

SELECTED LESSONS
IN
ENGLISH

英文選讀

BY

TAO-LSYEN WU (吳道序)

中國編譯出版社印行

FOREWORD

Mr. Tao-tswen Wu's "Selected Lessons in English" should be welcomed by the English reading public in that it represents the reading of English from a new angle.

Mr. Wu has been tutor of English in the Fuh Tan University for several years, and therefore has considerable experience in the teaching of English as well as deep knowledge of the real need of Chinese students in their efforts to master the English language. Besides, Mr. Wu himself has spent many years in the research of English literature.

I, therefore, recommend Mr. Wu's book to those who are interested in English literature, or those who are teaching Chinese students advanced English.

T. H. Lee

Shanghai,
Sept. 18, 1939.

PREFACE

It is hoped that this little volume may be used as a suitable English textbook in either universities or senior high schools, and thus may meet a timely need. During the present war time there is a great shortage of all sorts of supplies, books being no exception. It is often heard that many instructors in English have complained that almost no English textbooks are available (not to say suitable), and even if available, they are so limited in copies that several students have to share one. This causes much inconvenience, with which this little volume aims at doing away.

Originally two volumes were planned, one for use in universities and another for that in senior high schools. But printing here is now so difficult that the compiler cannot but be contented with a volume like the present one. As will be observed, some of the articles contained herein are intended for university students and some for senior high school students, while others for both of them so that two birds may be killed with one stone.

It is believed that most of the articles selected and printed in the pages that follow must have been taught and re taught in many classrooms and consequently they cannot be far from being suitable materials for teaching. The notes given at the end of every lesson may serve

PREFACE

as an aid to the students: it is hoped that, in finding their lessons easier on account of the notes, they will become more interested in the lessons.

Thanks are due to the compiler's colleagues in the Department of Western Literature of the Fuh Tan University for their suggestions and encouragement,—especially to Prof. Lee-fu Woo, Dean of the School of Liberal Arts and concurrently Head of the Department, and to Mr. Chi-seng Yang, Lecturer in English, the advices of both of whom have made this little volume possible.

The Compiler

Chungking,
September, 1939.

CONTENTS

	Page
Foreword— By T. H. Lee.....	ii
Preface— By The Compiler.....	iii
Lesson	
I. The Significance Of Spiritual Mobilization <i>Generalissimo Chiang</i>	1
II. A Letter To Senator Borah <i>Henry L. Stimson</i>	6
III. Stalin's Struggle With Trotsky <i>John Gunther</i>	16
IV. How The Kaiser Abdicated <i>Alfred Nicmann</i>	21
V. Sunday Before The War <i>A. Clutton-Brock</i>	31
VI. The Last Lesson <i>Alphonse Daudet</i>	35
VII. A Fishing Party <i>Guy De Maupassant</i>	40
VIII. The Battle Of Waterloo <i>S. Zweig</i>	52
IX. Gettysburg Address <i>Abraham Lincoln</i>	66
X. The Dignity Of Labour <i>Thomas Carlyle</i>	68
XI. Give Me Liberty Or Give Me Death <i>Patrick Henry</i>	72

CONTENTS

XII.	New Ways For Old	
	<i>The Editor Of "Answers"</i>	78
XIII.	The Priest's Soul	
	<i>Lady Wilde</i>	81
XIV.	A Fellow Traveller	
	<i>A. G. Gardiner</i>	90
XV.	The Story Of The Whistle	
	<i>Benjamin Franklin</i>	95
XVI.	My Old Penholder	
	<i>George Gissing</i>	97
XVII.	Morning	
	<i>Daniel Webster</i>	100
XVIII.	The Break Up Of A Great Drought	
	<i>William Hale White</i>	103
XIX.	Little Great Men	
	<i>Oliver Goldsmith</i>	106
XX.	My Friend Gorki	
	<i>Feodor Chaliapin</i>	111
XXI.	Nehru And His Father	
	<i>John Gunther</i>	115
XXII.	Prison Letters To Indira (1)	
	<i>Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru</i>	120
XXIII.	Prison Letters To Indira (2)	
	<i>Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru</i>	123
XXIV.	Lord Collingwood To His Daughter Sarah	
	<i>Lord Collingwood</i>	125
XXV.	Attention To Reading	
	<i>Lord Chesterfield</i>	129

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SPIRITUAL MOBILIZATION

By Generalissimo Chiang¹

My dear fellow countrymen:

We are going to enforce the National Spiritual Mobilization,² and beginning from May 1,³ the entire nation shall have to observe in full the Outlines of National Spiritual Mobilization and Measures for its enforcement promulgated by the Supreme National Defence Council⁵ on March 12. The people should hold monthly meetings, take oath under the National Pact,⁶ and should exhort one another in accordance with the Outlines.

We must realize that this is an important stroke⁷ which concerns the very existence of the State and the fate of China's war of resistance. I urged upon the brethren⁸ of the entire country, particularly the public leaders, to promote the Movement with all their heart.

Why must we enforce the National Spiritual Mobilization? The reasons have been set forth⁹ in the Outlines. Here I wish to stress particularly two points. (1) We must realize that spiritual force is even stronger than material and military strength; and (2) we must review¹⁰ our spiritual defects in the past.

As a proof to the first point, there have been many cases in which several thousand Chinese soldiers have succeeded in resisting or repulsing several hundred or several thousand enemy troops. There have also been cases

204 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SPIRITUAL MOBILIZATION

in which Chinese women have resisted the enemy troops single-handed.¹¹

As a matter of fact,¹² a greater part of our success in beating back the enemy and reconstructing our nation depends upon the spiritual strength of every member of the country. The nearer we approach victory, the more difficult our environment will become, and the greater will be the necessity of mobilizing our entire spiritual force to strive for the final triumph.

As to¹³ the second point, it may be recalled that three or four months after the war broke out there were many comments regarding China, one of the most striking being: "No matter from a spiritual or material standpoint, China is not strong enough to resist a foreign foe!" Whether this is an insult to our nation or not has yet to be proved by future developments. Of course, many heroic deeds have been shown to the world by our patriotic citizens in the course of the war of resistance,¹⁴ but our countrymen must not forget that hostilities have not yet been brought to a conclusion, the enemy has not yet been repulsed, and that the final victory has not yet been achieved.¹⁵ The present, therefore, calls for¹⁶ an introspection.¹⁸

Let us ask: ² Have we fellow citizens achieved spiritual progress alongside with the progress of the war? Have we remedied our past defects in the course of the war? Have those who have ability exerted it to the best? Have the front and the rear effected a close co-operation? Have our thoughts, speeches and actions been placed completely under the common object that state and nation is above

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SPIRITUAL MOBILIZATION

everything else and that military necessity and victory always come first? Have our speeches and actions coincided with¹⁷ our inner thoughts? Can everyone of us stick it out¹⁸ to the last? Can we remain absolutely firm, dauntless and honest? Has every citizen placed explicit¹⁹ confidence in the final success of our Resistance and Reconstruction? Can we make the enemy and the puppets²⁰ and traitors see that our national spirit is something to be reckoned with?²¹ Has our mode of living conformed with the conditions of wartime?

When a nation is deficient materially and the deficiency cannot be remedied immediately, it can by no means²² be considered as a national humiliation, because material production needs manpower, resources and time and therefore replenishment²³ cannot be made in a short time. But it is different with spiritual deficiency. Spiritual deficiency would make the possession of weapons of war and material resources useless.

If a country is invaded by another and lacks the will to resist, it is not only humiliation but also a crime.

We must bear in mind²⁴ that if we emerge victorious from the war and succeed in our program²⁵ of national reconstruction, the Chinese race of several thousand years' standing²⁶ will not perish and we will have all the hope and confidence in the establishment of a New China based on²⁷ the "San Min Chu I." On the other hand,²⁸ if we don't have the unbending will²⁹ to resist and thus lose our independence, future historians will severely condemn³⁰ us and the humiliation will not be erased for a hundred

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SPIRITUAL MOBILIZATION

generations to come.³¹

The National Pact is our weapon for resisting the enemy. For instance, we swear not to render service to either the enemy or the traitors. If the time comes when we are coerced at the point of the bayonet³² to do service to the enemy or the traitor, we know that we would rather have death than break our oath. If everyone of us is determined to sacrifice (die) any time, undoubtedly the enemy will collapse before us and the successful consummation³³ of the resistance campaign³⁴ and the national reconstruction is bound³⁵ to come.

I earnestly request all our people to take practical steps³⁶ to restore the ancient Chinese virtues and to strengthen the nation's spiritual fort under the common object of regarding 'state and nation above everything else, of giving priority³⁷ consideration to military and victory and of concentrating our will and strength on³⁸ a single purpose, so that we may strive for everlasting peace in the midst of the present disturbed and depressed³⁹ world.

Let it be understood that Resistance means also Reconstruction and that the two tasks must be consummated simultaneously.⁴⁰ Our countrymen must realize ~~the~~ past mistakes in not deeply believing in the Three People's Principles and should beginning from today pledge their faith in the Three People's Principles and struggle for its realization.

The most fundamental point is that our people, irrespective of⁴¹ their age, must have self confidence in the bright future of the nation. We must firmly believe

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SPIRITUAL MOBILIZATION

that the Chinese Republic to be established according to the Three People's Principles after the victory will be a new and most progressive state, a state for the people,⁴² of the people,⁴³ and by the people,⁴⁴ a state which will contribute much towards the welfare of humanity and the world.

Time is short, and we should no longer indulge in⁴⁵ empty theories and empty thoughts. No time and energy should be lost. We must remember that we are facing a strong foe and that the fate of our country is hanging in the balance.⁴⁶ Let the whole nation lead a new spiritual life and with one heart and one soul jointly participate in the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement so as to consummate our all-important⁴⁷ mission. //

- | | |
|---|------------------------------|
| 1. Generalissimo Chiang 蔣委員長, 於 1887 年生於浙江奉化溪口鎮 | 17. coincide with 符合 |
| 2. N. S. M. 全國精神動員 | 18. stick it out 堅持 |
| 3. 指 1939 年 | 19. explicit 顯明的 |
| 4. shall 表示必須之義 | 20. puppets 傀儡們 |
| 5. S. N. D. C. 國防最高委員會 | 21. reckoned with 計算在內的, 重視的 |
| 6. National Pact 國民公約 | 22. by no means = not |
| 7. stroke 暴動 | 23. replenishments 補給 |
| 8. brethren 同胞 | 24. bear in mind = remember |
| 9. set forth 陳述 | 25. program 計劃 |
| 10. review 檢討 | 26. standing 地位 |
| 11. single-handed 隻手, 獨自 | 27. based on 基於 |
| 12. as a matter of fact 事實上 | 28. on the other hand 另一方面 |
| 13. as to 至於 | 29. unbending will 不屈的意志 |
| 14. in the resistance 在抗戰的過程中 | 30. condemn 責備 |
| 15. call for 需要 | 31. to come 將來 |
| 16. introspection 反省, 內省 | 32. bayonet 刺刀 |
| | 33. consummation 完成 |

A LETTER TO SENATOR BORAH.

34	campaign 戰役	41.	irrespective of 不管
35	bound 必然的	42	for the people 民享
36	take practical steps 採取實步 驟	43	of the people 民有
37	prior 先的	44	by the people 民治
38	concentrate on 集中在	45	indulge in 溺於；放縱於
39	depressed 不景氣的	46	hand in the balance 安危成敗 未卜之勢
40	simultaneously 同時地	47.	all-important 極其重要的

A LETTER TO SENATOR BORAH¹

By Henry L. Stimson²

February 23, 1932.

My dear Senator Borah:

You have asked my opinion whether, as has been sometimes recently suggested, present conditions in China have in any way indicated that the so called Nine Power Treaty³ has become inapplicable⁴ or ineffective⁵ or rightly in need of⁶ modification,⁷ and if so, what I considered should be the policy of this Government⁸.

This treaty, as you of course know, forms the legal basis⁹ upon which now rests¹⁰ the "open door" policy towards China. That policy, enunciated by John Hay¹¹ in 1899, brought to an end the struggle among various Powers for so called spheres of interest¹² in China which was threatening¹³ the dismemberment¹⁴ of that empire. To accomplish this Mr. Hay invoked¹⁵ two principles (1) equality of commercial opportunity among all nations in dealing with¹⁶ China, and (2) as necessary to that equality the preservation of China's territorial and admin-

A LETTER TO SENATOR BORAH

istrative integrity.¹⁷ These principles were not new in the foreign policy of America. They had been the principles upon which it rested in its dealings with other nations for many years. In the case of¹⁸ China they were invoked to save a situation¹⁹ which not only threatened the future development and sovereignty of that great Asiatic people, but also threatened to create dangerous and constantly increasing rivalries between the other nations of the world. War had already taken place between Japan and China. At the close of²⁰ that war three other nations intervened²¹ to prevent Japan from²² obtaining some of the results of that war claimed²³ by her. Other nations sought and had obtained spheres of interest. Partly as a result of these actions a serious uprising²⁴ had broken out in China which endangered the legations²⁵ of all of the Powers at Peking. While the attack on those legations was in progress,²⁶ Mr. Hay made an announcement in respect to²⁷ this policy as the principle upon which the Powers should act in the settlement of²⁸ the rebellion.²⁹ He said:

“The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about³⁰ permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed³¹ to friendly Powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard³² for the world the principle of equal and impartial³³ trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.”

He was successful in obtaining the assent of the other Powers to the policy thus announced.

A LETTER TO SENATOR BORAH

In taking these steps³⁴ Mr. Hay acted with the cordial support of the British Government. In responding to³⁵ Mr. Hay's announcement, above set forth,³⁶ Lord Salisbury,³⁷ the British Prime Minister, expressed himself "most emphatically as concurring in³⁸ the policy of the United States."

For 20 years thereafter the "open door" policy rested upon the informal commitments³⁹ thus made by the various Powers. But in the winter of 1921, at a conference participated in⁴⁰ by all of the principal Powers which had interests in the Pacific, the policy was crystallized into⁴¹ the so called Nine-Power Treaty, which gave definition and precision to the principles upon which the policy rested. In the first article of that treaty, the contracting⁴² Powers, other than⁴³ China, agreed:

"1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

"2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed⁴⁴ opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.

"3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.

"4. To refrain from⁴⁵ taking advantage of⁴⁶ conditions in China in order⁴⁷ to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing⁴⁸ action inimical

A LETTER TO SENATOR BORAH

to⁴⁹ the security of such states."

This treaty thus represents a carefully developed and matured international policy intended, on the one hand, to assure to all of the contracting parties their rights and interests in and with regard to China, and on the other hand, to assure to the people of China the fullest opportunity to develop without molestation⁵⁰ their sovereignty and independence according to the modern and enlightened⁵¹ standards believed to obtain among the peoples of this earth. At the time this treaty was signed, it was known that China was engaged in⁵² an attempt to develop the free institutions⁵³ of a self-governing republic after her recent revolution from an autocratic form of government; that she would require many years of both economic and political effort to that end;⁵⁴ and that her progress would necessarily be slow. The treaty was thus a covenant⁵⁵ of self-denial⁵⁶ among the signatory powers in deliberate renunciation⁵⁷ of any policy of aggression which might tend to interfere with that development. It was believed—and the whole history of the development of the "open door" policy reveals⁵⁸ that faith—that only by such a process, under the protection of such an agreement, could the fullest interests not only of China but of all nations which have intercourse with her best be served.

In its report to the President announcing this treaty, the American Delegation, headed by the then Secretary of State, Mr. Charles E. Hughes,⁵⁹ said:

"It is believed that through this treaty the 'open door' in China has at last been made a fact."

A LETTER TO SENATOR BORAH

During the course⁶⁰ of the discussions which resulted in⁶¹ the treaty, the chairman of the British Delegation, Lord Balfour,⁶² had stated that—

“The British Empire Delegation understood that there was no représentative of any Power around the table who thought that the old practice of ‘spheres of interest’ was either advocated⁶³ by any government or would be tolerable⁶⁴ to this conference. So far as the British Government were concerned,⁶⁵ they had, in the most formal manner, publicly announced that they regarded this practice as utterly inappropriate to the existing situation.⁶⁶”

At the same time the representative of Japan, Baron Shidehar,⁶⁷ announced the position of his Government as follows:⁶⁸

“No one denies to China her sacred right to govern herself. No one stands in the way⁶⁹ of China to work out her own great national destiny.”

The treaty was originally executed⁷⁰ by the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Subsequently it was also executed by Norway, Bolivia, Sweden, Denmark,⁷¹ and Mexico. Germany has signed it, but her parliament has not yet ratified⁷² it.

It must be remembered also that this treaty was one of several treaties and agreements entered into⁷³ at the Washington Conference by the various Powers concerned,⁷⁴ all of which were interrelated⁷⁵ and interdependent.⁷⁶ No one of these treaties can be disregarded without disturbing

the general understanding and equilibrium⁷⁶ which were intended to be accomplished and effected by the group of agreements arrived at in their entirety. The Washington Conference was essentially a disarmament⁷⁷ conference, and aimed to promote the possibility of peace in the world not only through the cessation of competition in naval armament but also by the solution of various other disturbing problems which threatened the peace of the world, particularly in the Far East. These problems were all inter-related. The willingness of the American Government to surrender⁷⁸ its then commanding lead⁷⁹ in battleship construction and to leave its positions at Guam⁸⁰ and in the Philippines without further fortifications,⁸¹ was predicated⁸² upon, among other things,⁸³ the self-denying covenants contained in the Nine-Power Treaty, which assured the nations of the world not only of equal opportunity for their Eastern trade but also against the military aggrandizement⁸⁴ of any other Power at the expense of⁸⁵ China. One cannot discuss the possibility of modifying or abrogating⁸⁶ those provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty without considering at the same time the other promises upon which they were really dependent.

Six years later the policy of self denial against aggression by a stronger against a weaker Power, upon which the Nine-Power Treaty had been based, received a powerful reinforcement⁸⁷ by the execution by substantially all the nations of the world of the Pact of Paris,⁸⁸ the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact.⁸⁹ These two treaties represent independent but harmonious steps taken for the purpose of