

Third Edition

**Brickley / Smith / Zimmerman**

# Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture

# 管理经济学与组织架构

双语教学版

[美] 詹姆斯·布里克利 克雷佛·史密斯 杰诺德·施泽曼 著 张志强 王春香 译注

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# Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture

Third Edition

Bilingual Edition

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*Dedicated* to our children—

Erica, Nic, Alexander, Taylor, Morgan, Daneille and Amy.

# 前 言

## PREFACE

As a result of the spectacular scandals surrounding Enron, Arthur Andersen, Global Crossing, WorldCom, and Adelphia, the business environment has changed dramatically. “Corporate governance” is now the watchword in corporate board rooms, capital markets, and government agencies. Executives now face additional government regulations, stiffer penalties for misleading public disclosures, as well as a more skeptical investment community. The common perception is that bad people caused the massive failures of the past and that more government oversight will solve these problems. We disagree. We argue that these business debacles resulted from badly designed *organizational architectures*. The blueprints for their destruction were designed into the firms’ “organizational DNA.” This book examines how organizations govern themselves by designing corporate control mechanisms that channel managers’ incentives into actions that create—not destroy—firm value. The topic is critical to anyone who works in or seeks to manage organizations—whether they are for-profit or not-for-profit firms.

Thirty years ago, teaching managerial economics to business students was truly a “dismal science.” Many students dismissed standard economic tools of marginal analysis, production theory, and market structure as too esoteric to have any real relevance to the business problems they believed they would encounter. These students doubted they would be responsible for the pricing decisions of their future employers. They sought positions in large firms, eventually hoping to manage operations, marketing, finance, or information systems staffs. But a new generation of economists began applying traditional microeconomic tools to problems involving corporate governance, incentive conflicts, executive compensation, and mergers and acquisitions. These economists focused on the internal structure of the firm, not on the firm’s external markets. This book draws heavily from this research on organizations and applies it to how organizations govern themselves.

## New Demands: Relevant Yet Rigorous Education

Today’s students must understand more than just how markets work and the principles of supply and demand. They also must understand how self-interested parties within organizations interact, and how corporate governance mechanisms control these interactions. Consequently, today’s managerial economics course must cover a broader menu of topics that are now more relevant than ever to aspiring managers facing this post-Enron world. Yet, to best serve our students, offering relevant material must not come at the expense of rigor. Students must learn how to think logically about both markets and organizations. The basic tools of economics offer students the skill set necessary for rigorous analysis of business problems they will likely encounter throughout their careers.

Besides the heightened interest in corporate governance, global competition and rapid technological change are prompting firms to undertake major organizational restructurings as well as to produce fundamental industry realignments. Firms now attack problems with focused, cross-functional teams. Many firms are shifting from functional organizational structures (manufacturing, marketing, and distribution) to flatter, more process-oriented organizations. Moreover, this pace of change shows no sign of slowing. Today’s students recognize these issues; they want to develop skills that will make them effective managers and prepare them to manage organizational change.

Business school programs are evolving in response to these changes. Narrow technical expertise in a single functional area (whether operations, accounting, finance, information systems, or marketing) is no longer sufficient. Effective managers within this environment require cross-functional skills. To meet these challenges, business schools are

becoming more integrated. Problems faced by managers are not just finance problems, operations problems, or marketing problems. Rather, most business problems involve elements that cut across traditional functional areas. For that reason, the curriculum must encourage students to apply concepts they have mastered across a variety of courses.

This book provides a multidisciplinary, cross-functional approach to managerial and organizational economics. We believe that this is critically important. Our interests span economics, finance, accounting, information systems, and financial institutions; this allows us to draw examples from a number of functional areas to demonstrate the power of this underlying economic framework to analyze a variety of problems managers face regularly.

We have been extremely gratified by the reception afforded the first two editions of *Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture*. Adopters report that the first two editions helped them transform their courses into one of the most popular courses within their curriculum. This book has been adopted in microeconomics, human resources, and strategy courses in addition to courses that focus specifically on organizational economics. The first two editions were founded on powerful economic tools of analysis that examine how managers can design organizations that motivate self-interested individuals to make choices that increase firm value. Our third edition continues to focus on the fundamental importance of markets and organizational design. We use the failures of Enron (Chapter 1), Arthur Andersen (Chapter 22), and Adelphia (Chapter 10) as case studies to illustrate how poorly designed organizational architectures can be catastrophic. Other books provide little coverage of such managerially critical topics as developing effective organizational architectures, including performance-evaluation systems and compensation plans; assigning decision-making authority among employees; and managing transfer-pricing disputes among divisions. Given the increased importance of corporate governance, this omission has been both significant and problematic. Our primary objective in writing this book is to provide current and aspiring managers with a rigorous, systematic, comprehensive framework for addressing such organizational problems. To that end, we have strived to write the underlying theoretical concepts in simple, intuitive terms and illustrate them with numerous examples—most drawn from actual company practice.


## The Conceptual Framework

Although the popular press and existing literature on organizations are replete with jargon—TQM, reengineering, outsourcing, teaming, venturing, empowerment, and corporate culture—they fail to provide managers with a systematic, comprehensive framework for examining organizational problems. This book uses economic analysis to develop such a framework and then to use that framework to organize and integrate the important organizational problems, thereby making the topics more accessible.

Through the text, readers will gain an understanding of the basic tools of economics and how to apply them to solve important business problems. While the book covers the standard managerial economics problems of pricing and production, it pays special attention to organizational issues. In particular, the book will help readers understand:

- How the business environment (technology, regulation, and competition in input and output markets) drives the firm's choice of strategy.
- How strategy and the business environment affect the firm's choice of organizational design—what we call *organizational architecture*.

- How the firm's organizational architecture is like its DNA; the firm's ultimate success or failure can be traced back to its organizational architecture, which will affect how people in the organization will behave in terms of creating or destroying firm value.
- How corporate policies such as strategy, financing, accounting, marketing, information systems, operations, compensation, and human resources are interrelated and thus why it is critically important that they be coordinated.
- How the three key features of organizational architecture—the assignment of decision-making authority, the reward system, and the performance-evaluation system—can be structured to allow managers to achieve their desired results.



These three components of organizational architecture are like three legs of the accompanying stool. All firms must coordinate each leg with the other two so that the stool remains functional. Moreover, each firm's stool must match its strategy; a balanced stool in the wrong setting is dysfunctional. Although milking stools are quite productive in a barn, tavern owners would purchase taller stools.

## Reasons for Adopting Our Approach

This book focuses on topics that we believe are most relevant to managers. For instance, it provides an in-depth treatment of traditional microeconomic topics (demand, supply, pricing, and game theory) and corporate governance topics (assigning decision-making authority, centralization versus decentralization, measuring and rewarding performance, outsourcing, and transfer pricing). We believe these topics are more valuable to prospective managers than topics typically covered in economics texts such as public-policy aspects of minimum-wage legislation, antitrust policy, and income redistribution. A number of other important features differentiate this book from others currently available, such as:

- Our book provides a comprehensive, cross-functional framework for analyzing organizational problems. We do this by first describing and integrating important research findings published across several functional areas, then demonstrating how to apply the framework to specific organizational problems.
- This text integrates the topics of strategy and organizational architecture. Students learn how elements of the business environment (technology, competition, and regulation) drive the firm's choice of strategy and the interaction of strategy choice and organizational architecture.
- Reviewers, instructors, and students found the first two editions accessible and engaging. The text uses intuitive descriptions and simple examples; more technical material is provided in appendices for those who wish to pursue it.

- Numerous examples drawn from the business press and our experiences illustrate the theoretical concepts. For example, the effect of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on demand curves is described in Chapter 4 and how one devastated company located in the World Trade Center responded is discussed in Chapter 14. These illustrations, many highlighted in boxes, reinforce the underlying principles and help the reader visualize the application of abstract ideas. Each chapter begins with a specific case history that is used throughout the chapter to unify the material and aid the reader in recalling and applying the main constructs.
- Nontraditional economics topics dealing with strategy, outsourcing, leadership, the legal form of organization, corporate ethics, and implementing management innovations are examined. Business school curricula often are criticized for being slow in covering topics of current interest to business, such as corporate governance. The last six chapters examine recent management trends and demonstrate how the book's framework can be used to analyze and understand topical issues.
- Cases and end-of-chapter problems are drawn from real organizational experience—from the business press as well as our contact with executive MBA students and consulting engagements. We have structured exercises that provide readers with a broad array of opportunities to apply the framework to problems like ones they will encounter as managers.

## Fitting the Text into the Business Curriculum

Our book is an effective tool for a variety of classes at the MBA, executive MBA, and undergraduate level. Although this text grew out of an MBA elective course in the economics of organizations at the University of Rochester, the book's modular design allows its use in a variety of courses. We have been encouraged by the creativity instructors have shown in the diversity of courses adopting this text. Besides the introductory microeconomics course, this book also is used in elective courses on corporate governance, strategy, the economics of organizations, and human resources management. The basic material on managerial economics is presented in Parts 1 and 2—the first 10 chapters. The tools necessary for understanding and applying the organizational framework we develop within this text have been selected for their managerial relevance. In our experience, these economics tools are invaluable for those students with extensive work experience, and for those who didn't major in economics as an undergraduate. Those with an economics background may choose to forgo components of this material. We have structured our discussions of demand, production/cost, market structure, pricing, and strategy to be optional. Thus, readers who do not require a review of these tools can skip Chapters 4 through 9 without loss of continuity.

We strongly recommend that all readers cover Chapters 1 through 3 and 10; these chapters introduce the underlying tools and framework for the text. Chapters 4 through 9, as we noted above, cover the basic managerial-economics topics of demand, costs, production, market structure, pricing, and strategy. Part 3 (Chapters 11 through 17) develops the organizational architecture framework; we recommend that these be covered in sequence. Finally, Part 4 (Chapters 18 through 23) covers special managerial topics: the legal form of organization, outsourcing, leadership, regulation, ethics, and the process of management innovations and managing organizational change. They are capstone chapters—chapters that apply and illustrate the framework. Instructors can assign them based on their specific interests and available time.

## Third Edition

The third edition differs from the second in several ways:

- The core microeconomics material in Chapters 4 through 7 has been enriched—for example, we added technical problems to each chapter and to the end-of-chapter materials. Linear demand and supply curves are covered in greater detail than in previous editions.
- A new chapter entitled “Choosing the Legal Form of Organization” (Chapter 18) focuses on the basic trade-offs between partnerships, private and public corporations, and nonprofits, including such factors as taxes, risk sharing, and incentive problems.
- The knowledge-creation process of converting “wetware” into “software” (based on modern economic growth theory) has been incorporated into Chapters 3 and 10, and this concept has been integrated throughout the text.
- Many of the examples and opening chapter illustrations of real companies have been updated with new ones added that focus especially on international and post-Enron corporate governance issues.
- More end-of-chapter cases and problems are included.
- Each chapter has been revised to further enhance the book’s readability.
- Expanded supplements include a much-improved website, better PowerPoint slides, and new test question.
- A Capstone case on Arthur Andersen has been added at the end of Part 3 to give students an opportunity to apply this book’s framework to an actual catastrophic business failure.

## Capstone Case Study: Arthur Andersen

The third edition also includes a case study of the collapse of the worldwide accounting firm Arthur Andersen, following revelations about Andersen’s involvement with Enron. The case describes Andersen’s history from its founding in 1914, its entry into the consulting business, and its bitterly disputed spinoff Andersen Consulting, to its humiliating conclusion—a guilty verdict on a felony charge that it had obstructed the SEC’s investigation of Enron and subsequently being prohibited from auditing publicly traded companies. Andersen discontinued its auditing practice in August 2002. In the 1990s Arthur Andersen made significant changes in its organizational architecture. This case vividly illustrates how a failed organizational architecture can destroy a once thriving firm. Located at the end of Section 3, the case provides ample opportunities for students to apply the book’s conceptual framework by requiring students to analyze:

- The effects of environmental and strategic changes at Andersen on its organizational architecture.
- The claim that Andersen’s problems on the Enron audit were due to a few “bad partners” in the organization.
- How Andersen might have avoided this calamity.
- The relationship between the “hard” and “soft” elements of Andersen’s corporate culture.

## New and Improved Supplements

### Instructor's CD-ROM

The Instructor's CD-ROM contains the Instructor's Manual, the Test Bank, and the PowerPoint slides. The Instructor's Manual is written by the text authors and includes overviews of the chapters, chapter outlines, teaching suggestions, supplementary discussion and questions for the case studies within the chapter, and review questions and answers. The Instructor's Manual also contains Sample Course Syllabi and Sample Exams. For the first time, this edition will be accompanied by a Test Bank, written by David Ciscel of the University of Memphis, available on the Instructor's CD-ROM with 500 multiple-choice questions. It also provides over 400 colorful PowerPoint slides, created by Charles M. Gray of the University of St. Thomas to correspond with the chapters.

### [www.mhhe.com/economics/brickley3](http://www.mhhe.com/economics/brickley3)

Instructors will find lots of new resources on the website to accompany the third edition. In addition to the online Instructor's Manual, PowerPoint slides, Chapter Summaries and Outlines, and End-of-Chapter Review Question Solutions, we have added Teaching Tips and Classroom Exercises by Charles M. Gray and Kathryn Combs of the University of St. Thomas that feature in-class experiments such as online auctions. Students will find updated fill-in-the-blank and application problems (with answers), links to *Standard and Poor's* and *Business Week*, Related Web Links, and a new Bibliography for Further Reading.

### Wall Street Journal Edition

Students can subscribe to the *Wall Street Journal* for 15 weeks at a specially priced rate of \$20 in addition to the price of the text. Students will receive a "How to Use the *WSJ*" handbook plus a pass code card shrink-wrapped with the text. The card directs students to a website where they enter the code and then gain access to the *WSJ* registration page to enter address info and set up their print and online subscription, and also set up their subscription to Dow Jones Interactive online for the span of the 15-week period.

**说明：**本书定价不包括“前言”中提到的“New and Improved Supplements”。对于采用本书作为教材的任课教师，我公司将根据教学需要提供相应服务，包括“课件”和登陆网站的密码。

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# 致 谢

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

No textbook springs from virgin soil. This book has its intellectual roots firmly planted in the work of dozens who have toiled to develop, test, and apply organization theory. As we detailed in the preface to the first edition, the genesis of this book was a course William Meckling and Michael Jensen taught on the economics of organizations at the University of Rochester in the 1970s. Bill's and Mike's research and teaching stimulated our interest in the economics of organizations, prompted much of our research focused on organizational issues, and had a profound effect on this text. No amount of citation or acknowledgments can adequately reflect the encouragement and stimulation that they provided, both personally and through their writings.

Bill and Mike emphasized three critical features of organizational design: (1) the assignment of decision rights within the organization, (2) the reward system, and (3) the performance-evaluation system. These three elements, which we call *organizational architecture*, serve as an important organizing device for this book. As readers will discover, this structure offers a rich body of knowledge useful for managerial decision making.

Important contributions to the literature on the economics of organizations have been made by a host of scholars. Through the work of these individuals, we have learned a tremendous amount. A number of our colleagues at Rochester also contributed to the development of the book. Ray Ball, Rajiv Dewan, Scott Keating, Stacey Kole, Andy Leone, Glenn MacDonald, Larry Matteson, Kevin Murphy, Mike Ryall, Greg Schaffer, Ronald Schmidt, Larry Van Horn, Karen Van Nuys, Ross Watts, Michael Weisbach, and Ron Yeaple offered thoughtful comments and suggestions that helped to clarify our thinking on key issues. Don Chew, editor of the *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance*, provided invaluable assistance in publishing a series of articles based on the book; his assistance in writing these articles improved the exposition of this book enormously. Our collaboration with Janice Willett on *Designing Organizations to Create Value: From Strategy to Structure* (McGraw-Hill, 2003) enriched our understanding and exposition of many important topics.

This project also has benefited from an extensive development effort. In addition to generations of Simon School students, dozens of colleagues both in the United States and overseas formally reviewed the manuscript and gave us detailed feedback, for which we are very grateful.<sup>1</sup> New material for this addition was reviewed by:

Thomas Cate, Northern Kentucky University  
David H. Ciscel, The University of Memphis  
Mark A. Cohen, Vanderbilt University  
Kathryn L. Combs, University of St. Thomas  
Michael D. Curley, Kennesaw State University  
Michael J. Gibbs, University of Chicago  
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Creighton S. Long, Bethel College  
Stanley H. Masters, Binghamton University  
Robert J. Michaels, California State University—Fullerton  
Ron Necoechea, Roberts Wesleyan College

<sup>1</sup>The first two editions benefited from reviews by John Brown, Gordon Dash, Gary Ferrier, Luke Froeb, Michael Gibbs, Charles M. Gray, Philip Grossman, James Henderson, Harvey James, Jr., Daniel LeClair, Alejandro Manelli, Robert Maness, Stephen Margolis, J. Peter Mattila, Daniel McConaughy, Robert Michaels, Seth W. Norton, Richard Pace, David Parker, Tim Sorenson, Martin Stahl, Michael Sykuta, Steven Tomlinson, Roger Tutterow, Walter Verdon, Edward Weiss, Mike Williams, Robert Windle, Daryl Winn, Pan Yatrakis, and Huizhong Zhou.

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This book represents the current state of the art. Nonetheless, development is ongoing as the research evolves and as we continue to learn. *Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture* covers an exciting, dynamic area. We hope that a small portion of that excitement is communicated through this text. Reviewers, instructors, and students frequently mention the relevance of material to the business community, the accessibility of the text, and the logical flow within the text's framework. However, in the final analysis, it is instructors and their students who will determine the true value of our efforts.

We appreciate the extensive feedback we have received from many readers; their generous comments have improved this edition substantially. Although we had a definite objective in mind as we wrote this book, it is important to be open to suggestions and willing to learn from others who are traveling a similar yet distinct path. Although we are unlikely to please everyone, we will continue to evaluate suggestions critically and to be responsive where consistent with our mission. If readers would like to share their thoughts on this work or their classroom experiences, please feel free to contact any of us at the University of Rochester. Many thanks in advance for the assistance.

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