THE
DICTIONARY
of
WORLD
POLITICS

A REFERENCE GUIDE TO CONCEPTS, IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS

GRAHAM EVANS AND JEFFREY NEWNHAM

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WORLD POLITICS

To the memory of Agnes, Tom and David Evans,
who would have enjoyed it
(GE)

To my mother, and to the memory of my father
(JDN)

The earth is not so old, after all, and never it seems, has it been in so interesting a state.

Robert Musil, *The Man Without Qualities*, quoted in Merle, M. (1987), *The Sociology of International Relations*, p. 5.

PREFACE

I first became aware of the need for a comprehensive dictionary of world politics when I began to study the subject at the postgraduate level in the late 1960s and early 1970s. At that time it was emerging as a fairly discrete entity in Europe but more especially in the United States where it had successfully established itself as something other than a mere sub-branch of the study of politics. However, despite a general orientation in the academic community in favour of regarding it as a separate discipline it was still an 'unruly flock of activities' with no overarching consensus about what was to be studied or how. It seemed to me then, as it does with even greater force now, that the eclectic nature of the discipline, along with its seemingly unlimited range and scope, cried out for a single-volume study devoted to the clarification of what might be termed its key concepts and major institutions. Although the history of academic inquiry into world politics is a relatively recent one, its proliferation in the second half of the twentieth century, inspired by social scientific borrowing, has given rise to a somewhat bewildering variety of methodologies, theories, frameworks for analysis, hypotheses, concepts, ideas and allusions. Such growth presents a daunting prospect even to the most industrious and diligent student. At the very least, acquiring just a rudimentary grasp of the structures and processes of world politics, whether it be from the standpoint of the scholar or the practitioner, requires some acquaintance with politics, history, law, philosophy, economics, sociology, psychology and anthropology as well as a knowledge of languages and cultures other than one's own, and perhaps a smattering of mathematics thrown in for good measure.

Clearly, the need for such a volume was self-evident. By the same token, the reason for its absence from the library shelves was obvious. Unless each entry is framed out to individual experts in a number of stipulated areas, it is difficult to imagine any one scholar possessing the necessary background to be able to offer a comprehensive and sophisticated guide – both to the state of the discipline itself and to the range of activities it purports to explain and describe.

To avoid the confines of the one-scholar approach, and mindful of the probable extravagance of the many, my colleague Jeffrey Newnham was invited to join the enterprise in the hope that such a pooling of resources would produce both economies of production and breadth of perspective. Coming from a background more sympathetic to the social scientific approach, he could leave me free to deal with the classical or traditional aspects of the work. Attacking it from two directions would not only reflect the eclecticism of the subject but hopefully strengthen the end product. In support of the dictum that the whole is more than the sum of the parts, a number of entries were more avowedly collaborative. At all times we endeavoured to present, albeit from our different perspectives, a consistency of style and content which would achieve a maximum amount of convergence and a minimum of dissonance.

PREFACE

Entry length varies considerably and this is a function not merely of the importance of particular items but also of the availability of material connected to them: the general rule being that some items, important though they may be to the subject, are essentially non-contentious or are adequately covered elsewhere in easily digested forms. Our overall purpose was not just to write a book about world politics. We also wanted to make a contribution to it. The entries therefore are not mere explication, they do represent distinct points of view.

The selection of entries was governed by two main considerations: first those ideas, concepts and institutions which we considered essential to any understanding of world politics (e.g. power, hegemony, diplomacy) and second those which, although important, are likely to be found only in specialized texts or journals (e.g. trilateralism, unit veto or heartland). Inevitably, selection of items for inclusion or exclusion is to some extent discretionary. In many ways, the enterprise is comparable to the compilation of an anthology of poetry – some of the 'greats' must go in, but some leeway is given for personal (if not idiosyncratic) choice. As far as possible, we avoided entries on individuals except where their names were associated with particular ideas or policies (e.g. Hobbesian or Truman doctrine). Some events get in because of their continued relevance (e.g. Vietnam War or Camp David accords) but in general these have been avoided. The book does not claim to provide an exhaustive compendium of references, but we do hope that we have presented an intelligible guide through the maze of complex issues and phenomena which make world politics such a fascinating, often tragic, dimension of social behaviour.

Linkage is an important feature of any dictionary (perhaps even more so in one dealing with foreign policy issues) and accordingly the work has a cross-reference facility. The items in small capitals in the text are those which might be usefully followed up to gain a more extensive explanation, or to indicate the family of ideas to which the particular entry belongs. For example, the entry on REALISM contains references to THUCYDIDES, HOBBESIAN, the STATE, the STATE-SYSTEM, POWER, SELF-HELP, SOVEREIGNTY, NATIONAL INTEREST, BALANCE OF POWER, INTERNATIONAL LAW, ORGANIZATION, EQUALITY, HIGH POLITICS, GREAT POWERS and ANARCHY – all of which, singly or together, should provide the reader with a comprehensive overview of the item in question. At the end of the book a select bibliography has been provided, both to give guidance for further study and to acknowledge sources.

Graham Evans
Swansea, December 1989

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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The Dictionary of
World Politics

A

ABM
Anti-ballistic missile. This is a system of interceptor missiles and accompanying RADARS which would seek to defend designated targets against incoming offensive missiles. Until the STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE of the 1980s, it was always assumed that an ABM system could most effectively be deployed as a 'point' defence of 'hard' targets (e.g. missile silos). However, the systems first mooted in the 1960s were susceptible to various countermeasures, in particular, pre-emptive attacks on their radars. Furthermore, the development of multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) meant that any system could potentially be saturated by incoming missiles and confused by decoys all carried on one 'bus'. The originally envisaged ABM systems would have intercepted incoming missiles relatively late in their midcourse phase, thus creating the paradox that high altitude defensive detonations would severely degrade the environment of the defender.

The shortcomings of these earlier systems led to the ABM Treaty of 1972. This limited ABM deployment to two sites: one to protect the capital, the other an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) site. In 1974 a further PROTOCOL was agreed limiting ABM deployment to one site. The US system was dismantled in 1975 although the Soviet Union continues to deploy the Galosh system around Moscow.

The TECHNOLOGY of space-based defence, developed during the 1980s, implies that some offensive missiles could be destroyed before re-entry into the earth's atmosphere. The significance of the type of system discussed above would therefore be reduced.

Absolutism
Political term usually associated with domestic politics and usually denoting a system of government which is not limited by internal institutions or laws. Many European STATES in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries displayed this feature. In the twentieth century 'absolutism' has given way to 'totalitarianism' (though the two are not synonymous: the latter refers to total control of all aspects of society while the former refers strictly to the possession of power). In INTERNATIONAL POLITICS the term is used in two ways:

1. as above, referring to political systems extant in the post-Westphalian European STATE-SYSTEM.
2. as a metaphor to give strength to the BILLIARD BALL concept of the NATION-STATE which assumes 'absolute' internal cohesion and a single unified DECISION-MAKING structure.

Most modern writers shun the term because of its inaccurate description of the character of the nation-state and its intrinsic vagueness.

Accidental war
The term may appropriately be used in two senses. First, where WAR occurs literally by

'accident'; thus through some technical malfunction an act of violence occurs which nobody intended. A variation of this might be where, through insubordination or incompetence, an individual or group commits an act of violence, against the intentions of the political leadership, which leads to WAR.

Secondly, accidental war may occur because one or a number of parties in conflict misread the situation and initiate violence. 'Accident' in this second sense may be seen as a function of MISPERCEPTION rather than technical failure or failure in the chain of command. This misperception is particularly likely in periods of CRISIS where time pressure is a situational factor which often accounts for considerable psychological stress among political leaders and their senior advisors. Historians and political scientists have identified the European crisis of the summer of 1914 as exemplifying many of the characteristics of accidental war in both senses used here.

The advent of NUCLEAR WEAPONS has greatly increased concern about preventing accidental war. ARMS CONTROL theories and measures have been directed to reduce the incentives to attack and to seek to reassure adversaries, particularly in times of crisis, that they can manage the situation without recourse to war. Attention has also concentrated upon the PROLIFERATION of nuclear weapons and the likelihood that this will increase the dangers of accidental war.

See also: CRISIS MANAGEMENT; PRE-EMPTION

Accommodation
Term much beloved of CRISIS MANAGEMENT theorists and practitioners of negotiational DIPLOMACY. It refers to the process whereby ACTORS in CONFLICT agree to recognize some of the others' claims while not sacrificing their basic interests. The source of conflict is not removed but the AGGRESSION it often generates is presumed to be. It assumes that international conflict is not ZERO–SUM, where the gain of one party is automatically the loss of the other. It also assumes that total HARMONY OF INTEREST does not prevail. Thus, it can be described as a half-way house (place of 'accommodation') between confrontation and harmony. The term is normally used in association with 'interests' and as such is not without sophistry.

Accuracy
A term used in strategic analysis. The ability to hit a desired target at any required distance is obviously a function of any weapon TECHNOLOGY. The development of AIR WARFARE and NUCLEAR WEAPONS in the twentieth century substantially increased the importance of this variable. Accuracy is now expressed in terms of Circular Error Probable and is widely applied, as a comprehensive measure, on all surface-to-surface missiles. Combined with the yield or size of the warhead, therefore, it is possible to compute the lethality of any such system. Other factors being equal, the more accurate the missile and the greater the yield the more damage it can inflict. Again technology has increased the accuracy factor of missiles to such an extent that operational planners are now able to consider COUNTERFORCE options in a way that was not feasible in the third quarter of the century.

ACP
African, Caribbean and Pacific. This is EUROPEAN COMMUNITY shorthand for those STATES in the THIRD WORLD which have negotiated a special AID and trade REGIME with the states of the Community. The TREATIES drawn up to establish this regime were signed at YAOUNDÉ and LOMÉ, respectively. Currently these relations are

governed by the third Lomé Convention signed in December 1984. On this occasion the ACP states numbered sixty-six. It should be noted that many of the more significant states of the Third World in Latin America and Asia are not covered by this regime. In the future, regional groupings such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) might provide preferable vehicles for negotiation between Western Europe and the Third World.

Acquiescence

Term used in INTERNATIONAL LAW to indicate recognition of territorial claims. Acquiescence itself is not a mode of acquisition, but it can strengthen a claim if it is accompanied by a degree of control over the territory in question.

Action–reaction

The term which describes a relationship where two ACTORS are stimulated to respond to what the other is doing in an immediate reactive way. The term has been widely applied to CONFLICT analysis, particularly by GAME THEORISTS and scholars influenced by behavioural psychology. Students of ARMS RACES, such as Lewis Fry Richardson, have applied action–reaction ideas to this phenomenon. According to the Richardson process, therefore, STATE A reacts to State B's increase in military CAPABILITY by increasing its own expenditure. State B perceives this as justifying its own initiative but, at the same time feeling that A's reaction has reduced its margin of safety, B further increases its own arms budget. Richardson's work on action–reaction in arms races is set out in *Arms and Insecurity* (1960). Like many models, Richardson processes represent highly simplified versions of the real world and few would want to attempt to support the proposition that arms races cause WARS.

Nonetheless, arms races frequently precede hostilities and may, in themselves, contribute to the tension and hostility associated with violent conflict.

Action–reaction ideas have also been applied to DECISION-MAKING. The influence here has been particularly felt from behavioural psychology. Sometimes the term input–output is used rather than action–reaction. In this approach decision-making is conducted by a system. The system reacts to its environment, which includes other decision-making systems. Thus an action–reaction pattern can be again stipulated. The application of action–reaction models to decision-making in WORLD POLITICS was widely established in the third quarter of the century as a productive and plausible way of conceiving the activity.

Act of war

Literally, any act which is incompatible with a state of PEACE. Under customary INTERNATIONAL LAW states had the right to resort to WAR whenever they deemed it necessary. The principal restraint upon this behaviour was thus the laws of warfare. Distinction must immediately be made between the laws covering the conduct of war – *jus in bello* – and the laws governing the resort to conflict – *JUS AD BELLUM*. The idea of an act of war, therefore, properly comes under *jus ad bellum*.

Before the establishment of universal international institutions in the twentieth century, there was a good deal of auto-interpretation attached to this concept. In practice states could decide for themselves what constituted an act of war. Once war had been declared between the parties then notice was served upon the whole state system that relations had changed from peace to war. A complicating factor in this was the ALLIANCE. States entering alliances took upon themselves obligations to fight each other's wars. If the alliance was to function properly the parties needed to know what constituted an act of war against themselves

whereby the alliance would become operational. This is referred to as the *casus foederis*.

The current century has seen important changes in the laws of war, both 'ad bellum' and 'in bello'. Treaty law, such as that set out in the UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, now draws a clear distinction between the legal and illegal use of FORCE. The presumption is now made that force can only be used in SELF-DEFENCE. In the absence of more effective means of CONFLICT RESOLUTION, states still resort to force. The twentieth century has required its statesmen to be more imaginative in seeking justification for doing so than in the past. At the same time use of less direct modes of AGGRESSION, such as GUERRILLA WARFARE, have made it more difficult to apply the laws of war. External INTERVENTION in civil wars has become widespread in the twentieth century. Some of the most intractable regional conflicts – such as the ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT – originated as communal differences. In sum, just as international lawyers have attempted to establish new criteria for the use of force, other developments have increased uncertainties.
See also: AGGRESSION, BELLIGERENCY.

Actor

Any entity which plays an identifiable role in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS may be termed an actor. The Pope, the SECRETARY GENERAL of the UN, British Petroleum, Botswana and the IMF are thus all actors. The term is now widely used by both scholars and practitioners in international relations as it is a way of avoiding the obvious limitations of the word STATE. Although it lacks precision it does possess scope and flexibility. Its use also conveys the variety of personalities, organizations and institutions that play a role at present. Some authors have argued that, in effect, the system can be conceived of as a MIXED ACTOR model because the relative significance of the state has been reduced. More precise distinctions between actors can be made by introducing additional criteria. Such criteria might include the tasks performed by actors and the constituency affected by this task performance. Some commentators suggest that actors should be judged according to their degree of AUTONOMY rather than the legalistic concept of SOVEREIGNTY.
See also: PLURALISM.

Adjudication

A method of settling disputes by referring them to an established court, as such it ought not to be confused with ARBITRATION. The basis of adjudication is that the adjudicator applies INTERNATIONAL LAW to settle the dispute. The creation of the WORLD COURT in the present century has meant that the means for international adjudication now exist on a permanent basis. In 1920 the PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE was established by the LEAGUE OF NATIONS and between 1922 and 1940 it made thirty-three judgements and gave twenty-seven advisory opinions. In 1945 the INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ) was established as its successor. The main difficulties both courts have experienced are the limitations upon their jurisdiction. Parties can only submit a case for adjudication by express consent, although there is an optional clause in the statute of the ICJ (see Article 36). Moreover, only STATES may be party to cases before the Court (Article 34). This has had the effect that important non-state ACTORS, including individuals, cannot directly initiate litigation.

It must be recognized that many disputes are simply not justiciable. International actors find that other modes of CONFLICT settlement allow greater flexibility for bargaining and compromise and do not imply the same loss of control over the outcome that is inherent in adjudication. Also, international law tends to have a STATUS QUO

orientation. REVISIONIST states thus tend to find that the use of adjudication does not allow sufficient scope for peaceful change. This must be said notwithstanding the ability of the World Court to apply principles *EX AEQUO ET BONO* if the parties agree (see Article 38).

Although the World Court represents the most significant attempt yet to apply the rule of law in international disputes instead of the more traditional modes of settlement (WAR, DIPLOMACY, ARBITRATION), it is severely hampered in its operation by the absence of the principle of compulsory jurisdiction. International adjudication is always dependent on the consent of states, and this is rarely given on matters of vital importance. The doctrine of SOVEREIGNTY is therefore seen by many as an insuperable barrier to the development of the international judicial system. Compulsory jurisdiction is not on the horizon and the international judicial process has played no significant part in the major issues of WORLD POLITICS since 1946 (e.g. the COLD WAR, the anti-colonial revolution, the NORTH–SOUTH division, or the regulation of NUCLEAR WEAPONS).

Administered territory

Refers to the 'Mandates system' established in Article XXII of the Covenant of the LEAGUE OF NATIONS usually credited to Jan Smuts but actually first proposed by G. L. Beer, a member of Woodrow Wilson's staff at Paris in 1919. It involved control and administration, though not SOVEREIGNTY, over former COLONIAL possessions of Germany (in Africa and the Pacific) and Turkey (in the Near and Middle East) and was largely a US-inspired attempt to avoid the traditional IMPERIAL relationship. Administration of these territories was ceded to certain 'responsible' STATES in 'sacred trust' to the League. Thus South Africa, by mandate in 1920, was given administrative responsibility for the former German South-West Africa (now Namibia). The principles

of trusteeship, tutelage, guardianship and ultimately international supervision and control were envisaged but the international supervisionary dimension, as instanced by the case of Namibia, has proved a particularly difficult matter to enforce. The system was clearly a compromise between outright ANNEXATION of these territories and direct international administration. The struggle between the old REALIST and the newer IDEALIST approaches can be seen in the language of the Article dealing in this matter: it was designed to foster and develop territories 'which are inhabited by people not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world' (Article XXII). The term 'stand by themselves' is clearly a reference to the principle of SELF-DETERMINATION, the intention being that the mandatory state held administrative authority until such time (to be determined by the League) that these territories and their populations became sufficiently sophisticated to manage self-rule and achieve full legal title. To this end three classes of mandate were introduced depending on the degree of development attained and a Permanent Mandates Commission was established to oversee the process. With the creation of the UN the mandates system and administered territory was transmuted into the system. Most of the former territories have now achieved full INDEPENDENCE (including Israel, Jordan, LEBANON, Syria and Iraq) with the notable and continuing exception of Namibia. The latter, which represents the last unresolved legacy of the First World War, is now set, under UN supervision, to achieve independence in 1990.

Despite its obvious faults and despite what today might appear to be its paternalistic overtones it should be noted that the mandates system was 'the world's first experiment in the international control of dependent territories' (F. S. Northedge, *The League of Nations*, 1976). In this way, it contributed much to the downfall of the COLONIAL system that had hitherto dominated INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.