



世界政治与国际关系原版影印丛书

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〔美〕 罗伯特·吉尔平 著

# 世界政治中的战争与变革

WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS

Robert Gilpin



北京大学出版社  
PEKING UNIVERSITY PRESS

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# **War and Change in World Politics**

**ROBERT GILPIN**

*Princeton University*

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## 内 容 简 介

本书向读者介绍了一种国际政治变革中新的理论,它建立起了一个概念性框架,这一框架可能会改变我们看待国际关系的思维方式。吉尔平教授认为,国际关系的本质数千年来未曾改变,他综合运用历史、社会学和经济学方面的理论来论述世界秩序中引起变革的力量。讨论集中在国际体系中不同的力量增长以及这种不平衡所带来的结果。经济或军事力量平衡的变换削弱了现存体系的基础,因为改变这种体系所获得的力量取决于增加收益、降低成本。吉尔平认为,其结果是行为体通过领土的、政治的或是经济的扩张来变革体系,直到维持变革的边际成本大于边际收益。当国家根据它们的利益来发展实力、变革体系时,它们会为之奋斗,不论是通过增加经济效率,追求共同利益的最大化,或者在有利于自己的情况下重新分配财富和权力。

## 作 者 简 介

罗伯特·吉尔平(Robert Gilpin)是当代西方著名的国际政治经济学权威。1930年生于美国佛蒙特州柏林顿。1952年毕业于佛蒙特大学。1954年于康奈尔大学获硕士学位。1960年在加州大学伯克利分校获博士学位。1960—1961年在哈佛大学做博士后研究。1961年起在美国普林斯顿大学威尔逊国际事务学院讲授国际关系学。1967—1968年和1976—1977年任洛克菲勒基金会研究员。1975—1976年为美国总统技术和经济顾问团成员。现为美国艺术和科学学院院士。其主要著作有:《美国实力与多国公司》(1975)、《世界政治中的战争与变革》(1981)、《国际关系政治经济学》(1987)、《全球资本主义的挑战:21世纪的世界经济》(2000)、《全球政治经济学:解读国际经济秩序》(2001)等。



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## 出版说明

引进和交流,是国际研究诸学科发展壮大所不可或缺的环节和纽带。没有引进和交流,学术就难以活跃,也不易创新。每一位从事世界政治与国际关系研究的学者、每一位学习世界政治与国际关系的学生,无不深感阅读外文原文文献的重要性,他们都深知,原文的报刊、教材和专著,是获取最新国际信息、最新理论论争、最新参考资料的必不可少的重要来源,而获得这样的原文文献的机会是不均等的,因此,他们极其渴望更为方便地直接接触到原文文献。而在目前不易直接在国内购买原版书籍的情况下,采取原版影印的方式引进国际上的优秀教材和专著是解决问题的一条捷径,如此就可以使国内普通读者方便地获得最有权威的原文读物,从而可以快速了解国外同行的教学和学术成果,为深入学习和研究、为开展有效的对外学术交流、也为国际关系诸学科在我国的创新和发展,打下更坚实的基础。

这套“世界政治与国际关系原版影印丛书”,正是基于上述认识而组织出版的,并且得到了我国国际关系教学与科研领域最有权威的专家教授们的认可,他们分别来自于北京大学国际关系学院、复旦大学国际关系与公共事务学院、中国人民大学国际关系学院、外交学院、清华大学国际问题研究所、中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所、中共中央党校战略研究所等单位,作为本套丛书的学术顾问,他们愿意向我国该学科及相关领域的广大学者和学生共同推荐这套丛书。

本丛书第一批先行选入了一些经典文献选读性质的国外优秀教材,也包括美国大学中的一些知名国际关系学教员所编著的教材,内容主要在国际关系理论方面,也包括国际政治经济学和比较政治学方面的优秀教材。它们皆可称为原文中的精品,值得研读和收藏,不仅如此,由于它们本身在国外的大学课堂里都是应用较广的教材和读物,所以特别适合作为我国国际关系与世界政治专业大学教学中的参考读物,甚至可以直接作为以英文授课的课堂教材。在每本书的前面,我们都邀请国内比较权威的专家学者撰写了精彩的导论,以指导读者更好地阅读和使用这些文献。

根据读者的反映和我国建设中的国际关系学科的发展需要,我们决定在上述影印图书的基础上,开辟一个“学术精品系列”,以让我国国际关系专业的学者和学生有机会更方便地接触到那些堪称“精品中的精品”的学术书籍,比如摩根索的《国家间政治》、沃尔兹的《国际政治理论》和基欧汉的《权力与相互依赖》等等。这些作品大都已经有了中文译本,而且有的还不只一种中译本,它们的学术和学科地位是不言而喻的,在中国读者心目中也已有着持久深入的影响,正因如此,在这个新系列的每一种图书前面我们没有再烦请学术顾问们撰写导言。我们相信,如此有生命力的作品,当它们以新的面目出现在中国读者面前时,一定会引发新的阅读感受、新的理论遐思和新的战略决策思考。至少,



它们可以带给我们真正原汁原味的享受,让我们更加贴近当代的国际关系理论和国际关系理论家。

今后,我们会陆续推出更新、更好的原版教材和专著,希望广大读者提出宝贵意见和建议,尤其欢迎更多的专家学者向我们推荐适合引进的国外优秀教材和专著,以帮助我们完善这套丛书的出版,并最终形成一套完整的世界政治与国际关系及其相关学科适用的原文教学研究参考书系。

最后也要特别提醒读者,我们引进这套丛书,目的主要在于推动学术交流、促进学科发育、完善教学体系,而其作者的出发点和指导思想、基本观点和结论等,则完全属于由读者加以认识、比较、讨论甚至批评的内容,均不代表北京大学出版社。

**IN MEMORY OF HAROLD SPROUT  
1901-1980**

**The great events of history are often due to secular changes in the growth of population and other fundamental economic causes, which, escaping by their gradual character the notice of contemporary observers, are attributed to the follies of statesmen or the fanaticism of atheists.**

**John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace***

# Preface

In his excellent book *Sociologists, Economists and Democracy* (1970), Brian Barry identified and analyzed two of the foremost approaches to theorizing in contemporary social science: the sociological and economic modes of theory construction. This study will draw on the insights provided by these two types of social theories in an attempt to understand international political change. Each type of social theory makes its own contribution. However, in this study we shall regard both as suggestive, rather than as methodologies to be applied rigorously. Thus their strengths and weaknesses will be discussed here briefly to familiarize the reader with the intellectual background and underlying methodology of this book.

The fundamental feature of sociological theory is its emphasis on whole societies or whole social systems. Although definitions of social systems vary, they have in common the notion of a set of identifiable elements characterized by explicit or implicit interrelationships. Whether these elements are individuals, groups, social roles, or other factors, sociological theory assumes that individual behavior is explained by the nature of the system and one's place in it. The social system is the primary determinant of behavior, either by socializing the actor with respect to a particular set of norms and values or by exercising constraints on the actor. In brief, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and the social system itself must be the focus of theorizing.

In contrast to the holistic approach of sociological theory, eco-

conomic theory, or what some call rational-choice theory, focuses on the individual (Becker, 1976, p. 5; Rogowski, 1978). It assumes that individual behavior is determined wholly by rationality; that is, individuals seek to maximize, or at least to satisfy, certain values or interests at the lowest possible cost to themselves. In this context, rationality applies only to endeavor, not to outcome; failure to achieve an objective because of ignorance or some other factor does not invalidate the rationalist premise that individuals act on the basis of a cost/benefit or means/ends calculation. Finally, it holds that individuals will seek to acquire their objectives until a market equilibrium is reached; that is, individuals will pursue an objective until the associated costs are equal to the realized benefits. Following these individualistic and rationalistic assumptions, economists attempt to explain human behavior.

The strength of the sociological approach is its focus on the structural and institutional determinants of individual behavior. Individuals make choices and act in a world of rules and norms not entirely of their own making. Moreover, these constraining rules and social structures cannot be reduced wholly to self-interest; in many cases individuals can even be viewed as behaving in ways opposed to their self-interest. Although individuals (acting alone or through groups or states) seek to change rules and structures in accordance with their interests, they can never escape completely the constraints of social structure. Moreover, as Percey S. Cohen has stressed (1968, p. 126), although individuals and groups attempt to promote their interests, their actions invariably lead to unanticipated consequences. Both self-interest and social structure are determinants of human behavior.

The strength of economic theory is that it embodies a general conception of social and political change that can be useful in understanding international political change. As John Harsanyi has argued, the problem of social change "must be ultimately explained in terms of personal incentives for some people to change their behavior" (1969, p. 532). That is, a theory of change seeks to explain why "some people have decided that their interests would be better served by a new type of institutional arrangement" (Harsanyi, 1969, p. 532). It focuses on how

technological, economic, and other changes affect the power and interests of individuals (organized in coalitions and states) and thereby influence them to modify their behavior and institutions.

Underlying this economic view of social or political change is the assumption that the purposes and natures of social institutions are determined principally by the self-interest and relative power of individual members. In the words of James Buchanan, "political structure is conceived as something that *emerges* from the choice processes of individual participants" (1966, p. 26). Individuals, groups, and other actors use their powers to create social and political institutions that they believe will advance their interests. Thus the objectives of a social or political institution primarily reflect the interests of its more powerful members. When these interests or the relative powers of individuals (or of groups and states) change, there will be attempts to change the nature of the institution and its objectives in order to reflect significant changes in interest and power.

A second advantage of the theory of rational choice is that it can draw on a large and well-tested body of economic theory. In fact, economics provides a highly developed theory of social behavior, and for this reason economic theory has been applied to an ever-increasing range of social and political phenomena. In some cases the application of economic theory to conventionally conceived noneconomic behavior such as suicide or the choice of a marriage partner has bordered on the ridiculous. Yet, if used with discretion, the so-called laws of microeconomics (demand, marginal utility, and diminishing returns), as well as those from public finance and other subcategories of economics, can help explain political behavior.

Thus economic theory suggests that the study of international political change must consider how political, economic, and technological developments affect the relative incomes (powers) of political actors and the costs of obtaining the objectives sought by groups and states. Among these objectives, the most important ones are sociopolitical arrangements favorable to the interests of a group or state. Thus, this study will argue that a group or a state will attempt to change the political system in response to developments that increase its relative power or decrease the

costs of modifying political arrangements and will continue its efforts until an equilibrium is reached between the costs and benefits of further change.<sup>1</sup>

Although it is helpful to assume that social systems and political institutions emerge from the decisions of powerful actors in pursuit of perceived interests, the resulting social arrangements are not completely willed or controlled by these actors. Furthermore, social and political institutions, once in place, operate according to a logic of their own. For example, the actions of individual consumers or sellers give rise to an economic market, but these individuals in a freely competitive market cannot control the price at which they buy or sell goods. Similarly, as Kenneth Waltz (1979) pointed out, individual states compose an international system, but they have only limited control over its operations and to varying degrees must conform to the logic of a competitive, anarchic system of interacting states. Waltz's insight is indicative of the value of the sociological approach (or systems approach) to the theory of international relations.

Because this book will analyze political change in the past, as well as in the modern world, a relevant question is whether or not economic theory is universally applicable. Is its utility restricted to market economies composed of acquisitive individuals pursuing rational self-interest?<sup>2</sup> In this book we shall assume that rationality is not historically or culturally bound but that individuals in all societies past and present attempt to achieve their interests and goals by the most efficient means possible. However, the specific interests or objectives that individuals pursue and the appropriateness of the means they employ are dependent on prevailing social norms and the material environment. For this reason, although here we employ the economic mode of analysis in an effort to understand political change, we appreciate that the sociological perspective is also necessary to an

<sup>1</sup> A noteworthy example of this approach to political change is that of Haskel (1976), who applied rational-choice theory to foreign-policy decision making. Haskel's book was a pioneering effort that deserves much more attention than it has thus far received.

<sup>2</sup> This so-called formal-substantive issue was the subject of a famous exchange between the anthropologist Melville Herskovits and the economist Frank Knight. Herskovits eventually conceded the argument and wrote a precedent-setting book applying formal economic theory to nonmarket and primitive societies (1952).

understanding of the context of rational behavior. In short, the economic and sociological approaches must be integrated to explain international political change.

Thus this study will draw on both the sociological approach and the economic approach to social theory in an attempt to develop a theory or conception of international political change. At the same time, we are mindful of the severe limitations of both types of social theories and of the fact that even though each approach partially compensates for the weaknesses of the other, a combination of the two approaches does not provide a comprehensive explanation of political change nor resolve the basic dilemma of social science: whether to explain trivial matters with exactitude or to treat significant matters with imprecision. In this study we have chosen to follow the latter course in the belief that possible errors and certain oversimplification are the price one must pay if one is to deal with the important issues of our age. This sacrifice of precision is justifiable only if this study clarifies the issues of war and change in world politics more than it obfuscates.

I have benefited enormously in the writing of this book from the assistance of others. The Lehrman Institute of New York City provided the initial funding and intellectual encouragement. Additional financial support was received from the Rockefeller Foundation and its program on conflict studies. Princeton University granted me leave from my teaching and academic responsibilities; its Woodrow Wilson School and the Center of International Studies helped me in financial and other ways. I thank all these institutions for making it possible for me to complete the book.

Further, I would like to thank those individuals who criticized the manuscript or helped me in other ways. I would like particularly to express my deep appreciation to several colleagues, students, and others for their comments on the manuscript: David Caploe, Michael Doyle, Robert Heilbroner, Miles Kahler, Peter Katzenstein, Marion J. Levey, Jr., Jim Keagle, Robert Keohane, Michael Loriaux, Michael Mastanduno, Ralph Pettman, Mark A. Sinz, David Spiro, and Kenneth N. Waltz. A special debt is owed to my colleague William Branson for his suggestion of the



appropriateness of economic theory in seeking to explain political change and for his tutoring in economics over the years. Participants in my graduate seminar on international relations and colloquia at Boston College and Stanford University were very helpful. They raised more issues than I could possibly answer. My secretary, Dorothy Gronet, and the professional typing service of Winifred Donahue have my thanks for preparing the typescript. Behind the scenes, my wife Jean orchestrated it all as editor, prodder, and critic par excellence.

Finally, I would like to express my appreciation of the late Harold Sprout, to whom I have dedicated this volume. He never read the text, nor even knew of its existence, and probably would have disagreed with much of it. Yet he contributed to its conception and influenced it, and its author, in more ways than he ever appreciated. He was an outstanding leader in the American study of international relations, forever at the frontier of the field. Those of us who had the privilege of knowing him and being his colleagues will always treasure our memories of him.