

徐海霞 / 著

# 经济增长与中国分权 框架下的政府政策研究

Jingji Zengzhang Yu Zhongguo Fenquan  
Kuangjiaxia De Zhengfu Zhengce Yanjiu



立信会计出版社

LIXIN ACCOUNTING PUBLISHING HOUSE

徐海霞 / 著

# 经济增长与中国分权 框架下的政府政策研究

Jingji Zengzhang Yu Zhongguo Fenquan  
Kuangjiaxia De Zhengfu Zhengce Yanjiu



立信会计出版社

LIXIN ACCOUNTING PUBLISHING HOUSE

## 图书在版编目(CIP)数据

经济增长与中国分权框架下的政府政策研究/ 徐海霞著. —上海: 立信会计出版社, 2011. 11  
ISBN 978-7-5429-3155-9

I. ①经… II. ①徐… III. ①经济增长-关系-区域  
经济-经济政策-研究-中国-1978~2008 IV.  
①F127

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字(2011)第 238429 号

责任编辑 黄成良  
封面设计 周崇文

## 经济增长与中国分权框架下的政府政策研究

---

出版发行	立信会计出版社		
地 址	上海市中山西路 2230 号	邮政编码	200235
电 话	(021)64411389	传 真	(021)64411325
网 址	www.lixinaph.com	电子邮箱	lxaph@sh163.net
网上书店	www.shlx.net	电 话	(021)64411071
经 销	各地新华书店		

---

印 刷	常熟市梅李印刷有限公司		
开 本	787 毫米×960 毫米	1/16	
印 张	16	插 页	1
字 数	251 千字		
版 次	2011 年 11 月第 1 版		
印 次	2011 年 11 月第 1 次		
印 数	1—1 000		
书 号	ISBN 978-7-5429-3155-9/F		
定 价	32.00 元		

---

如有印订差错,请与本社联系调换

财政分权政策能否成为经济发展战略中的一项政策推动力,从20世纪50年代 Tiebout、Oates 等人的开创性研究,到80年代转型经济的普遍效仿,50多年来一直成为宏观经济学领域研究的焦点之一,但是尽管如此,关于财政分权经济效应的研究结论依然不是很清晰。随着市场经济的逐步完善和对外开放的逐步加深,我国不仅在经济环境和制度结构上发生了巨大的变化,而且在市场行为主体的行为方式上也发生了很大变化。中央政府意识到不可能在所有地区实现同等的发展,因此尝试通过给予地方政府更多的权力,鼓励地方经济的发展。这种策略的基本假设是,地方政府比中央政府能够更好地对资源进行分配。回顾财政分权相关政策的实践,我们需要回答这样一个问题:财政分权政策的实施是否带来了相应的经济增长?对于探索中国经济增长之谜,最初,国内学者大都集中于家庭联产承包责任制的农村改革、引入物质激励的现代企业制度改革、价格双轨制、引进技术和鼓励出口等方面,却忽略了作为经济体制改革突破口的财政分权改革,应该说中国的经济体制改革是从财政分配领域的改革开始的。当时,中国已经历了约30年的计划经济,意识到不可能在所有地区同时实现均衡发展,中央政府决定下放更多的权力,鼓励地方政府发展经济,财政分权就成为这一改革的突破口。无论这一改革的初衷是源于中央财政压力还是政府的远见卓识,财政分权改革无疑成为中国经济发展战略中最重要的政策推动力之一,其影响显著而深远。

回顾相关研究的历史,随着国际上对财政分权与经济增长关系研究的兴起,人们对于中国财政分权制度改革在中国持续高速增长中的作用逐步开始关注。虽然关于中国财政分权改革对经济增长影响的文献越来越多,但是我国财政分权对经济增长的影响效应一直都未得到较全面的解答,许多问题仍有待于进一步厘清和探讨。较为典型的问题是,现有关于财政分权对经济增长作用机制的分析大多是通过将各级政府支出引入经济增长模型,这种简化的模型能够得到较好的结论,可以明晰财政分权

对经济增长的直接效应,但是却忽略了财政分权对经济增长的间接效应,即财政分权会通过与其他要素而对经济增长产生间接影响,这一点在转型经济中可能显得更加重要,因为忽视了财政分权的间接效应将会导致对于中国财政分权效应的不客观评价。

由此,致力于福利最大化的宏观经济政策应随这些变化适时地做出调整。政府追求的目标是多元化的,在当前坚持科学发展观,促进地区、城乡、人与自然、人与社会统筹发展的经济社会发展战略中,我国各级政府绩效在以经济增长为主的考核机制下,如何适时调整以兼顾其他目标的实现,将是我们研究的又一个重要课题。因此,本书对于财政分权的研究将从经济增长拓展到其他与经济增长密切相关的领域,既考察财政分权对经济增长的直接影响,也考察财政分权对其他与经济增长具有密切联系的要素的影响即间接影响,这些要素主要包括地区市场分割、地方政府效率等,由此系统地对于我国改革开放以来的财政分权、经济增长及其相关影响因素之间的关系进行实证研究并解释相关结论的政策含义,最后将从政策调控的角度对如何建立分权框架下“以经济增长为导向”的中国政府政策的目标和路径进行实证分析,在此基础上,对完善机制提出了相应的建议。

本书理论部分首先在传统内生经济增长模型的基础上,将政府支出引入生产函数用以描述财政分权对经济增长的影响,构造了一个经济增长模型来研究。分析发现,财政分权水平会影响经济增长的速度,且各级政府支出水平之间存在最优的财政分权水平,如果实际财政分权水平  $s/g$  小于最优财政分权水平  $(s/g)^*$ , 进一步提高  $s/g$  可以提高经济增长速度,但当  $s/g$  过高时,过度的财政分权反而会降低经济增长速度。其次基于前面基本模型得出的结论,实际上是把财政分权作为外生的变量而并没有解释财政分权。为了充分理解财政分权带来经济增长的过程,我们需要扩展基本模型,并建立解释财政分权的模型,这些模型的意义在于它们对财政分权提供了更为全面的阐述。这样,我们进一步在基本理论模型中引入内生变量即政府支出结构,并得出经济增长率不仅和财政分权程度  $\theta_f$ ,  $\theta_i$  有关,还与中央和地方政府支出的构成  $\phi_f$ ,  $\phi_i$  有关。这样,如果实际的政府支出构成与最大化增长率的政府支出构成不同,重新配置政府支出构成可以提高经济增长率。

本书实证研究部分首先分析了中国 1978—2008 年省级财政分权与各省经济增长的关系,由此得出财政分权对经济增长产生了显著促进作用

用的实证结论。在此基础上,还对我国财政分权的跨时差异和地区差异展开了具体的经验分析,这极大地扩展了财政分权与经济增长关系实证研究的现有结论。分税制改革前地方财政分权对地方经济增长的影响显著负相关,而1994年以后地方财政分权与经济增长显著正相关,在综合了分税制改革前后时期1978—2008年的样本中财政分权的系数为正。这样,实证结论显示,分税制改革后我国财政分权的正面效应开始显示;同时,财政分权在不同地区之间还呈现出显著的差异,即我国经济发展程度较高地区财政分权的积极作用可能要大于经济发展程度较低的地区,东部各省的财政分权优势要高于中西部地区。

为了充分理解财政分权带来经济增长的过程,我们通过扩展基本模型来建立解释财政分权的模型,这些模型的意义在于它们对财政分权提供了更为全面的阐述。首先,对于我国财政分权带来经济增长的过程进行了进一步的解释:政府支出结构的不同配置影响了公共资源的配置及经济增长;在事实财政分权程度的度量指标下,转移支付的数量和形式会对财政分权效应产生一定影响;从政府行为的角度来解释,政府之间的政策协调能力会影响财政分权效应的发挥。接着,在基本理论模型中引入作为内生变量的政府支出结构,并以中国分税制改革后的跨省面板数据为样本,实证检验了我国财政分权、各级政府支出结构与经济增长的关系,并得出检验结果。其中尤其值得我们注意的一点是,地方基本建设支出的比重显著为正,而中央基本建设支出的比重则显著为负,原因在于我国1994年分税制改革以后经济实力的大幅度上升使得地方政府的实力增强,私人资本更为活跃,此情况下中央政府从经济建设的领域转移到公共服务领域,更多地致力于社会保障、医疗健康、社会福利等旨在提高人民生活水平的项目,而道路、桥梁、交通等基础设施建设和企业技术改革、高新技术创新等由地方政府和私人资本承担,因此投资效率大大提高。

此外,我们运用各种不同的经济计量方法考察了财政分权对经济增长的间接效应,这里选择了两个发挥间接效应的重要经济变量即市场分割和地方政府效率。首先,利用相对价格方差法测算了我国28个省市的商品市场分割程度,其中主要涉及我国市场分割程度的测算和比较、分税制改革后我国财政分权对于地方市场分割及经济增长影响的实证检验。其次,运用空间计量经济学实证分析我国财政分权对地方政府效率的影响效应,其中,选择DEA方法和受限随机效应Tobit模型来测算并解释我国地方政府支出效率的差异和特点,在此基础上,选取合理的解释变量

来建立空间面板计量模型分析我国财政分权是否对地方政府效率产生的影响及其特征。

本书共分为 8 章,具体内容安排如下:

第 1 章导言,简单介绍研究的背景和意义,具体阐述了经济增长和财政分权的含义及其度量方法,并介绍了研究方法和分析框架。

第 2 章中国财政分权改革的演进过程及必要性分析,通过介绍改革开放以来我国财政分权改革的演进过程,其中简单介绍财政包干制,将重点放在 1994 年分税制改革上,回答了我国财政分权改革的必要性和可能性,具体包括基于中间需求效应的我国政府间财政权力博弈分析、各省财政分权指标的变化趋势及不同地区财政分权指标的比较。

第 3 章财政分权对经济增长影响的理论分析框架,在对财政分权与经济增长相关文献回顾的基础上,总结了现有关于财政分权与经济增长的相关观点,既包括财政分权有利于促进经济增长的观点,也包括财政分权存在潜在缺陷的观点。借助于传统内生增长理论的宏观经济总量均衡模型,对财政分权影响经济增长的效应以及作用机制进行分析,从而建立起财政分权与经济增长实证分析的理论框架,充分体现了财政分权对经济增长的直接效应和间接效应。

第 4 章省级财政分权与中国经济增长关系的实证检验,通过模型设定的计量分析结果,最终采用固定影响的变截距面板数据模型和我国 1978 年以来的经验数据,对我国自 20 世纪 80 年代开始的财政分权对经济增长的整体效应进行了估计。结果表明,样本期间内我国的财政分权显著地促进了经济增长,且在给定的经济环境中,存在最优财政分权程度。由于上述对财政分权措施的分析只是从一个静态的角度着眼,为了克服此问题,我们对我国财政分权措施进行了进一步的内生性和时滞效应检验,由此得到我国的财政分权措施在一定程度上受到国家财政政策宏观调控的左右,且我国财政分权措施的变化对经济产生作用具有一定的时滞期,大约在第 3 期产生正的影响,而实际 GDP 的脉冲响应强度是正向的而且比较稳定。

第 5 章中国财政分权跨时差异和地区差异的分析与评价,这里我们运用不同的检验方法对财政分权的跨时差异与地区差异进行了实证检验与影响因素分析,并通过扩展基本理论模型检验了政府支出结构的影响效应。实证结论显示我国分税制改革之后中央政府的基本建设支出比重过大,存在一定的无效配置,此时中央政府应当逐步调整经济建设方面的

支出比重,将该方面的支出责任让渡给地方政府和私人资本,而将重心转移到社会公共服务领域。

第6章与第7章对我国财政分权的研究从经济增长拓展到与经济增长密切相关的其他领域,分析的目的在于探究财政分权通过其他要素影响经济增长的间接效应。第6章中利用相对价格方差法测算了我国28个省市的商品市场分割程度,其中主要涉及我国市场分割程度的测算和比较、分税制改革后我国财政分权对于地方市场分割及经济增长影响的实证检验,计算结果表明,1996—2007年间我国的市场分割程度并不像一些学者所揭示的那样愈演愈烈,且从全国情况来看,1994年的分税制改革对经济增长具有直接促进效应;同时,分权制改革的成本即市场分割与“诸侯经济”也极大地削弱了经济增长的直接促进效应,综合这两方面的效应来看,在全国的市场分割程度的均值0.0587处财政分权程度提高1%,而对于经济增长的促进作用仅为1.19%。第7章中运用空间计量经济学实证分析我国财政分权对地方政府效率的影响效应,其中选择DEA方法和受限随机效应Tobit模型来测算并解释我国地方政府支出效率的差异和特点,在此基础上,选取合理的解释变量来建立空间面板计量模型,并利用27个省市自治区1995—2008年的经验数据对我国财政分权对地方政府效率的影响效应进行了实证检验。检验结果表明,我国财政分权对地方政府效率具有显著影响,传统的面板回归模型因没有考虑到空间相关性而低估了这一作用,由此可以看出,我国地方政府效率在相邻地域间具有较强的空间相关性,而财政分权对剥离了规模效率的纯技术效率的作用力更大,同时说明财政分权对地方政府因规模报酬而发生的效率增加的影响力不大。

第8章分权框架下中国政府政策的改革与完善,从分权框架下政府政策完善的角度,通过寻求我国财政分权与经济增长之间矛盾关系的制度性根源,提出“以经济增长为导向”的我国政府政策如何进行改革和完善的整体思路。

**关键词** 财政分权 经济增长 政府支出结构 市场分割 地方政府效率



## Abstract //

Whether fiscal decentralization policy could become a kind of policy impetus in the economic development strategy, from the pioneering research of Tiebout and Oates in the 1950s to general imitation of transition economy in the 1980s, has always been one of the focuses in the macroeconomics field research. Nevertheless, the economic effects of fiscal decentralization are still not very clear. With the gradual improvement of our market economy and the gradual deepening of opening to the outside world, in China there are some tremendous changes not only in the economic environment and institutional structure, but also in the manners of market entity. Central government realized that it could be impossible to achieve equal developments in all areas, therefore we should try our bests to give local government more powers and to encourage local economic developments. The basic assumption of this strategy is that local governments can realize better allocation of resources than central government. Looking back the practices of fiscal decentralization, we should answer the following question whether the implementation of fiscal decentralization policy could bring about the corresponding economic growth. To explore the mystery of China's economic growth, initially domestic scholars have focused on the household contract responsibility system in rural areas, on the modern enterprise system reform which introduce material incentives in enterprises, on the double-track price system, technology import and export promotion. However, they neglect the fiscal decentralization reform as the breakthrough of economic system reform because we should admit that China's economic system reform began in the field of financial allocation. At that time China had gone through the planned economy about 30 years, and the following economic reform

realized that it was impossible to achieve equal developments concurrently in all areas. So our central government decided to give local governments more powers and encourage local governments to develop their economies. Thus fiscal decentralization was turning into the breakthrough of such reform. Regardless of the original intention to this reform from the financial pressure or excellent vision of the government leader, fiscal decentralization reform undoubtedly has become one of the policy impetuses in the economic development strategy and its role and impact were very significant.

Looking back the history of relative studies, with the rise of international study about the relationship between economic growth and fiscal decentralization, scholars gradually started to pay more attention to the role of China's fiscal decentralization reform on China's sustained high-speed growth. Although the relative literatures about this topic also started up, these literatures did not systematically explore the impact mechanism of fiscal decentralization on economic growth. Furthermore, many questions are up for getting clear and discussion. The most typical question is that the existing literature about the mechanism got beautiful result by introducing different level government expenditure in the economic growth models. This way can clarify the direct effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, but probably neglect the indirect effect of fiscal decentralization. Fiscal decentralization may in directly affect economic growth by affecting those variables which would affect economic growth. We argue that in transition economy, the indirect effect may be more important, so neglecting the indirect effect may lead to inappropriate evaluation of the effects of China's fiscal decentralization on economic growth.

Thus, macroeconomic policy which dedicates welfare maximization should adjust at the right time along with those changes. The government has always pursued multi-goal, nowadays China's development strategy adhere to scientific outlook on development, to promote regional, urban and rural areas, people and nature, man and society etc over-all development. But under current economic growth-

oriented evaluation mechanism, it is worth studying the topic about to what degree other economic and society goals realizes meanwhile government pursues economic growth. So this article would expand the study of fiscal decentralization from the conceptual of economic growth to relative factors closely related to economic growth and evaluate both the direct effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth and the effect of fiscal decentralization on those factors closely related to economic growth such as the regional market segmentation and local government efficiency. Therefore, we can carry out the empirical study on the relations between fiscal decentralization, economic growth and relative factors since China's reform and opening and we can also explain the policy implications of these conclusions.

The theoretical part of this article firstly describes the influence of fiscal decentralization on economic growth through a dynamic model based on the the traditional growth model. And through quoting government spending into the production function, I design an economic growth model. Thus, I find the most effecient decentralized level about spending level amomg different government. If the real share of government spending and the most efficient share are different, we can raise the ratio of economic growth through reallocating spending level amomg different governments. We can conclude that if  $s/g < (s/g)^*$ , raising  $s/g$  can increase the economic growth rate. But when the spending share of low-level government is too high, excessive fiscal decentralization can reduce the ratio of economic growth oppositely. Next, the first basic growth model only explains the economic effects of our fiscal decentralization aroud tax-sharing system reform in the angle of exogenous variable. Thus we obtain the influenced degree from fiscal decentralization to economic growth roughly and we can difficultly estimate the varied condition of these exogenous variables during limited time accurately. That is to say, the preceding model only explains that fiscal decentralization can promote economic growth, but can not explain fiscal decentralization itself. Therefore, beyond the analysis of exogenous variable's influence we extend the basic model by quoting

endogenous variable (the composition of government spending) of economic system into the model. We find that economic growth ratio is related to not only the decentralized level but also the spending composition between central government and local government. So if the real share of government spending and the most efficient share are different, we can raise economic growth ratio through reallocating spending level among different government.

The empirical part of this article firstly analyzes the relationship between provincial fiscal decentralization and economic growth from 1978 to 2008. We find the empirical conclusion that fiscal decentralization significantly promotes economic growth. Additionally, we also empirically analyze the intertemporal change and interregional difference of China's fiscal decentralization effects which contrasted to the conventional results. Before tax-sharing system reform, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and provincial economic growth is significantly negative while significantly positive after tax-sharing system reform in 1994. The coefficient of fiscal decentralization is no longer significantly negative in the sample from 1978 to 2008. Thus, empirical conclusion shows that the positive effect of fiscal decentralization is appearing after tax-sharing system reform. In addition to standing for the positive effect of tax-sharing system reform, the sub-sample analysis finds a positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth in the localities with higher per capita GDP, but none in the localities with lower per capita GDP from 1994 to 2008. The provinces in the east also take larger advantage of fiscal decentralization than the provinces in the middle and west have.

This article analyzes the reason of intertemporal change and interregional difference of China's fiscal decentralization through extending the preceding basic model. We attribute such differences to the composition of public expenditures, fiscal independency and the improved coordination and intervention power of different-level governments after 1994 tax-sharing system reform. Through dynamic model combined expenditure composition and the panel-datas after

China's tax-sharing system reform, we find that the optimal decentralization ratio also depends on the allocation between central and local public expenditure. It is notable that the coefficient of the share of local budgetary spending on development is significantly positive and that of central government is significantly negative. Potential distortions may exist in the expenditure pattern between central and local governments. The central government may be in a much better position to undertake public investment with nation-wide externalities in the early stages of economic development. With the progress of economic growth, the central government should decrease its intervention in economy and encourage the local government and private investment to focus on the provision of public services.

Moreover, we investigate the indirect effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth through several kinds of econometric methods. Here we select two important variables which exert the indirect effects: market segmentation and local government efficiency. Firstly, we measure 28 province-to-province market segmentation degrees using regional RPI data. This mainly refers to the measure and comparison of China's market segmentation degrees, empirical verification the effects of fiscal decentralization on regional market segmentation and economic growth after tax-sharing system reform. Secondly, we empirically analyze the effects of fiscal decentralization on local government efficiency using spatial econometrics. Here we select DEA and restricted stochastic effect Tobit model to measure and explain the discrepancy and character of China's local government efficiency. So we can select reasonable explanatory variables to set up spatial panel-data model and analyze the effect and character of China's fiscal decentralization on local government efficiency.

The book includes 8 chapters, which are organized as follows:

Chapter 1 is the "introduction", which mainly introduces the study background and the meaning. This chapter explains the concept and measurement of economic growth and fiscal decentralization. And it also introduces the study methods and analytic framework.

Chapter 2 is about the evolution and necessity analysis of China's fiscal decentralization. It introduces the evolution of China's fiscal decentralization since reform and opening, mainly focusing on tax-sharing system reform since 1994. Thus it answers the necessity and possibility of China's fiscal decentralization reform. The contents include that the game analysis of China's financial powers between governments based on the effect of intermediate needs, the changing trend of fiscal decentralization index in all provinces and the comparison of fiscal decentralization index in different regions.

Chapter 3 is about the theoretical framework of the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth. Firstly, it reviews the relative arguments about fiscal decentralization and economic growth including the arguments favoring fiscal decentralization and cautioning against fiscal decentralization. Secondly, this chapter analyzes the effect and mechanism of action of fiscal decentralization on economic growth recurring to macroeconomic equilibrium model of traditional endogenous growth theory. Thus it builds up the theoretical framework of the empirical analysis of fiscal decentralization on economic growth which fully reflects the direct and indirect effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth.

Chapter 4 empirically verifies the relation China's provincial fiscal decentralization and economic growth. It uses panel-data model with the fixed-effect intercept distortion through econometric analysis of model setting and empirical data since 1978. Thus it can estimate the whole effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth since 1980s. Finding that: during the sample period China's fiscal decentralization significantly promotes economic growth and among the given economic condition there exists the most efficient decentralized level. Because the preceding analyses about fiscal decentralization only see from the static angle, to solve this problem we carry out further verifications about endogeneity and time-lag effect of China's fiscal decentralization. Thus we receive that to some degrees China's fiscal decentralization was manipulated by the macro-control of fiscal policy. The action of fiscal

decentralization reform on economy has certain time-lag period and the positive effect occurs in the third phase or so. The impulse response intensity of real GDP is positive and stable.

Chapter 5 investigates the intertemporal change and interregional difference of China's fiscal decentralization effects. Here it carries out empirical verification and factor analysis on the intertemporal change and interregional difference of fiscal decentralization by using different verificative methods and it verifies the effect of endogenous variable government expenditure composition through extending the basic theoretic model. Empirical conclusions show that the central government spending on basic construction is too much after China's tax-sharing system reform and potential distortions may exist in the expenditure pattern between central and local governments. At present the central government should adjust the spending sharing of economic construction and release this spending ability to the local government and private investment and transfer the focus into the field of social public services.

Chapter 6 and chapter 7 extend the research of fiscal decentralization from traditional economic growth to other fields closely related to economic growth and its intension is to explore the indirect effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth through other factors. Chapter 6 measures 28 province-to-province market segmentation degrees using regional RPI data and this mainly refers to the measure and comparision of China's market segmentation degrees, empirical verification the effects of fiscal decentralization on regional market segmentation and economic growth after tax-sharing system reform. Conclusions show that from 1996 to 2007 China's market segmentation degrees were not more and more serious as some scholars had advanced. From the nationwide angel tax-sharing system reform in 1994 produced direct promotion effect on economic growth and the cost of decentralization reform including market segmentation and vassal economy deeply weakened that positive effect on economic growth. From the angel of these two effects, at the mean value of nationwide

market segmentation degree 0.0578, if fiscal decentralization degree was raised 1 percent, the promotion effect on economic growth would be 1.19 percent. Chapter 7 empirically analyze the effects of fiscal decentralization on local government efficiency using spatial econometrics. Here it selects DEA and restricted stochastic effect Tobit model to measure and explain the discrepancy and character of China's local government efficiency. So we select reasonable explanatory variables to set up spatial panel-data model and analyse the effect and character of China's fiscal decentralization on local government efficiency using empirical data of 27 provinces from 1995 to 2008. Conclusions show that China's fiscal decentralization significantly affects regional government efficiency and traditional panel model underestimate this effect because of not considering the spatial correlation. Thus we achieve that China's regional government efficiency between contiguous regions has intensive spatial correlation. The action of fiscal decentralization on the pure technical efficiency which peels off scale efficiency is more deeply. And the effect of fiscal decentralization local government's efficiency improvement from return to scale is just a little.

Chapter 8 is about the reform and improvement of China's governmental policy in the frame of decentralization. It advances the whole clue how to reform and improve China's governmental policy which is economic-growth-oriented by exploring the institutional source of the contradiction between fiscal decentralization and economic growth from the angel of policy improvement in the frame of decentralization.

**Keywords** Fiscal Decentralization; Economic Growth; Government Expenditure Composition; Market Segmentation; Government Efficiency



# 目 录

第 1 章 导言 .....	1
1 研究动因 .....	2
2 探讨的问题 .....	5
3 经济增长与财政分权的含义及衡量方法 .....	6
4 研究方法、思路与分析框架 .....	12
5 研究的缺陷及需要进一步探讨的问题 .....	15
第 2 章 中国财政分权改革的演进过程及必要性分析 .....	16
1 财政包干制与分税制 .....	17
2 中国财政分权改革的必要性分析 .....	33
3 财政分权指标的变化趋势分析及比较 .....	41
第 3 章 财政分权对经济增长影响的理论分析框架 .....	46
1 财政分权与经济增长：相关文献综述 .....	46
2 财政分权对经济增长影响的相关理论模型 .....	61
3 中国财政分权对经济增长影响的作用机制分析 .....	70
4 本章的分析结论 .....	84
第 4 章 省级财政分权与中国经济增长关系的实证检验 .....	87
1 相关实证研究的文献回顾 .....	87
2 省级财政分权与中国经济增长关系的计量检验 .....	90
3 中国财政分权措施的内生性检验与时滞效应 .....	106
4 本章的分析结论及政策含义 .....	111
第 5 章 中国财政分权跨时差异和地区差异的分析与评价 .....	114
1 中国财政分权地区差距的实证检验 .....	114
2 中国财政分权跨时差异与地区差异的影响因素分析 .....	123