



名师点评博士论文

邓晓芒点评

论康德的 知性与理性

易晓波 著

康德是18世纪德国最伟大的哲学家，也是德国古典哲学的创始人。他的哲学体系以批判性著称，对后世产生了深远的影响。在《纯粹理性批判》中，他探讨了知性与理性的关系，认为知性是感性经验的整理能力，而理性则是超越经验的思维活动。这种区分对于理解人类认知的本质具有重要意义。本书通过对康德哲学的深入分析，揭示了其思想中的内在逻辑与矛盾，为读者提供了一个全新的视角来审视这一伟大的哲学体系。

名 师 点 评 博 士 论 文

邓晓芒点评

论康德的 知性与理性

易晓波 著

湖南教育出版社

图书在版编目 (CIP) 数据

论康德的知性与理性/易晓波编. —长沙: 湖南教育出版社, 2009. 12

(邓晓芒点评博士论文)

ISBN 978 - 7 - 5355 - 6338 - 5

I. 论… II. 易… III. 康德, I. (1724 ~ 1804) — 哲学思想—研究 IV. B516. 31

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字 (2009) 第 206991 号

论康德的知性与理性

易晓波 著

责任编辑: 龙育群

责任校对: 邓勇林

湖南教育出版社出版发行 (长沙市韶山北路 443 号)

网 址: <http://www.hnepb.com> <http://www.shoulai.cn>

电子邮箱: 228411705@qq.com

客 服: 电话 0731—85486742 QQ 228411705

湖南省新华书店经销 湖南广播电视大学印刷厂印刷

710×1000 16 开 印张: 13 字数: 175 900

2010 年 1 月第 1 版 2010 年 1 月第 1 次印刷

印数: 1—3000

ISBN 978 - 7 - 5355 - 6338 - 5

G · 6333 定价: 22. 20 元

本书若有印刷、装订错误, 可向承印厂调换

中文摘要

“知性”和“理性”是康德批判哲学的两个基础性概念,廓清这两个概念的含义及其关系,对我们加深理解康德批判哲学及其体系具有重要的理论意义。

在近代哲学那里,“知性”和“理性”的运用虽然有所不同,但最早明确地提出它们的区别的,还是康德。康德“知性”概念的含义体现为三个层次:知性 1,是广义的知性,指广泛使用的所有高级认识能力(知性、判断力和理性),代表对知性的逻辑理解,适用于理论领域、实践领域甚至审美领域;知性 2,是较狭义的知性,指理论理性,或理论运用中的所有高级认识能力,代表对知性的认识论理解,是产生和运用概念(范畴)的能力,涉及先验逻辑的先验分析论和先验辩证论;知性 3,是最狭义的知性,特指建立对象意识的先验自我意识或统觉,来自认识主体(我自体),代表对知性的本体论理解。康德的“理性”概念也有三个层面的含义:理性 1,在外延上包括所有高级认识能力(知性、判断力和理性)及实践能力,内涵上指理性的逻辑推理能力,是一个逻辑概念;理性 2,是较狭义的理性,最高的认识能力,原则的能力,以形式逻辑的推理来设置理念,引导、调节认识,属于先验逻辑的辩证论,是一个认识论的概念;理性 3,是最狭义的理性,辩证法的根源,通往物自体(上帝等),设置无限统一的对象,这在理论认识上虽然只是“辩证幻相”,但却为理性的实践运用留下了地盘,所以理性 3 的实质是实践理性、自由意志,是一个实践本体论概念。其中,知性 1 和理性 1 是基本等同的概念;知性 2 和理性 2 虽然都是认识论意义上的概念,但知性 2 体现为“先验逻辑”,即范畴及其原理体系,是逻辑的认识论化,理性 2 则体现为理念的内在运用,服务于知性 2,主要是辅助和引导知性 2 达到认识的完成,起调节性作用;知性 3 和理性 3 主要是本体论意义,知性 3 体现为现象的本体论,即范

畴演绎追溯到先验统觉的客观统一作用,构成经验对象,理性 3 则体现为自在之物的本体论,即道德本体论,前者是认识论的本体论化,把认识结构变成了存在结构,后者是过渡到实践的本体论。知性和理性在知性 3 和理性 3 那里是水火不相容的,因而被隔绝开来了。

知性三阶段的深化首先体现在先天综合判断中。先天综合判断作为判断,其根据不在于被动的感性,而在于能动的知性;作为综合判断,决不能只根据矛盾律来获得理解,其根据在形式逻辑之外,即在认识论中,这就将逻辑学问题认识论化了,知性 1 就此进展到知性 2;作为先天判断,其根据不在于知性的后天运用,而在于知性的纯粹运用,最终归结到本源的统觉的综合统一,知性 2 由此深化为知性 3。知性 3 的自发性在康德对范畴的先验演绎中得到了凸显。知性 3(即知性本身)就是先验统觉,就是统觉的本源的综合统一能力,就是统觉的本源的综合这一行动。统觉的综合统一性原理是知性的一切运用,因而是整个人类知识中的最高原理。康德认为,认识就在于被给予的表象与一个客体的确定的关系,而客体无非是知性在一个统觉(即知性 3 自身)中按照其概念将所予直观的杂多表象联结起来而构成的。所以,对客体的认识过程也就是认识的客体的形成过程,客体和客体的知识是一回事,知性 3 也因此就是“客体”形成的力量源泉,是本体论意义上的知性。通过诸范畴(知性判断的逻辑机能),直观杂多必然从属于统觉的本源的综合统一,诸范畴就是知性 3 为自身的这种规定或综合统一行动所颁布的规则。由于对象只能通过我们的感性直观才被给予,知性范畴也就只对我们的感官对象、现象才有效,只是经验对象及其知识的可能性条件。既然一切现象或经验对象的总和就是自然,知性 3 就通过诸范畴而为自然先天立法,知性 3 体现为规则的能力。但因为现象和物自体的区分,知性及其诸范畴就仅仅作为感性世界的形式框架而被限制在可能经验的范围内,既不能认识作为物自体的对象,也不能认识作为“我自体”的认识主体,知性的自发超越性由此就被阻断了。虽然就其能动的自发性而言,知性的超越性是无限的,但这时知性就只是退回到知性 1,丧失了自己的认识论意义。但也正是因为现象与物自体的这种区分,揭示出另外一种致力于超越知性的局限性的更高的认识能力,即理性。

理性是最高的认识能力,我们的一切知识开始于感官,由此前进到知性,而

终止于理性。在其一般的逻辑运用中,理性(理性 1)是间接推理的能力。理性(理性 2)作为一种先验的能力,是原则的能力,它努力的目标是纯粹出自原则(也即来自概念)的综合知识,从而与作为规则的能力的知性 3 区别开来。它以知性为对象,使知性的诸规则统一于原则之下,为知性的有条件的知识找到无条件者。但这只是理性行动的一个主观原理,由此所产生的“无条件者”的概念也只是理性的先验理念,其作用只是用来引导知性建立知识的系统统一性,因而是调节性的而不是构成性的。如果把理性的主观原理偷换成客观原理,对理性理念作超验的运用或客观的运用,就会产生欺骗性的幻相,理性 2 就被提升为理性 3。理性 3 的来自概念的综合知识惟一地只建立在它的实践的兴趣上,所以,理性 3 实际上就是实践理性。

理性 3 在其实践的运用中关心的只是意志这种原因性的规定根据,它在规定意志的同时自身就具有了一种原因性,在这种意义上就是意志。意志作为按照法则的表象规定自己的原因性的能力,实际上也就是实践理性。当理性 3 提供出经验性的实用规律时,它就是以经验为条件的实践理性即一般实践理性,是受束缚和被遮蔽了的理性 3,为它所规定的就是一般意志即自由的任意。当理性 3 提供出先天的纯粹实践规律时,它就是纯粹实践理性,为它所规定的就是纯粹意志或自由意志。一般实践理性、自由的任意早已把纯粹实践理性(理性 3)、自由的意志作为自身的本质和可能性条件包含在自身中了。理性 3 在实践领域的超越性,就体现在一般实践理性和自由的任意能够向着纯粹实践理性和绝对自由的纯粹意志(理性 3)不断地提升。但意志概念一旦被康德完全等同于纯粹实践理性的法则,它的绝对自发性就仅仅表现为普遍的逻各斯,从而失去了自身所具有的自由超越性,理性 3 的自由精神由于这种阻断而跌落下来。

道德律体现了理性 3 的逻辑规范性,它是意志自律的原则,意志自律就是意志自由,自由和道德律是交替地相互归结的。自由的理念使我们认识到自己是属于知性世界的,服从道德自律原则;由于我们同时又属于感官世界,所以就只能把自己思想为负有义务的。由此,意志自由的理念就向我们提供了使道德律作为定言的先天综合命题得以可能的第三者。但理性 3 理解的最终界限正是自由的不可理解性,理性 3 因此就变成了没有内容的理性 1。但康德仍坚持

认为,理性 3 还是一个“事实”。因为道德律或道德律的意识是纯粹理性(理性 3)的惟一“事实”。道德律是某种自身肯定的东西,它作为事实肯定了纯粹实践理性的客观实在性,并通过理性的这一积极的概念,证明了它自身在实践上的客观实在性。通过这一事实,在思辨哲学那里只具有消极性的自由的原因性的概念,在实践哲学中获得了积极的规定,也成为了一个“事实”。自由理念的这种客观实在性,在实践上提出了灵魂不朽和上帝存在概念的必要性,从而使得理论理性(理性 2)能够在实践领域中并出于实践的意图而悬设上述三个理念,理性 3(实践理性)和理性 2(思辨理性)在此统一起来了。

但由此,知性 3 立法的自然概念领地(感官之物、现象)和理性 3 立法的自由概念领地(超感官之物、物自体),却被完全隔绝开来了。这就需要对判断力进行批判,以完成知性 3 向理性 3 的过渡。但知性和理性的这种过渡和统一,即理论领地和实践领地的这种统一,在康德那里仍然是由于纯粹的“逻辑运用”才成为必要和可能的。因此知性 1 和理性 1 才是康德整个知性和理性学说的最基本的立足点和最后的归宿。

关键词:康德;知性;理性;自由;道德律;意志

Abstract

Understanding and reason are two basic concepts in Kant's philosophy. To explicate their meanings and their relationships is of crucially theoretical significance for us to deepen our comprehension of his philosophy and its system.

It was Kant who definitely distinguished understanding and reason, although the two terms had been differently used in modern philosophy. The meanings of Kant's understanding are embodied in three levels. Understanding 1, the understanding in a broad sense, refers to all higher faculties of cognition in general use (including understanding, the power of judgment and reason). It represents the logical comprehension of understanding and is applicable to theoretical, practical and even aesthetic fields. Understanding 2, the understanding in a narrower sense, indicates the theoretical reason or all higher faculties of cognition in the theoretical use. It represents the epistemological comprehension of understanding, refers to the faculty of producing and using concepts (categories), and includes the analytic and dialectic of transcendental logic. Understanding 3, the understanding in the narrowest sense, denotes the transcendental self—consciousness or the pure apperception constructing object—consciousness. It comes from cognitive subject (I as I am or I as intelligence and thinking subject), and represents the ontological comprehension of the understanding. Kant's reason also has three levels of meanings. Reason 1, in terms of its extension, includes all higher faculties of cognition (including un-

derstanding, the power of judgment and reason) and practical faculty; in terms of its intension, it refers to the faculty of reasoning in general logic. It is thus a concept of logic. Reason 2, the reason in a narrower sense, is the highest cognitive faculty, i. e. , the faculty of principles. It sets ideas by means of syllogism to conduct and regulate our cognitions, belonging to the transcendental dialectic. This is an epistemological concept. Reason 3, the reason in the narrowest sense, is the roots of the dialectics, leads to the things—in—themselves (God, etc.) and sets infinitely united objects. This makes room for the practical use of reason although this is merely a “dialectic illusion” in respect of theoretical cognition, so the essence of reason 3 is practical reason or free will. It is thus a concept of practical ontology. Among these levels, understanding 1 is basically identical with reason 1. Understanding 2 and reason 2 are epistemological concepts, but the former denotes “transcendental logic”, that is, categories and system of its principles, and is the epistemologicalization of logic. Reason 2 refers to the internal use of ideas, serves understanding 2, assists and instructs the cognitive completeness of understanding 2, and plays a regulative role. Understanding 3 and reason 3 are mainly ontological. The former is manifested in the ontology of phenomena, that is, the objectively united role of transcendental apperception to which the deduction of categories traces back, and it constitutes objects of experience. The latter indicates the ontology of things—in—themselves, that is, the moral ontology. Understanding 3 is the ontologicalization of the epistemology, changing cognitive structure into existential one while reason 3 transits to practical ontology. Therefore, it is in the third level that understanding and reason are incompatible with and are entirely barred from each other.

The deepening of the three levels of understanding is firstly reflected in synthetic *a priori* judgment. As judgment, it is built not upon the passive sensibility but upon the active understanding. As synthetic judgment, it can never be comprehended simply on the basis of the law of contradiction. Instead, its

basis is beyond formal logic, namely, in the epistemology, which thus epistemologicalizes the problems of logic and understanding 1 is advanced to understanding 2. As a *a priori* judgment, its basis lies in the pure, rather than the *a posteriori*, use of understanding, and ultimately comes down to the original synthetic unity of apperception, thus understanding 2 being deepened into understanding 3. The spontaneity of understanding 3 gets prominent in Kant's transcendental deduction of categories. This level of understanding (namely, understanding itself) is the very transcendental apperception, the very faculty of the original synthetic unity of apperception, and the very action of original syntheses of apperception. The principle of synthetic unity of apperception is the supreme principle of all use of the understanding and of the whole human knowledge accordingly. Kant considers that cognitions consist in the determinate relation of given representations to an object, and that the object is constituted only by understanding's combining the manifold of a given intuition, according to its concepts in one apperception (that is, understanding 3 itself). Therefore, the process of cognizing the object is the very forming one of the cognized object. The object and the knowledge about it being the same, understanding 3 is thus the source of the power that forms the object, and is understanding in ontological sense. Through categories (the logical functions of the understanding judgment), intuitive manifold is necessarily subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception, and the categories are the rules made by understanding 3 for its own prescription or the action of synthetic unity. The objects can only be given by our sensibility, so the categories of understanding are merely effective on our objects of sense and appearances, and are simply the conditions of objects of possible experience and knowledge about them. Now that the sum total of all appearances or objects of experience is nature, understanding 3 prescribes *a priori* laws to nature through categories, and can be characterized as the faculty of rules. However, because of the distinction between appearances and things—in-themselves, understanding and its cate-

gories, simply as the formal framework of the world of sense, are confined to possible experience and can cognize neither the objects as things — in — themselves nor the cognitive subjects (I as I am). Thus the spontaneous transcendence of understanding is kept back. As far as its active spontaneity is concerned, the transcendence of understanding is infinite, but at this point understanding withdraws into understanding 1 and loses its epistemological significance. It is just the distinction between appearances and things — in — themselves that reveals another higher faculty of cognition applying itself to transcending the limitation of understanding, that is, reason.

Reason is the highest faculty of cognition. All our cognition starts from the senses, goes from there to the understanding, and ends with reason. In its logical use, reason (reason 1) is the faculty of indirect inference. As a transcendental faculty, reason (reason 2), is the faculty of principles, and its aim is to yield synthetic cognitions from principles (that is, from concepts), thus distinguishing itself from understanding 3 as the faculty of rules. Taking understanding as its objects, reason 2 unifies rules of the understanding under principles, and is to seek the unconditioned for the conditioned cognitions of understanding. However, this is only a subjective principle of actions of reason and the concepts of “the unconditioned” produced accordingly are also simply transcendental ideas of the reason. These ideas are solely applied to lead understanding to establish the systematic unity of cognitions, so they are regulative not constitutive principles. If the subjective principles of the reason are passed off as objective and used in a transcendent or objective way, fraudulent illusion will be produced and reason 2 will be advanced to reason 3. The synthetic cognitions of reason 3 which come from concepts are merely established on its practical interest and therefore reason 3 is in fact the practical reason.

In its practical use reason 3 is only concerned with the determining grounds of the will as causality. While determining the will, reason 3 has causality. In this sense, reason 3 itself is equal to the will. The will, as the power

of determining its own causality according to the representation of laws, is in fact the practical reason. When it provides pragmatic laws, reason 3 is the empirically conditioned or the general practical reason, constrained and concealed, and what it determines is the general will or free *Willkür*. When it provides *a priori* practical laws, reason 3 is the pure practical reason and what it determines is the pure will or free will. General practical reason or free *Willkür* has already involved in itself the pure practical reason (reason 3) or free will as its essence and the condition of its possibility. The transcendency of reason 3 in the field of practice is manifested in the continual advancement of the general practical reason or free *Willkür* toward the pure practical reason or absolutely free and pure will (reason 3). But once the concept of the will is completely equated by Kant with the law of pure practical reason, then the absolute spontaneity of reason 3 is changed into general logos and loses its free transcendency, and so its free spirits will fall off due to this interdiction.

Moral law indicates the logical determination of reason 3 and is the principle of autonomy of the will. Autonomy of the will means freedom of the will, so freedom and moral law reciprocally come down to each other. The idea of freedom of the will makes us recognize that we belong to the world of understanding and follow the principle of moral autonomy. Meanwhile, because we belong to the world of sense, we can only think of ourselves as put under obligation. As a result, freedom provides us with the third that makes possible the moral law as the categorical synthetic *a priori* proposition. But the incomprehensibility of freedom is the very boundary of the comprehension of reason 3, and therefore reason 3 withdraws into abstract and empty reason 1. However, Kant holds that reason 3 is still a "fact", because moral law or the consciousness of moral law is the sole fact of pure reason (reason 3). Moral law, being a fact and something in itself positive, affirms the objective reality of pure practical reason (reason 3) and also practically demonstrates its own objective reality through the positive concept of reason. By means of this fact, the negative con-

cept of free causality in speculative philosophy acquires positive determination in practical philosophy and also becomes a "fact". The objective reality of the idea of freedom practically puts forward the necessity of the concepts of the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, and thereby enables theoretical reason (reason 2) to postulate the above three ideas in the field of practice and for practical purposes, thus reason 3 (practical reason) and reason 2 (speculative reason) being united together here.

However, the domain of the concept of nature (the things of sense, phenomena) under the legislation of understanding 3 is entirely barred from that of concept of freedom (supersensible things, things-in-themselves) under the legislation of reason 3. There needs a critique of the power of judgment in order to finish the transition from understanding 3 to reason 3. But the transition or unity of understanding and reason, i. e. , that of theoretical and practical fields, becomes necessary and possible simply because of their pure "logical use" for Kant. Therefore it is understanding 1 and reason 1 that are the most essential standpoint and the final settling place in his whole doctrine about understanding and reason.

Key words: Kant; Understanding; Reason; Freedom; Moral Law; Will

目 录

序 论 /1

第一章 康德知性与理性的含义及区别 /9

第一节 “知性”概念的含义 /9

一、广义的知性 /9

二、较狭义的知性 /14

三、最狭义的知性 /16

第二节 “理性”概念的含义 /20

一、广义的理性 /20

二、较狭义的理性 /22

三、最狭义的理性 /24

第三节 知性与理性的区分 /27

一、知性与理性在理论运用上的区分 /27

二、知性与理性在实践运用上的区分 /35

三、知性与理性在不同层次的意义 /44

第二章 知性三阶段的深化及其困境 /45

第一节 先天综合判断的意义 /45

一、逻辑学问题的认识论化：从知性1进展到知性2 /46

二、认识论问题的本体论化：从知性2深入到知性3 /50

第二节 先验演绎对知性3自发性的凸显 /55

一、先验统觉及其与知性的同一性 /57

二、知性一切运用的最高原则 /63

2 论康德的知性与理性

三、知性为自然立法 /66

第三节 现象与物自体的划分对知性能动超越性的双重阻断 /70

一、现象与物自体的划分 /70

二、努斯精神的第一重阻断:知性对作为物自体的对象的不可知性 /76

三、努斯精神的第二重阻断:知性对作为“我自体”的主体的不可知性 /80

第三章 理性的三阶段提升及其前景 /87

第一节 从理性1向理性2以及理性3的提升 /87

第二节 纯粹实践理性自由的含义:从努斯中建立自己的逻各斯(自律) /108

一、自由的任意:理性3的孕育和纯化 /108

二、自由的意志:理性3的法规 /112

三、任意与意志的关系:理性3的奠基作用 /118

第三节 自由与道德律的关系 /127

一、道德律 /127

二、道德律与自由的交替地相互归结关系 /134

三、道德律的演绎 /139

第四节 纯粹实践理性的“事实”与“悬设” /146

一、纯粹实践理性“事实”的涵义 /147

二、“事实”对自由的证明 /157

三、纯粹实践理性的“悬设” /163

余 论 /177

参考文献 /181

跋 /191

序 论

近代西方哲学的理论重心是认识论,但与之前的哲学相比,康德哲学的一个突出特点是,在认识之前要先对我们的认识能力进行批判,以考察人类知识的可能性条件、来源、范围和界限。在作为高级认识能力的一般理性能力中,康德“最早明确地提出知性与理性的区别”^①,正是以知性与理性的这种区别为基础,康德运用纯粹理性的建筑术构建起他的整个批判哲学体系。200多年来,西方学界关于康德及其哲学的著作可谓是汗牛充栋,对其中所涉及的问题几乎都进行了全面、细致、深入和卓有创见的研究;中国学界对康德哲学的介绍引进和深入研究已有100年,也取得了丰硕的成果;所有这些都为我们今天理解和研究康德哲学奠定了坚实的基础。对“知性”和“理性”这两个康德批判哲学的基础性概念,国内外研究中不乏精彩论述和真知灼见,但存在一个共同的缺陷,即大多停留在康德文本的表面定义和论述,对其内在的深层含义,却避重就轻,缺乏应有的重视和深入研究。当然,康德批判哲学的晦涩难懂、行文的枯燥繁琐和对“知性”、“理性”概念运用的歧义丛生,也为我们的理解和研究平添了许多障碍和困难。本文的目的在于,厘清“知性”和“理性”概念的内涵及其运用,进一步加深我们对康德批判哲学及其体系的理解,并以此抛砖引玉,求教大方。

知性和理性、特别是理性的性质是西方哲学史的中心主

^① 黑格尔:《小逻辑》,贺麟译,商务印书馆,1980年第二版,第126页。

题之一。在建立一般思维的行动——the act of understanding(理解的行动)或 the act of reasoning(推理的行动)——和心灵中与之对应的负责这种行动的能力——“知性”(Verstand, understanding)或“理性”(Vernunft, reason)——之间的关系过程中,知性和理性得到了各自的规定,并逐渐区分为两种既相近又有差异的心灵能力或认识能力^①。这种区别在近代哲学、尤其是经验主义哲学那里,已经有了明显的意识。对经验主义哲学来说,理性主要是指理性推理的能力,形式逻辑的三段论演绎法是理性应用的最重要工具,所以这种理性是单纯的演绎理性,是逻辑学意义上的理性,它不是新知识的来源。知性则不同。培根把知性看作是归纳的能力,从经验中抽出和形成原理;理性则根据这些原理演绎出新的实验,这样知性的归纳就成了理性演绎的基础。洛克认为知性是知觉(perception)的能力或思维(thinking)的能力^②,它被动地接受感觉和反省所提供的简单观念,以简单观念为材料和基础,通过综合、比较和分析形成各种复杂观念、关系观念和一般观念,这个过程其实就是感性经验上升到理性知识的归纳过程。休谟大致在与洛克相同的意义上使用了“知性”。由于经验主义哲学认为我们的一切知识都来源于感觉,知性本身不存在任何理论和实践方面的天赋原则,即洛克所谓“白板”;所以,知性尽管是形成新知识的不可或缺的能力,但作为一种思维能力,它的综合、比较和分析等归纳活动,其实只是对所予知识材料进行一般形式逻辑的思维,所以,经验主义哲学中的知性归根结底是一种形式逻辑学意义上的理性。

对经验主义的知性和理性观的分析,国内好像还不多,很有独到之处!

在康德以前,“知性”和“理性”在理性主义哲学那里的区别并不明显,理性或知性不仅是逻辑推理的能力,而且能够直观,这种理性直观或知性直观是理性三段论演绎的基础。斯宾诺莎在《知性改进论》中认为,我们凭借知性(intellectus)的

① Howard Caygill: *a Kant Dictionary*, Blackwell Publishers, 1995, P. 346~347, 405~406.

② 洛克著:《人类理解论》,关文运译,商务印书馆,1959年版,第93、207页。