

**DICTIONARY
OF
PHILOSOPHY
AND
RELIGION**

**Eastern
and
Western Thought**

W.L. REESE

Dictionary
of
Philosophy and Religion
Eastern and Western Thought

by

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To W.L.R. I and III from II

PREFACE

The present volume, although termed a *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion*, has many encyclopedic features including analyses of the thought of all major philosophers and religious leaders. It is a dictionary in the sense that its major emphasis is on explication of terms, while its encyclopedic aspect is a recognition that the key terms of philosophy and religion are best explored in the context of the conceptual systems of those who have introduced and developed them. One of the key features of the volume is the extent of its cross-references. The analysis of each thinker is presented in a numbered sequence of ideas, and references are made from concepts or topical headings to the location where the concept is treated in the entry of the individual thinker. For example, turning to the topic, "Universals," brings one to a discussion containing cross-references to the positions of 43 philosophers on the topic, constituting a comprehensive history of that concept in philosophy. Among the entries the reader will note that the mention of Plato is followed by "(q.v. 1)," directing one to the first point under the entry, "Plato," for further elucidation of his view of absolute realism in the context of his general philosophy. The mention of "Aristotle (q.v. 7)" similarly directs the reader to point number 7 in the Aristotle entry for elucidation of his view of moderate realism. "Ockham (q.v. 6)" refers to the sixth numbered point in the Ockham discussion for further information on his position of nominalism, and "Locke (q.v. 4)" refers one to the fourth point of the Locke entry for his view of conceptualism.

Cross-references run from philosophical movements as well as topics, to the positions of individual philosophers. By following out such references it should be possible to gain a "fix" on any important philosophical topic. The treatment of philosophical and religious ideas in their relations to individuals and movements is designed to encourage a process of orientation through conceptual triangulation, beginning from any term, person, or movement, and proceeding to the other two. General terms used in the sketches of individual philosophers will usually be found to have been treated in their own right, and lead to other individuals who have used the term in the same, or in a related, sense. In the case of most philosophers it has

been possible to relate them to a movement, likewise treated, so that the reader may refer from the philosopher to his school or movement, and thus to other philosophers with similar orientation. The reader is thus encouraged to undertake his own explorations of the themes, movements, and thinkers important in philosophy and religion.

It has been our goal to provide reliable, but not exhaustive, information on the topics treated. In this regard, in addition to general library resources, every item of the dictionary has been checked against the following sources: *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Company), 1967; *Diccionario de Filosofía*, ed. José Ferrater Mora, 4th edition, Editorial Sudamericana, 1958; the so-called philosophers' edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 11th edition, 30 vols., 1910; André Lalande, *Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie*, Neuvième Ed., 1962; *The Great Ideas: A Syntopicon* (Great Books of the Western World, ed.-in-chief, R.M. Hutchins), vols. 1 & 2; *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, ed. James Mark Baldwin, 3 vols., 1960; *The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers*, ed. J.O. Urmson (New York: Hawthorne Books, Inc.), 1960; *Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. D.D. Runes (Ames, Iowa: Littlefield, Adams & Co.), 1955; John Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., Ltd.), 1957; *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*, ed. B. Wuellner, (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co.), 1956; *An Encyclopedia of Religion*, ed. Vergilius Ferm (New York: The Philosophical Library), 1945; *Encyclopedia of Religion and Religions*, ed. E. Royston Pike (New York: Meridian Books), 1959; *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, ed. S. Radhakrishnan and C.A. Moore (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1957; *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, trans. and comp. Wing-Tsit Chan (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1963; Chandradhar Sharma, *Indian Philosophy: A Critical Survey* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962; and *Philosophers Speak of God*, ed. Hartshorne and Reese (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1953. In addition, substantial use has been made of the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. James Hastings, 13 vols., (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons), 1951; W.C. and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1962; and the Italian *Enciclopedia Filosofica*, 6 vols. (Firenze: G.C. Sansoni), 1967.

For more extensive analyses than we have provided, the reader should turn to the multi-volumed encyclopedias; *i.e.*, the sets edited by Edwards, Hastings, Ferrater Mora, and the Italian encyclopedia. Finally, of course, the reader should turn to the writings of the individuals themselves; the treatment of each individual includes a list of his principal writings. One point of importance in the conceptual triangulation mentioned above is the desirability of moving from term and movement to the bibliographies of the individual thinkers presented in the dictionary. If no writings are given, it is because none or only fragments have survived.

In addition to topics, men, and movements, the volume likewise contains sketches, both historical and analytical, of the fields of philosophy. Here the reader may gain initial orientation to the areas of ethics, aesthetics, value theory, epistemology, logic, and philosophy of science—once again with cross-references to individual thinkers—as well as a discussion of the variety of ways in which philosophy, as a discipline, has been understood through the centuries. With respect to logic the dictionary contains an extensive list of informal fallacies with definitions and examples, discussions of immediate inference, syllogisms, the antilogism, the construction of truth tables, the

propositional calculus, quantification theory, and the logic of relations.

The decision to compose a single dictionary of philosophy and religion derived from the observation that dictionaries of philosophy and dictionaries of religion necessarily make extensive reference to the other area. The inclusion of both in a single volume is thus natural, and makes possible a fuller appreciation of the similarities and differences of the two areas.

It was editor Richard Huett who in 1961 conceived of the idea of the dictionary and enlisted my energies for its writing; he too whose encouragement at every stage made possible the project's continuing; and he who in the situation of a serious derailment of plans helped the manuscript to its home at Humanities Press, one of the most distinguished imprints in philosophy. My gratitude to him is immense; it extends to Simon Silverman as well. Finally, I wish to thank the following succession of helpers, listed in the order of their temporal involvement: Patricia Yench, Elizabeth Balcavage, Margaret Mc Bride, Faye Pappas, Donald Peas, Helen Somich, Margaret Gleeson, Cheryl Warren, Patricia Reese and Judith Fowke. Any inadequacies in the work are, of course, my responsibility as "principal investigator."

William L. Reese
Slingerlands, New York

KEY

The entries of the dictionary are liberally cross-referenced. When the reader comes upon a term or name followed by “*q. v.*” and a number, *e.g.*, Aristotle (*q. v.* 6), this means that the numbered point in the entry given (in our example, the 6th point of the Aristotle entry) contains additional information pertinent to the topic under discussion. One objective of the dictionary is maximum comprehensiveness. For this reason virtually every person or term mentioned anywhere in the text will have its own entry to which the reader may refer. In the case of the few individuals mentioned with no separate entry, their names, where mentioned, are generally accompanied by dates or major publications.

Apart from unusual cases, noted below, all titles of books listed in the dictionary are rendered in English. It is to be assumed in each case, however, unless contrary notice is given, that the writing was done in the language appropriate to the nationality of the speaker. During the Middle Ages that language was Latin for all of Europe. Where an author has written in several languages, the language of a given book is indicated by an appropriate notation (“E” for English, “F” for French, “G” for German, “Gr” for Greek, “L” for Latin, etc.). In some cases it was more convenient to provide information covering the languages of authorship in the text preceding the listed titles. Where the book has been translated into English, this fact is indicated by a capital “T” following the title. In general, translators’ titles follow their originals very closely. In cases where a translator has departed widely from the author’s title, we have provided our own close translation of the original title, followed by the translator’s title. In all such cases the date given is that of the original publication, and not the publication date of the translation.

The only instance where titles are given in a foreign language are those where the translated volume has retained a non-English title, as in the case of Thomas Aquinas’ *Summa Theologica*, or where translation provides no gain to the reader in terms of information, *e.g.*, Duns Scotus’ *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*.

CONTENTS

Preface	i
Key	iv
Dictionary	1

A

AARON BEN SAMUEL.

Q. v. Cabala (3a).

ABARBANEL.

Q. v. Leon Hebreo.

ABDUCTION.

From the Latin *ab* ("away") and *ducere* ("to lead").

(1) In Aristotle abduction refers to those types of syllogistic inference which fail to carry certainty with them, whether due to a weak connection between the major and middle terms, or the middle and minor terms.

(2) For C. S. Peirce (*q. v.* 8), abduction is one of three basic forms of inference, along with induction and deduction. Abduction is the means whereby hypotheses are generated, moving from a particular case to a possible explanation of the case. As in Aristotle, so for Peirce abduction is a mode of probable inference. For Peirce the inference has the following form: The surprising fact, F, is observed. If H were true F would be commonplace. Therefore, H is (possibly) true.

ABELARD, PETER. 1079-1142.

French philosopher and theologian. Studied with Roscelin, and William of Champeaux. Among the disputations in which he was involved the one with William of Champeaux on the problem of universals (*q. v.*) turned out to be most constructive. Opened several schools of philosophy and

theology, especially in Paris where, 1113, the celebrated, yet unfortunate, Heloise-Abelard story began. His book, *On the Divine Unity and Trinity*, was condemned as heretical and burned in 1121. Abbot of St. Gildas, 1125. He lectured at Ste. Genevieve, Paris, from 1136-49. Accused of heresy by St. Bernard and condemned by the Council of Sens, 1141. An appeal to Pope Innocent II led to a prohibition against his continuing to teach. Withdrew to Cluny where he remained until his death. His passionate faith in reason stirred all of Europe, and helped shape a new intellectual climate for the schools.

Principal writings: *Yes and No*, 1122; *Christian Theology* (T), 1124; *Theology of the "Supreme Good"* (T); and *Know Thyself* (T), between 1125-38; as well as four treatises on logic.

(1) Having studied under two teachers, Roscelin and William of Champeaux, who stood at opposite poles on the question of universals, Abelard sought a middle way. This assertion oversimplifies the story but only in not being sufficiently tentative. Roscelin was, at least, widely understood to be an out and out nominalist, believing that individual things alone exist, and that the universal is a mere word (*flatus vocis*). Roscelin's student, William of Champeaux, held that each species of things has an essential nature, and this nature is in each individual thing belonging to that species, entirely and wholly present. The individual members of each species, then, differ from each other only accidentally.

(2) Abelard moved to his own position by means of a disputation with William of Champeaux. On William's view, Abelard contended, any one thing can really be said to be at the same time in different places: Socrates is really Plato, and occupies two places simultaneously. In addition, what we say of any two members of a species can also be said of God. God, too, is a substance, and is hence on this view identical with all that is, so that one consequence of the doctrine is pantheism. In countering such criticism William of Champeaux changed his view to hold that the essences or natures of any two things of the same species are numerically different, although alike in resulting in the same properties.

(3) Abelard's position would seem to be not very different from the position to which he forced William of Champeaux although Abelard approaches the problem in the manner of Roscelin. His doctrine includes at least the following points: (a) We predicate names of things; and there are both universal and particular names. (b) It is not the word as *flatus vocis* that we predicate of things, but the name or word in its logical content which we predicate, that is, the word as *sermo*. (c) This logical content is "common to all" to which it applies while "proper to none." It is the result of abstraction freed from the individuating circumstances of the individual thing. He also calls this content "a common and confused image of many things." The content of the universal words, or concepts, then may be said to be derived from the things, but not to be in them quite as we conceive that content. At the same time, however, he holds that the exemplars or divine ideas are in the mind of God; hence, his view fits both realism and conceptualism.

(4) Next in order of importance to his view of universals is the attitude expressed in his *Sic et Non*, or *Yes and No*, in which are collected contradictory opinions of the Fathers on the leading issues of theology and philosophy. He felt the individual thinker should be at liberty to judge among these alternatives, not forced to believe. Against most of the intellectuals of his day he believed in the primacy of inquiry over faith: "By doubting we are led to inquire, by inquiry we perceive the truth."

(5) In the *Scito Te Ipsum* or *Know Thyself* he developed the view that sin implies both knowledge and intent to do evil. This view places the ethical center of gravity in the will, and forces some adjustment in the doctrine of original sin.

(6) He made significant contributions to the development of logic. These are discussed under Logic (6).

ABHINIVESHA.

Sanskrit term signifying the love of life and fear of death. One of the five kinds of delusive attachment of the Yoga system (*q. v.* Yoga 3).

ABRAHAM BEN SAMUEL ABULIIFA.

Spanish cabalist. *Q. v.* Cabala (3c).

ABSOLUTE.

From the Latin *absolutus*, meaning "the perfect" or "completed". The term stands opposed to the *relative*, and frequently means simply the negation of the relative, *i. e.*, as that which is independent of relation. The term carries the sense of the fixed, the independent, the unqualified, the completed. Its principal use in philosophy has been in systems of metaphysics. It has also had use in value theory and in natural philosophy. At various times the term has been applied to *e. g.*, time, space, value, truth, and God. No easy classification of the uses of the term is possible. Descartes applied the term to the self-evident principles and demonstrated propositions capable of use in deducing solutions to further problems. Fichte applied the term to the ego as the initiating power of knowledge and reality. The Absolute, a noun standing for the name of God, was introduced by Nicholas of Cusa (*q. v.* 4), who regarded God as both Absolute Maximum and Absolute Minimum. The term was utilized by Fichte (*q. v.* 8), and Schelling (*q. v.* 1). Hegel uses the term (*q. v.* 3, 18, 22) as the name for the capstone entity of his system, the Absolute Spirit, which has dimensions of absolute truth and beauty. In this usage the term entered the vocabulary of 19th-century idealism, and continued to characterize representatives of this school into the 20th century. In most of its usages by idealist philosophers the term is employed in the original Latin sense, indicating a posited wholeness, unity and completeness of reality, which yet somehow lies beyond the world of our experience. The Russian philosopher, Soloviev (*q. v.* 3) equated the Absolute with reality, which he regarded as a living organism. It has been used in the East in recent years (*q. v.* Sri Aurobindo 1) as an alternate term for Brahman.

ABSOLUTE EGO.

Q. v. Fichte (3).

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.

Q. v. Idealism (3); Hegel (8-22).

ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM.

Q. v. Royce (8).

ABSOLUTE REALISM.

Q. v. Realism (1); Universals (2), (4), (8), (12).

ABSOLUTE SUCHNESS.

Ashvaghosa's name for reality. *Q.v.* Ashvaghosa (1, 2, 5).

ABSOLUTION.

Q.v. Penance (2).

ABSTRACTION.

From the Latin *abstractus*, past participle of the verb *abstrahere* ("to draw from").

(1) In Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophy (*q.v.* Aristotle 3 and Thomas Aquinas 5) abstraction is the process whereby universal ideas come to be appropriated by the mind. Abstraction is possible because of the *hylomorphic* nature of substance, *i.e.*, that substance is composed of matter and form. The mind receives a sense datum or phantasm and draws out the form, thereby providing a universal for intellectual use.

(2) For Locke (*q.v.* 4) abstraction takes place by drawing out what is common to a group of individual things, on the basis of a comparison of their similarities and differences.

(3) In contemporary logic and mathematics abstraction is the name of that operation upon a variable which produces a function.

ABYSS.

Q.v. Valentinus; Jacob Boehme.

ACADEMY, PLATONIC.

Q.v. Plato's Academy.

ACCIDENT.

From the Latin *accidens*, present participle of *accidere*, "to happen."

In Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophy, that mode of being which inheres in some other being, such as the mode of existence of the redness in an apple. To be contrasted with substantial being, such as the mode of existence of the apple itself. Not only a quality such as redness, however, but any of the nine Aristotelian categories (*q.v.* Aristotle 4, 6) other than substance itself.

ACCIDENTAL FORM.

Q.v. Form (5c).

ACHILLES PARADOX.

Q.v. Zeno of Elea (5).

ACOSMISM.

From the Greek *a* ("not") and *kosmos* ("world"). The term was coined by Hegel to refer to the doctrine that the world is unreal and that only God exists. Hegel applied the term to the philosophy of Spinoza, but that may be a misapplication. The term fits more

exactly the Acosmic Pantheism of Shankara (*q.v.* Pantheism 9, 14).

ACQUAINTANCE, KNOWLEDGE BY.

Q.v. Russell (6).

ACT.

A Latin term derived from *agere* ("to do"). The Greek term is *energeia*.

(1) Aristotle (*q.v.* 7-8) contrasted act (*energeia*) with potency (*dynamis*), associating the former with form and the latter with matter.

(2) The same contrast in Scholastic philosophy is between *actus* and *potentia*. A distinction is made between first and second act. By "first act" is meant the form of a thing, and by "second act" the operation of the thing. "Act" suggests in this terminology both actuality and activity. In contrast to other beings, God is regarded as *actus purus*.

(3) Gentile (*q.v.* 1) spoke of his philosophy as a philosophy of the pure act. What he meant, however, was that action—in his sense, human activity—was to be given primary ontological status.

(4) Mead (*q.v.* 4) regarded the act, beginning with the gesture, as the central category of all analysis and meaning.

ACTION, PHILOSOPHY OF.

Q.v. Blondel (1).

ACTIONISM.

Q.v. Rudolf Eucken.

ACTUAL ENTITY.

Q.v. Whitehead (9).

ACTUALISM.

Q.v. Giovanni Gentile (1).

ACTUALITY.

Q.v. Aristotle (8); *q.v.* Weiss.

ACTUAL OCCASION.

Q.v. Whitehead (9).

ACTUS PURUS.

A Latin term meaning "pure act" or "pure actuality." This is the appropriate name for God in Scholastic philosophy. As purely actual, God is the one being without potentiality; hence the highest, or only complete, Being. *Q.v.* Aquinas (4); Act.

ADAM KADMON.

The hermaphroditic, primordial man of the Cabala (*q.v.* 1f).

ADDITION.

Q.v. Propositional Calculus (11).

ADELARD OF BATH.

12th-cent. A.D. English philosopher. Taught in Paris and Laon. He translated Euclid from Arabic into Latin. In the medieval dispute over universals Adelard advanced a "doctrine of indifference" to the effect that, depending upon the way it is viewed, an object of the understanding can be regarded either as an individual or a universal. Nonetheless, he likewise held that the Platonic perspective represents the superior point of view.

Principal writings: *On the Things of Nature; On Questions of Nature.*

ADEQUATION.

From the Latin *ad* ("to") and *aequare* ("make equal"). Aquinas used the Latin *adequatio* in defining truth (*q.v.* 10) as the adequation of thought to thing.

AD HOC.

The Latin phrase, meaning "to this," suggests the directional character of the *ad hoc*. In the logic of explanation an *ad hoc* hypothesis (*q.v.* 7, 10) is one formed to explain a given phenomenon, but differing from powerful hypotheses in not being derivable from other phenomena or yielding other testable consequences. The value of such an hypothesis, applying only to the phenomenon from which it was derived, is hence open to considerable doubt.

ADIAPHORA.

Q.v. Melanchthon (1).

ADICKES, ERICH. 1866-1928.

German philosopher. Born near Bremen. Studied in Berlin. Taught at Münster and Tübingen. A representative of neo-Kantianism (*q.v.* 7) retaining the influence of his teacher Friedrich Paulsen (*q.v.*), Adickes came to the Kantian position after phases of voluntaristic pantheism and spiritual pluralism.

ADLER, FELIX.

Q.v. Ethical Culture.

ADOPTIONISM.

The theological doctrine that Christ, born as a mortal being, became the Son of God by adoption. The doctrine, appearing in several forms in the first three centuries A.D., led to the Adoptionist Controversy in 8th-century Spain, and was condemned in the Charlemagne-sponsored synods of 792, 794 and 799.

AD QUEM.

From the Latin *ad* ("to") and *quem* ("which"). The phrase, along with *ad quod*

("to what") is used in referring to the end point, tendency, or goal of an argument or chain of reasoning. To be contrasted with a *quo*, referring to the corresponding beginning point.

AD QUOD.

Q.v. *Ad Quem.*

ADVAITA.

Sanskrit term meaning "nonduality." The term refers to the central idea of the Vedantic philosophy that man's self (the *atman*), and the soul of all things (the Brahman) are identical. The school of Indian thought stressing nonduality is known as *Advaita Vedanta* (*q.v.* Vedanta 1). The religio-philosophical task of human life is to dispel our mistaken beliefs in duality, including, of course, the belief in our separateness from Brahman. The chief representatives of the school are Gaudapada (*q.v.*) and Shankara (*q.v.* 1-4).

ADVENTITIOUS IDEAS.

One of Descartes' three classes of ideas, along with "factitious" and "innate" (*q.v.* Descartes 4). Adventitious ideas come from experience, entering the mind through sensation.

AELIUS THEON.

Q.v. Rhetoric (10).

AENESIDEMUS.

1st century B.C. Greek philosopher. Born in Crete. Taught in Alexandria. Reviving Pyrrhonism (*q.v.*) and systematizing its arguments, Aenesidemus set its form of extreme skepticism against both Stoicism and the moderate skepticism of the Academy (*q.v.* Plato's Academy).

Principal writings: *Pyrrhonic Discourses*, 8 volumes; only references remain.

(1) Following Pyrrho (*q.v.*) with respect both to suspending judgment on all matters, as well as the development of *ataraxia*, or imperturbability, Aenesidemus developed the tropes, or headings, which require the suspension of judgment.

(2) He organized his tropes into a list of ten. Judgment must be suspended due to: (a) the variety of species among living forms manifesting different modes of perception; (b) the variety of classes of men manifesting individual differences; (c) differences in the data given by different senses; (d) differences in perception due to different states of every organism; (e) the differences following the variety of positions one can take up with respect to an observed object including distance; (f) differences in the medium through which perception occurs;

(g) differences in the states of the objects themselves; (h) the impossibility of eliminating the contradictions and discriminating between the multiplicity of factors involved in judgment; (i) differences due to frequency of occurrence, the rare occurrence seeming wondrous due to infrequency alone; (j) and differences due to customs, habits, beliefs, and states of development of different peoples.

(3) He argued against causality on the ground that, *e.g.*, if cause precedes effect there must be a moment when the particular cause has caused and the effect not yet begun, and this moment reveals the incoherence of the idea.

AEON.

Among Valentinian Gnostics, especially, the name given to the semi-divine, spiritual intermediaries emanating from God and bridging between God and the material world, which meant—in their view—bridging between good and evil. *Q.v.* Valentinus.

AESTHETICS.

From the Greek *aisthesis* ("sensation"). This term has come to designate not the whole domain of the sensible, but only that portion to which the term "beauty" may apply. The term was introduced by Baumgarten (*q.v.* 1, 3) who defined the term broadly, although theory of beauty made up part of the study. Herbart (*q.v.* 1, 4) also used the term in a broad sense. It was really Hegel who canonized the more limited reference of the term by using it to refer to his writings on art.

Theories concerning the nature of the beautiful in art or in art and nature, however, begin at least with Socrates, and have engaged the energies of philosophers ever since. Among significant theories the following may be cited:

(1) Plato (*q.v.* 1, 5g) held to an imitation theory of art, believing art to be an imitation of some aspect of the space-time world which was for him an imitation of an imitation. Beauty, on the other hand, referred to the symmetry and proportion of form; and was to be found primarily in the abstract ideas after which the world is patterned, in his view.

(2) Aristotle (*q.v.* 13) modifying Plato's imitation theory so that art became an imitation not of an actual, but of a possible thing, produced a theory in which beauty depends on organic unity, a unity in which every part contributes to the quality of the whole.

(3) A somewhat similar point of view has been expressed in this century by DeWitt

Parker, who held that the master principle of form is organic unity; and that this supposes the organization of all the elements of the experience into a single, inclusive whole.

(4) Plotinus (*q.v.* 8) associated the beautiful with a radiance or splendor, resulting from the quality of unity in the object. For Plotinus the One was a divine principle, more or less completely reflected in the world.

(5) Thomas Aquinas (*q.v.* 10) combines principles from his predecessors, while developing the concept at the same time. Beauty is that which gives pleasure on sight, and is hence related to the cognitive faculties. Beautiful objects must have integrity or perfection, proportion or harmony, and brightness or clarity.

(6) In the 20th century Jacques Maritain (*q.v.* 3) continued this tradition, demonstrating that the view of beauty as a transcendental, of art as a concrete embodiment of beauty pleasing to the intellect, and a sign of something more divine, can be illuminating to the modern mind.

(7) Shaftesbury (*q.v.* 1-2) and Hutcheson (*q.v.* 2) interpret beauty in terms of a special inner sense sensitive to harmony.

(8) Immanuel Kant (*q.v.* 9) turned our attention to the aesthetic judgment, finding beauty in whatever produced a sense of harmony in the relations between the faculties of the will and the understanding.

(9) Hegel (*q.v.* 18-19) finds beauty to be the presentation of truth in sensuous form. Put otherwise, it is the Absolute shining through appearance.

(10) Bosanquet (*q.v.* 4) is a follower of Hegelian idealism in aesthetic terms, utilizing Hegel's notion of the "concrete universal," and the importance of imagination.

(11) Croce (*q.v.* 2) likewise followed the idealistic tradition, finding beauty in the specific act of the imagination which produces a novel and complete intuition. Secondly, it is found in the successful expression of such acts.

(12) For Schopenhauer (*q.v.* 5) the aesthetic moment comes in an appreciation of an idea apart from its particularity by a knower who has escaped the conditions of his individual existence. It is just as true to say that the aesthetic involves the appreciation of the throbbing will in things by an awareness liberated for the moment from the conditions of particular existence.

(13) Nietzsche (*q.v.* 1) follows Schopenhauer in holding that emotion in art represents the underlying dynamism of the universe, and is for that reason attractive to us. At the same time, however, the highest

art—as in tragedy—combines Apollonian rationality with Dionysiac passion.

(14) Tolstoy (*q.v.* 3), indeed, defines art to be an expression of emotion, and the work of art to be its vehicle. At the same time an ethical interest enters his discussion; he holds that aesthetic satisfaction centers in artistic embodiment of the highest and best feelings to which humanity has risen.

(15) For Lessing (*q.v.* 1) the arts stand to each other in a nonreductive fashion, each having its own function and principles.

(16) Santayana (*q.v.* 9) defines the aesthetic quality as "objectified pleasure."

(17) Friedrich Schiller (*q.v.* 1) believed the aesthetic to be the basic category of life, allowing morality and feeling to coexist in unity.

(18) Collingwood (*q.v.* 3) finds art, along with religion, science, history, and philosophy, to be mutually supportive forms of human experience. Taken together, one approaches the concrete reality of things in their historicity.

(19) Edward Bullough contributed to aesthetics the concept of "psychical distance." An object is viewed aesthetically when we put it out of gear with our practical selves, and interpret even our feelings in this experience as characteristics of the object.

(20) Theodor Lipps (*q.v.*) finds *Einfühlung*, or empathy, to be the core concept of the aesthetic experience. This occurs when we feel ourselves into objects and experiences outside ourselves, projecting our feelings and activities into the object unintentionally, while remaining contemplative and free from practical compulsion.

(21) H.S. Langfeld defines aesthetics as "the science of beauty and ugliness." The two are relative to each other, and at opposite ends of the scale of values. His view combines the emphases of Bullough on psychical distance, and Lipps on empathy, while adding to Lipps' analysis the claim that there is "tentative" activity within the self in this experience.

(22) In relation to Freud (*q.v.* 4) what is aesthetically compelling relates to the inner drama of man, rooted in the great drives of life and death, sex and guilt. The artistic consciousness works through repression and sublimation of this material. When it is well-done we are captivated by the transformed material.

(23) A somewhat different approach to art occurs in the writings of Jung (*q.v.* 1). The aesthetic material to which we respond is the archetypal deposit within the unconscious of every individual. The artist works in terms of this material, however, unknowingly, and to this we respond.

(24) If one thinks in terms of quality, one thinks of the work of D.W. Prall for whom the object of aesthetic experience is the intuited surface of the world. In sensation we receive the structural and qualitative relations of that surface.

(25) Dewey (*q.v.* 6) finds art in experience. Dividing experience into instrumental and consummatory phases, art becomes experience in its consummatory phase. Hence, art is to be found not only in the fine arts, but characterizes experience wherever it moves toward consummation.

(26) Stephen C. Pepper (*q.v.* 2) works with a combination of the two preceding approaches, finding aesthetic quality to be a function of contextual relations so arranged that the eye or ear is held by the qualities, and led back and forth without being permitted to wander from them in order that their richness and intensity may be educed.

(27) Clive Bell understands each instance of beauty to be, at the same time, an instance of significant form, suggesting a variety of ways of signifying and communicating apart from ordinary discourse.

(28) Roger Fry shares, at least in part, the view of Bell. He sometimes speaks of the "aesthetic emotion," for example. But he also holds that the aesthetic experience involves the apprehension of certain kinds of relations presented to us in the sense-data of experience.

(29) Susanne Langer (*q.v.*) in her earlier work identified the arts with the presentation of "unconsummated symbols" to our awareness. These bear intentionality, yet lack dictionary definition. In her later work an entire world is presented whose categories are not actual but "virtual" time, space, etc.

(30) Ortega y Gasset (*q.v.* 4) makes the valuable suggestion that contemporary art is seeking a new basis through dehumanization. Traditionally, at least classically, art has sought to glorify the human form and human attributes. The dehumanization of the arts is thus a constructive quest for a new standing ground.

(31) Thomas Munro (*q.v.*) argues for a scientific aesthetics, empirical in tone and research oriented, studying works of art and their development much as biology studies the organic world.

(32) I.A. Richards may be taken as a representative of emotivism in art, as well as of linguistic analysis. Distinguishing emotive from descriptive meaning, he holds that the arts express emotional-volitional attitudes rather than insights that might relate to descriptive propositions.

(33) Georg Lukács (*q.v.*) in his later Marxist works held that form is determined

by content, that abstract art is therefore degenerate, and that social realism is the only valid approach to the aesthetic. Social relations become the basis of aesthetics, refuting his early neo-Kantian stand.

AESTHETICISM.

Q.v. Walter Pater (1).

AETIOLOGY.

Q.v. Etiology.

AEVUM.

Q.v. Time (6).

AFFECT.

A term used in the rational psychology of Spinoza (*q.v.* 4) to name the variety of feelings, purposes, and drives which motivate us. Since the affects are internal their influence upon us would seem to allow a kind of self-determination.

AFFIRMATIVE PROPOSITIONS.

The A and I propositions of syllogistic logic (*q.v.* Syllogism 1-5).

AFFIRMING THE ANTECEDENT.

Q.v. Syllogism (9).

AFFIRMING THE CONSEQUENT.

Q.v. Fallacies (27).

A FORTIORI.

A Latin phrase meaning "all the more" or "with the greater force." A type of argument in which two cases are compared, a lesser and a greater. The argument runs from the lesser to the greater case. If from the lesser case one is able to gain a certain consequence how much more certain one should be able to expect this consequence, or a stronger result, in the greater case; *e.g.*, if a householder will give a stranger a loaf of bread rather than a stone when he is in need, how much more certainly, *a fortiori*, we can expect our heavenly father to care for us.

AGAPE.

Greek term meaning "selfless love." The term is derived from the *Agape* or "love feast" of the early Christians, a common meal to promote "Christian fellowship" frequently associated with the sacrament. Q.v. Love (6); Nygren.

AGAPISM.

Q.v. Peirce (13).

AGNI.

A Sanskrit term meaning "fire." One of the most important of the Vedic gods, Agni was god of the altar fire; and also

represented the trinity of earthly fire, lightning and sun. In this extended sense he was the mediator between the gods and man.

AGNOSTICISM.

From the Greek *a* ("not") and *gignoskein* ("to know"). A term coined by T.H. Huxley (*q.v.*) to express a position of suspended belief. Huxley used the term to apply to any proposition for which the evidence was insufficient for belief. It is usually, however, applied principally to suspension of belief with respect to God. Protagoras (*q.v.* 5), holding that with respect to the gods he has no way of knowing that they exist or do not exist, would exemplify the ordinary sense of the term, agnosticism. Also *q.v.* Spencer (4), who relates the term to the Unknowable, and Stephen (*q.v.*) who helped to popularize the term. Also *q.v.* Westermarck (3).

AGREEMENT, METHOD OF.

Q.v. Mill, John S. (4).

AGREEMENT AND DIFFERENCE, JOINT METHOD OF.

Q.v. Mill, John S. (4).

AGRIPPA.

c. 2nd-or 3rd-century A.D. Greek philosopher. A skeptical philosopher in the manner of Aenesidemus (*q.v.*) and Pyrrho (*q.v.*), Agrippa summarized in five tropes, or headings, the arguments supporting the skeptical suspension of judgment.

(1) The first trope supporting suspension of judgment is the disagreement among philosophers concerning what, if anything, can be known. There is no criterion by which we can evaluate the claims of the philosophers, some supporting sense, some supporting reason; others supporting sense and reason together.

(2) The second trope relates to the fact that every proof requires premises which in turn must be proved, and so on back in an infinite regress.

(3) Thirdly, all data is relative: sensation to the sentient being, reason to the intelligent being. The relativity of data prevents us from knowing what a thing is in itself.

(4) Fourthly, although we try to avoid regress by positing hypotheses, the truth of the hypotheses has not been determined. Therefore, we cannot accept as true the conclusions following from them.

(5) Fifthly, there is a vicious circle in attempting to establish the sensible by reason, since reason itself needs to be established on the basis of sense.

AGRIPPA VON NETTESHEIM, HENRY CORNELIUS. 1486-1535.

German philosopher and cabalist. Born in Cologne. Studied at the University of Cologne. During a stormy and unsettled life he served four heads of state, including Charles V, and was for a time physician to the Queen Mother of Francis I. His lectures at universities, and his published work, were invariably controversial arousing the antagonism of the Inquisition. His interest in cabalism was an outrage to many, yet his major work disowned such an enterprise along with the sciences and the arts. Finding epistemological uncertainty and vanity everywhere, he urged a return to primitive Christianity and devotion to the Scriptures. His works were written in Latin.

Principal writings: *On the Occult Philosophy*, (written 1510, published 1531-3); *On the Uncertainty and Vanity of the Sciences and the Arts* (T), 1530.

AHANKARA.

Q.v. Sankhya (5c).

AHIMSA.

A Sanskrit term meaning non-injury. Basic to the practice of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism. Because each living thing is in process of working out its salvation, one must be careful not to interfere in any way. The prohibition has religious force. Q.v. Jainism (3), Yoga (4).

AHRIMAN.

Also known as Angra Mainyu. The malevolent deity of the Zoroastrian religion, locked in combat with Ahura Mazda, or Ormazd, the benevolent deity of the religion (q.v. Zoroaster 1-3; 5-6).

AHURA MAZDA.

Also known as Ormazd. The benevolent deity of the Zoroastrian religion, locked in combat with Ahriman, or Angra Mainyu, the evil spirit (q.v. Zoroaster 1-3, 5-6).

AI.

From the Chinese, meaning "love." For Mo Tzu (q.v. 3) and Han Yu, key terms in achieving the good and right.

AJATIVADA.

Sanskrit term meaning "No-Origination." A doctrine of Gaudapada (q.v. 1), holding the sole reality to be the Absolute.

AJITANATHA.

Q.v. Vardhamana.

AJIVA.

Q.v. Jainism (1).

AKSARA.

From Sanskrit, meaning "imperishable." Used in the *Upanishads* as an alternative name for Brahman.

ALBERINI, CORIOLANO.

Q.v. Latin American Philosophy (9).

ALBERTISTS.

The name given to the followers of Albertus Magnus (q.v.). Originally, the name for all Thomists since Albertus Magnus was the teacher of Thomas Aquinas.

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, ST. 1206-1280.

Born in Bavaria. Studied in Padua and Bologna, joined the Dominican order, 1223. Taught at University of Paris (1245-48), where Thomas Aquinas was among his students, and at Cologne. Part of his time was taken up by administrative tasks for the Dominicans; and he was Bishop of Ratisbon from 1260 to 1262. Interested in the physical sciences, as well as in philosophy and theology, he insisted on the importance of observation and experiment. Not only called "The Great," but also "Doctor Universalis."

Principal writings: *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, 1240-49; *Handbook on Creatures*, 1240-43; *Commentary on the Pseudo-Dionysius*, 1248-54; *On the Unity of the Intellect*; and an unfinished *Handbook of Theology*, 1270-80, whose authorship is possibly multiple, and in any case, questioned.

(1) Immersing himself in the translations of and about Aristotle from Greek and Arabic manuscripts, Albertus Magnus performed the much needed function of interpreting Aristotle to the European mind. The result of his commentaries is, in fact, however, a fusion of Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism since he was no more able than his predecessors to separate Aristotle from his interpreters.

(2) He views God as the necessary being in whom essence and existence are identical. He proves God's existence from motion and the impossibility of an infinite chain of principles, in Aristotle's fashion. He finds God's nature to be intelligent, omnipotent, living, free, and unitary.

(3) At the same time in the manner of the Pseudo-Dionysius he finds that we know not what God is; but what God is not.

(4) And in the manner of the Neoplatonists he finds reality flowing from God in a series of emanations in which the intelligences and their spheres are produced, leading down to things of this earth.

(5) He denied that angels and human souls were composed of matter and form, while