




英文版

剑桥哲学研究指针

The Cambridge Companion to Philosophy

弗洛伊德

杰罗姆·诺伊 编



Freud

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Edited by Jerome Neu

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出版说明

生活·读书·新知三联书店自20世纪80年代中期以来一向重视引进西方现当代学术著作，在著译界朋友大力支持下，我店陆续刊行综合性文库和专题性译丛若干套，对近二十余年中国学术思想的建设发展起到了积极的作用。

三联书店现在以英文原版形式引进出版“剑桥哲学研究指针”，其主旨则在于便利国内读者和研究者翻阅查考，掌握西方学术研究的最新动态。“剑桥哲学研究指针”是英国剑桥大学出版社20世纪90年代刊行的大型学术参考书，面世之后，好评如潮，影响巨大，自1992年至今已出版六十余种。这套书以大哲学家为中心线索，辅以若干时期的哲学主题及哲学流派，由出色当行的学者出任主编，邀集各领域专家组成国际化的学者队伍，专门撰写文章，综述研究状况，缕列文献目录；各书的编辑方针清晰，体例完备周密，内容丰富，资料充足，是很好的西方哲学研究指南读物。如原出版者所说：“这套书的目的之一，乃是针对艰深而富有挑战性的哲学家著作，帮助读者打消畏难心理”，对哲学有兴趣的非专业读者和学生，由此可获得权威有效的方便指引；专家和深入研究者由此则可概览各种解释与分析的新进展。

在21世纪中国社会和思想文化创造性发展的大背景下，这套书或将有助于中国读者深入勘察有关西方思想传统的各种不断演变的诠释，形成权衡取舍的批判性视野，并逐步确立中文学术界自身的看法。这是我们引进出版这套书的深层期望所在。

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Introduction

if often he was wrong and, at times, absurd,
to us he is no more a person
now but a whole climate of opinion
under whom we conduct our different lives . . .
(W. H. Auden, *In Memory of Sigmund Freud*)

Despite distorted understandings of Freud's views and despite periodic waves of Freud-bashing, Auden's assessment remains essentially correct. Freud's influence continues to be enormous and pervasive. He gave us a new and powerful way to think about and investigate human thought, action, and interaction. He made sense of ranges of experience generally neglected or misunderstood. And while one might wish to reject or argue with some of Freud's particular interpretations and theories, his writings and his insights are too compelling to simply turn away. There is still much to be learned from Freud.

The essays here collected focus on some of Freud's masterworks and some of his central concepts, trying to bring out the structure of his arguments and contributions to our self-understanding.

Freud was born in 1856 in Freiberg in Moravia, but after his family's move when he was four years old, he passed almost all of his long life in Vienna. The story of his life is the story of his thought. The great events were most often the occasions of his discoveries and speculations. After his childhood move, the rest of his life can be viewed as a tale of four cities, the psychogeography of which is explored by Carl Schorske. Vienna, embroiled in anti-Semitism, was the ambivalent scene of Freud's professional advances and defeats as well as home to his contented family life. London was, from the beginning until his flight there from Hitler in the last months of his

life, capital of the land of hope and order, ideal site of the liberal ego. Paris, on the other hand, place of his early studies of hysteria with Charcot, provided the romantic center for his imagination, offering the attractions of the dangerous and alluringly irrational id. And finally Rome, embodying layers of history through which the archeologist can dig just as the depth psychologist can excavate the buried past, was the unapproachable city of his youthful ambitions and adult dreams, and it became the locus for a fitful reconciliation of polarities.

Some of the episodes of Freud's childhood are later recalled in the *Interpretation of Dreams*, largely the record of the analysis of his own dreams. For Freud, dreams eventually came to be regarded as "the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious" (1900a, V, 608); and how they served as both a source of insight and a kind of confirmation for his theories is considered by James Hopkins. Hopkins's main concern, however, is how Freud's interpretation of his dreams can be seen as an extension of commonsense models of explanation (by motive). Additional defense of Freud's approach can be found in David Sachs's discussion of Adolf Grünbaum's *Foundations of Psychoanalysis*, the most influential recent philosophical critique of Freud. While Sachs's essay takes the form of a review, it in fact constitutes an independent discussion of questions of evidence in Freud, going into particular detail about *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. That book, along with the *Interpretation of Dreams*, is one of Freud's many forays beyond the psychology of neurosis into the realm of general psychology. But it was with the neuroses that psychoanalysis received its start.

Freud's earliest psychoanalytic theorizing concerned cases of hysteria, a disorder involving organic symptoms with no apparent organic cause. Freud rejected the fashionable explanations of his time, which appealed to malingering, heredity, and the peculiarities of women (Freud in fact demonstrated the existence of cases of male hysteria), and came instead to propose a "seduction theory," which traced hysterical symptoms to traumatic prepubertal sexual assaults (typically by fathers). While Freud's views developed, he initially believed the assaults were experienced as neutral at the time they occurred, and that it was only later, after the intercession of puberty with the addition of new energy and new understanding, that the original experience was retroactively traumatized and defended

against. It was thus no accident that sexuality was crucial in the understanding of pathological defense: It was only in the sphere of the sexual (with its presumed delayed onset) that a memory could have more force than an original experience, so the ego might be taken by surprise and rendered incapable of normal defense. But ultimately, to explain the character of the original experience and the repetition of symptoms (if the energy of an external trauma was what was crucial, why wouldn't the symptom successfully use up that energy and so clear itself up?), Freud had to postulate sexual energy in the child. And he came to abandon his seduction theory in favor of a theory that gave greater importance to internal conflict than external trauma. This has become a matter of controversy in recent years, some even suggesting that Freud abandoned his seduction theory because of the unpopularity of drawing attention to child molestation. The suggestion is ludicrous, if only because Freud replaced the theory with even more unpopular ideas (in particular involving the postulation of infantile sexuality and so the denial of the presumed innocence of childhood). The suggestion also misunderstands the move: Freud did not come to believe that children are never molested, that all such charges are the result of fantasy (his own cases compelled him to believe otherwise); his discovery was not that children are never in fact assaulted, but that they could develop hysterical symptoms later in life even if they had not been. Psychic reality was as important as material reality. And there were sufficient theoretical reasons for the shift, reasons that are traced by Gerald Izenberg.

Izenberg also argues for the importance of clinical experience and theoretical insight in producing the hypotheses that Freud used his self-analysis to test, including the hypotheses of infantile sexuality and the Oedipus complex. Freud's self-analysis, begun in the summer of 1897 (shortly after his father's death), can be taken as one of the turning points in the history of self-understanding. Exactly how its role in the development of Freud's thought should be understood, however, is controversial. In contrast with the confirmatory role argued for by Izenberg, Simon and Blass suggest that Freud's self-analysis was in fact the origin of the central ideas involved in the Oedipus complex. And they caution that such self-discovery requires justification before its results can be generalized. But this may get the confirmation situation backward. Freud himself in-

sisted that "I can analyze myself only with the help of knowledge obtained objectively (like an outsider)" (1985 [1887-1904], 281). This suggests his understanding of the Oedipus conflict began with its discovery in his patients. Thus, his self-analysis would have been used to confirm the existence of the Oedipus complex (after all, if it was truly universal, it had to be present in him too), and was not the source of its discovery. That would explain why he wrote to Fliess "I have found, in my own case *too*, [the phenomenon of] being in love with my mother and jealous of my father, and I now consider it a universal event in early childhood" (p. 272, italics added, cf. p. 250 where it is already noted in others). Again the matter, like many discussed by the authors in this volume, is controversial and properly the subject of argument. The particular tension raised by the relation of conditions of discovery to conditions of confirmation emerges repeatedly. Nancy Chodorow, for example, brings attention to it in the course of her division, survey, and exposition of Freud's views on women.

It is also a tension relevant to a problem sometimes pointed to in connection with the contrast (already mentioned in passing) between the psychology of neurosis and normal psychology. It is sometimes suggested that it is in some way illegitimate to generalize from the study of "abnormal" cases to an understanding of the "normal." But such generalization is in no way peculiar to psychoanalysis. Certainly it is a standard feature of much medical argument (it was the study of scurvy among sailors on ships without fresh fruit that led ultimately to the understanding of the normal need for vitamin C in the diet). There need be no real problem, so long as one remains aware of the difference between the conditions of discovery and the conditions of confirmation. Indeed, as Freud argues, using the analogy of a crystal the breaking of which reveals its otherwise hidden structure, "pathology, by making things larger and coarser, can draw our attention to normal conditions which would otherwise have escaped us" (1933a, XXII, 58-9). In fact, I believe (and argue in my discussion, "Freud and perversion") that the theory of infantile sexuality that emerged from Freud's struggles with the seduction theory is only fully intelligible in the light of Freud's understanding of adult perversion as presented in his *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*. Freud was not the first to note that children suck their thumbs, but it was his new conceptual understanding of the sexual

instinct (as made up of components analyzable in terms of source, object, and aim) that enabled him to argue persuasively that such activity should be seen as an early manifestation of that instinct, as a form of infantile sexuality. The complex intertwinings of theory and observation (of self and other, of normal and abnormal), and their relation to evidence and confirmation, emerge again and again in this book.

There is also still much to be learned from Freud in relation to issues in contemporary philosophy of mind, moral, and social theory. Hopkins's discussion of the interpretation of dreams ties it to modern models of explanation by motive, which are of concern in recent philosophy of action. The special characteristics of unconscious mental states, including their relation to the states ascribed by commonsense psychology, are further explored by Sebastian Gardner. His discussion of the unconscious also connects with recent questions concerning the divided or multiple self. Clark Glymour discusses how Freud's early theorizing grew out of his medical, and specifically neurological, training. He then argues that the model of the mind in Freud's *Project for a Scientific Psychology* adumbrates significant features of recent computational models in cognitive psychology, and that his approach may still have much to teach us. For example, if Freud's explanations – like many modern ones – are often homuncular (accounting for the actions of an agent by the actions of littler internal agents), Freud's hypothetical basic units must be seen as having very complex capacities rather than as the simpleminded equivalents of on–off switches. The model, Glymour suggests, comes from politics rather than computers and has useful implications for puzzles about the relation of reason and the will: forms of irrationality that emerge in self-deception, ambivalence, weakness of the will, and the like, as well as in neurotic symptoms.

The shaking of the Cartesian picture of a unitary consciousness brings with it metaphysical and epistemological issues; it also promises to clarify the workings of our ordinary conflictual moral experience. Jennifer Church emphasizes distinctive features of primary process thinking and aspects of internalization in relation to moral development. As she presents it, the power and appeal of Freud's account of the superego can be found in its ability to make naturalistic sense of the dutiful selflessness that Kantians and others regard as characteristic of morality. The question remains whether that

account can be detached from Freud's views on the specifically sexual character of our early relationships with our parents. Can castration anxiety be ignored, and the desirability of power substituted, when explaining the motivation for internalization? Freud's views on the character of our early relationships with our parents are traced in Bennett Simon and Rachel Blass's "The development and vicissitudes of Freud's ideas on the Oedipus complex"; and the distinctive features of the development of women according to Freud and problems connected with those views are further explored by Nancy Chodorow. The importance of ambivalence in the formation of conscience is discussed by John Deigh.

Some of the wider applications and implications of Freud's theories are considered in the final essays in the book. With Richard Wollheim's discussion, we can see how in his writing about Leonardo and others Freud uses psychoanalytic biography to illuminate the place of the infantile, especially infantile sexuality, in mature achievement. In some of his studies of art, we can see the pervasiveness (in transformed, sublimated form) of the forces that Freud had uncovered in explaining neurotic symptoms, dreams, jokes, and the like. But the motivations of art are complex, and in other of Freud's studies the focus is on the character of the subject in a work of art, on how the deepest mental layers in a representation are revealed. The carryover from Freud's clinical theorizing to other fields is considered further in Robert Paul's reading of Freud's anthropology, which emphasizes cultural analogues of obsessional neurosis in the context of Freud's developing thought about the nature of instincts. These analogues, he suggests, may help us understand the cross-cultural but enigmatic fact of gender inequality. The fantasy schemas of individual psychology help illuminate how we and our societies make ourselves who we are. The psychological place of religion in particular is also considered by John Deigh, who looks to Freud's changing theory of instincts to understand the deepening pessimism in his social thought between *The Future of an Illusion* and *Civilization and Its Discontents*.

What is presented here is, inevitably, a selection. Whole topics are neglected – for example, the role of transference (the patient's feelings toward the analyst, distorted in the analytic setting by projection based on earlier figures) in psychoanalytic theory and therapy, the problematic nature of Freud's theories of pleasure and