

# THE GREAT TURNING POINT

# THE GREAT TURNING POINT

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS  
PEKING 1962

## Contents

The Bankruptcy of the U S -Chiang Kai-shek Peace Plot — <i>Recollections of the early days of the War of Liberation</i> Wu Yu-chang . . . . .	1
Give Tit for Tat, and Fight for Every Inch of Land — <i>Recalling the great victory of Shangtang</i> Lieut.-Gen. Liu Chung . . . . .	39
In His Mind a Million Bold Warriors — <i>Reminiscences of the life of Chairman Mao during the northern Shensi campaign (I)</i> Yen Chang-lin . . . . .	58
The Great Turning Point — <i>Reminiscences of the life of Chairman Mao during the northern Shensi campaign (II)</i> Yen Chang-lin . . . . .	80
Thrust into the Tapih Mountains — <i>Notes on the southern march of the army commanded by Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping</i> Tang Ping-chu . . . . .	114
The Tashan Battle of Interception Lieut.-Gen. Wu Ke-hua . . . . .	137
On the Southern Huai-Hai Line Ho Kuang-hua . . . . .	159
Reminiscences of the Battle of Tientsin General Li Tien-yu . . . . .	176
Brave Troops Cross the Yangtse Lieut.-Gen. Pao Hsien-chih . . . . .	211

# The Bankruptcy of the U.S.-Chiang Kai-shek Peace Plot

—*Recollections of the early days of the War of Liberation*

Wu Yu-chang

During the latter part of the War of Resistance Against Japan, U.S. imperialism intensified its interference in China's internal affairs vainly scheming to take Japan's place after the war and turn China into a U.S. colony. Chiang Kai-shek, relying on the aid and support of U.S. imperialism, far from actively preparing forces to counter-attack the Japanese and recover lost territory simply concentrated upon planning the wheres and hows of bringing about a civil war, so that when victory came he could "come down from Mount Omei"<sup>1</sup> and destroy the Communist Party and the Liberation Army at one fell swoop and so restore the semi-feudal, semi-colonial reactionary rule. The Chinese Communist Party had long clearly seen through the reactionary plots of Chiang Kai-shek. Comrade Mao Tse-tung in *On Coalition Government* had already given a serious warning: "Under the smoke-screen of 'convening the National Assembly' and 'political settlement,' the chief ruling clique of the Kuomintang is now making clandestine preparations for a civil war. If our fellow countrymen fail to notice and expose this dirty scheme and stop such prepara-

---

<sup>1</sup>Mount Omei is in Szechuan Province. After Wuhan was occupied by the Japanese army in 1938, Chiang Kai-shek and the main force under his command took refuge in the mountainous areas of Szechuan and other provinces and sat there watching the bitter struggle against the Japanese aggressors which was being waged behind the enemy lines by the army and people of the Liberated Areas.

tions, then one fine morning they will be aroused by the cannonade of civil war."

On August 8, 1945 the great socialist country, the Soviet Union, declared war on Japan. Under the mighty force of the Soviet Red Army's attack, Japanese imperialism was compelled to surrender. The War of Resistance Against Japan was victoriously ended. After eight years of bitter struggle, in which the Chinese people had made such sacrifices and shed so much blood, how great was their elation when they heard the victory news! But at this moment, Chiang Kai-shek on the one hand ordered the Liberation Army to "stay where you are, pending further orders," and to refrain from counter-attacking and recovering lost territory, while on the other hand he ordered the enemy and puppet troops to "be responsible for maintaining local public order," and to wait for the Kuomintang to "take over." With the support of U.S. imperialism, Chiang Kai-shek maintained his co-operation with the Japanese and their puppets, with the object of not only swallowing up the entire fruits of victory, but also in the hope of completely wiping out the Chinese Communist Party and the people's revolutionary strength which it led.

However, because of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's correct leadership, at the time of victory in the War of Resistance the Chinese people's revolutionary strength was already enormous. The Liberated Areas had a population of over 100 million people, the Liberation Army had been expanded to one million men with a people's militia of over two million; the Chinese Communist Party had already become a large and politically mature party of one million several hundred thousand members, one fully capable of leading the people of the whole country to smash through all obstacles and put the revolution on the road to victory. Countering Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang's reactionary policy of "wrest every ounce of power and every ounce of gain from the people," at a meeting of cadres in Yen-an on August 13, 1945, Comrade Mao Tse-tung in his speech *The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan* put forward the revolu-

tionary policy of "give him tit for tat and fight for every inch of land." According to this policy, on the one side we were to strive for peace and oppose civil war; on the other we were to draw up full preparations against Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary plan of launching a country-wide civil war. That is to say, we were not to harbour any illusions about imperialism or the reactionaries, not to fear intimidation, but to protect firmly the fruits of the people's struggle and to make all-out efforts to establish a new China—a new democratic China of the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat.

Precisely because the Chinese Communist Party adopted a firm policy, and as at this time public opinion, both at home and abroad, was against Chiang Kai-shek starting a civil war, while at the same time Chiang Kai-shek felt that his preparations for full-scale civil war were not yet complete, and that he needed a little more time to move even more troops to the civil war front, he therefore decided to put across his peace plot trick. Masquerading as an angel of peace, this man, who had risen through internecine warfare and whose executioner's hands were stained with the blood of the people, on August 14, 20, and 23 sent telegrams inviting Comrade Mao Tse-tung to come to Chungking to negotiate "peace." He was obviously putting on a wily performance, but should his invitation be accepted or ignored? Comrade Mao Tse-tung held that in order to use all possible means to strive for peace, and to expose the plots hatched by U.S. imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek and so unite and educate the people, we ought to go. If we did not go, we would fall right into Chiang Kai-shek's trap, as he was hoping he could use our refusal as a pretext to say we had turned down peace and wanted to start a civil war. Therefore, with courageous determination, Comrade Mao Tse-tung decided to fly to Chungking. When the military and civilian population of Yenan heard this news, they were extremely worried. And their anxiety over Chairman Mao's safety was not groundless, as Chinese history abounds with

stories like the *Feast at Hungmen*.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek's gangster-like treatment of Li Chi-shen, Hu Han-min<sup>2</sup> and others was still fresh in their minds. But Comrade Mao Tse-tung had correctly analysed the international and internal situation and understood that with the strength of the people, especially the strength of the Liberated Areas, behind him, it would be difficult for Chiang Kai-shek to re-stage the old Tangshan Hill act. Just as Comrade Mao Tse-tung was about to leave, Tai Lao (Comrade Fan Wen-lan's wife) hurried to me and said, "Please tell Chairman Mao that we beg him not to go on any account!" At the moment Comrade Mao Tse-tung was about to board the plane, I gave him the Fans' warning message. He smiled and replied, "Thank them for their good intentions, but I'll take good care of myself." So in this way, escorted by Chou En-lai, Wang Jo-fei and other comrades, on the afternoon of August 28 Comrade Mao Tse-tung arrived in Chungking amidst the cheers of thousands.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's arrival caused the entire hilly city of Chungking to seethe with excitement, caused all the people of the Kuomintang-controlled areas to be filled with hope. Innumerable workers, students and city dwellers warmly welcomed Chairman Mao and called him the Chinese people's saviour. Many people were moved to tears by the event, and Liu Ya-tse joyfully wrote a new poem praising Chairman Mao. Although the people yearned so much for peace, they did not know that Chiang Kai-shek's medicine chest was full of phony "peace" medicine.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's arrival in Chungking took the wind out of Chiang Kai-shek's sails. As this was the last thing

---

<sup>1</sup>This is a story of ancient China describing how Hsiang Yu plotted to murder Liu Pang at Hungmen. In 206 B.C. Hsiang Yu and Liu Pang, after having overthrown the rule of the Chin Dynasty (221-207 B.C.), with the people's rebel army, began to quarrel between themselves over who should occupy the now vacant throne. One day Hsiang Yu invited Liu Pang to a banquet at Hungmen, meaning to kill him at the feast. But since Liu Pang was fully prepared for such treachery, the attempt failed.

<sup>2</sup>Because of internal strife in the Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-shek detained Li Chi-shen in 1929 and interned Hu Han-min in 1931 at Tangshan Hill on the outskirts of Nanking.

Chiang had expected, he had made no preparations to negotiate. When our representatives came he was thrown into confusion and lapsed into political impotency. Although he appointed Wang Shih-chieh, Chang Chun, Chang Chih-chung and Shao Li-tse as delegates to start discussions with our Party delegates Comrades Chou En-lai and Wang Jo-fei, it was clear from their shifty and empty talk that they were insincere towards the negotiations. We had to make all the proposals and they did nothing more than give negative responses. Also, on August 29, one day after Comrade Mao Tse-tung arrived in Chungking, Chiang Kai-shek secretly ordered all war areas to reprint the iniquitous handbook he had compiled in 1933—*Handbook on Bandit Suppression*. On September 17, he issued a confidential order to circulate these handbooks (the confidential order and the handbook both fell into our hands). Also in September, a Kuomintang army under the warlord Yen Hsi-shan launched an invasion of the Shangtang region of the Shansi-Hopci-Shantung-Honan Liberated Area.

After more than forty days of hard negotiating, Chiang Kai-shek was forced by the internal and external situation to feign acceptance of the peace and unity policy put forward by our Party; he had to feign agreement to bring the Kuomintang political tutelage to an end,<sup>1</sup> to convene a political consultative conference, to guarantee the freedom of the people, to guarantee the equality and legality of all political parties, to forbid the activities of the secret services, to release political prisoners, to actively carry out local self-government, to reform and reduce the armed forces of the whole country, to punish traitors, to

---

<sup>1</sup>Sun Yat-sen advocated that the programme of national construction should fall into three periods, namely, the periods of military rule, political tutelage and constitutional rule. He held that after the unification of the nation, an interim period would be needed to train the people to govern themselves before convening a national assembly to work out a constitution and elect a new central government. This period would be known as the period of political tutelage. This proposal was later misused by Chiang Kai-shek who, on the pretext that the conditions for constitutional rule were not yet ripe, delayed the period of political tutelage indefinitely in order to maintain the dictatorial rule of the Kuomintang as a permanent institution.



disband the puppet troops, and to other proposals. All this was recorded in the "Summary of Conversations Between the Representatives of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China," also known as the "October 10th Agreement," signed on October 10, 1945 by representatives of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. And what was the advantage of this? Comrade Mao Tse-tung said: "That's fine. If the Kuomintang launches civil war again, it will put itself in the wrong in the eyes of the whole nation and the whole world, and we shall have all the more reason to smash its attacks by a war of self-defence." (*On the Chungking Negotiations*)

In order to strive for peace and gain the sympathy of the great masses of the people, especially the middle-of-the-roaders, and to discredit the rumours and slanders spread by the Kuomintang reactionaries, during the negotiations our Party made some necessary concessions. We agreed to concede eight Liberated Areas: Kwangtung, Chekiang, southern Kiangsu, southern Anhwei, central Anhwei, Hunan, Hupeh and Honan (not including northern Honan): we agreed to proportionately reduce our armed forces: that is, if the Kuomintang was really willing to reduce its army to 120 divisions, then we could reduce the Liberation Army to 20 divisions, only a seventh of the total armed forces of the country. But the Kuomintang's aim was to eliminate altogether the Liberated Areas and the Liberation Army, consequently no agreement could be reached on the questions of political power and armed forces in the Liberated Areas. The experience of the Chungking negotiations once again proves that the questions of political power and of armed forces are basic problems of the revolution, and that they therefore become the focal point of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary struggle. Whoever forgets this principle is sure to commit serious errors.

From the above it can be seen that our Party made some concessions during the negotiations, but these concessions were all made according to principle and were not harmful to the basic interests of the Chinese people; whenever a question involved basic interests, our Party was firm, uncompromising

and unmoved by any threats. Also, during the negotiations we never relaxed our vigilance and made all necessary preparations against the Kuomintang civil war plot. At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party, Comrade Liu Shao-chi (he was at that time acting on behalf of the chairman) suggested that some of our troops in the south be moved up north; in this way the Liberated Areas in the north would be strengthened and, if civil war broke out, they would not be cut off in the enemy's rear and swallowed up; and at the same time such a troop movement would be an advantage in the negotiations. After receiving Comrade Mao Tse-tung's approval, this suggestion was carried out. At this time in the Liberated Areas, especially the newly liberated areas, we were freely arousing the masses, and the people's movements against traitors and bullies, for reduction of rents and settling accounts with the landlords were enthusiastically started; in some places the peasants went to the extent of taking things into their own hands and solving land problems themselves. In this way, after the surrender of Japan, the Liberated Areas not only rapidly expanded but also consolidated their foundations. Precisely because we on the one hand took part in the peace negotiations and on the other prepared for self-defence, we were enabled to place ourselves in an unbeatable position.

Although the "October 10th Agreement" had been signed, Chiang Kai-shek had not the slightest intention of observing it. The "October 10th Agreement" was proclaimed on October 12, and on the 13th Chiang Kai-shek circulated to his subordinates a secret order on "bandit suppression," ordered his military commanders to conform to the so-called *Handbook on Bandit Suppression* which he had compiled, to "urge their officers and men to do their utmost," to "energetically attack" the Liberated Areas, and to "speedily complete the mission"; that is to say, he gave the order to start a large-scale attack against the Liberated Areas.

Nevertheless, under the heroic counter-attacks of the soldiers and people of the Liberated Areas, Chiang Kai-shek's military assaults met with ignominious defeat. In the middle of

October, a Kuomintang army of Yen Hsi-shan numbering over 30,000 men was completely wiped out by our army, and its commander Shih Tsch-po, Commander of the 19th Corps, and many other high-ranking officers were captured. This was the famous Battle of Shangtang. In late October during the larger Peiping-Hankow Battle, in the Hantan sector our army destroyed over 70,000 Kuomintang troops who were advancing along the Peiping-Hankow Railway to invade the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Liberated Area. In this battle, one of the commanders of the Kuomintang forces General Kao Shu-hsun, Deputy Commander of the Kuomintang's 11th War Zone and concurrently Commander of the 8th Corps, revolted against the Kuomintang; Ma Fa-wu, another Deputy Commander of the Kuomintang's 11th War Zone and concurrently Commander of the 40th Corps, and other high-ranking officers were compelled to lay down their arms.

The victories of the army and people of the Liberated Areas also pushed forward the movement against civil war in the Kuomintang-controlled areas. On November 19, people of all walks of life in Chungking established the Federation Against Civil War. On November 25, the brutal interference of the reactionary Kuomintang troops and police at a great meeting of protest against civil war held in Kunming touched off a general strike of over 10,000 Kunming students. This resulted in the world-shaking incident known as the "December 1st Massacre."<sup>1</sup> A rapid succession of students' demonstrations in support of the Kunming students broke out in all parts of the country, and a protest campaign against civil war with the students' movement as its main force quickly spread over the whole of the Kuomintang-controlled area.

The resolute opposition of the Chinese people to civil war forced U.S. imperialism to change its method of interfering in the internal affairs of China. On November 27 the U.S.

---

<sup>1</sup>On December 1, 1945 the Kuomintang reactionaries dispatched a large number of soldiers and secret agents to the Southwest Associated University and the Teachers' College where they threw hand-grenades, killing and wounding many students.

government announced the recall of its infamous U.S. ambassador to China, Patrick J. Hurley, and sent George C. Marshall as its special representative to “mediate” in the Chinese civil war. It was clearly evident that U.S. imperialism was vainly scheming to take the initiative in directing Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang for another act in their “peace” farce. Under these conditions, at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain held in December 1945, the U.S. had to agree to the resolution on the China problem which the Soviet Union had consistently advocated and reaffirm the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China.

Because of the above-mentioned three reasons — the victories won by the army and people in defence of the Liberated Areas, the increasing opposition of the people of the Kuomintang-controlled areas to civil war, and the resolution of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain on the China problem — and especially the first reason, Chiang Kai-shek was compelled to agree to convene the Political Consultative Conference as prescribed by the “October 10th Agreement.”

The representatives of our Party appointed to attend the PCC were Chou En-lai, Tung Pi-wu, Wang Jo-fei, Yeh Chien-ying, Lu Ting-yi, Teng Ying-chao and I, a total of seven. At that time Comrade Tung Pi-wu was already in Chungking. (Later Comrade Yeh Chien-ying took part in the work of the Peiping Executive Headquarters and was replaced as PCC representative by Comrade Chin Pang-hsien.) Led by Comrade Chou En-lai we flew to Chungking on December 16. Chungking, the old home town where I had lived and struggled for many years, was still groaning in the darkness of reactionary control. Now, returning from Yenan, the Mecca of the revolution, to Chungking, I found my heart filled with boundless emotion.

Immediately after our arrival in Chungking we proposed to the Kuomintang that an unconditional truce must be carried out before the opening of the PCC. As the Kuomintang was in an unfavourable military and political position at that time,

they were forced to agree to our proposal. On January 10, 1946 the Central Committee of our Party and the Kuomintang government at the same time transmitted orders to the troops of both parties to cease military operations effective as of January 13. But Chiang Kai-shek, before the cease-fire order was published, first sent a secret order to his army to "seize strategic points," thus proving clearly that he was not truly willing to halt the civil war, but only wanted to use the cease-fire as a smoke-screen to further civil war.

The Political Consultative Conference opened on January 10, the same day that the cease-fire order was issued. A total of 38 delegates of all sides took part in the PCC: Kuomintang, 8; Communist Party, 7; Democratic League, 9; China Youth Party, 5; and personages without party affiliation, 9. The composition was extremely complicated but could be roughly divided into three kinds of forces: The left wing, the centre, and the right wing. The left wing, that is the revolutionary group, represented by the Communist Party, standing for the interests of the working class and the masses of the people, advocated the overthrow of the Kuomintang one-party dictatorship and the establishment of a new democratic state; the right wing, that is the reactionary clique, represented by the Kuomintang, stood for the interests of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, and insisted on fascist government by a one-party dictatorship; the centre, to which the Democratic League basically belonged, could be said to be the reformist group, mainly representing the interests of the national bourgeoisie. They dreamed of carrying out in China the old type of democracy based on a bourgeois dictatorship. At that time the China Youth Party had openly split with the Democratic League and had become a dependent of the Kuomintang; the Democratic Socialist Party, while keeping up the appearance of remaining within the Democratic League, actually belonged to the right wing clique. Of the non-party delegates, the majority were of the middle-of-the-road group with some to the left and some to the right. Our policy was to try to unite with the middle-of-the-roaders to facilitate our struggle against the reactionaries.

The Conference lasted 22 days, during which there were 10 plenary sessions and many committee meetings. (The committees worked on Government Organization, the Programme for Peace and National Reconstruction, Military Affairs, National Assembly, and Draft Constitution; in all there were five groups of which I took part in the Draft Constitution Committee.) Regardless of whether it was a plenary session or a committee meeting, the meetings were all packed with struggle. The focal points of debate were, as usual, the questions of the armed forces and political power, that is, the so-called problem of nationalization of the troops and democratization of the nation.

The Kuomintang reactionary clique and its lackeys put forward the "nationalization of troops" question, stating that first armed forces must be nationalized and that afterwards political life could be democratized, scheming to use "democracy" as a bait to catch the people's army. Directly opposing this plot of Chiang Kai-shek, our Party pointed out that if you wanted to bring about nationalization of troops you must first carry out democratization of both the nation and the armed forces. That is to say, you should change the nation from a Kuomintang one-party dictatorship to a democratic nation, and you should change Chiang Kai-shek's private warlord army into an army of the people. During the keen struggle over these two principles, some of the middle-of-the-roaders unexpectedly thought of travelling a "third road"; they had visions of both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party turning over their armies, and they, as representatives of the "nation," taking them over. But where in the world is a bargain like that to be found? Their visions disappeared into thin air.

The debate over the problem of democratization of the nation was also very heated. The Kuomintang was unwilling at that time to reorganize its dictatorial government into a united democratic government, and merely wished to ward off the pressure of the people by using methods such as adding a few government councillors; it was also unwilling to carry out real democracy and constitutional government in the future, and

only wanted, while the old "National Assembly" was still effective and on the basis of the so-called the "May 31st Draft Constitution,"<sup>1</sup> to make a few alterations by changing the formula but not the ingredients. Not only this, it went to the extent of scheming, under the name of "unifying national sovereignty," to swallow up the Liberated Areas. To counteract this plot of Chiang Kai-shek, our Party on the one hand insisted on local self-government, election of provincial governors by the people and the drafting of provincial constitutions, to guarantee the continuance and expansion of the new democratic political rights in the Liberated Areas; on the other hand we requested that the Kuomintang reactionary government be reorganized to form a real united democratic government, and, under the leadership of this government, to convene a true National Assembly and to frame and adopt a real democratic constitution, so as to end the Kuomintang one-party dictatorship and create conditions for the victory of the people's revolution throughout the country as a whole. On this question, the main interest of a few of the middle-of-the-road personages was concentrated on the appointment of government councillors and such things as presidential and cabinet systems; that is to say, they were working for the old kind of democracy and their own personal position, and not for the new democracy and the interests of the people.

After a sharp struggle, the Political Consultative Conference finally passed five resolutions: on Government Organization, the Programme for Peace and National Reconstruction, Military Affairs, National Assembly, and Draft Constitution. Although these resolutions were still far from meeting the full demands of our Party, they were, nevertheless, in differing degrees favourable to the people and unfavourable to Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary rule.

The convening of the Political Consultative Conference and the publication of the PCC resolutions caused the people of the

---

<sup>1</sup> This refers to the draft "constitution" Chiang Kai-shek proclaimed on May 3, 1936, with the aim of strengthening his fascist dictatorial rule.

whole country, especially those of the Kuomintang-controlled areas, to be filled with joy and high spirits; not a few believed that China had now entered a new stage of peace and democracy. Actually, Chiang Kai-shek was only using the PCC to promote a peace fraud and as a cover for the preparations he was at that time making for large-scale civil war.

From the beginning our Party never harboured the slightest illusions about Chiang Kai-shek. In his opening speech at the PCC, Chiang Kai-shek had stated his so-called four "pledges," to give the people rights of freedom, to give all political parties equal rights and legal status, to promote local self-government, and to release political prisoners. So at the time of requesting the Kuomintang to release our comrades who had been arrested, we pondered deeply on how to make the request. Would it be better to submit a long list of names, or should we just mention a few particular comrades? Taking into account the reactionary character of the Kuomintang, we came to the conclusion that mentioning the names of some comrades would not merely fail to cause them to be rescued, but on the contrary might draw the attention of the Kuomintang to them and add to their danger. Therefore, we finally mentioned only two of our comrades, Liao Cheng-chih and Yeh Ting. In addition, we also asked for the release of General Chang Hsueh-liang.<sup>1</sup> It actually turned out as we had expected;

---

<sup>1</sup>Chang Hsueh-liang was the commander of the Northeastern Army of the Kuomintang. Being influenced by the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the people's movement against Japanese aggression, he accepted the Chinese Communist Party's proposal for an Anti-Japanese National United Front and urged Chiang Kai-shek to unite with the Communists and resist Japan. Chiang not only rejected these demands, but actively prepared to "annihilate the Communists" and massacre a number of patriotic youths in Sian. Under these circumstances Chang Hsueh-liang, in collaboration with Yang Hu-cheng, Commander of the 17th Route Army of the Kuomintang, arrested Chiang Kai-shek in Sian on December 12, 1936. This was known as the Sian Incident. Chiang was forced to accept the terms of uniting with the Communists and resisting Japan and was allowed to go back to Nanking. After his release Chiang arrested Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng and placed them under prolonged detention. Yang was secretly massacred in prison in 1949.



although the Kuomintang feared public opinion and the strength of our Party and therefore had to release Comrades Liao Cheng-chih and Yeh Ting, they did not release one other comrade. And they even refused to release General Chang Hsueh-liang, although people of all walks of life had raised the demand for his release. Right from the start, the so-called "release of political prisoners" was a hoax.

While the Political Consultative Conference was still in session, Kuomintang special agents started sabotage activities to break up the meeting, and the Tsangpaitang Hall Incident<sup>1</sup> and the searching of Democratic League delegate Huang Yen-pei's residence occurred at that time. After the adjournment of the PCC on February 10 when people of all walks of life were holding a meeting at Chiaochangkou in Chungking to celebrate the success of the PCC, Kuomintang special agents ferociously attacked the meeting and wounded Kuo Mo-jo, Li Kung-pu, and over sixty other people; this was the Chiaochangkou Incident which caused such an outcry for a time. Following this, on February 22 Kuomintang reactionaries shamelessly staged an anti-Soviet demonstration in Chungking, and organized special agents and hooligans to wreck our *Hsinbua Daily News* business offices and beat our newspaper employee Yang Li-yuan and other comrades half to death. At the same time, the business office of the Democratic League's organ, the *Democratic News*, was also wrecked by special agents. For a time, similar incidents of a provocative nature occurred throughout the whole of the Kuomintang-controlled areas. All these went to prove that the Kuomintang had already had the intention to tear up the PCC resolutions. Actually, at the Second Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee held in the first half of March, Chiang Kai-shek publicly announced that the "main points"

---

<sup>1</sup>While the Political Consultative Conference was in progress people from various walks of life in Chungking met every evening at the Tsangpaitang Hall to listen to the reports made by the PCC deputies. From January 15-24, Kuomintang special agents made repeated disturbances at these evening meetings. This was called the Tsangpaitang Hall Incident.