


American National Security

Policy and Process

Revised
Edition



Amos A. Jordan
William J. Taylor, Jr.

Foreword by Maxwell D. Taylor

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POLICY AND PROCESS

Revised Edition

AMOS A. JORDAN

WILLIAM J. TAYLOR, JR.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS

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To ANNE ARMSTRONG, chairman of the CSIS Advisory Board and vice chairman of its executive board.

Her service as chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and, earlier, as counselor to the president and as ambassador to the Court of St. James are but highlights in a life dedicated to American values and to the national security policies that sustain them.

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FOREWORD

It is a personal pleasure to be allowed to comment on the revised edition of this textbook on national security policy by an old friend, Amos A. Jordan, and Dr. William J. Taylor, Jr. Their work is a timely reappraisal of the meaning of national security and its requirements for safeguarding our country in the international environment foreseen for the remainder of the century.

The timeliness of the book arises from the growing national concern over the state of our security stimulated by evidence of increasing Soviet military strength and willingness to use it to advance an expansive foreign policy in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. The situation is made more ominous by concurrent evidence of our own impotence in dealing with events inimical to American policy in these same regions. Happily, our government is giving signs of intention to redress this imbalance in relative strength by a substantial program to rebuild and improve our military forces despite an unfavorable economic situation at home that discourages any such new undertakings. As this matter is likely to become a national issue, it behooves all citizens to acquire a clear understanding of what our security entails and how we can assure it against the most probable and most dangerous threats that may arise.

Despite the abundance of literature on the subject, I know of no agreed definition of national security. One would expect to find it in the National Security Act of 1947 which, with its amendment, provides the statutory foundation for our military establishment—but not so. The best it offers is an intimation of the scope of national security found in the statement that the function of the National Security Council is “to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security.” To the authors of the act, national security had become far more than the protection of our shores and skies from an armed enemy, and the responsibility for it was no longer a monopoly of the military—if it ever had been.

Dr. Jordan and his colleagues give us an explicit definition, entirely in accord with the broad concept that underlies the National Security Act. National security, in their view, is not only the protection of our people and territory from physical assault but also the protection by a variety of means of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which would threaten the

vitality and fundamental values of the state. Under this definition, the OPEC oil weapon becomes quite properly as much a matter of concern of national security as the Warsaw Pact forces facing our troops in Western Europe.

To achieve national security of this breadth, the drafters of security policy must first determine the national valuables requiring protection and then identify the threats thereto that have both the greatest damage potential and the highest probability of occurrence. As the richest nation in the world, we have many valuables to safeguard—at home our people, our political institutions, the national economy, and vast reserves of human and natural resources. Abroad, we must be ready to protect thousands of nationals, allies, scores of public and private investments, military forces, bases, and markets. There are also intangible national interests to protect such as the principles of the Bill of Rights and of the United Nations charter, our treaty engagements, a favorable balance of power, freedom of the seas, and our international reputation. The assured security of such a variety of assets and interests is costly not only because of their number and geographical dispersion but also, in many cases, because of their exposure to the hostile actions of unfriendly foreign governments or the consequences of destructive environmental forces.

The exposure to danger of such interests is in many cases the result of physical proximity to the Soviet Union—for example, our interests in Western Europe, the Middle East and Northeastern Asia. In a different way, our economy is exposed to danger as the result of its dependence on imports. To maintain an adequate level of productivity, the economy must have uninterrupted access to raw materials, located mostly in four regions: Latin America, the Middle East, parts of Africa, and the Southwest Pacific. Continuity of trade with these regions will be affected by the consequences of the excessive population growth that plagues the producer countries—scarcities of land, food, water, energy, capital, and foreign exchange. Such conditions induce political instability ranging in form from frequent changes of government to revolution, civil war, and chaos.

With such a future in prospect, our leaders are justified in assuming that the greatest dangers to our valuables will come from three sources: the malevolence of the Soviet Union, the consequences of our dependence on imports, and the turbulent conditions in many regions of the Third World. An adequate security policy must provide the means, military and nonmilitary, to forestall the most likely and dangerous threats that may arise from these sources.

The authors of this text describe at length the many agencies and procedures involved in producing such a policy. Numerous difficulties will always intervene to prevent or delay its formulation. In the light of experience, at least two major obstacles are sure to arise—inadequacy in political guidance as to the likely course of future national policy, and disagreement over the priorities in resources and effort to be accorded the principal threats.

No solution has yet been found for the chronic dearth of political guidance that impedes security planning. Although a president from time to time will

give a broad indication of the goals of future foreign policy and of some of the obstacles that he expects to encounter, such guidance is rarely sufficiently specific or timely to meet the needs of effective security planning. We have had a recent example of what may happen when a change in foreign policy exceeds the supportive capabilities of existing military policy.

The Carter Doctrine, enunciated in January 1980, is an example of what can happen when a change in foreign policy exceeds the supportive capabilities of existing military policy. Although our armed forces had long been aware of the increasing importance of Mideast oil to the United States and its allies, they were unprepared for President Carter's order to be ready henceforth to defend the entire Persian Gulf region against any attempt by the Soviets or any other party to gain or exercise control over it. The new mission suddenly assigned to this distant, vaguely defined area a strategic importance comparable to that of Western Europe, and, in so doing, it added a responsibility beyond the means provided the armed forces under current military policy. In short, our foreign policy has adopted an objective out of range of military support—a dangerous imprudence of a kind that, often in past history, has exacted a heavy price from the offending nation.

Even with the best of political guidance, security planners would still face the difficulty of distributing available financial and human resources wisely to meet the competitive needs of several threats at the same time. Ever since the advent of nuclear weapons, this kind of conflict has arisen between the policy planners who would give first priority to the needs of the strategic forces and those who favor the claims of conventional (nonnuclear) forces. On the one hand, the argument has been that a strategic war with the Soviets is by far the most dangerous threat since it might well result in the complete destruction of our country. Hence, an ability to deter or win such a war quickly should be the number one objective of military policy and enjoy an unqualified first priority in the allocation of resources.

The opposing argument is that, although the vast destructive potential of nuclear war is undeniable, that very fact makes its occurrence highly unlikely because of the enormous risks run by both sides. In such a war, there could be no victory if the term denotes, as it should, a situation more favorable to the victor than the one prior to the resort to arms.

In contrast, the argument proceeds, we shall always need conventional forces to deal with numerous but unpredictable minor conflicts and to reinforce foreign policy by a visible strength in being. Our newly acquired dependence on foreign imports creates new tasks for such forces in assuring access to essential markets and keeping open the sea and air lanes. Because of the high probability of such conflicts, we must have ample ready forces of the right kind to deal with them.

The dilemma posed in this debate is whether to favor the most destructive but least probable threat or the most probable threat with a variable damage potential ranging from minor to very great. In the past, the partisans of the strategic forces usually have prevailed, but the growth in importance of the

economic factor in international relations may now force greater attention toward the needs of the conventional forces.

The authors have treated thoroughly many of the foregoing points. From their description of policy-making, one is bound to be impressed with the importance of blending effectively the input of many elements of the executive branch in conjunction with parallel activities by key congressional committees. Despite the integrative role performed by the National Security Council, the government still displays great ineptitude in formulating and carrying out multidepartmental programs—witness the prolonged frustration in achieving a national energy program.

In focusing attention on the intricacies of the national security process, let us never lose sight of the predominant role of the president, who is alone responsible for the goals, means, and outcome of all national policy. The complicated procedure described in this text has a single purpose—to assist the president to choose the right goals, adopt the best alternative course of action, achieve the specified aims, and verify the effective execution of his decisions. The national security process can do no more than bring its product to the threshold of the Oval Office where the president takes over and his personal methods replace those of the bureaucracy. While the latter can assist him by orderly staff work and to some extent lighten his burden, in the end he will conduct his business in his own way.

As the authors point out, the inner working of the White House varies with the personality and work habits of its occupant. The duty of his immediate staff is to present to the president the external input, preferably in an orderly way but always in a way compatible with his own work style. Some presidents prefer to acquire information by reading, some by listening, some by a combination of both. All whom I have observed have, without exception, wanted the unadulterated truth—no matter how unpleasant—from their staffs, and have never tolerated “yes men” for long. One quickly concludes that character is by far the most important attribute for occupants of key White House positions, beginning but not ending with the president. As in most endeavors of moment, the human factor in the national security process far transcends in importance all matters of form, organization, or procedure.

In the 1980s, our leaders responsible for national policy-making will be confronted to an increasing degree by the complexities arising from military imbalance, economic interdependence, and the expansive foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The challenges to these leaders in formulating and executing an adequate national security will be formidable. Understanding those challenges and the problems and prospects they create in an increasingly dangerous world is a responsibility of all Americans. This textbook is a useful contribution toward that understanding.

Maxwell D. Taylor

PREFACE

The genesis of this book was the idea from Dr. Frank N. Trager, who observed in 1972 that there was a crying need for a college textbook on U.S. national security. His forecast was that, after the trauma of Vietnam was behind us, there would be renewed interest among the nation's faculties and youth in the study of national and international security. He has, of course, been proven correct. He suggested to two of his friends on the West Point faculty, Amos A. Jordon and William J. Taylor, Jr., that they undertake the task of writing a text. At the time, there were many books on particular aspects of U.S. defense policy and several edited compendia of articles. By their very nature, however, none of them could serve adequately the needs of students at most colleges and universities to gain a basic understanding of the policies and processes involved in American national security. By the end of the decade, nothing had been published that changed the early estimate of the situation.

In 1972 the principal authors completed a detailed outline of 160 pages and drafted the first few chapters. Thereafter, major changes in assignments and responsibilities denied these two the long periods of consistent research and careful attention that a sound textbook requires. Over the intervening years, as the project's completion was delayed, a number of people listed as "Associates" in the first edition contributed significantly to research and writing, as chapters were drafted and redrafted to serve as material for the instruction of West Point cadets and also to capture changes in the international system and the development of new dimensions in national and international security.

Finally, in 1980 the principal authors carved out the major block of time needed for a complete rewriting and updating of the first edition manuscript. This effort was assisted by several in the Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy, who read, critiqued, and worked in last-minute research. Their contributions are acknowledged in that edition. The penultimate draft was critiqued carefully and most helpfully by one of America's leading soldier-statesmen, General Maxwell D. Taylor, to whom we are deeply indebted for writing the foreword. Various chapters were reviewed and critiqued by several distinguished scholars and practitioners—George Carver, Chester Crocker, William T. R. Fox, Lieutenant General Robert G. Gard, Jr.,

Alexander Haig, Ralph Nurnberger, James Schlesinger, Lieutenant General DeWitt C. Smith, and Admiral Stansfield Turner, among others.

The first edition was a huge success. Feedback to the authors and to the Johns Hopkins University Press was most positive; so were the published reviews of the book.

As we approached this second edition, we solicited written comments from many professors who had used the book in the classroom. We asked for appraisals of strengths and weaknesses and sought guidance on additions or deletions to our coverage. In general, the response indicated that we should stay with our basic approach, updating only as necessary. We have followed that advice.

This second edition has been prepared at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., where the coauthors are president and chief executive officer, and chief operating officer, respectively. We are especially indebted to two of our associates at CSIS, George Sinks and John Henshaw, who worked with us many extra hours on this revision. For their unique insights in examining regional chapters, we owe our thanks to Fred Axelgard (Middle East), Robert Downen (Asia), Georges Fauriol (Latin America), and Helen Kitchen (Africa). Lieutenant Colonel Richard H. Sinnreich, CSIS army fellow; Richard Wilcox, CSIS fellow from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Reginald J. Brown, CSIS senior associate, were most helpful in providing insights for updating chapters in their areas of expertise.

Finally, we want to acknowledge once again the inspiration and support of Polly Jordan and Louise Taylor, who have shared our dedication to education in the field of national security affairs.

ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	antiballistic missile
ALBM	air-launched ballistic missile
ALCM	air-launched cruise missile
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, U.S. (treaty)
ASAT	antisatellite
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AVF	all-volunteer force
BMD	ballistic missile defense
BNW	battlefield nuclear weapons
C ³	command, control, and communications
CD	civil defense
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
D.P.R.K.	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
D.R.V.	Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
EEC	European Economic Community
FBS	forward-based systems
FY	fiscal year
FYDP	Five-Year Defense Program
GAO	Government Accounting Office
GNP	gross national product
HUMINT	human intelligence
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
IG	Interdepartmental Group
INF	intermediate nuclear forces
IRBM	intermediate-range ballistic missile
IRG	Interdepartmental Region Group
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFM	Joint Force Memorandum
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan

LDC	less developed country
LTB	Limited Test Ban (treaty)
MAD	mutual assured destruction
MARV	multiple-aimed reentry vehicle
MBFR	mutual and balanced force reduction
MFN	most favored nation
MIRV	multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicle
MRBM	medium-range ballistic missile
MRV	multiple reentry vehicle
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORAD	North American Air Defense Command
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NVA	North Vietnamese army
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
ONUC	Organization des Nations Unies dans le Congo (UN Organization in the Congo)
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PD	Presidential Directive
PGMs	precision-guided munitions
PPBS	Planning, Programming, Budgeting System
PRC	Policy Review Committee
P.R.C.	People's Republic of China
R&D	research and development
R.O.K.	Republic of Korea (South Korea)
R.V.N.	Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SCC	Special Coordination Committee
SIG	Senior Interdepartmental Group
UMT	universal military training
UNFICYP	United Nations Force in Cyprus
WWMCCS	World-Wide Military Command and Control System

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
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NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: WHAT IS IT AND HOW HAVE AMERICANS APPROACHED IT?

The capabilities that together serve as the foundation for a nation's security are always relative to the capabilities of other nations. Thus, an understanding of the elements of national security should begin with an examination of the international context within which a nation's security must be shaped. This setting determines the security problems and prospects that face the nation and also limits the choices available. A small, self-sufficient island-nation faces problems different from those of a landlocked, underdeveloped but resourceful nation bordered by both enemies and friends. The internal structure of a nation must also be considered because, for some countries, principal threats may be almost totally internal as different ethnic, cultural, religious, or political groups fight for control of the government. In Part 1 we examine the overall setting within which U.S. national security exists.

U.S. national security policies have been focused upon security within an international system that can be characterized as loosely ordered anarchy.

Despite attempts to bring some greater semblance of order to the system, individual nation-states remain the sovereign actors. Each nation pursues its own interests, which may at times conflict with the national interests of another state. While such conflicts need not lead to violence, all too often they do, and Chapter 3 describes and analyzes the ways the United States has traditionally dealt with national security challenges. The necessity of dealing with external threats (as opposed to internal ones) has been the dominant preoccupation in U.S. national security, but elements of the domestic situation have helped form a distinctly “American” approach to dealing with foreign threats.

Conflict and violence among nations is hardly a new phenomenon, but the means for violent conflict have taken a quantum jump in the twentieth century. The acquisition of nuclear weapons has given individual nations the ability to destroy major parts of the world in a matter of hours. America’s brief monopoly on these weapons of destruction produced hope that war could be prevented by mere threat of their use. These hopes, like the American nuclear monopoly, were short-lived. Rather than preclude any resort to force in the settling of conflicts, nuclear weapons may actually have loosened controls on lower levels of violence and created a danger of escalation to nuclear warfare. In the last two chapters of Part 1, we examine the role of force in the nuclear age, America’s attempts to deal with perceived threats, and the continued use of force to resolve international conflicts.

1

NATIONAL SECURITY: THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING

National security, a term that has come into broad usage only since World War II, means widely differing things to different people. Clearly, it signifies protection of the nation's people and territories against physical assault and, in that narrow sense, is roughly equivalent to the traditionally used term, *defense*. National security, however, has a more extensive meaning than protection from physical harm; it also implies protection, through a variety of means, of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten fundamental values and the vitality of the state.

Helmut Schmidt, former chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, expressed one element of this broader meaning of national security in noting that the past few years—which have included the oil crisis, monetary instability, worldwide inflation and unemployment, and other ills—have revealed, in his terms, a new “economic dimension” of national security. “By this,” he said, “I mean the necessity to safeguard free trade access to energy supplies and to raw materials, and the need for a monetary system which will help us to reach those targets.”¹ The chancellor stressed that this new dimension was an addition to, not a replacement for, the more traditional elements of security such as military balances and arms control.

Broadening the concept of security to include key international economic factors, as Chancellor Schmidt has done, is now widely accepted. Indeed, foreign policy and national security are now seen to broadly overlap. A generation ago this was not the case; one might then have depicted the relationship between foreign policy and national security policy as two slightly overlapping, but largely tangential, spheres (fig. 1.1, left). One sphere was concerned generally with international political, economic, scientific, cultural, and legal relationships, and the other sphere focused primarily on specific features of military policy and the domestic politics of defense forces and budgets. The area of overlap between the two resided largely in alliance




FIG. 1.1

politics and coercive diplomacy. Since World War II—especially during the period toward the end of the Cold War and the beginning of *détente*—the two spheres of foreign policy and national security have drawn closer together (fig. 1.1, right), as strategic arms limitation talks began, political measures to contain East-West competition were launched, and international trade and finance and multinational business became increasingly “linked” with international politics. The suddenness with which the 1973 oil embargo impelled “interdependence” into the consciousness of political leaders and academicians alike has further pushed together the spheres of foreign policy and national security policy.

As noted, there also are important domestic aspects of national security policy, such as defense budgets and personnel policies. Domestic support, political and psychological as well as material, is the bedrock on which any national security policy is built. It is easy to drift from that self-evident statement, however, into a view that dissent from a whole variety of policies poses a threat to national security and hence must be suppressed. One of President Nixon’s difficulties with the Congress and the nation at large was precisely his tendency to use the concept of national security too broadly, invoking it as a cloak to cover various unwise or even illegal actions.

Despite such unwarranted domestic extensions of the term, national security does have important domestic elements. These will be focused upon primarily in Part 2, which examines the process and actors involved in national security decision-making. In the remainder of this chapter and the rest of Part 1, we will deal essentially with the international dimensions of national security policy.

Theory and International Politics. If theory were money, political scientists would be the wealthiest people on earth—and not among the *nouveau riche*. Theorizing about politics and power has abounded ever since the first person found reality too complex to grasp in its entirety and experience too limited to explain everything that happened. Members of every society from the hollows of caves to the halls of the White House have had to act upon occasion with a sinking feeling of uncertainty as to where chosen courses of action will lead. Yet they must act on that most basic of theories, namely, that effects do have causes and that changing the latter will necessarily modify the former.