

GERMANY UNIFIED AND EUROPE TRANSFORMED

A STUDY IN STATECRAFT

With a New Preface



PHILIP ZELIKOW

CONDOLEEZZA RICE

Germany Unified and Europe Transformed

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WITH A NEW PREFACE

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Preface, 1997

Over the past year, many friends and scholars have engaged us in discussions of our book. Through reviews, seminars, and letters we have benefited from questions about what we intended, what we did not say, and what we might have written instead.

Many people have asked us about the knotty problem of whom to credit with ending the Cold War peacefully. Credit should be awarded, in abundance, to those who contributed to “a turning point in the more than seventy-year history of antidemocratic and totalitarian systems that emerged after World War I.”¹ Yet some prefer to rise above particular human choices and focus instead on anonymous crowds or abstract historical forces, such as the rise of freedom, the information age, and many other candidate “big causes.”

Many factors, including the hopes of individuals, contributed to the events that unfolded in 1989 and beyond. We acknowledge them. Our story is placed in a well-defined setting already shaped by the operation of large-scale historical forces. In that setting some felt confident, others frustrated, and still others both hopeful and uneasy. Yet given these underlying circumstances, many outcomes were possible. The former Soviet foreign minister and ambassador to the United States, Alexander Bessmertnykh, stated at a recent conference that “the story of reunification seems simple after you’ve heard what everybody has to say about it. In fact, it was not that simple; it was not that naive; and it was not that placid. There were a lot of nerve-racking situations in Moscow.”² And not only Moscow.

Some recent books put forward particular Germans, Americans, or Soviets as winners of the prize for having made this difference in the ending of the Cold War. However diverting, such a contest tends to shed more heat than light. We are more interested in the interaction of perceptions and choices

from several governments. Though some individuals had more influence than others, we found the spotlight shifting from person to person, country to country, at different times or on different issues. Recent events suggest, however, that one person's role is receding into history quickly and unfairly: Mikhail Gorbachev's receiving 1 percent of the vote in the 1996 Russian presidential election was just a footnote as we celebrated the country's first democratic election. As time passes, it is very important that history never forget how this man of great strengths and equally great weaknesses contributed significantly to the ending of the Cold War.

We would like to offer another way of thinking about the challenge of assigning "credit" to one person or another, or to one or another person's favorite cause. The following might be thought of as a map to causal variables in the unification of Germany.

Dependent, or outcome, variables:

- *Unification and its timing.* The two German states are unified into one before the FRG elections at the end of 1990.
- *The fundamental nature of the new German state.* Unification occurs via Article 23 of the West German constitution, destroying the GDR and making the new state an expanded FRG without any fundamental changes in the system of government or principles for the organization of society.
- *The political alignment of the new German state.* The united Germany is a full member of the North Atlantic Alliance, with all German territory protected by NATO, all German forces remaining integrated within NATO's multinational military command, and without placing unique legal limits on German forces.
- *Asymmetrical treatment of NATO and Soviet forces.* All Soviet forces leave Germany; Western forces stay, including U.S. nuclear forces.

Explanatory, or independent, variables, which must meet three criteria:

- a. but for the specified content of the variable (that is, in a counterfactual condition with this variable being absent), the content of one or another dependent, or outcome, variable would have been materially different;
- b. the above-mentioned counterfactual condition must be reasonable, in that there was a genuine possibility of the variable being absent; and
- c. the causal variable is independent, in that the decisive content of the variable was indeterminate even after the contents of preexisting (but not simultaneous) variables were established.

At least thirteen variables appear to meet these criteria:

1. The USSR and the GDR divide sharply and publicly on the need for and direction of reform communism (1988–1989).
2. Hungarian decisions on borders are made and misunderstood, and then Hungary reverses its policy toward Romanian and East German refugees (May–September 1989).
3. East Germans decide against the “Chinese solution” for domestic protest and choose, with Soviet backing, the reform communist government of Krenz (October 1989).
4. Responding erratically to a surge in domestic unrest, the Krenz government’s policies culminate in the unplanned opening of the Berlin Wall (October–November 1989).
5. Kohl, with Bush’s encouragement, reverts from the Ostpolitik paradigm of “Wandel durch Annäherung” (change through rapprochement) back to the Adenauer paradigm of “Wandel durch Kraft” (change through strength); Kohl destabilizes the East German governments of Krenz/Modrow, spurring popular contemplation of unification; the United States helps deflect international attempts to curb Kohl and restrain popular expectations in the GDR (October–December 1989).
6. Kohl spurns confederative negotiations with Modrow and the “Roundtable,” and, with U.S. backing, decides to seek direct economic and political annexation of eastern Germany (January–February 1990).
7. The United States chooses maximal objectives for unifying Germany in NATO and the Two Plus Four plan for negotiating international aspects of unification (January–February 1990).
8. Kohl’s agenda for rapid unification, propelled by indicators that it is internationally viable, produces a surprising electoral victory for his cause in the GDR election (March 1990).
9. Soviet diplomatic reactions to German developments are ineffective as Two Plus Four activity is deliberately delayed and constrained and the US-FRG rallies the West behind common objectives for unification (February–May 1990).
10. The FRG offers limited financial aid to the USSR and spurs positive but inconclusive multilateral consideration of a much larger assistance package (January, May–July 1990).
11. The United States and the FRG shape and deliver commitments on German armed forces and significant change in NATO’s political and military stance that nevertheless remain consistent with preexisting US-FRG objectives (June–July 1990).

12. Gorbachev makes a series of connected decisions: he avoids an invasion of Lithuania, begins to abandon structures of collective leadership, and starts changing his stance on the German question during and after the Washington summit. Yet he successfully fends off challenges at the Twenty-third Soviet Communist Party Congress (May–July 1990).
13. Complex political-military negotiations of linked political and economic agreements, consistent with preexisting US-FRG objectives, are accomplished among Two Plus Four states and specifically among the USSR, Germany, and the United States (July–September 1990).

Our narrative attempts to reconstruct the intricate details of each of these variables, which are themselves clusters of choices and interactions.

We have also been asked repeatedly what lessons can be drawn from such a complex story. Our opinions differ. To Zelikow, the story shows what kinds of government actions and consequences are possible. He is skeptical, though, about efforts to turn the kind of comprehension that comes from such explanatory knowledge into mind-closing axioms. To Rice, there are lessons here in statecraft that can guide policymakers of the future. This episode reminds policymakers to expect the unexpected (the East German exodus in the summer of 1989); to choose goals that are optimal, even if they seem at the time politically infeasible (Germany fully integrated into NATO despite Soviet objections); and that the government that knows what it wants has a reasonable chance of getting it (as Washington and Bonn did and Moscow did not).

Important new sources on the events of 1989 and 1990 have appeared since our book was first published. We do not believe, however, that these sources oblige us to amend our narrative, and several provide reinforcement of some key details.

Scholars now have wider access to the archives of the former East German government. Some fruits of this access are apparent in a new history of East German disintegration and reconstruction by Charles Maier. New sources also reveal fascinating points for comparison, especially in the linkages of East-West diplomacy and domestic upheaval, between the failed revolt of 1953 and the successful revolution of 1989.³

The most important new source is Helmut Kohl's account of German unification. For this memoir, two journalists interviewed him many times, were shown a few documents, and then stitched Kohl's recollections together.⁴ The result is a book that is solid and highly useful. It confirms or reinforces the interpretations offered in our book, both about general issues and on key details. Overall the book is marked by the same clarity about basic principles

that marked Kohl's policies at the time. The account, by this former history student, is soaked in historical memories and anecdotes that surface in almost every important meeting Kohl recounts. Where we have independent evidence about the episodes being described, Kohl is truthful. He prefers to omit some awkward episodes and problematical policy details. He draws a curtain over the actual content of his discussions with colleagues in the government, especially the details of his clashes with his coalition partner and foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher.⁵

The memoir reaffirms how deeply ingrained were the convictions Kohl had formed as a young supporter of West Germany's first postwar chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. By the 1980s he was dismayed by how many people had given up on unity: "The times had too powerful an effect, too much resignation, and also—one must say it—betrayal of the inherited path [Verrat ihre Spuren hinterlassen]." He reveals that he was distracted by internal political battles and by prostate problems during the refugee crisis of August and September 1989 (and the near-crash of the American-piloted passenger aircraft in which he was flying on August 22). As events opened the door for movement toward reunification, Kohl describes how on the one hand he constantly assured every foreign leader (except Bush) that he did not want any escalation of the unrest in East Germany, and how, on the other hand, even before the Berlin Wall opened, he had adopted the view that "cosmetic corrections [in the GDR] weren't enough. We didn't want to stabilize an intolerable situation." So he insisted on revolutionary change as a precondition to any aid for the new reform communists. Kohl describes these apparently contradictory positions without acknowledging any inconsistency. His is not a very analytical book. He is quite open, however, about his constant wish to take the initiative away from the East Germans and not help the new government of Hans Modrow. Even when pressure to help the former dissidents became intense, Kohl felt that it was "completely absurd to aid this regime several weeks before the first democratic election." It was an election Kohl wanted to win (through his surrogates).⁶

Kohl reveals his sensitivity to the politics of pursuing NATO membership for a united Germany. He says that he deliberately downplayed the NATO issue in his November 1989 "ten-point plan" for unity to keep from aggravating the already hostile reaction from the Kremlin. Kohl understood well how, after this initiative, George Bush "made it clear to our partners in NATO that the United States supported my policy. [Bush's] calculation was to make himself a spokesman for the German side and in return to secure our firm assurance that we would stick strongly by membership of a united Germany in NATO." Yet in early 1990, after Modrow and Gorbachev arrived at their

common approach on the unity issue, Kohl says he feared that, “had Gorbachev now pushed the offer of a quick reunification against NATO withdrawal and neutrality, he could have grabbed wide support for this among the people of both German states. The resulting pressure on the policy would have had fatal consequences.”⁷

Kohl is especially helpful in detailing his effective efforts to contain French unease and manage his long-standing relationship with a deeply ambivalent François Mitterrand. At one point Kohl became frustrated at the revival of French-Polish geopolitical cooperation, which he thought of as the revival of the “little entente” practiced against Germany during the 1920s. When one Polish visitor described how the Polish prime minister had told him that one must play ping-pong between Warsaw and Paris, over the German net, Kohl exclaimed, “That old game! I laughed at this then and said to him, ‘Naturally you can do that. Certainly we can all repeat the same stupid mistakes we made back then.’” Kohl had little use for the French foreign minister, Roland Dumas, but he thought that in Mitterrand’s breast “two hearts were beating,” each pulling the French leader in a different direction.⁸ For the Americans, Bush and Baker in particular, Kohl has nothing but praise.⁹

The Federal Republic of Germany’s former foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, has published a massive memoir.¹⁰ Though he offers a strong chapter on the events of early 1989, Genscher’s lengthy treatment of the process of German unification has many omissions (especially about the formation of his government’s policies), some useful details, and is short on candor. We would rather not comment on each of his claims to have been prescient, to have originated all key concepts, and to have seen every subsequent event unfold in accordance with his plans. Instead, we simply note that opaque policy phrases (such as “cooperative security structures”) are put forward and then interpreted to suit the preferred meaning of the moment—then as minister, now as memoirist. To counter this pattern, the interested reader can compare the accounts of particular episodes presented in our book (and others), including the endnotes, and examine the relevant details and meanings of the time.¹¹ Unfortunately, the resulting habit of wariness can divert attention from the apparent sincerity and importance of Genscher’s genuine convictions on the national question and Germany’s alignment with the West, principles that demonstrate why his coalition with Chancellor Kohl endured as long and successfully as it did.

President Bush and his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, are preparing a book that will recount some of their experiences in detail. Their work will not offer many surprises on the German story to readers of this book, but it may be the most candid memoir ever written by an American

president. Thought processes and calculations are opened fully, with the authors acknowledging uncertainties and mistakes as well as presenting insights. We learned that, until December 1989, Scowcroft was more hesitant about German unity than we on his staff had realized. Nevertheless, Scowcroft always forwarded his staff's analyses to the president, even if his own advice sometimes differed from them. The pivotal importance and firmness of Bush's personal judgments stand out more clearly than ever, as does the fact that Bush did not also receive more cautionary advice from his secretary of state, James Baker.

Memoirs have also been published by Baker (with Thomas DeFrank), by President Bush's deputy national security adviser (later director of Central Intelligence), Robert Gates, by the Bush administration's ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack Matlock, and by one of our National Security Council staff colleagues, Robert Hutchings.¹² None presents significant new material on the issues handled in this book. Baker's account is obviously mandatory reading for researchers. Though he is selective in what he covers and has sanded down many sharp edges, the material Baker gave DeFrank is frequently candid and often reconstructs the decision-making process behind a policy, and the factual assertions are quite reliable. Matlock provides much useful information, especially about some Soviet-American exchanges and about the vital and poorly understood crisis over Lithuania (and other nations in the Soviet empire). Matlock's work is more noteworthy, however, for his observations of the Soviet scene than for its reconstruction of the details of either Soviet or American foreign policy toward Europe in 1989 and 1990. The Gates memoir is an exceptional work. Though he covers too wide a period to treat the issues of this book in depth, Gates provides details about certain White House meetings and also offers new evidence confirming how serious the KGB's discontent with Gorbachev's policies had become by February 1990.¹³ Hutchings leavens his memoir with considerable scholarship to provide a broad portrait of American policy toward Europe during the Bush administration.

Gorbachev has also published a 1,200-page volume of memoirs.¹⁴ This valuable work, like Genscher's, has many omissions, as on uncomfortable topics such as the secret discussions of massive multilateral assistance with Kohl and Bush during the spring of 1990. The book does contain many verbatim excerpts from the original records of Gorbachev's meetings, and it is a serious reflection of his thought. In his forthcoming book, Gorbachev's and Shevardnadze's long-time English-speaking interpreter, Pavel Palazchenko, will add even more detail about the meetings between U.S. and Soviet leaders.¹⁵

The one story that we wish we had known better before our book was published was that of François Mitterrand and French diplomacy. Mitterrand's estate has posthumously published reminiscences about his attitude toward the Germans.¹⁶ More important new evidence supports the much more ambivalent portrait offered in our book. One of Mitterrand's closest advisers, Jacques Attali, has published a third volume of what he claims are excerpts from his diaries, this time covering the period from 1988 to 1991.¹⁷ The publication of this volume caused a stir in France and reportedly kept Attali from being invited to Mitterrand's funeral. Throughout the book significant new evidence is presented about the real content of French bilateral and EC discussions at the highest level, thereby providing confirmation of hypotheses advanced in this book about the beliefs at various times of Gorbachev and Thatcher, as well as of Mitterrand himself.

Attali's diaries show Bush and Mitterrand disagreeing about German unification as early as their Kennebunkport meeting in May 1989, with Bush saying, "It can be done," and Mitterrand answering that a popular call for reunification of Germany was one of "only two possible causes of war in Europe" (the other being German acquisition of nuclear weapons). Thatcher had claimed in her memoirs that Mitterrand tended to agree with her fears about German unification. Attali's diaries back her account. In December 1989, "1913" was always on Mitterrand's mind, and he had warned Genscher that Bonn was about to re-create the pre-World War I Triple Alliance of France, Britain, and Russia, again rallied against Germany. Using another analogy, he complained to Thatcher, "We find ourselves in the same situation as the leaders in France and Britain before the war, who didn't react to anything. We can't repeat Munich!" Mitterrand's private reaction to the opening of the Berlin Wall was that "these people are tinkering with a world war." A month earlier he had confided to Attali that "those who speak of German unification don't understand anything. The Soviet Union will never accept it. It would be the death of the Warsaw Pact: Can you imagine it? And the GDR, it's Prussia. It would never want to fall under the control of Bavaria." Furious in February 1990 that "Gorbachev tells me he'll be firm, and then gives up on everything!" Mitterrand flew to Moscow in May expecting Gorbachev to seek his help in resisting German unification. "I'd enjoy doing it if I thought he would. But why clash with Kohl if Gorbachev will only drop me three days later? I'd be totally isolated." Nevertheless, Mitterrand, knowing he was breaking from the position of his allies, privately proposed to Gorbachev that a united Germany remain in NATO but withdraw from its integrated organization.¹⁸ By that time, however, such ideas faced firm opposition from the United States, West Germany, and Britain.

The new material that has surfaced since this book first appeared highlights the uncertainty, exultation, and fear surrounding the historic months in 1989 and 1990 that changed the future of Europe and the world. As time passes, readers must make a conscious effort to recapture the clamor and detail of this dramatic period of history. We hope our book will continue to help them do it.

Notes

1. Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Turning Points in Modern Times: Essays on German and European History*, tr. Thomas Dunlap (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 21. Bracher's own macro-level distribution of credit highlights two preconditions: "the choice to confront Soviet totalitarianism and the basic striving for freedom and a Western living standard within the East bloc." As to catalysts, "What made the breakthrough possible was Gorbachev's and Shevardnadze's understanding of what was necessary and inevitable, along with the role played by personalities (in the West, Reagan and Bush, Schmidt and Kohl)." Ibid., p. 24.

2. Bessmertnykh made his comments at a March 1996 conference of former Soviet and American officials entitled "The End of the Cold War," hosted at Princeton University by Don Oberdorfer and Fred Greenstein. The proceedings are now being edited by William Wohlforth for publication.

3. See Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: East Germany from the Crisis of Communism to the Trials of Unity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). On 1953, the work cited in the original edition by Christian Ostermann, James Richter, and Hope Harrison has been usefully supplemented by Christian F. Ostermann, "'Keeping the Pot Simmering': The United States and the East German Uprising of 1953," *German Studies Review* 19 (February 1996): 61–90; and Gerhard Wettig, "Die beginnende Umorientierung der sowjetischen Deutschland-Politik im Frühjahr und Sommer 1953," *Deutschland Archiv* 28 (May 1995): 495–507.

4. Helmut Kohl, *Ich Wollte Deutschlands Einheit*, ed. Kai Diekmann and Ralf Georg Reuth (Berlin: Propyläen, 1996).

5. Kohl says nothing, for example, about the Genscher-Stoltenberg dispute over the extension of NATO to the former territory of the GDR, and how he reversed his position the next week during his meeting with Bush at Camp David. There are various other omissions at this level of detail. Also, in describing what we know were several difficult exchanges with Genscher about the Polish border question, or the NATO position, or whether to decouple the internal and external aspects of unification, Kohl is cryptic or just describes his own position, without ever detailing the to-and-fro. Yet he describes his confrontations with rivals in his own party, as with Heiner Geißler in September 1989, with apparent relish.

6. For the quotations see Kohl, *Ich Wollte Deutschlands Einheit*, pp. 33, 117, 258.

7. Ibid., pp. 189, 254.

8. Ibid., pp. 324, 198.

9. Kohl's warm feelings toward Bush are well known, but here the chancellor offers a striking compliment to Baker, whom he repeatedly calls "brilliant," adding that Baker "had the stuff there to be President himself. George Bush probably would not have achieved so much if Jim Baker had not been standing at his side." Ibid., p. 364.

10. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Erinnerungen* (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1995).

11. For example, Gunther Hellmann, "Der Präsident, der Kanzler, sein Aussenminister und die Vereinigung, oder: Staatskunst als Heuernte," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 37 (June 1996): 357–363; Elke Bruck and Peter M. Wagner, "Die deutsche Einheit und ich," *Zeitschrift für Politik* 43 (Hefte 2, 1996): 208–224. Wagner, with Bruck and Felix Lutz, is associated with the "Forschungsgruppe Deutschland," a research center, currently based in Munich, that has achieved access to some significant West German archival materials.

12. James A. Baker, III, with Thomas M. DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995); Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); Jack F. Matlock, Jr., *Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1995); Robert J. Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989–1992* (Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

13. The much longer manuscript of the Gates book, before it was pared down for publication by a commercial press, is available for research, both through the CIA Historian's Office and at Harvard University.

14. Michail Gorbatschow, *Erinnerungen*, tr. Igor P. Gorodetzki (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1995).

15. Pavel Palazchenko, *Assignment Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: A Memoir of the Last Years of the Soviet Union, 1985–1991* (University Park: Penn State Press, 1997). The English translation of Gorbachev's memoir is hundreds of pages shorter. We therefore assume that the German-language edition is more exhaustive. A recent doctoral dissertation at the University of Bonn, by Rafael Biermann, provides a valuable and detailed reconstruction of Soviet policy toward Germany during the years of revolution. The fine articles by Hannes Adomeit cited in the original edition are being enlarged into a full-scale analysis of contemporary Soviet-German relations.

16. François Mitterrand, *De l'Allemagne, de la France* (Paris: Editions O. Jacob, 1996).

17. Jacques Attali, *Verbatim: Tome 3, Chronique des années 1988–1991* (Paris: Fayard, 1995). Attali's diaries undoubtedly reflect his own selective recall or distillation of events, even as they were happening. Yet where we have evidence to cross-check specific assertions of fact, as with Mitterrand's meeting with Gorbachev in Kiev or his talks with Bush, Attali's notes appear to be substantially accurate. As a further safeguard, the material we use from the book in this preface quotes expressions Mitterrand voiced over and over, on various occasions described in the diaries.

18. For the quotations see *ibid.*, pp. 241, 369, 337, 313, 416, and 495.

Preface to the 1995 Edition

“For decades a thick closed blanket of clouds obscured the star of German unity,” Germany’s former foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher recalled. “Then for a short time the blanket of clouds parted, allowed the star to become visible, and we grabbed for it.” “Grabbed” is a good word for what happened. It captures the sense of a frantic lunge in 1989 and 1990, what the British scholar Timothy Garton Ash has called a “hurtling and hurling together, sanctioned by great-power negotiations.” It was, he wrote, a time when “more happened in ten months than usually does in ten years.”¹

Opinions may vary about the result. A renowned German commentator has called the outcome “the greatest triumph of diplomacy in the postwar era.” A former Soviet foreign minister has called it “one of the most hated developments in the history of Soviet foreign policy and it will remain so for decades.”² Although now the outcome may seem almost preordained, those closest to the events—whether former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze or political figures from East and West Germany—still marvel that this tumult did not lead to a “bloodbath,” a war, or at least a new phase of cold war.³

The main purpose of this book is to tell the story of this extraordinary episode in modern diplomacy. This is, above all, a diplomatic history. Both authors were involved in the events as members of President George Bush’s National Security Council staff: Philip Zelikow was a career diplomat detailed to the White House; Condoleezza Rice was on leave from her professorship at Stanford University. The book originated as an internal historical study which a senior State Department official, Robert Zoellick, invited Zelikow to write as he was leaving the government to accept a faculty appointment at Harvard University. After securing promises of unlimited access to all relevant documents at both the State Department and the White House, as well as

access to relevant intelligence documents, Zelikow agreed and began work. But as the project took shape, it became clear that the story could not be told properly just from the perspective of the United States.

Historians have rightly criticized works that dwell too much on the perspective of one or another country, neglecting what others were doing or thinking, forgetting that diplomacy is really the interplay of several different sets of beliefs and actions. None of the many books published so far on German unification has tried, for example, to tell the German story *and* the Soviet story *and* the American story, and then study how they interacted to produce the results all could see. That is the task we set for ourselves.

To do this we complemented research in the American archives with a careful study of all materials available in German and Russian. We consulted papers that became available from the East German state archives and some significant archival materials available for the Soviet Union, including papers prepared for meetings of the Politburo and policy guidance prepared for Shevardnadze. We also talked to key decision makers in a number of countries; some of them commented on our draft, and we have constantly cross-checked recollections and published accounts against the available documentary evidence.

We made another decision about this book: we have cited all of our sources. It is not unusual for former officials to consult government records in preparing an account of their experiences, but it is unprecedented for them to cite these records just as a professional historian would. Most of the American records we have cited remain classified and unavailable to the public. We were able to cite them because the citations themselves revealed no secrets. Yet, with these American records, we faced a dilemma. Scholars will not be able to check some of our uses of still-classified government documents. They must, for a time, take on faith that we have used our evidence properly. This is a fair and appropriate concern. But the other side of the dilemma is that by failing to include any citations, we would have frustrated still more scholars who would never know what sources we had used. We decided that this latter concern was more important, for several reasons.

A surprisingly large proportion of our assertions can be checked, directly or indirectly, against published accounts and unclassified documents. This point should be apparent from a careful look at our citations. Also, our notes can convey our inside understanding of what the documents mean, who prepared them, which ones mattered and which did not. Furthermore, problems of privileged access to source material are not unique to former government officials. Often papers or materials held by private persons are available only to certain people or with special restrictions. Here we were

fortunate in being able to use documents that belong to the American people and will eventually be made available to the public. So we have cited our sources as carefully as possible. Although the American archival material is not yet catalogued in the Bush Library or the National Archives, the citations are complete enough to enable scholars to find the cited documents once the cataloguing is done. Finally, at our request, the National Security Archive has also filed a massive request under the Freedom of Information Act to expedite the declassification of as much material as possible. The archive will make this material available to scholars. All material that can be declassified, including unclassified but hard-to-obtain public affairs material (transcripts of State Department press briefings, for example), will also join the collections of papers scrupulously maintained by the Archival Library of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University.

We were involved in the events we describe. We had, and still have, opinions about them. This is natural; indeed, even scholars who experience events vicariously can become just as opinionated about them. As former officials we were also obliged by law to let the government make sure we had not abused our special knowledge to reveal secrets that are still important to the security of the United States. (This was not a problem.) But from the start we have been absolutely free to tell the story any way we chose. No one, on any occasion, has even attempted to tilt or shape our story, except in telling us his or her side of it.

In preparing this book we have received help and advice from many quarters. For financial support in performing some of the research, we are grateful to the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Harvard University's Program for the Study of Germany and Europe, and Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control. We are also especially thankful for the encouragement and advice we received at key points from Robert Zoellick, Robert Blackwill, Coit Blacker, and Ernest May. The research and production of this book was aided by Stanford's Center for International Security and Arms Control and the talents of Yvonne Brown, Brian Davenport, Kiron Skinner, John Fowler, Chris Fleishner, Artur Khachikian, Elizabeth Ewing, Matthew Bencke, and Deborah Schneider. We have received many useful comments from the scholars who reviewed the manuscript anonymously for Harvard University Press, and from Alexander Abashkiri, Donald Abenheim, Hannes Adomeit, Alexandra Bezymenskaia, Maxim Bratersky, Gerhard Casper, Gordon Craig, David Holloway, Karl Kaiser, Felix Philipp Lutz, Elizabeth Pond, Alfred Rubin, W. R. Smyser, Marc Trachtenberg, and Peter Wagner. We also wish to acknowledge the encouragement and support of our editor, Aida Donald, and the patience and creativity of our copy editor, Amanda Heller.

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