

Cryptanalytic Attacks on RSA

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by

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DEDICATED TO PROFESSOR GLYN JAMES
ON THE OCCASION OF HIS 70TH BIRTHDAY
WITH GRATITUDE FOR HIS ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT

Preface

The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.

SUN TZU
The Art of War (500 BC)

The book is about the cryptanalytic attacks on RSA. RSA is the first *workable* and *practical* public-key cryptographic system, invented in 1977 and published in 1978, by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, then all at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and is still the most widely used cryptographic systems in e.g., online transactions, emails, smartcards, and more generally electronic and mobile commerce over the Internet, for which its three inventors received the year 2002 Turing Award, a prize considered to be the equivalent *Nobel Prize for Computer Science*. The security of RSA relies on the computational intractability of the Integer Factorization Problem (IFP), for which, no efficient (i.e., polynomial-time) algorithm is known. To get an idea how difficult the *integer factorization* is, let us consider the following 2048 bits (617 digits) composite number, known as RSA-2048:

251959084756578934940271832400483985714292821262040320277771378360_
436620207075955562640185258807844069182906412495150821892985591491_
761845028084891200728449926873928072877767359714183472702618963750_
149718246911650776133798590957000973304597488084284017974291006424_
586918171951187461215151726546322822168699875491824224336372590851_
418654620435767984233871847744479207399342365848238242811981638150_
106748104516603773060562016196762561338441436038339044149526344321_
901146575444541784240209246165157233507787077498171257724679629263_
863563732899121548314381678998850404453640235273819513786365643912_
12010397122822120720357.

It is a *product* of two *prime numbers*. The RSA Data Security Incorporation currently offers a \$200,000 prize for the first person or group finding

its two prime factors. The basic idea of RSA encryption and decryption is, surprisingly, rather simple:

$$C \equiv M^e \pmod{N}, \quad M \equiv C^d \pmod{N},$$

where $N = pq$ with p and q prime, M , C , e and d are the plaintext, ciphertext, encryption exponent and decryption exponent, respectively. Note that e and d must be satisfied with the condition that $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(N)}$, where $\phi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$ is Euler's ϕ -function. Let, for example, $e = 65537$, N be the above mentioned number RSA-2048, and C the following number:

```
218598056144555493024019389629177159753811144728543422921500499254_
181211032562087679022259831067991286101190897695119357754765408522_
697956638242922870637083231694404873947694078432775781998614979942_
064361669462614088852741600217233052059574880668463536030287944235_
822627708134997061064700771693064600712629809165416998449992925313_
374281387325903328781863209595468701560742767599157207314869432305_
892651836189508103764678721683360183118994273706398707795480800698_
501878875875150532123738006235671958527639461339868604410378449818_
383913059864587128396200112815989134558427750667427151537609736712_
04647757116059031684587.
```

To recover M from C one requires to find d ; to find d one needs to calculate $\phi(N)$; to calculate $\phi(N)$ one needs to factor N . But unfortunately, factorizing N is intractable when N is large (in the present case, N is a 2048-bit number, which is far beyond the computing power of any factoring algorithm on any computer at present); no polynomial-time factoring algorithm is known so far. Thus, RSA is secure and C is safe since it is difficult to recover M from C without factoring N . This is essentially the whole idea of RSA! One can try to decrypt the above given RSA ciphertext C or try to factor the number RSA-2048 in order to get an idea how difficult it is to break RSA or to factor a large number.

The book consists of ten chapters. Chapter 1 presents some computational and mathematical preliminaries, particularly the theory and practice of tractable and intractable computations in number theory. Chapter 2 introduces the basic concepts and theory of the RSA cryptographic system and its variants in a broad sense. As the security of RSA is based on the intractability of the Integer Factorization Problem (IFP), which is also closely related to the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), the attacks based on solutions to IFP problem are discussed in Chapter 3, whereas the attacks based on solutions to DLP problem are discussed in Chapter 4. As quantum algorithm is applicable to both the IFP problem and the DLP problem, Chapter 5 will discuss some quantum attacks on RSA via quantum order finding, quantum factoring and quantum discrete logarithm solving. Chapter 6 concentrates on some simple elementary number-theoretic attacks on RSA, including e.g., forward attack, short plaintext attack, common modulus attack and fixed-point

attack. It is common that to speed-up the computation of RSA encryption, a short public exponent e is often used. It is also true for the RSA decryption if a short private exponent d is used. However, the use of short exponent e or d can be dangerous. So, in Chapter 7 we shall discuss some cryptanalytic attacks on the short RSA public exponent e , whereas in Chapter 8 we shall discuss some attacks on the short RSA private exponent d . In Chapter 9, a completely different type of attacks, namely, the side-channel attacks on RSA, are discussed. Unlike the mathematical/algorithmic attacks in the previous chapters, side-channel attacks do not exploit the mathematical properties or weakness of the RSA algorithm/system itself, but exploit the hardware implementation issues of the system. In other words, these attacks are nothing to do with the RSA algorithm/system itself but have something to do with the hardware implementation of the RSA algorithm/system. Chapter 10, the final chapter, presents some quantum resistant, non-factoring based cryptographic systems as an alternative/replacement to RSA, such as lattice based and code-based cryptosystems, so that once RSA is proved to be insecure, there is an immediate replacement to the insecure RSA.

The book is self-contained and the materials presented in the book have been extensively classroom tested for various courses in Cryptography and Cryptanalysis at Aston and Coventry Universities in England, and the South China University of Technology and Nankai University in China. Many parts of the materials in the book have also been presented in seminars in various universities around the world. Hence, the book is suitable *either* as a research reference for public-key cryptology in general and for RSA cryptology in particular, *or* as a graduate text in the field.

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and the Department of Mathematics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in July-Sept 2007, hosted by Prof Michael Sipser and supported by MIT.

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The struggle between code-makers and code-breakers is endless. The struggle between attacks and anti-attacks on RSA is also endless as soon as RSA is still in use. New ideas and new attacks on RSA may be conceived and invented anytime. So comments, corrections and suggestions on the book, and new ideas and new attacks on RSA are particularly very welcome from the readers, and can be sent to any one of my following three email addresses: song.yan@beds.ac.uk, syan@math.mit.edu, or syan@cs.toronto.edu, so that I can incorporate them into a future edition of the book. Thank you for your help in advance.

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS, AUGUST 2007

S. Y. Y.

Notation

All notation should be as simple as the nature of the operations to which it is applied.

CHARLES BABBAGE (1791–1871)
English Mathematician, Philosopher, Mechanical Engineer and
Proto-Computer Scientist

Notation	Explanation
\mathbb{N} or \mathbb{Z}^+	Set of natural numbers or positive integers: $\mathbb{N} = \mathbb{Z}^+ = \{1, 2, 3, \dots\}$
\mathbb{Z}	Set of integers: $\mathbb{Z} = \{0, \pm n : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$
$\mathbb{Z}_{>1}$	Set of positive integers greater than 1: $\mathbb{Z}_{>1} = \{n : n \in \mathbb{Z} \text{ and } n > 1\}$
\mathbb{Q}	Set of rational numbers: $\mathbb{Q} = \left\{\frac{a}{b} : a, b \in \mathbb{Z} \text{ and } b \neq 0\right\}$
\mathbb{R}	Set of real numbers: $\mathbb{R} = \{n + 0.d_1d_2d_3 \dots : n \in \mathbb{Z}, d_i \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots, 9\} \text{ and no infinite sequence of 9's appears}\}$
\mathbb{C}	Set of complex numbers: $\mathbb{C} = \{a + bi : a, b \in \mathbb{R} \text{ and } i = \sqrt{-1}\}$
\mathbb{Z}_N or $\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$	Residue classes modulo N : $\mathbb{Z}_N = \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z} = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, N - 1\}$. Ring of integers. Field if N is prime
$\mathbb{Z}_N[x]$	Set (ring) of polynomials with integer coefficients, modulo N
$\mathbb{Z}[x]$	Set (ring) of polynomials with integer coefficients

\mathbb{Z}_N^*	Multiplicative group: $\mathbb{Z}_N^* = \{a \in \mathbb{Z}_N : \gcd(a, N) = 1\}$.
$\#(\mathbb{Z}_N^*)$ or $ \mathbb{Z}_N^* $	Order of the multiplicative group
\mathbb{F}_p or \mathbb{Z}_p	Finite field with p elements, where p is a prime
\mathbb{F}_q	Finite field with $q = p^k$ a prime power
$f(x)$	Function of x
f^{-1}	Inverse of f
$f(x) \sim g(x)$	$f(x)$ and $g(x)$ are asymptotically equal
$\binom{n}{i}$	Binomial coefficient: $\binom{n}{i} = \frac{n(n-1)(n-2)\cdots(n-i+1)}{i!}$
\int	Integration
$\text{Li}(x)$	Logarithmic integral: $\text{Li}(x) = \int_2^x \frac{dt}{\ln t}$
$\sum_{i=1}^n x_i$	Sum: $x_1 + x_2 + \cdots + x_n$
$\prod_{i=1}^n x_i$	Product: $x_1 x_2 \cdots x_n$
x^k	x to the power k
kP	$kP = \underbrace{P \oplus P \oplus \cdots \oplus P}_{k \text{ summands}}$, where P is a point (x, y) on an elliptic curve $E: y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$
\mathcal{O}_E	Point at infinity on an elliptic curve E
$\log_b x$	Logarithm of x to the base b ($b \neq 1$): $x = b^{\log_b x}$
$\log x$	Binary logarithm: $\log_2 x$
$\ln x$	Natural logarithm: $\log_e x$, $e = \sum_{n \geq 0} \frac{1}{n!} \approx 2.7182818$
$\exp(x)$	Exponential of x : $e^x = \sum_{n \geq 0} \frac{x^n}{n!}$
$a \mid b$	a divides b
$a \nmid b$	a does not divide b
$\gcd(a, b)$	Greatest common divisor of (a, b)
$\text{lcm}(a, b)$	Least common multiple of (a, b)
$\lfloor x \rfloor$ or $[x]$	Greatest integer less than or equal to x
$\lceil x \rceil$	Least integer greater than or equal to x

$x \bmod N$	Remainder: $x - N \left\lfloor \frac{x}{N} \right\rfloor$
$x = y \bmod N$	x is equal to y reduced to modulo N
$x \equiv y \pmod{N}$	x is congruent to y modulo N
$x \not\equiv y \pmod{N}$	x is not congruent to y modulo N
$x^k \bmod N$	x to the power k modulo N
$kP \bmod N$	kP modulo N , with P a point on elliptic curve E
$\text{ord}_N(a)$	Order of an integer a modulo N ; also denoted by $\text{order}(a, N)$
$\text{ind}_{g,N}(a)$	Index of a to the base g modulo N
$\log_g a \bmod N$	Discrete logarithm of a to the base g modulo N : $\log_g a \bmod N = \text{ind}_{g,N}(a)$
$\pi(x)$	Prime counting function: $\pi(x) = \sum_{\substack{p \leq x \\ p \text{ prime}}} 1$
$\tau(N)$	Number of (positive) divisors of N : $\tau(N) = \sum_{d N} 1$
$\sigma(N)$	Sum of (positive) divisors of N : $\sigma(N) = \sum_{d N} d$
$\phi(N)$	Euler's totient function: $\phi(N) = \sum_{\substack{0 \leq k < N \\ \gcd(k, N) = 1}} 1$
$\lambda(N)$	Carmichael's function: $\lambda(N) = \text{lcm}(\lambda(p_1^{\alpha_1}), \lambda(p_2^{\alpha_2}), \dots, \lambda(p_k^{\alpha_k}))$ if $N = \prod_{i=1}^k p_i^{\alpha_i}$
$\zeta(s)$	Riemann zeta-function: $\zeta(s) = \prod_{n=1}^{\infty} n^{-s}$, where $s = \sigma + it$, with $\sigma, t \in \mathbb{R}$ and $i = \sqrt{-1}$
$\left(\frac{a}{p}\right)$	Legendre symbol, where p is prime
$\left(\frac{a}{N}\right)$	Jacobi symbol, where n is composite
Q_N	Set of all quadratic residues of N
\overline{Q}_N	Set of all quadratic nonresidues of N
J_N	$J_N = \left\{ a \in \mathbb{Z}_N^* : \left(\frac{a}{N}\right) = 1 \right\}$
\tilde{Q}_N	Set of all pseudosquares of N : $\tilde{Q}_N = J_N - Q_N$
\sim	Asymptotic equality
\approx	Approximate equality
∞	Infinity

\Rightarrow	Implication
\Leftrightarrow	Equivalence
\square	Blank symbol; end of proof
\sqcup	Space
Prob	Probability measure
\in	Member of
\subset	Proper subset
\subseteq	Subset
$[q_0, q_1, q_2, \dots, q_n]$	Finite simple continued fraction: $q_0 + \frac{1}{q_1 + \frac{1}{q_2 + \frac{1}{\ddots q_{n-1} + \frac{1}{q_n}}}}$
$[q_0, q_1, q_2, q_3, \dots]$	Infinite simple continued fraction: $q_0 + \frac{1}{q_1 + \frac{1}{q_2 + \frac{1}{q_3 + \frac{1}{\ddots}}}}$
$C_k = \frac{P_k}{Q_k}$	k -th convergent of a continued fraction
\mathcal{P}	Class of problems solvable in polynomial-time by a deterministic Turing machine
\mathcal{NP}	Class of problems solvable in polynomial-time by a nondeterministic Turing machine
\mathcal{ZPP}	Class of problems solvable in polynomial-time by a random Turing machine with zero errors
\mathcal{RP}	Class of problems solvable in polynomial-time by a random Turing machine with one-sided errors
\mathcal{BPP}	Class of problems solvable in polynomial-time by a random Turing machine with two-sided errors
$\text{co-}\mathcal{RP}$	\mathcal{RP} -complete problems
$\text{co-}\mathcal{NP}$	\mathcal{NP} -complete problems
\mathcal{PS}	\mathcal{P} Space problems
\mathcal{NPS}	\mathcal{NP} Space problems
CFRAC	Continued FRACtion method (for factoring)
ECM	Elliptic Curve Method (for factoring)

NFS	Number Field Sieve (for factoring)
QS/MPQS	Quadratic Sieve/Multiple Polynomial Quadratic Sieve (for factoring)
ECPP	Elliptic Curve Primality Proving
DES	Data Encryption Standard
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
DSS	Digital Signature Standard
DHM	Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key-exchange
RSA	Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Encryption
RSAP	RSA Problem
IFP	Integer Factorization Problem
DLP	Discrete Logarithm Problem
ECDLP	Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
QRP	Quadratic Residuosity Problem
SQRTP	Modular Square Root Problem
RFP	k -th Root Finding Problem
LLL	Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovasz lattice reduction algorithm
SVP	Shortest Vector Problem
PNT	Prime Number Theory: $\pi(x) \sim x/\ln x$
WWW	World Wide Web
\mathcal{M}	Plaintext space
M	$M \in \mathcal{M}$ Plaintext
\mathcal{C}	Ciphertext space
C	$C \in \mathcal{C}$ Ciphertext
e_k	Encryption key
d_k	Decryption key
$E_{e_k}(M)$	Encryption $C = E_{e_k}(M)$
$D_{d_k}(C)$	Decryption $M = D_{d_k}(C)$
e	RSA encryption exponent
d	RSA decryption exponent
$E_e(M)$	RSA encryption $C = E_e(M) \equiv M^e \pmod{N}$
$D_d(C)$	RSA decryption $M = D_d(C) \equiv C^d \pmod{N}$
$M \mapsto M^e \bmod N$	RSA function

原书缺页

Table of Contents

Preface	xi
Notations	xv
1. Computational/Mathematical Preliminaries	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Computability, Complexity and Intractability	4
1.3 Efficient Number-Theoretic Algorithms	15
1.4 Intractable Number-Theoretic Problems	41
1.5 Chapter Notes and Further Reading	54
2. RSA Public-Key Cryptography	55
2.1 Introduction	55
2.2 Public-Key Cryptography	60
2.3 RSA Public-Key Cryptography	66
2.4 RSA Problem and RSA Assumption	71
2.5 RSA-Type Cryptosystems	73
2.6 Chapter Notes and Further Readings	88
3. Integer Factorization Attacks	91
3.1 Introduction	91
3.2 Fermat Factoring Attack	93
3.3 The “ $p \pm 1$ ” and ECM Attacks	94
3.4 Quadratic Sieve Attack	98
3.5 Successful QS Attack	103
3.6 Number Field Sieve Attack	105
3.7 Chapter Notes and Further Reading	110
4. Discrete Logarithm Attacks	111
4.1 Introduction	111
4.2 Baby-Step Giant-Step Attack	115
4.3 Silver-Pohlig-Hellman Attack	118
4.4 Index Calculus Attacks	122
4.5 Xedni Calculus Attack	127

4.6	Chapter Notes and Further Reading	132
5.	Quantum Computing Attacks	135
5.1	Introduction	135
5.2	Order Finding Problem	137
5.3	Quantum Order Finding Attack	139
5.4	Quantum Integer Factorization Attack	142
5.5	Quantum Discrete Logarithm Attack	146
5.6	Chapter Notes and Further Reading	148
6.	Simple Elementary Attacks	149
6.1	Introduction	149
6.2	Guessing Plaintext Attacks	150
6.3	Blinding Attack on RSA Signatures	151
6.4	Guessing $\phi(N)$ Attack	152
6.5	Guessing d Attack	155
6.6	e^{th} Root Attack	159
6.7	Common Modulus Attack	161
6.8	Fixed-Point Attack	164
6.9	Chapter Notes and Further Readings	166
7.	Public Exponent Attacks	169
7.1	Introduction	169
7.2	A Theorem of Coppersmith	170
7.3	Short e Attacks for Same Messages	173
7.4	Short e Attacks for Related Messages	177
7.5	Lattice Attack for Stereotyped Messages	183
7.6	Chapter Notes and Further Reading	187
8.	Private Exponent Attacks	189
8.1	Introduction	189
8.2	Diophantine Attack	190
8.3	Extended Diophantine Attacks	195
8.4	Small Private CRT-Exponent Attacks	198
8.5	Partial Private Key Exposure Attacks	201
8.6	Chapter Notes and Further Reading	205
9.	Side-Channel Attacks	207
9.1	Introduction	207
9.2	Modular Exponentiation Revisited	208
9.3	Timing Attacks	209
9.4	Time Attacks on RSA in OpenSSL	212
9.5	Power (Analysis) Attacks	215
9.6	Random Fault Attacks	216
9.7	Chapter Notes and Further Reading	222