

HYPOMNEMATA

Untersuchungen
zur Antike und zu ihrem Nachleben


Hayden Pelliccia

Mind, Body, and Speech
in Homer and Pindar

VANDENHOECK & RUPRECHT · GÖTTINGEN

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Mind, Body, and Speech
in Homer and Pindar



VANDENHOECK & RUPRECHT IN GÖTTINGEN

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In memory of my father
Orlando Pelliccia

Preface

This study begins and ends with the interpretation of a passage in Pindar (*Nemean* 7. 102-104: "My heart will never say . . ."), just as the project itself began when, provoked by the apparent meaning of the lines, I asked myself the question, "Can Pindar's heart really *say* anything, anyhow?" From my puzzlement over this question began an extended review of the Homeric background, as I searched for an instructive parallel to what Pindar might be trying to get across. Does Homer ever attribute speech-capabilities to a bodily organ such as the heart or θυμός? From that question the present work developed.

Chapter One is largely given over to presenting the preliminary problem, as posed by Homer's references to the organs, of metaphorical versus literal usage. The issues can be briefly summarized by juxtaposing two English sentences: (1) "My stomach aches", and (2) "My heart aches". In the first both the subject and the verb are given physical (*literal*) meaning, whereas in the second neither is (and thus the usage is *metaphorical*). In Chapter One I sketch out comparable limits in the use of the Greek organ-words as subjects of verbs belonging to, or adjacent to, the word-field of "speaking" -- that is, the limits for each element, the subject (an organ) and the verb, each of which, as the English examples illustrate, can move up and down on the various scales measuring metaphorical and literal content. The goal of this preliminary inquiry is to warn against the drawing of false conclusions: what kinds of inference do such utterances as (1), "My stomach aches", and (2), "My heart aches", permit? A non-native speaker of English who applies to "aches" in (2) the meaning he knows it to have in (1) will probably make incorrect inferences about the nature of the "heart" in (2), where it is metaphorical, as opposed to the physical stomach of (1). But the relationship may also be reversed, as in, for example, "heart disease", vs. "So-and-so has no stomach for work". These questions are relevant to the assessment of the intellectual-historical inferences made by scholars like Snell, whose theories are briefly discussed at the beginning of the chapter.

Detecting shifts of metaphorical and literal content in the use of Homeric Greek is, for a modern speaker, a subtle and exacting exercise.

The first part of Chapter Two contains a close analysis of passages in which a character is said to address speech to his θυμός, in some of which speeches he implies that the organ itself has spoken to him. I pay special attention here to the physical proximity of the speakers to any potential audience: is conversation with one's θυμός -- if conversation is what such speeches actually constitute -- conducted in public or in private? The finding that such speeches are spoken exclusively in private raises questions about the assumption, made by some modern scholars, that Homeric Greeks had an uncomplicated literal belief in the possibility of such conversation. How might we explain this restriction, and what other accounts of these supposed conversations are available besides the literalistic one? Looking especially to the psychological needs of the speakers, and to the dramaturgical needs of the poet, I attempt to discover answers by classifying all the Homeric soliloquies according to their generic affiliations, comparing and contrasting those identified as "addressed to the θυμός" with those not so identified, and inspecting the circumstances in which the various types are made. The second part of the chapter examines passages in which an organ is said to engage in such acts as "thinking", "hoping", "expecting", and "wishing". The chapter concludes with a discussion of the poet's dramaturgical use of the organs and the gods as forces intervening into and motivating human behavior.

Chapter Three compares the findings about Homeric usage to selected post-Homeric evidence, chiefly from Pindar, in order to ascertain the significant deviations from the Homeric conventions, as established in the preceding chapter, and to elucidate Pindar's text in the light of these findings. I find that although Pindar, like Aeschylus and other fifth century poets, innovates upon the Homeric patterns, these innovations consistently represent logical extensions of tendencies already present in the Homeric usage. The passage at the end of *Nemean* 7, however, is found to be anomalous in this respect, so that the text itself is called into question.

The discussions in Chapters Two and Three are *in part* contributions to answering the theoretical questions raised in Chapter One. It is my conviction, however, that close literary explication such as I provide in Chapters Two and Three is a *sine qua non* for making successful intellectual-historical inferences of the kind attempted, without such a foundation, by scholars such as those discussed at the beginning of Chapter One. So far as the present work is concerned, the theoretical discussion in Chapter One is intended to prepare the way for Chapters Two and Three; the initial discussion of Snell et al. is a necessity imposed by the history of scholarship: scholars engaged in

intellectual history are the ones who have treated these issues. My own goals throughout are philological, aimed at the elucidation of specific texts and passages, and I only touch upon philosophical, intellectual-historical, or psychological-historical issues. In so far as I venture generalities about passages in the aggregate, I tend to favor typological generalization -- again, not philosophical. Here, and elsewhere (see, for example, Pelliccia 1987, 1989, and 1993), I have proceeded by way of the "open border" between syntax and rhetoric; in this my greatest influences have been E. Norden, J. Wackernagel, E. R. Curtius, E. Fraenkel, and E. L. Bundy. This approach often intersects with the typological approach exemplified in the works of W. Arend and B. Fenik.

Standard editions (e.g., *PMG*) are listed in the bibliography under the abbreviations used; commentaries are cited in the form "see Fraenkel ad loc.", with full information given in the Bibliography under the commentator's last name. Books and articles are referred to by the author's last name and the date of publication, followed, where relevant, by the page numbers (e.g., Snell, 1932, 82).

I have been greatly helped by the advice of various consultants and readers, and I wish to thank Kevin Clinton, John Coleman, Gregory Hays, Albert Henrichs, Terence Irwin, Jay Jasanoff, Donald Mastronarde, Andrew Miller, Phillip Mitsis, Alan Nussbaum, Piero Pucci, Jeffrey Rusten, Ian Rutherford, Danuta Shanzer, Richard Thomas and Calvert Watkins. Ian Rutherford gave me a diskette version of his forthcoming book on Pindar's *Paeans*, which proved an invaluable help. Malcolm Heath sent at the last moment the proofs of his article on *Nemean 7*, and thus enabled me to improve my account of the ancient scholarship on the poem. The index of passages was compiled by Greg Hays.

In addition to twice reading and commenting upon the entire text, William Race solved the, for me, intractable problem of contriving a title, and for this I am deeply grateful; there is no better reader and critic. Mary Lefkowitz and Hugh Lloyd-Jones provided me with constructive criticism, moral support, and warm friendship over the years during which this book was written; the debt I owe them, and the gratitude and affection I feel for them, are very great.

Finally, I wish to thank Alessandra, Caedmon, and Elspeth Pelliccia, and Abby Westervelt.

Hayden Pelliccia

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14 February 1994

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CHAPTER ONE

Preliminary Issues

1.0: Prologue

Lines 102-104 of the seventh *Nemean* ode have long exercised Pindarists:¹

τὸ δ' ἐμὸν οὐ ποτε φάσει κέαρ
ἀτρόποισι Νεοπτόλεμον ἑλκύσαι
ἔπει·

Alexandrian scholars saw here a reference to complaints leveled against Pindar by Aeginetans dissatisfied with his treatment of Neoptolemus in the sixth *Paean*: in *Nemean* 7 the poet returned to the subject of Neoptolemus' death and denied that the earlier treatment had contained any slander of the Aeginetan hero.² If this account of the passage is correct,³ then we have in the lines evidence that Pindar was willing to include in an epinician ode material (seemingly) more relevant to his own concerns than to those of the victor. It is for this reason, among others, that *Nemean* 7 has become a touchstone of Pindaric criticism.⁴

¹ See the references in the next note for discussion and further bibliography; the passage is a critical test-case for Bundy's influential claim that "there is no passage in Pindar and Bakchylides that is not in its primary intent *enkomiastik*" (Bundy, 1962, 3); the poem's importance for understanding the conventions of Pindaric epinician is already proclaimed in Schadewaldt's book-length study of it (Schadewaldt, 1928), the most important investigation of the genre prior to Bundy, written by a student of the scholar who had provided the most compelling statement of the opposed "historicist" interpretation (Wilamowitz, 1908).

² Σ 150a: ὁ δὲ Ἀριστόδημος, ὅτι μεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Αἰγινήτων ἐπὶ τῷ δοκεῖν ἐν Παιᾶσιν εἰπεῖν τὸν Νεοπτόλεμον ἐπὶ ἱεροσυλίᾳ ἐληλυθέναι εἰς Δελφοὺς, νῦν ὥσπερ ὑπεραπολογεῖται εἰπὼν, ὅτι οὐχ ἱεροσυλῶν ἐτελεύτησεν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ κρεῶν φιλοτιμηθεὶς ἀνιρέθη. 150b: . . . πέποιθεν ἑαυτῇ ἢ ἐμὴ ψυχῇ, μηδέποτε τῷ Νεοπτολέμῳ ἐνυβρίσαι. See also 94a: καθόλου γὰρ ἀπολογεῖσθαι βούλεται περὶ τοῦ Νεοπτολέμου θανάτου πρὸς τοὺς Αἰγινήτας. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ἡτιῶντο τὸν Πίνδαρον, ὅτι γράφων Δελφοῖς τὸν Παιᾶνα ἔφη (*Paean* 6. 117)· ἀμφιπόλοισι μαρνάμενον μοιριᾶν περὶ τιμᾶν ἀπολωλέναι. Cf. Σ 70 and 123

Apart from the scholarly controversy besetting the passage, its correct interpretation is desirable for its own sake. Two questions that I have not seen raised in the many discussions of the passage are, Why does Pindar attribute the denial to his heart? What are the contexts, if

a. These and other alleged allusions to the paean in *N. 7* have been discussed in detail by Tugendhat, 1960, Lloyd-Jones, 1973, 127-137 (= Lloyd-Jones, 1990a, 138-153), Smith, 1984, and Most, 1985, 133f. and 203-213; Heath, 1993, however, puts the discussion on an entirely new footing. See Rutherford, forthcoming, for further discussion of the paean. For excellent discussions of related issues, see Lefkowitz, 1991, *passim*.

³ Heath, 1993, has shown how previous discussions incorrectly imposed upon the reports preserved in the scholia a view that in *N. 7* Pindar altered and improved the account given in the paean -- an idea which, apart from the absence of any support in the scholia (see Heath), foisted an implausible illogicality on the poet ("I've changed the earlier account, and besides, it wasn't slanderous to begin with": cf. Fogelmark, 1972, 116: "Pindar is certainly alluding to the Aeginetan criticism aroused by *Paean VI*, but he is also stating in a somewhat illogical way that he has not maligned Neoptolemus in *N. VII*, just as if he wanted to say: 'Do not say that I have offended the name of Neoptolemus! I'll never admit that! Look here, the entire poem (sc. *N. VII*) is full of praise; to say something else would be ridiculous.'").

⁴ Cf. Willcock, 1975 (a review of Fogelmark, 1972), 7: "the essence of [Bundy's] approach to Pindar is to deny that he ever intrudes his own personal problems into the odes. And the key poem for this argument is and will remain the *Seventh Nemean*". On some of the more general interpretative issues, see Slater, 1977, Lee, 1978, Cingano, 1979, and Lefkowitz, 1991, Ch. 5. The position of Heath, 1993, is complex: while defending the ancient belief, reflected in the scholia, that "apology" could form a natural part of "encomium", and that therefore there is nothing a priori wrong with the ancient scholars' discovery of an apologetic element in *N. 7*, he nonetheless believes that their apologetic account of *N. 7* is demonstrably false. His discussion (185f.) of apology and encomium seems to me not to distinguish strongly enough between what might be called *apologia pro laudando* (with *laudandus* to include all objects of praise other than the speaker, e.g., both Sogenes and Neoptolemus in *N. 7*) as opposed to *apologia pro laudatore ipso* (these categories correspond to Bundy's "objective" and "subjective" types; see Ch. 3 n. 29 below); he discusses the latter type as part of the argument from the *ethos* of the speaker (see especially 186 n. 42), and appeals to the scholiastic accounts of *P. 2* in support; these accounts demonstrate only that ancient scholars believed that such apology could form a part of encomium, but that demonstration, which was not really in dispute, does not answer Bundy's challenge (and Heath does not tell us whether he regards the scholiastic suggestions about *P. 2* as right or wrong). Bundy, at any rate, was acutely sensitive to Pindar's rhetorical use of this form of apology (see Bundy, 1972, *passim*; cf., on "elencitic" encomium, Pelliccia, 1992); but the real question has to do not with "apology" per se, but with references to external issues irrelevant to the celebration of the victor. Heath does not support with parallels his point that such reference is relevant if it is needed to (re-)establish the laudator's credentials in the eyes of the audience (cf. on *P. 2* above, and cf. Hubbard, 1991, for the issue as raised in *P. 9. 76-96*), and it will require complicated and unsupportable secondary hypotheses to explain away what would seem to be an indisputable given: Pindar's credentials were already acceptable to the (Aeginetan) family of Sogenes.

any, in which other Greek poets attribute such speech to their internal organs? The effort to answer these questions, which has proved to be surprisingly complicated, does in the end, I think, succeed in shedding some light on the passage.

1.1: Some Previous Accounts of the "Heart" and Related Organs

The present investigation is directed at the speech habits of organs like the heart, as it is represented at the end of the seventh *Nemeän*. The first issue to settle is, What is "like the heart"? The κέαρ (or κῆρ) belongs to a class of entities that Greeks of the archaic and classical periods spoke of as (normally) being present in human bodies, and to which they ascribed, according to the literary evidence, intellectual and emotional autonomy of varying degrees. These entities, which I shall loosely refer to as "organs,"⁵ are the ἥτορ, θυμός, κέαρ/κῆρ, κραδίη/καρδία, νόος/νοῦς, πραπίδες, φρήν/φρένες, and ψυχή.⁶ The Homeric evidence for these organs, apart from its chronological precedence, is pre-eminent both in volume and in force and persistence of influence, and I devote the bulk of the investigation to it.

The quantity of this evidence is very large. Jahn's figures for the *Iliad*, *Odyssey*, and *Homeric Hymns* are: ἥτορ 102 x, θυμός 816 x, κῆρ 90 x, κραδίη 63 x, νόος 118 x, πραπίδες 14 x, φρήν/φρένες 379 x, and ψυχή 84 x.⁷ Furthermore, the ground has been much worked over previously: it is impossible to study these words without touching upon topics that have long and distinguished histories in the study of Homeric psychology, theology, and dramatic technique. I will accordingly

⁵ The word "loosely" is meant seriously; I think that the convenience of the catch-all term "organs" outweighs its inaccuracies (cf. Jahn, 1987, 26 n. 20): the ψυχή flies off at death (or even in a faint: *Il* 5. 696, 22. 467), and in Homer has no active participation in the psychology of the living person (see Claus, 1981), resembling the θυμός in respect of the former characteristic, but not the latter; νόος is more a function than a physical thing (see Jahn, 46-118, Schmitt, 1990, 174-217; cf. von Fritz, 1943 and Leshner, 1981). For the remainder the term "organ" is adequate, provided that its limitations are recognized. For reasons explained at the end of this chapter, this investigation is concerned mostly with the ἥτορ, θυμός, κῆρ, and κραδίη. Cf. the next note.

⁶ Jahn, 1987, initially includes μένος in the group, but then eliminates it (39-45); I agree that it does not belong here, though there are a handful of passages in which it, in combination with the θυμός or κραδίη, bids or impels a person to action; these will be touched upon in the discussion.

⁷ Jahn, 1987, 6 n. 29.

devote this first chapter to describing how my position and approach relate to those of my predecessors, and to explaining (and justifying) the method by which I arrange and selectively classify the great bulk of the primary evidence. I re-iterate that the subject of my investigation is strictly limited to the speaking capabilities of the organs; inevitably that must impinge upon more general questions about their overall natures, an area that has enjoyed very intensive research; but the primary focus is not on the latter, but the former.⁸

The question of the organs' speech-capabilities has never really been directly addressed before, so far as I have been able to ascertain. The subject is discussed, where it is, in investigations into monologues. These investigations fall into two overlapping types: those that are primarily concerned with dramatic technique, and those that study deliberation as evidence for psychology. These two types roughly correspond to literary versus intellectual history. The greatest figure among the practitioners of the second type is Bruno Snell, whose writings over the half century from the late twenties to the late seventies have defined the terms of the debate.⁹ Prior to Snell, the outstanding figures were Leo and Schadewaldt, both of them students of monologue as literary and dramatic technique.¹⁰ After the

⁸ For overall accounts of the organs in Homer, and of Homeric psychology in general, see above all, Jahn, 1987, and Schmitt, 1990. There are some recent specialized studies: on the ψυχή, see Claus, 1981, and Bremmer, 1983 (on which see the review of West, 1985); on the φρήν, see Darcus Sullivan, 1988, on the θυμός, Caswell, 1990. Other useful discussions are to be found in Adkins, 1970, Austin, 1975, Ch. 2, Böhme, 1929, Cheyins, 1981, Darcus Sullivan (or Darcus), 1979a, 1979b, 1980a, 1980b, 1981, Dodds, 1951, Ch. 1, Harrison, 1960, Jarcho, 1968, Kurath, 1921, Onians, 1954, Padel, 1992, Ch. 2, Pucci, 1987, 157-187, Redfield, 1975, Ch. 5, Robinson, 1990, Russo and Simon, 1968, Scully, 1984, Snell, 1931, 1953, Ch. 1, Webster, 1952/3.

⁹ Voigt, 1934, is an investigation of monologues entirely along the lines laid down by Snell, whose student Voigt was. The most recent comprehensive criticism of Snell is to be found in Schmitt, 1990, 12-71 (on Voigt see especially 21-27), and Williams, 1993 (especially Ch. 2); the most important earlier criticisms are those of Lesky, 1961, Lloyd-Jones, 1983, 1-27, 188 n. 38, and 238-240, and Petersmann, 1974; for recent discussions in English besides Williams, see Sharples, 1983, Fowler, 1987a, 106 n. 7, Halliwell, 1990, Rosenmeyer, 1991, and Gaskin, 1991.

¹⁰ Leo, 1908, and Schadewaldt, 1926; Hentze, 1904, is the most notable predecessor in the study of Homeric monologues; Otter, 1914, and Birt, 1931, represent an important minority view (the latter being an attempt to draw attention to the former), almost entirely neglected by other writers: Otter was reviewed negatively by Wilhelm Nestle (Nestle, 1916) and summarized by Sitzler, 1916/18; otherwise he is mentioned, on my finding, only by Eigler, 1988, 3 n. 20 and Medda, 1983, who, in his chapter on Homer, is chiefly interested in arguing that prayers should be regarded as monologues (cf. Ch. 2 n. 68 below); his is the most important *literary* discussion of recent years, and the only one that gives due attention to Otter and Birt.