



名师点评博士论文

邓晓芒点评

图像与本质

——胡塞尔图像意识现象学辨证

耿涛著

胡塞尔区分了两种类型的图像意识：一种是感知的，即图像事物本身；另一种是想象的，即图像意识。在《图像意识》中，胡塞尔提出了图像意识的双重本质：一个是感知的本质，另一个是想象的本质。胡塞尔认为，图像意识是一种特殊的意识形式，它既不是纯粹的感知，也不是纯粹的想象，而是一种介于两者之间的意识形式。胡塞尔认为，图像意识是一种特殊的意识形式，它既不是纯粹的感知，也不是纯粹的想象，而是一种介于两者之间的意识形式。胡塞尔认为，图像意识是一种特殊的意识形式，它既不是纯粹的感知，也不是纯粹的想象，而是一种介于两者之间的意识形式。

对胡塞尔图像意识的现象学考察的关键在于对图像客体与图像主题的“本质”关系的澄清上。这个“关系”就是模像。模像就是对一个在显现中的不显现者的当下化，它本已地显示了图像意识的发生过程的内部。它表现为：图像客体总是作者发生活动的客体，而图像主题总是被发现的客体。通过模像，那不显现的图像主题就既内在又外在于图像客体意识的过程之中。本文的“辨证”就以“模像”为切入点。

我们通过图像与符号的关系、图像意识与表象客观化的关系以及对两种本质区别的图像意识的关系的区分，否定了图像意识中的图像主题及模像作用，从而得出图像意识本质上是非感知而非想象的初步结论。但是，图像主题在胡塞尔的图像意识理论中具有一个重要作用，即它成全了“图像意识自立”。换言之，如果没有图像主题，那我们还能将一个意识体称作“并且称作‘图像意识’吗？没有模像、没有相似性，那么，我们如何使图像意识成为其自身？而本质上属于感知的图像意识又如何能在感知的域之下，具有自己的‘种差’？所以，如果要是我们试图对图像主题的肯定成立，我们就要深入到作为新的“二重构造”的图像意识结构的内部，探知这个结构的真正内涵，从而达到对“图像意识自立”问题的回答。这样，我们也不可避免地要相应地在这些问题的解答之下关注“感知”的问题。

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摘 要

根据胡塞尔的分析,一个完整的图像意识是由三个客体化立义的内在统一来完成的,即图像事物立义、图像客体立义和图像主题立义。就图像事物而言,我们具有的是一个普通感知,我们得到的是一些色块、线条、画布等等。在这个立义中,我们还没有看到“图像”,而图像客体立义就使这样的“图像”显现出来。它使我们在面对(比如说)一幅油画时,看到一个或生动、或呆板、或清晰、或模糊的“像”。这个立义并不是一个感知,而是一种想象;但也不是一个普通的想象——而是一种奇特的“感知性想象”。因为它被天然地编织进一个“图像主题”。图像主题立义是一种想象,它在图像意识之中也不是普通想象,因为它是一个“不显现者”,即我们并不是在看图像时直接想象到一个处于想象中的感知的“现实之物”。图像主题与图像客体立义处于一种内在的相互作用、相互成全的交织之中。缺少其中任何一个,另一个也不能发生。

对胡塞尔图像意识的现象学考察的关键在于对图像客体与图像主题的“奇特”关系的领会上。这个“关系”就是模像。模像就是对一个在显现者中的不显现者的当下化,它本已地显身于图像意识的发生过程的内部。它表现为:图像客体总是作着复现活动的客体,而图像主题总是被复现的客体。通过模像,那不显现的图像主题就被内在地编织在图像客体立义的过程之中。本文的“辨正”就以“模像”为契入点。

我们通过图像与符号的关系、图像意识与表象客体化的关系以及对两种本质不同的再现意识的关系的区分,否定了

图像意识中的图像主题及模像作用,而得出图像意识本质上是感知而不是想象的初步结论。但是,图像主题在胡塞尔的图像意识理论中具有一个重要作用,即它成全着“图像意识自立”。换言之,如果没有图像主题,那我们还能将一个意识体验作、并且称作“图像意识”吗?没有模像、没有相似性,那么,我们如何使图像意识成为其自身?而本质上属于感知的图像意识又如何能在感知的属之下,具有自己的“种差”?所以,如果要使我们这里对图像主题的否定成立,我们就要深入到作为新的“二重构造”的图像意识结构的内部,探询这个结构的真正内涵,从而达到对“图像意识自立”问题的回答。这样,我们也不可避免地要相应地在这些问题背景之下关注“感知”的问题。

胡塞尔在意向分析中使用一个著名的“感觉材料-立义”模式。感觉材料的“存在”就是它的“被知觉”,它是客体化立义之前的无形无象情形,从而意味着一种“空”的对待性关系。这就是被海德格尔阐发的“形式显示”的“纯形势”。海德格尔所追求的“就其自身显示自身”的“纯粹现象”就是此处的被胡塞尔放置在感觉材料位置上的“纯显现”。在海德格尔看来,立义就意味着对“本来之物”的遮蔽,我们要保有现象学的纯粹性,就要力图使“天然爱做立义这件事”的此在屏住自己“去立义”的“意向”欲望,而仅仅地、纯粹地守住客体化之前的“无物化”的纯涌动领域。但是,仅仅维持住这个“纯关系领域”恰恰会导致对“在……之中”的源初信赖。存在哲学就是这样地被抛入、被卷进“存在”之中。

由此,生存主体的对存在的执态的根源就在于由感觉材料的“纯显现”特征所造就的被动地处于“涌动”之中。于是,感觉材料——这个前对象化、前形式化、前客体化的感觉本身——就本已地牵出“在”的领会,即意味着“物执”——此“物”是前对象化的“纯物”。进而,我们——作为喜好“立义”者——立义“成象”。此象乃“纯然之象”,完全因着立义而来,本无所谓设定,但是因着先前的构造它的“感觉材料”的“物执”,

便也被这“物执”自然地浸染了,从而也具有了执态——“象执”。此所谓“由物执到象执”。普通感知的特征就在于相应的感觉材料只能被立义为同一个对象。所以,这里的“物执到象执”在自然意识中成为必然。

在图像意识中,材料被立义为本质上两个客体。也就是说,在图像意识中,首先地我们必然地进行普通感知,即我们首先地进行一个作为普通感知立义的图像事物立义。其中,所有的感觉材料之“执态”都侵入到图像事物这个感知对象之上,使得图像事物成为“存在”着的——即图像事物是“被执”的。而“之后”的图像客体立义则不被物执所侵,而成为“纯然之象”。此“象”因为与图像事物之“象”共同具有着同样的感觉材料,而叠合着向我们“显示”出来,以至于我们要把此图像客体之“象”看作是在作为照面性的普通感知客体的图像事物“之中”向我们显示着。因此,我们可以说:“象”被“像化”了

所以,我们之所以说在图像意识中没有“模像”作用,说图像意识就是感知而不是想象,就是因为图像就是在直接的“感觉材料-立义”的感知模式中被把握到的,就是因为我们直接性地看到了作为“纯然之像”的“图像”。而如果坚持图像意识(即在图像意识中看到本质)必须借助于它之外的东西的内在参与才能完成,那么我们就必须承认:存在着某种直观,这个直观“看”不到本质,它要靠想象“其他”才能让本质“光顾”。这样,一种看不到本质的“看”就出现了。而这意味着只有在看“现实物”时我们才能得到本质。但是,在现象学的视野中,这个所谓的“现实物”的身份是可疑的。于是,本质的显身就依赖于“现实物”,而不是现象学所显明了的“先验主体性”。

1918年的手稿中,胡塞尔借着对观赏舞台戏剧的分析而否定模像作用,否定图像主题。但是,胡塞尔所提出的戏剧观看中的“虚构性”本身只是成全于“叙事性”。“叙事”中得以显摆出来的客体当然没有所谓“模像作用”。它们毋宁说是被特定的叙事所“规定”着的。由此,戏剧观看中所产生的对“叙事客体”的意识,本质上不是图像意识。“模像性”问题并没有被

胡塞尔真正从其图像意识现象学中排除掉。

我们在影视审美中主要朝向的审美客体就是“叙事客体”。这样,影视戏剧艺术就在根本上与绘画艺术区别开来。正是在对绘画艺术的审美观照中,我们才可以根本地进入图像审美的独立领域。画家的思考并不意味着使绘画沦入“概念化”的窠臼。画家苦苦思考的只是世界的能见方式,这就意味着画家在创作过程中的一种特殊的“还原”——画家的眼睛所面对的不是成象的客体,而是把感知从感知对象的结果那里还原到感觉材料-立义的环节上。画家所努力寻求的正是这些感觉材料如何就这样地得以被立义成象。通过这种还原,客体构成的先验机制被显摆出来。所以,画家祈向具体可感知对象的“先验本质”。而这个“本质”在绘画作品中必然是侧显着的。每一幅作品都是祈向本质的一个“侧显”。然而绘画的本质侧显不同于一般对象的本质侧显。画家的带着思考的眼睛首先对对象进行着侧显,这个侧显通过画家的运作活动复又“转化”、显示在画布上。对于画布上的对象,我们再进行观看时,就是对画家的先行侧显的二次侧显,这个观者的二次侧显就是绘画审美。画家的“先行侧显”既使本质成功地展示于画布之上,同时这被展示的本质又在这些涂抹之中发生“变形”。这种“变形”不是画笔的任意涂抹,而是表现为画家在“还原”中所必然葆有的那种使视觉“复杂化”的朴拙。我们将之称为绘画审美向度上的“朴”。在对这种朴拙的本质侧显的二次侧显中,我们依然确定地把握到本质。无论画家的风格多么独特,也不会阻碍我们看到作为本质的纯然之像本身。于是我们的审美意识得以顺畅地进行。与“朴”相对,我们将这种在绘画审美中把握到纯然之像时所感受到的“顺畅”体验称为“雅”。绘画审美也就是流连于这别有意味的“朴-雅”之间的回味。

我们进一步将先验主体的“看本质”阐释为“或性保留”。当我们说我们在直观现象时,实际上,我们也可以“或者”说在直观本质,而这个“或者说”经常性地并不伴随着我们的言谈

作为必要的补充而出现;但是,根本上,我们的直观就必然地带着这样的“补充”。同样地,当我们说我们在直观本质时,我们的言谈也必然地或明确或隐然地伴随这个这样的“或者性”的说法。因此,我们的现象学的言说总是根本地这样“或性”地“保留”着它的必要的补充。这种本然地拖带式地言说状况是严格地切合于实事的本真状况的。从言说的角度扩展出去,我们就可以说,实事就是“本质/现象的或性保留”,或者说,本质就是以“或性保留”的情态显现自身。“或性保留”对本质直观所作的修正的意义就在于,它明见地表明:并非要将直观从一开始就分为两种“朝向”——一种朝向个别之物,一种朝向本质——才可以成全本质,而是就在任一素朴的直观中,在即使是未经过任何现象学“训练”的人的日常直观那里,本质已经被内在地参与进来。“或性保留”告诉我们:人对自己的形上自觉在日常的素朴直观中就具有其“形上”之根。

传统的“现象-本质”二分造成了人们对本质的反感,也造成了人们对本质的误解。在传统本质理论上,本质是与“现象”相对而具有压倒性优势的范畴。或者说,本质造成了“同一性”,并且世间一切都要从属之。但是,胡塞尔敏锐地看到,在对这种“二分压制”的对抗中,本质本身也被否定了,而这个否定是武断的。传统的实体形而上学确实具有上述问题,但是,并非任何同一性哲学都必然如此。在本文所开示的“本质/现象的或性保留”中,则根本不存在这样的压制与极权倾向,同时它守住了本质。

生存本身是可以被怀疑的。这个“可怀疑性”是绝对的。这“怀疑”看似是要走向一个“非人”的“世界”,看似是要否定人之“真性情”,看似是要否定、无视人生意义问题,但是,恰恰相反,先验现象学所要做的正是通过对这一切的彻底悬搁而要找回人生意义的根本的绝对的根据。因为,倘若依这种生存的不可悬搁性,我们必然不能在这生存的世间之中,找到人的趣善向好的一度。而这一度恰恰只能在世间的生存之外才可找到它的真正无可质疑的根据。人生并不只是匆匆而过的

喧嚣的被卷入,被抛入,并不只是面对命运的无可揣测的动荡与涌逼,而是在所有这些命运式的“卷”、“抛”、“诱”、“逼”之上人如何给予一个与之不同的、主动性的、有力的、践履着的回答。胡塞尔开创的现象学一个世纪以来为人类所昭示的正是这在命运的涌逼之下而必须辉然向上的人的精神内向度的无待的境界。贯穿胡塞尔终生运思的“意向性”原不仅仅是单纯知解理性向度的认识论话题,而“悬搁”对执态的震然一荡,便也荡开了与物缠绕的无是非境地。

如果还有人对这朝向本质的先验性有所怀疑的话,不妨依本文的理论进路仔细审视这样一个“素朴而日常”的事实——

我们每个人都是在镜子中看到了“我”,每个人从来都没有“直接”看到“我”,我看到的只是“我”的图像。但是,我们总已经在说:我看到了“我”。

主题词:图像;本质;现象学;胡塞尔

Abstract

According to what Husserl maintained, a complete image-consciousness is accomplished by the inner unity of three kinds of Objectivation-Apprehension, that is, image-thing-apprehension, image-object-apprehension as well as image-sujet-apprehension. As far as image-thing is concerned, what it means is an ordinary perception, that is to say, what a perceiver can percept is some colourful things, lines, canvas etc. Obviously, in this image-thing-apprehension we have not had 'an image' yet, and it is in the image-object-apprehension that make such an image available, that is, faced with a painting, what we hold is an image, whether it is vivid or dull, clear or unclear. This image-object-apprehension is not a perception but an imagination, yet this is not an ordinary but a peculiar perceptual-imagination, for the perception is from the beginning woven into an image-sujet. As for the image-sujet-apprehension, it is not inappropriate to consider it as an imagination, yet not an ordinary imagination, because it is in the field of image-consciousness, where the imagination does not appear itself, that is to say, we do not immediately imagine a perceptual 'real thing' in the imagination when watching the image. Actually, there is a inner interaction between the image-sujet-apprehension and image-object-apprehension, and it is by the inner interaction that either of the apprehensions

becomes itself. Without the other, the one can not be.

When making reflection on Husserl's image-consciousness phenomenology, the key point lies in the understanding of the relationship between the image-object and image-sujet. The very relationship is depiction (Abbildung). Depiction is presentation of a not-appearing-thing of appearing-things, which appear in the inner genetic process of image-consciousness. It behave itself in such a way that the image-object is a reproducing object and the image-sujet is a reproduced object. It is just by the depiction that the not-appearing image-sujet is woved innerly into the process of the image-object-apprehension. The Analysis which this present dissertation is engaged in must begin with the analysis of the 'depiction' in order to achieve itself.

The first result is that image-consciousness is according to its essence a perception rather than an imagination, which results from both making difference the relationship between image and symbol with the relationship between image-consciousness and objectivationalized representation and making difference the two essentially different representational consciousness. However, the image-sujet is very important in the image-consciousness theory of Husserl because it make image-consciousness-be-self-sufficient possible. In other words, without image-sujet we could not have experieced a consciousness as an image-consciousness, and what is more, we could not have made the image-consciousness be itself. Similarly, we could not have made the according to its essence belonging to perception image-consciousness possess its genus. Therefore, in order to make this negation of the image-sujet tenable, we have to dig into the core of the structure of a new double-constructional image-consciousness and understand

the true meaning of this structure. Additionally, we could have a response to the point of image-consciousness-be-self-sufficient. Then, it is necessary for me to expose the 'perception' in the context of such concerns.

In his intentional analysis Husserl establishes a famous formula of sensation stuff-apprehension. The Being of sensation stuff is its perceivedness. This is a non-form-and-non-image before an objectivation-apprehension, which means an outer, empty relationship. That is the pure situation of formal indication (formale Anzeige) exposed by Heidegger. The pure phenomenon as one appearing itself for itself, pursued by Heidegger, is no other than the pure indicating which Husserl here lay in the place of sensation stuff. In the view of Heidegger, apprehension does mean the coveredness of the pure thing, and then, in order to maintain the purity of the Phenomenology, it is necessary to quench the intentional desire to apprehend something with the Dasein which naturally is intentional to apprehend something, so as to hold on the field of pure stream of non-physicalized before objectivation purely. However, it is ironic to mention that holding on the field of pure stream at the same time bring forth the original belief (Glaube). It is just for this reason why Existenzphilosophie is concerned about the Sein.

Thus, the ground of taking a position (Stellungnahme) about Sein of existential subject lies in the stream which is contributed by the character of pure appearance of sensation stuff. Then, sensation stuff, the sensation itself of pre-objectification, pre-formation, pre-objectivation, is entangled with the understanding of Sein, which means taking a position in things. Moreover, we, who have an intention to apprehend something, apprehend something to make an image. The im-

age is a pure one, which comes out of apprehension, not posing anything, but, owing to earlier taking a position in things, immerse into the position and have a position too, namely taking a position in images. That is the so-called transition from taking a position in things to taking a position in images. The feature of ordinary perception lies in the fact that the correspondent sensation stuff can only be apprehended as the same object. Therefore, it is necessary for the transition in natural consciousness.

in the image-consciousness, stuff are apprehended as two different objects. It means that, in the image-consciousness, firstly we necessarily make ordinary perception, that is, we make an image-thing-apprehension as an ordinary perceptual apprehension. Thus, the position of all the sensation stuff jump into the image-thing as the perceived object, and the image-thing makes itself existielle. This image, for it have common sensation stuff with that image of image-thing, interacting appears to us, so that we may consider the image of image-object as an Amongness of image-thing as the ordinary perceptual object on hand. Thus, we can say, the object is imagilized.

The reason why we believe that there is no depiction in the image-consciousness and that the image-consciousness is perception rather than imagination, lies in the fact that the images is comprehended through the perceptual formula of immediate perception-stuff-apprehension, and the fact that we have a immediate sight of the image as pure image. And if it is true that only by means of the inner participation of something outside it the image-consciousness can be accomplished, then it shall be acknowledged that there exists an intuition which intuitis nothing essential and which can bring over the

essence only by the way of imagining something other. Thus, there appears a kind of seeing without having a vision of the essence, which means that we can achieve the essence only with seeing the 'real thing'. Yet it is in doubt for the identity of the so-called real thing from the view of Phenomenology. Therefore, the appearance of the essence is dependent on the real thing rather than the transcendental subjectivity exposed by Phenomenology.

In the manuscript of 1918, Husserl negate the depiction by means of the analysis of watching the Schauspiel. So negate the image-sujet. However, the fictionalization of watching the Schauspiel is accomplished only by the way of the narratives. The objects laid out by the narratives are certain to have no depiction. Rather, they are determined by certain narratives. Thus, the consciousness of narrative object in the process of watching Schauspiel, is not image-consciousness essentially. The point of the depiction is not excluded by Husserl from his Phenomenology of image-consciousness.

The aesthetic object in aesthetics of movie and TV is a narrative object, which make the art of movie and TV drama different from the art of painting. As far as the aesthetic sight of painting is concerned, an independent aesthetic field of image emerges out. The thinking of painter do not depress the painted work into one dull with conceptualization. What a painter thinks about again and again is the visible art of the world, which means that there is a particular reduction in the process of the paint-making. What is comprehended by the painter's eyes is not an object imagilized, but the progress of the reduction from the result of perception to sensation stuff-apprehension. What the painter strives for is how these sensation stuff can be apprehended to images. By the way of

this reduction, the transcendental machanicism of object-construction is laid out. Thus it is obvious that what the painter strives for is the transcendental essence of the particular perceptible object. Indeed, the essence always adumbrates in the painting. Every painting is a adumbration towards essence. However, the essential adumbration of painting is different from that of ordinary objects. The eyes of the thinking painter adumbrate the object, and the adumbration will be transformed by the operation of the painter into the canvas. When we watch the object in the canvas, what happens is the second adumbration of earlier adumbration of the painter. The second adumbration is the aesthetition of the painting, while the earlier adumbration of the painter both succeed in present the essence in the canvas and make the essence presented have some transformation through these scratches. The very transformation is not single the willful scratch of the painter, but the necessary simplicity which the painter hold in the act of reduction in order to make the sight complicated. This is what we name simplicity in the dimension of painting aesthetics. However peculiar the style of a painter is, nothing could interfere us with our sight of the essentially pure image. Against this simplicity, we could name the fluent experience having the sight of the pure image in the painting aesthetics elegance. Therefore, the painting aesthetics is winging between the two extremes, namely the simplicity and elegancy.

Moreover, we expose the essential sight of the transcendental subject as the reservation for perhaps-ness. That is to say, when we say we are sighting the phenomena, actually we may perhaps be sighting the essence. It is true that the perhaps-ness does not emerge as an necessary addition with our intercourse, but our sight necessarily is with such an addi-