著

出版人: 董 伟

责任编辑: 宋 娜

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
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作者在斯坦福大学做访问学者（2009—2010年）

本书是作者在美国辛辛拉提大学和斯坦福大学（2008-2010年）
做高级访问学者时完成的。

As a child he received books from the library of the Cultural Revolution—but Little West has since made education central to Chinese policy, writes Ethan Ottow.

Before the 1960s, the only way to get a good education was to go to a boarding school. Many of these schools were founded by the Quakers, and they were known for their high standards of education. The Quakers were a religious group that believed in equality and peace. They were also known for their commitment to education. Many of the boarding schools were founded by Quakers, and they were known for their high standards of education. The Quakers were a religious group that believed in equality and peace. They were also known for their commitment to education. Many of the boarding schools were founded by Quakers, and they were known for their high standards of education.



Prison and health care, particularly for African Americans, will be the focus of a book by the author, *Prison and Politics: The Struggle for Health Care in the United States*, published by the University of California Press. The book is a collection of essays that explore the role of the state in the provision of health care to prisoners and the impact of race on the quality of care. The author argues that the state has a responsibility to provide health care to all citizens, including prisoners, and that the current system of care is inadequate and discriminatory.

into a waiting list, especially when there is a limited number of available slots. And while the waiting list is not a guarantee, it is a strong indication that the program is in high demand.

[illegible]

In the 1980s, *Partridge* was one of a small group of writers who wrote about the gay community. *Partridge* was one of the first to write about the gay community. *Partridge* was one of the first to write about the gay community. *Partridge* was one of the first to write about the gay community.

[illegible][illegible]

I had a very clear aim to push forward Chinese economic reform

- Li De Wei (left)

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

...the ...
...the ...
...the ...

[illegible]

James H. Thompson, Jr., president of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, says that the industry is "not in a position to make any statement" regarding the proposed legislation. He adds that the industry is "not in a position to make any statement" regarding the proposed legislation.

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

Nobody likes it when someone stamps on a request, but the Scots want everyone to do it and try that here, writes Arminia Wallace

When the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) announced its decision in *Beck*, it was not only the first time in 20 years that the board had ruled against a union, but also the first time it had ruled against a union in a case involving a public employee. The decision was a landmark in the history of public employee unions, and it was a major victory for the American Federation of Teachers (AFT).

the fact that the two great nations of the world are now at war. It is a time when the people of the world are united in a common purpose, and when the people of the United States are united in a common purpose. It is a time when the people of the United States are united in a common purpose, and when the people of the world are united in a common purpose.

[illegible]

对李德伟的长篇报道译文

智慧的追求

当他还是一个孩子的时候，他曾经从文化大革命大火中抢救书本——但是，李德伟后来却把教育作为中国国策的核心。芬坦·欧托写道。

李德伟，中国广西工学院院长（注：2008 年调北京国家工商总局行政学院），他在上中学的时候，无学可上，但现在是中国共产党内的学者型官员之一。他的故乡是鱼米之乡湖南省的省会长沙，他家曾经从事纺织行业，靠生产羽绒被——一种流行的御寒品为生。当革命改变了他家的局面，但并没有改变他对教育的热爱。当他还是一个孩子的时候，他读书如渴。他接受了一个良好的小学教育，但后来遭遇了文化大革命。那时，老师们遭到批判，中小学和大学都被关闭了，而学生们都加入了红卫兵，读书被视为修正主义的奴化形式而停止了。

“我的中学教育是自学。”他对此记忆犹新。他被招工进厂后，仍然沉醉于书本中。他从旧书摊上搜索到各种文学、历史、经济学、哲学、物理和数学等书籍，他也曾悄悄地从狂热的造反派准备焚书的大火中抢救出书本。

有时候，为了买到他已经读过第一册书的续集第二、三册，他长途跋涉到听说有这些书籍的城市去买书，没有钱买车票，他就爬火车。就这样，他读完了他所能得到的书，在文化大革命结束时，高等教育重新开始，他通过考试进入南京大学。

他按照自己的意愿自学，涉猎广泛，正是这种经历把他塑造成现在的他，一个具有深刻历史感和远见卓识，能够洞察中国最深层次复杂性的经济学家。

无论如何，即使李德伟早期为受教育所作出的奋斗反映了知

识分子经历过的危险，但他后来的生涯也表明中国能够向她的那些愿意并且能够留在执政的共产党内的思想家提供唯一机会。李博士是这样的人，他决不盲从西方世界影响，他既是一个富于独创性并且充满活力的学者，同时也是一个职业的管理者和政治家，既能够影响政府决策也能够执行政策。他曾经是国家计划委员会的高级研究员，也曾经在实行改革过程的地方实施经济试点。他在南方大省广西的大城市柳州市担任副市长。他的观点大部分被认为属于有争议的边缘，甚至与传统对立，但后来越来越多地被采纳为共产党的正统政策。

70 年代末，他曾经在南京大学与一个比利时学生是朋友，这给他提供了到欧洲继续求学的机会。但是，他决定不这样做。他的根在湖南，这是中国共产主义的战场，也是毛泽东、刘少奇、彭德怀和其他早期共产党领袖人物的故乡。

“由于出生于湖南，那里的人们深受毛泽东的影响，我的梦想是为祖国贡献自己的一切。通过自学，我掌握了很多有关中国经济、政治、历史的知识，我觉得我能够形成关于中国发展的理论。我决定留在中国。”

但是，在改革初期，他的观点与当时党的传统理论不一致。1980 年，他还在南京大学的时候，写过一篇文章，在文中，他认为：中国经济应该允许多种所有制经济成分，而不是只有单一的国有制。他被批评为“与马克思说的不一致”，这样的指责在那些年中可能引起可怕的后果。但是，在邓小平领导的经济改革新时代，却得到广泛的实施，在一定程度内，经济政策需要在讨论中被检验。

随着时间流逝以及意识到市场经济制度原理在中国没有被正确理解，相对自由的理论探索成为可能。这个时候，他到北京在中国社会科学院读研究生，那里的气氛是开放的。“社科院有很自由的研究环境，教师们知道他们实际上并不了解国际上的前沿知识，他们也不可能教给我们这些知识。但是，他们非常明智，他们允许我们按自己的方式学习。因此，我们有机会寻找教科书

或其他书籍来教自己。我拥有明确的学习目标，推进中国经济改革。”他组织了一个研究团体，并很快开始与国家体改委、中央农村政策研究室联系。

“这些活动不仅提供了机会学习，而且也直接参与了经济改革决策。正是在那个时期，我形成了相当明确的关于中国改革道路的观点。我认为，中国的趋势必将与国际经济一体化。”

李德伟博士被调到国家经济委员会，开始影响政策。他提出了国有企业投标承包制度，他主张：国有企业应该让政府的所有权实行分离，形成新的国有制，这部分地模仿欧洲的利润分享制和工人参与制。1987年，他还提出了自己的中国发展理论，令人吃惊地既不同于毛主义旧的传统理论，也与当时的改革政策相左。然而，李的理论中心内容是系统的：中国不可能走传统工业化道路，过去所有这样的企图都必然地失败了。

李德伟相信：长期困扰中国的一个问题是：她的留学归来的知识分子和经济学家，蔑视中国的不发展，试图推行西方的现代化理论。然而，他们的努力总是归于失败。

李认为，由于中国拥有巨大的人口，而人口众多的大国不同于西方人口较少的小国。这种主张不仅是从历史角度看，而且对中国现代的发展具有特别重要的意义。如果他是正确的，这意味着，中国21世纪由政策推动的发展不能简单地追随欧洲和美国18、19世纪从农业经济向工业经济转化的老路。

李德伟的大国经济理论涉及宏观经济和微观经济观念和大数定律，一言以蔽之，归结为一个简单的问题：剩余劳动力。传统的工业化包含着劳动力从劳动密集型农业向资本密集型工业深刻的转化。由于工业至少在最初不能雇佣所有的来自农村的劳动力，因此引起尖锐的剩余劳动力问题。李认为，正是如何解决这个问题的方式，使中国这样的大国与工业革命发生时期的英国那样的欧洲国家产生了基本的差别。

“在英国，”他说，“工业革命时期，剩余劳动力能够迁移到殖民地国家，如澳大利亚、新西兰、美洲。因为英国当时是最

先进的经济，他们能够从国际贸易中赢利，他们的殖民地给他们提供了原材料来源和新的市场，因此，英国能够成功地完成转型。尽管拥有所有这些先发优势，他们仍然遇到过剩劳动力问题，以及由此而来的严重的社会问题，正如《雾都孤儿》所描写的那样。

“然而，对于中国而言，这不仅引发社会问题，而且导致社会崩溃。中国转化产生的剩余劳动力将不是数以百万计，而是数以亿计，如果没有食物和住所，将会引起造反。事实上，在中国历史上，已经发生过多多次造反，每一次都迫使中国的工业化回到起点。这意味着：不能容纳这些劳动力的资本密集型的工业重回到能够容纳这些劳动力的小农经济。”

“中国致力于维持内部一致，意味着她不可能进行扩张主义战争，像欧洲的统治者曾经做过的那样瓜分掠夺殖民地，使用他们的一些剩余工人。她的地理环境意味着几乎没有地方可以迁移出她的多余的工人，（中国人在 19 世纪曾迁移到美国，但这股潮流被对黄祸的歇斯的里制止了。）因此，她试图通过现代化成为工业国家的努力总是受阻于无法吸收从劳动密集型的农业流出的人口。19 世纪和 20 世纪初进步的改革者的企图都失败了，同样，李认为，早期共产党实现苏联模式的努力也同样失败了。后来，毛泽东英明地将注意力集中到农民群众，他把从旧地主那里夺过来的土地分给他们。实际上，这样做为市场经济发展提供了一个基石。这实际上与邓小平在 80 年代所做的事一样。毛因此创立了正确的理论。但是，后来，他开始进行集体化和文化大革命，推进苏联模式，脱离了中国的实际。”

李认为，邓小平通过将土地使用权适当地分给农民，重新恢复了市场经济的基础，直接为中国未来提供了稳定的粮食供应。但是，中国仍然面临着如何解决在实现现代化的同时不至于产生大量剩余劳动力的严重问题，这仍然可能导致社会动乱并迫使整个过程回到原来的起点。即使有一条解脱这个循环的出路，现在又产生了另一个使传统工业化无法持续进行的问题——环境问题。

中国脆弱的生态系统不能处理传统重工业引起的危害,而为了满足这些传统工业的要求,世界要耗尽它的资源。

早在 1987 年,他就精心创立了这个理论,李的观点也含蓄地不同意允许外国公司剥削中国丰富的廉价劳动力资源。他说,中国输出劳动密集型产品,进口资本密集型产品,贸易条件是很不平等的。中国如果继续维持在贸易中巨大的不利局面,那么,贸易量越大,中国将越落后。如果这种趋势继续的话,中国将无法追赶世界水平,相反,差距会越来越大。

李提出解决问题的办法是:中国不能试图盲从西方的工业化历史,而要直接从农业向高新技术产业和服务业经济发展,如果我们采纳这一途径,我们将得到第一流的人力资源。我们在软件和 IT 产业、医药产业、生物、新材料和新能源产业上与世界处于同一起跑线。如果说要积累资金,从这些产业比从劳动密集型产业积累得更多,而且,始终更接近于国际水平。

“在 80 年代我写此文时,清华大学的软件设计是处于世界水平的,那时,世界上还没有比尔·盖茨。如果从那时候起,中国更重视发展高新技术产业,那么比尔·盖茨将是中国人。遗憾的是,没有人听我的话。”

当然,面对中国虽然出现了一系列历史创伤,是否将有能力实现 80 年代末的飞跃的问题,李的讨论没有诉诸沉醉于将传统工业化观点当作现代化圣杯的观点,而是继续阐述说,中央政府应该将资源投入教育,这是可以将农民的孩子转变为熟练的高技术工人,而不是将钱全部倾倒在发展重工业上。这种办法在某些国家已经成功了,如战后日本、韩国、爱尔兰等等,这些国家都是优先发展教育,因此,他们的农民通过教育变成能在新型工业中工作的人才。因此,农民造反不会发生。如果比较培养人才的成本与投资钢铁、汽车等传统产业的成本,将是微不足道。

到 90 年代末,他决定到广西基层去,将他的理论投入实践。李博士的理论得到采纳,他的主张现在与中央政府政策完全一致。做好这项工作需要巨大的资金投入教育,这是长期以来被共

产党政府忽视的领域。如果成为现实, 这个从大火中抢救书本的孩子将创造出更富有生命力的思想火花。

《爱尔兰时报》 芬坦·托妥 2006年8月15日

Intellectual Pursuits

As a child he rescued books from the fires of the Cultural Revolution - but Li De Wei has since made education central to Chinese policy, writes **Fintan O'Toole**.

By the time Li De Wei was ready to go to secondary school, there was no secondary school to go to. Now president of Guangxi University of Technology, and one of the leading intellectuals in the Chinese Communist Party, he grew up in the big city of Changsha, capital of the great rice-producing province of Hunan. His family had been in the clothing business and made money by producing a popular winter coat, but lost its status in the revolution. It did not lose its love of education and, as a child, Li was an enthusiastic reader. But after a good primary education, he emerged into the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, when teachers were targeted for abuse, schools and universities were shut down while their students joined the Red Guards, and learning was dismissed as a form of enslavement to the corrupt past.

"My secondary education," he remembers, "was self-education."

Sent to work as a labourer, he remained nonetheless obsessed with books. He rifled the remaining second-hand book stalls for works of literature, history, economics, philosophy, physics and mathematics. He quietly rescued books from the bonfires that had been prepared for them by zealous revolutionaries.

He stowed away on trains when he didn't have the money for the fare, taking long journeys to towns where, he had heard, he could find the second or third volume of a work he had started to read. He learned enough to be able, when the Cultural Revolution ended and

higher education started up again, to pass the entrance exams for Nanjing University.

His self-education was haphazard but broad, and it would make him what he is now: an economist with an expansive sense of history and a vision broad enough to make sense of some of China's deepest complexities.

Yet, if Li De Wei's early struggle for an education typifies the difficult and dangerous experience of intellectuals, his subsequent career illustrates the unique opportunities that China can afford to those of its thinkers who are willing and able to remain within the ruling Communist Party. Dr Li is the kind of figure who has few obvious parallels in the West: a passionate scholar with an original mind who is also a career administrator and politician, able both to influence government policy and to implement it. He has been a senior figure in the State Planning Commission, the architect of local economic experiments that have tested the reform process, and deputy mayor of the large city of Liuzhou, in the large southern region of Guangxi. And his ideas, once bordering on the heretical, are being increasingly accepted as Communist Party orthodoxy.

Those ideas have been shaped in large part by a decision that might have seemed parochial, even reactionary. He was friendly with a Belgian student at Nanjing in the late 1970s and was offered the chance to continue his studies in Europe. But he decided not to do so. His roots were in Hunan, the cockpit of Chinese communism and the birthplace of Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai and other early Communist Party leaders.

"Being from Hunan, where Mao's example had a special significance for local people, my dream was to contribute as much as I can to China. Because I had a lot of self-taught knowledge of Chinese economics, politics and history, I felt I could form a theory of Chinese

development. I made the decision to stay in China."

From very early on, however, his ideas were at odds with the Party orthodoxies of the time. In 1980, while still at Nanjing, he wrote an article saying that the Chinese economy should be run with a variety of forms of ownership rather than through a single system of state ownership, and he was criticised for being "anti-Marxist". Such a charge might have had dire consequences just a few years earlier, but in the new era of economic reform under Deng Xiaoping, there was a broad realisation that, within bounds, economic policy needed to be tested in debate.

THE FLUIDITY OF the times, and the awareness that the market economy was a system whose principles were not well understood in China, made it possible to develop ideas with relative freedom. When he went to Beijing to do postgraduate research at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Cass), the atmosphere was one of openness. "Cass had quite a free environment for research. The lecturers knew they didn't really understand the leading edge of international knowledge. They couldn't teach us.

"However, they were very intelligent. They gave us freedom to learn the way we wanted. We had the chance to look for textbooks or any other source to teach ourselves. I had a very clear aim: to push forward Chinese economic reform." He formed a research group that quickly began to liaise with the state committee for reform and the Party's agricultural policy research centre.

"These activities provided a chance to learn but also to participate directly in policy-making for economic reform. From that, I formed quite a clear view of which way China would go. I realised the trend was that China would be integrated into the international economy."

Dr Li moved into the state planning commission, and began to influence policy. He worked out bidding systems for the awarding of

state contracts, and argued that state enterprises should move away from government ownership towards new forms of public ownership, partly modelled on European systems of profit sharing and employee participation. But he also worked on his own theory of Chinese development and, as it emerged in 1987, it was startlingly at odds, not just with the old Maoist orthodoxy but with the general thrust of the new reform policies as well. For Li's central contention was stark: China could not industrialise and all attempts to do so were doomed to fail.

Li De Wei believes that one of China's perennial problems has been that its intellectuals and economists have studied abroad, come back with a contempt for Chinese underdevelopment and tried to apply western models of modernisation. Their efforts consistently failed, he argues, because China has a huge population and countries with huge populations are different. The argument is not just historical, but has vast implications for China's current development. If he is right, that development has to be driven by policies that do not simply seek to do in the 21st century what the Europeans and Americans did in the 18th and 19th centuries: move from an economy based on agriculture to an economy based on industry.

Li's so-called Big Nation Economic Theory uses macro and micro-economic arguments and notions derived from number theory, but it boils down to a simple enough question: surplus labour. Classical industrialisation involves a profound shift of the workforce from labour-intensive farming to capital-intensive industry. Because industry, in its initial phases at least, cannot employ all the workers moving from the countryside, there is an acute problem of surplus labour. This problem, Li argues, is fundamentally different for a huge country like China than it was for a country like England, where the industrial revolution started.

"In England," he argues, "during the industrial revolution, their surplus labour could move to colonial countries such as Australia, New Zealand or America. Because England was the most advanced economy, they could benefit from international trade.

"Their colonies gave them access to raw materials and to new markets. So England could finish the transformation successfully. But even with all of these advantages, there was still surplus labour and it still led to serious social issues. Just read *Oliver Twist*. Move that problem to China, and it's not just a social issue, it's social breakdown. The surplus labourers wouldn't be millions, they would be hundreds of millions, and if they don't have food and shelter, they will cause revolution. In fact, in Chinese history, this has happened many times, and each time it has brought Chinese industrialisation back to where it started. Which means it brought the capital-intensive industry which can't contain enough of the labour force back to the small-scale agricultural economy which can contain the labour force."

CHINA'S STRUGGLES TO maintain internal cohesion meant that it couldn't engage in the expansionist wars that European rulers used to carve out colonies and use up some of their surplus workers. Its geography meant that there were few places for its unwanted workers to emigrate to (the Chinese did emigrate to the United States in the 19th century, but the flow was stopped by hysteria about the Yellow Peril). So its attempts to modernise by becoming an industrial nation always came up against the inability to absorb those who were to move out of labour-intensive farming. Progressive reformers tried it in the 19th and early 20th centuries and they failed. And, argues Li, the Communist Party's efforts to achieve a Soviet-style rapid industrialisation were equally doomed to fail.

Mao, he argues, started well by focusing, "on the peasant masses and giving them the land that was taken from the old landlords.

"Actually, this provided the foundation for the development of a market economy and is really equivalent to what Deng was doing in the 1980s, so Mao started with a correct theory. But later on, he started collectivisation and the Cultural Revolution, pushing for industrialisation, and that went away from Chinese reality." Deng, he says, restored the basis for a market economy by giving farmers reasonably secure tenure of their land, providing China with a stable food supply for the immediate future.

But China still faced the great problem of how to modernise without generating massive surplus labour that would in turn create social chaos and set the whole process back to square one. And even if there were a way to square this circle, there was now another factor that made Chinese industrialisation unsustainable: the environmental context. China's fragile ecology couldn't handle the damage that traditional heavy industries would do and the world was running out of the resources to feed those industries.

Back in 1987, when he elaborated this theory, Li's argument was also an implicit critique of the official policy of allowing foreign companies to exploit China's abundant resources of cheap labour. "The terms of trade were very unequal between the labour-intensive goods that China exported and the capital-intensive goods it imported. China remained at a grave disadvantage in trade: the more trade happened, the more backward China would be. If that trend continued, there would be no way for China to catch up to world levels, and in fact the gap would get bigger and bigger."

Li's solution to these problems was that China should stop trying to catch up with the West's history of industrialisation and go straight from agriculture to a high-tech and service economy. "I argued that if we adopt this approach, we start to get first-class human resources. We start at the same level that the whole world started off in software