




COLERIDGE, LANGUAGE AND THE SUBLIME

FROM TRANSCENDENCE TO FINITUDE

CHRISTOPHER STOKES




Coleridge, Language and the Sublime

From Transcendence to Finitude

Christopher Stokes



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First published 2011 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

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Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

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ISBN: 978-0-230-27811-0 hardback

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Stokes, Christopher, 1981–

Coleridge, language and the sublime: from transcendence to finitude/
by Christopher Stokes.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-230-27811-0 (alk. paper)

1. Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 1772–1834—Criticism and interpretation. 2. Sublime, The, in literature. I. Title.

PR4487.S92S76 2011

821'.7—dc22

2010034431

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11

Printed and bound in Great Britain by
CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

Acknowledgements

This research began as a DPhil thesis at the University of Sussex in 2004, in relation to which I must thank the AHRC (who provided a full scholarship), my two original examiners, Andrew Bennett and Sophie Thomas, and above all Nicholas Royle, who helped lay so much of the groundwork for this book with his unfailingly helpful and incisive supervisions. I would also like to thank my fellow DPhils at Sussex, who helped constitute a great community of scholarship and friendship: in particular, Miles Mitchard, Karen Schaller, Heba Youssef, Tatiana Kontou, Josh Vazquez, Jennifer Cooke and Peter Blake.

In bringing this study to completion, I owe a series of further debts. The staff at the British Library and the library of the Cornwall campus provided the spaces where this manuscript was hewn into shape, whilst my current colleagues at the University of Exeter have always been on hand, aiding this monograph both directly and indirectly. In particular, I'd like to thank Adeline Johns-Putra, Jason Hall, Alex Murray and Nick Groom, as well as the contingent of postgraduates on the University of Exeter's Cornwall campus. I should also acknowledge my fantastic undergraduate students, who have helped keep me sane (and intellectually sharp) throughout.

Finally, I would like to offer my gratitude to Palgrave Macmillan, notably Paula Kennedy, Benjamin Doyle and my thorough, but generous, anonymous reader.

Abbreviations and Textual Note

The following abbreviations are used throughout this book:

- CP* Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *The Complete Poems*, ed. William Keach (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1997). Citations are given by line number, although the complete page range of the poem is indicated in the first citation.
- CL* Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. E. L. Griggs, 6 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956–71).
- N* Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. Kathleen Coburn, 5 vols (London: Routledge, 1957–2002). Citations are given by note number (e.g. N1234). Numbering of notes is consecutive between volumes.

The following journal titles are also abbreviated:

- ELH* *English Literary History*
- JAAC* *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*
- NLH* *New Literary History*
- MLN* *Modern Language Notes*

The reader should also note that:

- Citations from multi-volume works include the volume number even if pagination is consecutive.
- With the exception of the medial], all quotations from original editions are presented with non-modified spelling and punctuation.
- All biblical citations refer to the *Authorized King James Version* (1611).

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Introduction

There is currently no full-length study of Coleridge and the sublime. This fact is rather surprising. The topic is central to histories and theories of Romanticism, and monographs entitled 'Poet X and the Sublime' are predictably common.¹ If we look at the recent Coleridge's Writings series, the sublime was chosen as a theme equal in importance to those of politics, humanity, language and religion.² And given Coleridge's immersion in German thought, as well as his authorship of what Paul Magnuson calls the nightmare poems, one would assume a dialogue is waiting to happen with a tradition whose major eighteenth-century proponents are Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant.³ However, one of the reasons that the sublime has not received systematic attention is precisely because it is not a systematic category as such in Coleridge's work. Unlike tropes such as the imagination or the symbol, it does not provide a centre around which he articulates a poetics, aesthetics or metaphysics. There is no grand statement to match the deduction of the imagination in the *Biographia Literaria*, or the definition of the symbol in *The Statesman's Manual*.

The closest he gets to an explicit theory of the sublime occurs in two 1814 fragments, which are involved in my analysis in Chapter 6. They are disappointingly brief. However, the fact that the sublime is not a systematic term in his writings is, for me, that which makes it most interesting and most valuable to study. Rather than being a centre in Coleridge's work, it is a fault-line, subject to a persistent ambiguity. The sublime is a category that has always involved a certain double-edgedness: its etymological and philosophical history alike attest to an experience of the limit, and we should remember every limit has both an inside and an outside edge. Characteristically, the sublime involves the opposites of pain and pleasure, the visionary and the invisible: it

intimates the whole and yet is often fragmented or non-realised. As Longinus establishes, it expresses a taste for the infinite, yet it also evokes the finitude of human categories and perceptions. What the double-edgedness of the sublime does, I argue, is to expose the double-edgedness of Coleridge himself.

The main thrust of this study is to show that whilst Coleridge was always driven by the transcendence hoped for by the so-called Romantic ideology, he also had a sense of finitude every bit as profound as more openly sceptical Romantics like Byron or Keats. Moreover, he brought an intellectual range and strength unmatched by other English poets in coming to face that sense of finitude – to write and think *through* it. In many ways, in fact, he was as much a post-Romantic as he was a Romantic, someone who experienced a seemingly endless series of crises – the end of his Unitarian faith, the trauma of the French Revolution, the sense of his own poetic death, his struggles with metaphysical monism, his religious guilt, his existential isolation – each of which affected and undermined Romantic idealism. As I show in the readings that follow, the sublime is the discourse where much of this internal struggle is played out. The sublime implicates his grandest ambitions and desires (be they poetical, ethical, political or metaphysical) and yet also comes to inscribe the failure of those ambitions and desires, and the more finite positions articulated in the wake of these failures. There are transcendent, confident forms of the sublime, borne aloft by the grandeur of the Romantic ideology, but there are also weaker, more fragile and finite forms.

By attesting to both, this monograph aims to follow the lesson of Seamus Perry's *Coleridge and the Uses of Division*: there are always two sides to Coleridge, and the 'counter-current opposing Coleridge's idealist progress ... [is] too often overlooked'.⁴ Certainly, this is true of nearly all existing work that analyses the sublime in Coleridge's poetry and thought. David Vallins, writing his introduction to the volume on the sublime from the *Coleridge's Writings* series, stakes out the following claim as cardinal:

Coleridge ... is the foremost advocate of the aesthetic of transcendence ... No other British Romantic focuses so consistently as Coleridge on the importance of transcending the material, the everyday, or the mundanely comprehensible in favour of a confrontation with ... infinite forces.⁵

This monograph, in essence, argues that this is (less than) half the story. Defining the sublime exclusively as a category of transcendence

not only forecloses what can be read in the texts and traditions of the sublime, but occludes a vital part of Coleridge.

Nevertheless, Vallins is merely summing up a broad critical consensus. The sublime is nearly always taken only in its positive aspect by Coleridgeans. For instance, Raimonda Modiano's discussion in *Coleridge and the Concept of Nature* begins with the proposition that 'at the centre of the Romantic sublime is the belief that man can transcend the boundaries of the phenomenal world'.⁶ Her central thesis is based around a trope of reconciliation: the idea that Coleridge minimised the sense of rupture and crisis so prominent in the Kantian sublime in favour of a more composed, harmonious sublime. With serene infinitude, the mind is expanded without any violence or discontinuity, and the supersensible is evoked as informing a transfigured nature in a fashion which parts Coleridge fundamentally from Kant. As Modiano puts it, he 'wants to take nature along in the experience'.⁷ The sublime, as a boundless force of reconciliation, is ultimately assigned to familiar centres of Coleridgean thought: the symbol and Christian doctrine. It is hard to detect any negativity or finitude in Modiano's conclusion: 'the essential and unique character of Coleridge's conception of the sublime rests on the integration of nature in an experience of transcendence tending towards a Christian "I AM"'.⁸

Of course, Modiano's analysis identifies many things about the Coleridgean sublime correctly, but it is one-sided. Those ideological centres – imagination, symbol, faith – are in an almost perpetual state of crisis and reconstruction from the very earliest stages of Coleridge's career and this is where I feel different forms of sublimity emerge. Yet, time and again, the sublime is posited only in its positivity. Steven Knapp, in his book *Personification and the Sublime*, sees the sublime primarily as a mediating and reconciliatory category, parallel to the symbol. Thus, just as the symbol balances the dangers of allegory (which loses touch with life) and literalism (which is too empirical), the sublime balances the supersensible locus of selfhood (which, again, may lose touch with life) and the threatened, physical self (which, again, is too empirical).⁹ Once more the sublime is assimilated to another, more central, category, and it exists to successfully connect the finite to a transcendent ground beyond it.

Even where critics are ready to see the double-edgedness of the sublime, Coleridge receives much the same treatment. Thus, Thomas Weiskel's classic *The Romantic Sublime* is famously organised around a positive and a negative sublime. Yet the limited discussion of Coleridge largely positions him as proposing a positive theology of the self, and

reads his theory of the imagination as a narcissistic mechanism.¹⁰ Even Seamus Perry, who I have already cited as being alert to Coleridge's differences with himself, does not really advance over Modiano's conclusions made nearly twenty years earlier. He too places the Coleridgean sublime in the same positive frame, as a trope of reconciliation, success and transcendence:

Coleridge's devotion to a totalising sublime is *more than satisfied* by the notion of a ubiquitous, divine creativity, subsuming the plurality of the world into unity, while at the same time his tenacious sensibility is gratified by the centrality reserved for nature in the new theology.¹¹

Ironically it is perhaps David Vallins, writing in his own study *Coleridge and the Psychology of Romanticism*, who comes closest to the kind of reading that I wish to broach. Having emphasised a scission between thought and expression, he identifies a recurrent concern with obscurity as sublimity in Coleridge's writings. However, his conclusion turns from potentially transcendent ideas to the facticity of writing itself: 'the effect of his writing is primarily to draw attention to itself, and to the effort involved in producing it, rather than to the sublime ideas which it explicitly invokes'.¹² It is this kind of shift towards the finite that comes much closer to my own argument.

Too often, any thought of finitude in Coleridge's poetry has been analysed merely as a kind of de-sublimation. Thus, for example, Thomas Weiskel identifies certain lyrics ('Dejection: An Ode' and 'The Nightingale') as de-idealising the lyric ego and undercutting the sublime.¹³ A similar point is made by Jerome McGann in identifying a disillusioned, revisionary phase in Coleridge's writing: in a poem like 'Constancy to an Ideal Object', there is no 'avenue for making or even anticipating new ideological affirmations'.¹⁴ He praises the poem for exposing Romantic idealism as 'the ignorant pursuit of an illusion'.¹⁵ When Coleridge is not being the Romantic ideologist *par excellence*, the advocate of transcendence, it seems he must instead be disenchanted. Finitude seems to mean nothing more than a *lack* of transcendence. A false dichotomy emerges between a sublime that is reduced to its transcendent moment and a sense of the finite that is seen purely as the end of an illusion.

What the false dichotomy overlooks is precisely the possibility for a more fragile sublimity, a sublimity that arises in the space where desire for transcendence is revised or relinquished. One can, after all, inscribe a limit without necessarily crossing *over* that limit. I want to make

a threefold affirmation about this more restricted sublimity. Firstly, it has been far too often overlooked in Coleridge studies, in favour of the simplistic dichotomy between transcendence and disenchantment mentioned above, a dichotomy that drastically oversimplifies the aesthetics of the sublime. Secondly, new and interesting things happen within it: Coleridge articulates new poetics, new ethics and even new metaphysics based on a renewed experience of the limit. Thirdly, it remains something best analysed through the category of the sublime. A new formation of the sublime occurs, rather than a de-sublimation or a crossing into a different aesthetic category. In asserting these positions, I have drawn on contemporary analyses of the sublime rendered by recent literary theory: not least because they articulate a reading of the sublime not dominated by the assumption of transcendence. However, in the context of a dominant historicist approach in Romantic studies today, this methodological decision deserves further, more elaborate comment.

A conversation about finitude: Romanticism, theory, sublimity

Literary theory, in its most fundamental sense, is nothing more than a philosophical approach to literature: a conceptual rather than historical interrogation of its types, effects and consequences that is as old as Plato and Aristotle. It is, moreover, something that the Romantics, including Coleridge, pursued more extensively than virtually any other generation of writers. Shelley on poetry and legislation, Wordsworth on language and society, Keats on literature and negativity: these are all explicit examples of literary theorising. The *Biographia Literaria*, no less, is one of the most fascinating works of literary theory we possess. Consequently, it is a shame that this wider sense of theory has been lost because of the overexposure of a certain, very narrow, type of theoretical enquiry. In this study, I draw to a greater or lesser extent throughout on a body of ideas associated with continental philosophy and aesthetics, with phenomenology and with deconstruction. However, I aim to do so with a light touch, without too much jargon and with a due attention to history and the findings of historicist criticism.¹⁶ I also want to keep the primary texts always in the foreground: someone like Paul de Man is, for me, most valuable as a way of continuing the tradition of close reading. Above all, I have attempted to be guided by two methodological principles. Firstly, to go beyond the narrow, textualist conclusions which dominated and doomed the period of high theory, and, secondly,

to always treat theory as a reading of traditions and texts, rather than as a master-discourse.

Let me address the first principle first, for I believe it is precisely in a turn towards the aesthetics of the sublime – as in parallel turns towards ethics and theology – that we see a fuller sense of theory's scope inscribed.¹⁷ Jean-Luc Nancy remarked in 1988 that 'one may be tempted to imagine that our epoch is rediscovering the *sublime*'.¹⁸ As shown by a glance through the contributors to the collection that Nancy's observation prefaces, translated into English as *Of the Sublime: Presence in Question*, this rediscovery implicated a considerable swathe of theorists: Jean-François Lyotard would be the obvious and pre-eminent example, but the sublime was addressed directly by many others.¹⁹ One interesting thing about this chronology is that the juncture when the aesthetics of the sublime became a dominant concern for French theorists was also roughly the high-water mark for theory in literary studies, at least in Anglo-American departments.

Indeed, what we might term the first wave of theory was rather hostile to the sublime. The major deconstructive readings of Coleridge from the period of high theory – texts like Tilottama Rajan's *Dark Interpreter* (1980) and *The Supplement of Reading* (1990), Jerome Christensen's *Coleridge's Blessed Machine of Language* (1981) and Susan Eilenberg's *Strange Power of Speech* (1992) – are largely indebted to the type of deconstruction practised by Paul de Man. They share with de Man a consuming interest in the operation of figures and tropes, and the notion that language is ultimately rhetorical rather than referential. The endpoint of any de Manian analysis tends to be an avowal of textual irony. Thus, two of Rajan's major conclusions are that 'Romanticism accepts the arbitrariness of its own signs, yet constantly seeks ways to deny the traumatic implications' and that Coleridge was 'perhaps too committed to the legacy of a transcendental poetics'.²⁰ Eilenberg's analysis of the relationship between Coleridge and Wordsworth argues that 'each body of writing ... aggressively allegorizes the other ... Wordsworth demystifies the Coleridgean uncanny; Coleridge deconstructs the Wordsworthian matter-of-fact'.²¹ And Christensen's analysis of the *Biographia Literaria* and other texts is rooted in identifying an endless linguistic deferral operating mechanistically against Coleridge's stated intentions.²²

As Derrida accurately observed in a eulogy, 'Paul [de Man] was irony itself'.²³ Given this preference for irony – irony being, perhaps, one of sublimity's obvious opposites – it is perhaps unsurprising that de Man himself found the sublime a discourse that was too idealist.²⁴ We see

this in an essay like 'Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant'.²⁵ De Man argues that the crucial thing about the Kantian analysis lies in a narrative of sacrifice imposed to permit the relationship between imagination and reason to become meaningful. His objection is that this is not 'an argument, [but] ... a story, a dramatized scene of the mind'.²⁶ The shift between the terms of the mathematical sublime (number, extension and quantity) to those of the dynamical (power, morality and mortality) allows the different faculties of the human mind to be cast as personifications in a tragic scene: 'the story of an exchange, of a negotiation, in which powers are lost and gained in an economy of sacrifice and recuperation'.²⁷ When the imagination plays the role of Antigone or Iphigenia, then its failure to comprehend the sublime object can be invested with meaning as a sacrifice. Yet what does it mean for a part of the mind to *sacrifice* itself? How can a psychological faculty be said to take up a part in this way? De Man's point – and the nub of his deconstruction – is that the Kantian sublime is essentially a figural construction. The sublime is revealed as an effect of allegory: in essence, Kant is ironised.

However, if irony seems the natural outcome of a de Manian deconstruction, I would like to draw attention to what Derrida calls 'a certain beyond-of-irony'.²⁸ Although Derrida identifies this beyond-of-irony as a subtle side of de Man's own work, the phrase perhaps better represents the drift of his own practice of deconstruction, as one can see from the following interview with Richard Kearney:²⁹

It is totally false to suggest that deconstruction is a suspension of reference. Deconstruction is deeply concerned with the 'other' of language. I never cease to be surprised by critics who see my work as a declaration that there is nothing beyond language, that we are imprisoned in language; it is, in fact, saying the exact opposite.³⁰

Recent French theory, in its various 'turns' as well as through thinkers who are more phenomenological and Heideggerian than Derrida, could be described as increasingly pursuing a 'beyond-of-irony' and the '"other" of language'. Rather than halting at the exposure of a vertiginous textual irony, it has pursued instead a certain *sublime* logic: theorising experiences at the limits of signification and phenomenality. It is no surprise that theory turned to the sublime as a topic as its own logic became increasingly sublime itself. It is perhaps unfortunate that literary studies turned away from theory – on the understandable grounds that avowals of textual irony were becoming clichéd and tired – at

more or less this point. Yet even when important works of theoretically informed Romantic criticism have appeared since the heyday of theory, they still tend to privilege the tropes of text, reference, figure, reading, writing and voice. Angela Esterhammer's *The Romantic Performative*, for instance, is innovative because it looks at the performative, but still, of course, remains primarily locked within an analysis of language.

In this book I attempt to exploit the recent theoretical turns made by theorists and continental thinkers in order to reconnect analyses of language with other kinds of narrative intertwined with the sublime. My initial chapters, on language, are perhaps predictably the most de Manian of my readings: yet I have also tried to use Rei Terada's interpretation of emotion to bring questions of passion, affect and feeling back into the picture. Theory need not imply pure scepticism – that emotions do not exist – as David Vallins suggests when avowing his own emotional essentialism.³¹ In my chapters on terror, particularly in my reading of 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner', I am heavily influenced by the recent engagement of theory with questions of freedom, evil and guilt: again, themes that might seem unusually traditional given the textualist theory familiar to Romantic studies. And in my fifth and sixth chapters, where the invocation of recent theorists such as Jean-Luc Nancy and Jean-Luc Marion is at its most explicit, I am indebted to the so-called theological turn in phenomenology. This reconnects theory to that most vexed topic of all: God.

More generally, my methodology has a phenomenological drift. I do not treat the subject merely as a rhetorical or textual category (as it threatens to be, incidentally, in Knapp's analysis of sublime personification). In many ways, a subjectivity that is estranged from itself is the most recurrent motif of this study, and I am keen not to posit it merely as a signifier 'I' adrift in language. In this, I am influenced by the more Heideggerian and Husserlian side of recent French theory, as well as a renewed interest in the question as to who or what succeeds the so-called death of the subject.³² A more phenomenological engagement with subjectivity – particularly evident at the end of my second and fourth chapters – offers an alternative to more essentialist notions of the subject, as well as to the misconception that theory implies that the subject simply doesn't exist, or is just a grammatical fiction.

Yet, all this is more or less ungrounded or anachronistic if we do not remember the second methodological principle – that theory is not a master-discourse, but readings of – and *inside* – a tradition. In general, I have only invoked theorists when their readings are rooted in texts from Coleridge's influences or contemporaries. For instance, it is via

Terada's references to John Keats that I put her concept of *pathos* into play with Coleridge, and it is Immanuel Kant who triangulates my readings of Coleridge, Jean-Luc Nancy and Jean-Luc Marion in Chapter 6. At times, we must also accept that certain texts remain ahead, as it were, of their readers. I exploit this kind of dynamic in my fifth chapter, for instance, when I argue that deconstructive scepticism directed against the Romantic nature sublime has already been anticipated by Immanuel Kant's strictures against visionary rapture, and Kant's text not only manages this, but offers a further set of resources (neglected by de Man and others) to understand the relationship between aesthetics and theology.

Positioning theorists in this way, as readers of and participants in tradition, is to acknowledge two crucial things about a justifiable use of theory. Firstly, we see that theory need not be merely the intellectual wing of some postmodern *zeitgeist*, committed only to issues of the text – as the reproduction of French thought through the Yale School and in turn the imitators of the Yale School might suggest. Rather, serious theory is part of a lineage of continental philosophy: engaged with the major figures of the European tradition (Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger) and with the perennial issues of philosophy, such as emotion, evil and theism/atheism. Secondly, it is to recognise that theory itself is shaped by philosophical history, not least the philosophical history of the Romantic period.³³ The grand axis from Kant to Hegel, the very axis in which Coleridge himself was so deeply immersed, is the legacy that modern literary theory of whatever stripe continues to work through. One of the most valuable assumptions of theory is that we have not finished reading Kant or the German Romantics, or exhausting the continued power and relevance of those texts – and I would affirm exactly the same of Coleridge.

To return specifically to the sublime, we must recall that it is readings of the *Critique of Judgment* – and to a lesser but still important extent, Burke and Longinus – that continue to be the site for contemporary meditations on the sublime. As Nancy remarks 'the sublime properly constitutes our tradition ... not *an* aesthetics ... [but] the aesthetic as question'.³⁴ This is not a question that is going to go away, at least not whilst we are held by a broadly Romantic or post-Romantic intellectual legacy. What I have found particularly useful and provocative about the various theoretical returns to the sublime is that they identify the sublime as a privileged moment in the philosophical and aesthetic thinking of the limit – of what it means to confront a boundary of what is cognisable or representable – and identify a need to continue a

dialogue with that thinking. In this sense, we may describe the sublime as a conversation about finitude. Longinus, Burke and Kant take part in this conversation, as do Derrida, Nancy and Lyotard: and as do the English Romantics, including Coleridge.

Coleridge, in short, belongs to an ongoing tradition. In the same way that Paul Hamilton has recently identified a philosophically vibrant Coleridge who contributed to a Hegelian moment that is, in some important ways, still *our* moment, I see Coleridge's thought as representing a fascinating conjunction between transcendence and finitude which implicates our own condition as a post-Romantic age.³⁵ He has a pivotal role as one of the great Romantic architects of transcendence, and throughout this book my readings tend to set off from one or another desire for transcendence. Yet, we must remember the double-edgedness of Coleridge and the sublime alike: this desire for transcendence was often a torn one. Moreover, in the wake of failures and crises, Coleridge does not merely revert to disillusion but tends to emerge with a renewed sense of the finite. The following quotation from his late work *Aids to Reflection* could act as a motif for this study: 'the Life, we seek after, is a mystery; but so both in itself and in its origin is the Life we have'.³⁶ The strange presence of mystery in 'the Life we have', of an immanence divided against itself, is crucial to this other side of Coleridge, so occluded by existing criticism. Jean-François Lyotard claims that the sublime 'does not reside in an over there, in another world, or another time, but in this: in that (something) happens', and there is something of this always accompanying the more conventional, transcendentalising Coleridge.³⁷ Finitude is always inherent in the motif of transcendence. It is this doubleness which makes Coleridge's voice far more subtle, interesting and intellectually challenging than has previously been acknowledged.

The tradition of the sublime: Longinus, Burke, Kant

Foregrounding the notion of a tradition of the sublime demands that we understand the constitution of whatever tradition is in question. It was noted earlier that the sublime was not a systematic category: perhaps that has something to do with its excessive and ambivalent nature as a concept – the aforementioned double-edgedness – but it also has to do with what Peter de Bolla describes as a discursive tendency to overrun those discourses adjoining it.³⁸ The sublime, by the Romantic period, was everywhere, which is why a study like this could cover a potentially limitless set of concerns and texts. Nevertheless, we can identify three

figures as by far the most influential pivots around which the tradition of the sublime is articulated. These are the anonymous third-century rhetorician known as Longinus, the British philosopher Edmund Burke, and Immanuel Kant. It is in acknowledgement of this that this study is structured around these figures and the three broad areas they helped define in sublime terms: language by Longinus, terror by Burke, and representation by Kant.

My opening section takes its bearings from Longinus's treatise *Peri Hypsous*, arguing that in defining the sublime as the highest intensity of linguistic expression, he gave to the eighteenth century a troubling double legacy. Firstly, he set up a model of a discourse that could not be governed by normal, formal rules, but was instead referred to an exceptional subjectivity: the impassioned transport of the great poet or orator. However, he also theorised the technical manipulation of figures which threatened to falsify that very aesthetic of sincerity. I trace the presence of both legacies in some of Coleridge's earliest poetry, and his first poetic persona, via the so-called effusions found in 1796's *Poems on Various Subjects*. These effusions suggested an outburst of genuine feeling and yet also increasingly engaged with a certain theatricality or fabulosity of the passions. Given that Longinus's texts obviously involve a more complex reception history than Burke or Kant, I also look at two mid-century writers who help, albeit partially and incompletely, to bridge the gap between the remote classical context and the 1790s.

The problem of passion continues in a political register, as I explore in my second chapter's reading of the 1798 *Fears in Solitude* quarto. The value of passion *per se*, and its relation to wider discourses on justification, principle and conviction, is raised in 'France: An Ode', and in 'Fears in Solitude' itself. By the quarto's final poem, 'Frost at Midnight', Coleridge has radically refigured his speaking position into a more private space. Making a fresh case for the lyric element of this poem (whilst acknowledging more recent historicist and political readings), I use Rei Terada's notion of pathos as a second-order emotion to explore the way that Coleridge confronts the experience of affect as destabilising, rather than being possessed by, an 'I'. This re-engages Coleridge with another side of the Longinian tradition: the negativity of the Sapphic lyric, founded on dispossession, fragmentation and the non-coincidence of feeling with itself.

My third chapter begins by noting the central importance of terror in the wake of Burke's *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*. However, by comparing the empiricist philosophies of Burke and associationist thinker David Hartley, we can