THE GLOBAL AGENDA

ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES



CHARLES W. KEGLEY, JR. EUGENE R. WITTKOPF

FOURTH EDITION

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Together, Kegley and Wittkopf have coauthored and edited many texts, including *World Politics: Trend and Transformation,* fifth edition (1995); *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process,* fourth edition (1991); *The Future of American Foreign Policy* (1992); *The Nuclear Reader: Strategy, Weapons, War,* second edition (1989); and *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy* (1988), all with St. Martin's Press.

For Linda and Suzanne
CWK

For Barbara, Debra, and Jonathan
ERW

PREFACE

With the end of Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies, the world for the third time in this century must confront the challenges and opportunities that the end of global conflict portends. Inevitably the transformation of world politics now taking place will confront nation-states and other world political actors with new issues that cry out for novel means of addressing them. Older issues, including those that may come packaged in new ways, will also demand attention. The competition between the new and the old will shape the global agenda for the remainder of this century and into the next.

With the dramatic changes the world has witnessed in recent years, it is not surprising that fresh perspectives now also vie with more traditional ones as scholars, political commentators, and policymakers alike seek to make sense of the often confusing and chaotic issues that populate the global agenda. Our purpose in preparing the fourth edition of *The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives* is to present incisive analytical perspectives and informed commentary on the policy issues that now animate the theory and practice of world politics. We believe that these analyses are critical to an understanding of the issues that inevitably will shape the world in which we all live and that today's students will inherit. We also continue to believe that there is a need for educational materials that treat description and theoretical exposition in a balanced manner and that expose a variety of normative interpretations without advocating any particular one. It seems to us that, to a greater or lesser degree, these purposes are rarely fulfilled in standard texts (by design and necessity) and that a supplementary anthology is the logical place for them.

The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives continues to categorize readings into four "baskets" that build on the distinction between *high politics*—peace and security issues—and *low politics*—issues of material and nonmaterial well-being. The distinction between high and low politics has never been entirely clear, and that is perhaps even more true with the end of the Cold War than previously. Still, the politics of peace and security often unfold differently than the politics of material and nonmaterial well-being. The conceptual distinction between high and low politics thus continues usefully to capture the elements of change and continuity that shape the contemporary global agenda. The criteria that guided the selection of particular articles and the rationale that underlies the organization of the book are made explicit in our introductions to each part. The introductions also help students connect individual readings to common themes.

Our editor at McGraw-Hill, Peter Labella, has been especially encouraging as we prepared the fourth edition of this book, and Fred Burns and Lisa V. Calberg have been helpful in seeing it to fruition. We thank them both. We also thank those who have contributed original articles to the book and the many others—from journal editors to permissions managers, from students to scholars and policymakers—who have contributed to our thinking about the issues and perspectives that animate the global agenda and who have kindly made important contributions, large and small, to the continuing appeal of this book.

Charles W. Kegley, Jr.

Eugene R. Wittkopf

CONTENTS

PART ONE

ARMS AND INFLUENCE

The contemporary international political system began to acquire its present shape and definition more than three centuries ago with the emergence of a state system in Europe following the highly destructive Thirty Years War. As the 1648 Peace of Westphalia brought that war to an end and as political, economic, and social intercourse grew among the states of Europe, new legal norms were embraced in an effort to regulate interstate behavior. The doctrine of state sovereignty, according to which no legal authority is higher than the state, emerged supreme. Thus the nascent international system was based on the right of states to control their internal affairs without interference from others and to manage their relations with other states with whom they collaborated or competed as they saw fit. Foremost in this system was the belief, reinforced by law, that the state possessed the right—indeed, the obligation—to take whatever measures it deemed necessary to ensure its preservation.

Although the international system and patterns of interaction among its political actors have changed profoundly since the birth of the state system, contemporary world politics remains significantly colored by its legacy. International politics continues to be conducted in an atmosphere of anarchy. As in the past, the system remains fragmented and decentralized, with no higher authority above nation-states, which, as the principal actors in world politics, remain free to behave toward one another as they choose.

This is not meant to imply either that states exercise their freedom with abandon or that they are unconstrained in the choices they make. The political, legal, moral, and circumstantial constraints on states' freedom of choice are formida-

ble. Moreover, states' national interests are served best when they act in a manner that does not threaten the stability of their relations with others or of the global system that protects their autonomy. Hence, as the British political scientist Hedley Bull has pointedly observed, the international system may be an anarchical society, but it is nonetheless one of "ordered anarchy."

The world has grown increasingly complex and interdependent as contact, communication, and exchange have increased among the actors in the state system and as the number of nation-states and other non-state international actors has grown. Expanded interaction enlarges the range of potentially mutual beneficial exchanges between and among states. But just as opportunities for cooperation have expanded, so have the sources of disagreement. That we live in an age of conflict is a cliché that contains elements of truth, as differences of opinion and efforts to resolve disputes to one's advantage, often at the expense of others, are part of any relationship. Thus, as the world has grown smaller, the mutual dependence of nation-states and other transnational political actors on one another has grown and the number of potential rivalries and antagonisms has increased correspondingly. Friction and tension appear to be endemic to international politics. Even as the Cold War fades from memory, competition and conflict persist, as demonstrated by Iraq's brutal invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the ubiquitous eruption of ethnic conflict in the Balkans, Africa, South Asia, and elsewhere.

Given the persistent characteristics of contemporary world politics, the number of *issues* that are at any one time in dispute among nation-states and other global actors appears to have increased greatly. The multitude of contentions renders the *global agenda*—the list of issues that force their way into consideration and command that they be addressed, peacefully or not—more crowded and complex. Because the responses that are made to the issues on the global agenda shape our lives both today and into the future, it is appropriate that we direct attention to those matters that animate world politics and stimulate the attention and activities of national decision makers. At the same time, as different state and non-state actors view global political issues from widely varying vantage points, it is fitting that we remain sensitive to the various perceptual lenses through which the items on the global agenda are viewed. Accordingly, *The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives* seeks to focus on the range of issues that dominates world politics as well as on the multitude of analytical and interpretive perspectives through which those issues are viewed.

The issues and perspectives discussed in *The Global Agenda* are grouped into four broad, somewhat overlapping, but analytically distinct issue areas: (1) arms and influence, (2) discord and collaboration, (3) politics and markets, and (4) ecology and politics. The first two deal with states' security interests, often referred to as matters of *high politics.* The latter two deal with the non-security issues, often referred to as matters of *low politics,* that increasingly have come to occupy, if not dominate, the attention of world political actors. In all four

issue areas, we seek to convey not only the range of issues now facing those responsible for political choices but also the many vantage points from which they are typically viewed.

We begin in Part I by considering issues appropriately subsumed under the collective rubric *arms and influence.* As the term high politics suggests, the issues and perspectives treated here focus on the prospects for peace and security in a world of competitive nation-states armed with lethal weapons that can be used to inflict violence and destruction.

ARMS AND INFLUENCE

It is often argued that states strive for power, security, and domination in a global environment punctuated by the threat of violence and death. This viewpoint flows naturally from the characteristics of the international political system, which continue to be marked by the absence of central institutions able to manage and resolve conflict. Hence, preoccupation with preparations for defense is understandable, as the fear persists that one adversary might use force against another to realize its goals or to vent its frustrations. In such an environment, arms are widely perceived as useful not only to enhance security but also as a means to realize and extend one's influence. Moreover, nation-states frequently see their interests best served by a search for power, by whatever means. Thus *power* and *influence* remain the core concepts in the study of world politics.

Appropriately, our first essay, "Power, Capability, and Influence in International Politics," by K. J. Holsti, provides a thoughtful discussion of these core concepts in international politics as they relate to the foreign policy behavior of states in contemporary world politics. The essay provides insights important not only for evaluating the subsequent essays in this book but also for evaluating how these sometimes ambiguous terms typically inform interpretations of global issues—for almost invariably such discussions make reference, implicitly or explicitly, to the interrelationships among power, capability, and influence.

If the purpose of statecraft is the pursuit of political power, then a critical question is, What are the most appropriate means that might propel states to positions of prominence in the international hierarchy? In "Force or Trade: The Costs and Benefits of Two Paths to Global Influence," Richard Rosecrance outlines rival approaches to the realization of that goal. The first encompasses the conventional path: the acquisition of military might. The United States and the Soviet Union exhibited steadfast dedication to this tradition throughout the Cold War, as did other participants in the post-World War II struggle for arms and influence. In contrast, other states—especially in Europe and Asia—chose a second path, which brought them global power through trade expansion, not territorial control and force.

Predicting that global leadership is destined to pass to what he calls "the new trading states," Rosecrance argues that those who remain wedded to the pursuit of power through territorial control and military spending will experience an erosion of their power and influence. States have a clear choice and must weigh the trade-off between economic and military power, according to Rosecrance, as prosperity through economic power and excessive military spending are incompatible. His conclusion—that trade instead of arms provides the most viable path to both prosperity and peace—finds a prominent place on the global agenda because it poses a dilemma no policy maker can ignore, especially now that the superpowers' military competition has ceased and the economic battleground arguably has become the primary locus in the struggle for power and influence. At issue is how security is to be realized and welfare assured.

Rosecrance's thesis is, of course, open to theoretical and empirical challenge. In the next selection, "The Future of Military Power: The Continuing Utility of Force," Eliot A. Cohen takes exception to the view that military force no longer plays a decisive role in world politics, even with the end of the Cold War and the spread of liberal democracy in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Unlike Rosecrance, Cohen maintains that the usability and usefulness of military force have not diminished and that the threat and actual use of military force retain many of their traditional functions and advantages.

Although Cohen recognizes that preparation for war is costly and the use of force risky, he questions the view that "methods of commerce are displacing military methods." Moreover, he questions the validity of three popular neo-liberal theories: that in creating conditions of interdependence, "the horrific quality of modern military technology, the spread of democracy, and the rise of transnational issues and actors" will inhibit recourse to war and give birth to a new age of lasting peace. Cohen maintains that none of these so-called liberal arguments is persuasive, as the trends and conditions that make them plausible are unlikely to endure. Thus, the conclusion that military power is becoming obsolete is not warranted. Instead, "war, and potential war, will remain a feature of international politics." In short, Cohen concludes that the usefulness of military power endures and that military force will continue to occupy a central place in world politics.

Cohen's thesis is compelling. The picture and prescriptions he presents must, however, be balanced against the long-term implications of a profoundly important world political achievement: Since World War II the great powers have experienced the longest period of uninterrupted peace since the advent of the state system in 1648. The faces of war and international politics *have* been transformed. How this remarkable achievement occurred is, however, subject to diametrically opposed interpretations. One says that the existence of weapons of mass destruction produced the long peace. The other contends that the long peace occurred *despite* these weapons, not because of them.

In "The Obsolescence of Major War," John Mueller explores the policy and moral implications of the long peace. He argues that war has passed from a noble institution to one in which it is now widely regarded as illegal, immoral, and counterproductive. The steps to this global awakening are traced in an account that suggests nuclear weapons were essentially irrelevant to the preservation of the long postwar peace. Mueller recognizes that "war in the developed world . . . has not become impossible" and that war in the Third World remains frequent and increasingly deadly. Still, he sees hope for the future in the fact that "peoples and leaders in the developed world—where war was once endemic—have increasingly found war to be disgusting, ridiculous, and unwise." "If war begins in the minds of men, as the UNESCO Charter insists," then, Mueller maintains, "it can end there." That would indeed alter the way the world has conventionally thought about arms, influence, and peace. In such a world (Cohen's assessment notwithstanding), the utility of force would be certain to command less respect than in the past.

Nuclear weapons are doubtless the most lethal form of power and hence the most threatening instruments of influence. How to avoid their use has dominated strategic thinking ever since the atomic age began in 1945. *Deterrence*—preventing a potential adversary from launching a military attack—has long been a central concept in these considerations. The failure of deterrence, particularly in a war between nuclear powers, could, of course, ignite a global conflagration culminating in the destruction of humanity, which means that the entire world has a stake in the operation of a successful deterrent strategy.

For many years great faith was placed in the ability of nuclear weapons to keep the peace. Indeed, the most popular theory of the avoidance of general war since 1945 is the claim that nuclear weapons have made general war obsolete. But others endorse John Mueller's thesis that nuclear weapons are "essentially irrelevant" in the prevention of major war. As argued at length in his well-known 1989 book *Retreat from Doomsday,* the growing aversion to war in general, in conjunction with the inhibiting fear of another major *conventional* war in particular, explains the obsolescence of war in the developed world.

Kenneth N. Waltz, a neo-realist, disagrees. As argued in "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," Waltz believes that nuclear weapons have had a pacifying impact on the course of world affairs since World War II. In a comprehensive review of thinking about nuclear weapons that outlines the evolution of nuclear doctrines, the efforts to construct a foolproof strategic defense, and efforts to bring about nuclear disarmament, Waltz advances the controversial conclusion that nuclear weapons have been "a tremendous force for peace" which "afford nations who possess them the possibility of security at reasonable cost." Without them, the post-World War II world would likely have been far less peaceful. Thus the peace and stability of the postwar world cannot be attributed to conventional deterrence. But, Waltz warns, scholars and policy makers have not understood the true strategic implications of nuclear weaponry and the reasons

why nuclear weapons dominate strategy, with the result that the advantages of nuclear weapons have not been properly appreciated.

Because arms both threaten and protect, a congeries of rival hypotheses can be advanced about the causes of armed conflict and of peace in the nuclear age. In "War in the Post-Cold War Era: Structural Perspectives on the Causes of War," Jack S. Levy summarizes leading ideas embedded in the assumptions of contending theoretical foci to explain the role of force in world politics and the means of preserving peace. As Levy notes, the outbreak of war derives from a wide range of circumstantial and causal factors, some internal to individual states and many external to them. Both contribute to its occurrence.

Focusing primarily on "systemic" or "structural" factors—attributes of the international system writ large—Levy reviews three major explanations for the continuing outbreak of war: (1) international anarchy and the security dilemma it creates, (2) theories of international equilibrium such as the operation of a successful balance of power under the emerging conditions of multipolarity, and (3) "power transition" theories and the propositions associated with them. His review suggests that, because war clearly has multiple potential causes, its control is difficult to manage, inasmuch as control depends on a varied combination of tangible and intangible factors. He warns, moreover, that "the changing structures of power in international and regional systems that have influenced decisions for war or peace so often in the past will continue to play a central role in such decisions in the future."

Achieving international security is often confounded by changes in global conditions. One change that could inhibit realization of that objective is the probability that the number of members of the "nuclear club" may increase dramatically in the future. Thus managing *nuclear proliferation* is a major political issue.

As Michael Renner warns in "What Should Be Done with Nuclear Arsenals? Disarmament and Weapons Proliferation," the nuclear issue remains complex. Despite recent breakthroughs in the negotiated reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the United States, Russia, and other former Soviet states, many states have powerful incentives to join the nuclear club and are actively pursuing development of nuclear capabilities. Showing why "the laying down of arms is a tricky process," Renner inventories the problems and prospects confronting the world community on this global issue. He finds the obstacles to the further expansion of nuclear states insufficient. To contain the spread, Renner argues that "disarmament will require shutting down test sites, converting weapons design labs to civilian use, dismantling existing warheads, and devising solutions for disposal of fissionable materials."

Renner warns that the danger of current disarmament agreements being reversed or abused always exists in a world where many leaders continue to equate arms with influence. And, he reminds us, the reduction of nuclear arsenals has a long way to go, as illustrated by the fact that in 1994 "the remaining