


THE EQUILIBRIUM AND EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTION



制度均衡与 制度演进

中国军人收入分配研究

On Income Distribution
of Servicemen

李辉
亿□著




社会科学文献出版社
SOCIAL SCIENCES ACADEMIC PRESS (CHINA)

THE EQUILIBRIUM AND EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTION

本书熟练运用制度经济学的进化博弈理论、马克思社会分工理论和比较研究、经验分析和实证分析的方法，对中国军人收入水平变化的制度性原因和变迁路径，以及现行收入分配制度变革的补偿性特征进行了深入、系统的研究，得出“中国军人收入分配制度均衡是低层次的总量均衡，具有结构性非均衡性质”的结论，提出了军人工资和军人岗位津贴等收入分配制度改革建议。本书对军人劳动贡献计量和收入分配生命周期分布等方面的分析，以及现有军人收入分配制度的“套住效应”、“补偿性效应”等提法很有新意，被誉为是本研究领域的“最新成就”，有相当的理论深度。

<http://www.ssap.com.cn>

ISBN 7-80230-032-0



9 787802 300323 >

ISBN 7-80230-032-0/F · 354 定价：25.00元。

THE EQUILIBRIUM AND
EVOLUTION
OF INSTITUTION

制度均衡与制度演进

中国军人收入分配研究

On Income Distribution
of Servicemen

李辉亿□著



社会科学文献出版社
SOCIAL SCIENCES ACADEMIC PRESS (CHINA)

图书在版编目(CIP)数据

制度均衡与制度演进：中国军人收入分配研究/李辉亿著．—北京：社会科学文献出版社，2006.4

ISBN 7-80230-032-0

I. 制... II. 李... III. 军人—收入分配—分配制度—研究—中国 IV. E232.1

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字(2006)第 019699 号

制度均衡与制度演进

——中国军人收入分配研究

著 者 / 李辉亿

出 版 人 / 谢寿光

出 版 者 / 社会科学文献出版社

地 址 / 北京市东城区先晓胡同 10 号

邮政编码 / 100005

网 址 / <http://www.ssap.com.cn>

网站支持 / (010) 65269967

责任部门 / 皮书出版中心 (010)85117872

电子信箱 / pishubu@ssap.cn

项目经理 / 邓泳红

责任编辑 / 董谊思

责任印制 / 同 非

总 经 销 / 社会科学文献出版社发行部
(010)65139961 65139963

经 销 / 各地书店

读者服务 / 市场部 (010)65285539

法律顾问 / 北京建元律师事务所

排 版 / 东远先行彩色图文中心

印 刷 / 北京智力达印刷有限公司

开 本 / 889 × 1194 毫米 1/32 开

印 张 / 11.125

字 数 / 214 千字

版 次 / 2006 年 4 月第 1 版

印 次 / 2006 年 4 月第 1 次印刷

书 号 / ISBN 7-80230-032-0/F·354

定 价 / 25.00 元

本书如有破损、缺页、装订错误，
请与本社市场部联系更换



版权所有 翻印必究

自序

本书是我在 2004 年 6 月完成并顺利通过答辩的博士学位论文的基础上修订而成的。本书要探讨的问题是中国军人收入分配制度的均衡状况。

我之所以选择这一问题进行研究，主要有以下几个方面的原因。一个原因是，收入分配现象最能体现人类的交换规律与行为准则。古典经济学家曾经把收入分配理论视为经济理论的核心部分，如李嘉图就认为政治经济学的研究主题应该是商品在参与生产过程的各阶级间的分配规律。另外一个重要的原因是，我国军人收入分配制度正面临着巨大的挑战，军人收入分配制度运行中存在一些带有“悖论”性质的现象亟需做出科学的解释。国家用于军人工资、福利待遇的投入总量在不断增加，但是现实中军人对自己收入水平的满意程度却在不断降低；虽然军人对自己收入水平的满意程度在不断降低，但是绝大部分军人并不愿意退出现役。基层单位的诱致性分配制度创新看起来并不利于收入分配制度的统一性与稳定性，但是它在实际运行的过程中却因为其有效性而不断得到巩固和加强。所以，本书不仅是非常理论性的，而且

有很强的现实背景。我选择这一课题的另一个重要原因还在于我对它已有较多的思考，它有助于笔者把多年来对分工理论、收入分配理论、进化博弈理论、军队管理理论的思考进行系统化。笔者想借写作博士论文的机会把所学所思加以归纳整理，以作为今后进一步学习和研究的台阶。

显然，洞察收入分配领域中出现的新问题并给出合理的解释并不容易。事实上，自 20 世纪 90 年代，伴随着市场经济收入分配方式多样化的出现，军人收入分配问题便很快成为理论界的热门话题。理论界几乎一致认为，提高军人待遇，对于防止军队人才流失，提高部队战斗力具有关键性的作用，但是，在如何提高军人待遇，防止军队人才流失，特别是在军人待遇和军人战斗力之间的关系上，理论界有很大分歧。主流的观点是，提高军人待遇，特别是高素质军事人才的工资福利待遇，是防止人才流失，提高部队战斗力的关键。非主流的观点则认为，个人的意志、品质和工作环境才是防止人才流失的关键，单纯通过提高所谓高素质人才的工资福利水平，实施起来不仅会面临许多困难，而且对整体战斗力的负面影响不容忽视。因此，问题的实质便成为如何在不同的历史时期为不同的军人确定合适的薪酬水平。本书把军队看作是一个“生产”战斗力的“团队”，军人的生产具有典型的“队生产”的特征。“队生产”有两种不同的形式，它们的效率基础是不同的。一种是以个人技能为基础，另一种是以成员之间的信息分享与团结合作为基础。计件工资作为一种激励机制，适合第一种组织强调个人专业技能的特点。而较为

平均的分配制度因不鼓励以自我为中心的竞争则更适合第二种组织强调成员团结合作的特点。可是，计件工资容易引发工人之间永无止境的激励竞争（Akerlof, 1976），从而造成“囚徒困境”的局面。第二种组织的平均报酬制度又容易打击能人的积极性，使整个工作团队陷入一种低效率的均衡。所以，军人收入分配制度改革就面临着竞争激励与团结合作激励的两难选择。目前世界各国军队普遍采用的相对平均的收入分配方式应该是这种两难选择的最优折衷。不过，随着技术变革和作战方式的变化，一旦甄别单个军人对总体战斗力的边际贡献率成为可能，那么，这种两难选择的最优折衷必然会发生改变，新的收入分配制度就会替代旧的收入分配制度。

人们几乎一致同意，个人的报酬水平应该与其贡献相匹配。因此，如何计量军人集体（军队）对 GDP 的贡献率以及单个军人对“团队产出（战斗力）”的贡献率就成为确定军人与非军人，以及军人与军人之间分配关系的关键，这是一个理论难题。部分经济学者通过计算一国拥有军队时的 GDP 总量和没有军队时的 GDP 总量，并把二者进行对比，以此确定军队的贡献率。问题是，如何确定没有军队时的 GDP 总量呢？直觉告诉我，要想克服这一难题，我们必须从军队的起源中寻找军队的贡献水平。这样一来，构建一个合适的经验模型，并做相关的经验分析就显得十分必要。本书构造了一个“二人世界”的冲突模型，目的就是为了证明：对于存在冲突与紧张关系的博弈双方来说，建立适当规模的防卫组织

对于增加博弈双方的产出是非常有利的。

分析军人团队对 GDP 的贡献率是回答军人与非军人之间分配关系的关键。分析不同军人对总体战斗力的贡献率则是回答军人与军人之间分配关系的关键。在这一点上,本书主要借鉴了克拉克的边际生产力理论。在既定的国防费约束条件下,军队要想使战斗力达到最大化,务必使军队花在每个军人身上的每一元钱所产生的边际战斗力相等。国防经济学就是用经济学理论、工具和方法来分析军队和国防问题,解释军事和国防现象的,虽然军事现象和国防问题主要是军事学研究的范畴。国防经济理论和军事学理论是互补的,共同发展的。因为任何一个理论都是几个重要社会经济变量之间的逻辑关系体系,因此,当一个现象可以用一个内部逻辑一致的理论来解释的时候,通常也可以通过不同变量的选择组合,而同时形成几个内部逻辑严谨并同样可以解释这一现象的若干个其他理论。现象具有复杂性和多样性的特点。不同的理论在解释同一现象的不同方面的准确程度并不相同,所以,我们通常借鉴不同的理论体系来解释复杂现象的不同方面,这有助于理解现象的整体性特征,进而把握现象的本质。为了准确地分析我国军人收入分配制度的复杂性和多样性,我们在书中借鉴了四种不同的收入分配理论体系。

弗里德曼(Milton Friedman)说过,经济问题总是与选择联系在一起的。理查德·A. 波斯纳(Richard A. Posner)在《法律的经济分析》中通过把经济学定义为“人类选择的科学”,把经济学变成了对所有人类目的性行为的研究。人才流

失实际上是一个带有目的性的行为选择问题，与行为选择相伴而生的则是机会主义倾向，这就意味着人的选择具有不确定性。制度之所以被设计出来，其中一个重要的原因就是用来克服不确定性的。以往关于军人收入的研究，主要是研究军人的工资水平、工资结构等问题。本书关于军人收入分配制度均衡的概念就拓展了研究的范围和研究的视角。军人与地方人员收入的比较不仅仅是工资的比较，而且是收入的比较；不仅仅是收入水平与收入结构的比较，而且是收入分配制度的比较，这就具有重要的理论意义。用马克思的分工理论和新制度经济学的最新成果来分析军人收入分配制度的均衡，是本书的一个重要特色。自然，作为一个前沿的研究课题，其难度也是可想而知的，更兼本书是进行交叉研究，需要运用分工理论、新制度经济学、收入分配理论、社会经济统计方法等多方面的知识，要做到融会贯通，难度更大。但我喜好挑战，一项研究课题越是困难，对我而言就越具有吸引力。

在写作过程中，我碰到的最大的困难来自于抽样调查和数据整理。从问卷设计到访问座谈，再到资料整理和统计分析，无不困难重重。所幸的是，笔者的抽样调查得到了全军财务研究中心国防科技大学分中心的资助和中心成员们的帮助。至于相关研究文献的整理，遇到的困难也不小。主要是相关研究文献太少，以至于几欲放弃。譬如，我军收入分配制度变迁的具体案例搜集得不多。由于准备不足以及笔者的知识结构缺陷，有许多内容笔者无法展开论述，虽然在有

些地方做了注释，但遗憾与不足是难免的。我真诚地期待学界前辈与同仁以及广大读者对本书进行批评、指正。如果本书的出版能引起大家对军人收入分配制度的关注与讨论，给大家提供一些新的思考视角，那将是我写作本书的最大收获。

回首一年多来博士论文的选题、研究与写作过程，充满了苦恼与喜悦。苦恼时，握笔如抱石，几乎茶饭不思；喜悦时，一气呵成，只想对天放歌，这样的心境恐怕是笔耕于砚的读书人所特有的。回味三年来求学路上的苦与乐，心中感慨不已。

首先，我要深深感谢我的指导老师陈代兴教授。三年来，先生的谆谆教诲、耳提面命，让我充分感受到了先生热诚、务实的治学态度。先生对问题的敏锐观察力和独到的看法，对我富有启发。此外，对于先生和师母在生活上给予我的关怀和帮助，我表示深深的感谢。

在三年的学习中，我有幸得到了国防经济专家刘化绵教授、万东铖教授、朱庆林教授、黄瑞新教授、果增明教授的教诲，他们深厚的学术功底和海人不倦的学术风范我将终身受益，我对他们表示深深的感谢。

武汉大学商学院的周茂荣教授和高玉芳教授，军事科学院的武希志研究员评阅了我的博士论文，提出许多富有价值的意见，在此致以真诚的谢意。

在论文选题和写作过程中，我还得到吴少华、刘洋、张云彬、张德勇等师兄弟热情无私的帮助，在此谨表我诚挚的谢意。

学习期间，我自始至终得到了军事经济学院研究生处和研究生队领导和同志们的关心，图书馆、学位信息工作站和各系资料室的同志给予我很多帮助，特向他们致以感谢。

我还要感谢国防科技大学人文与社会科学学院学术专著出版资助基金的资助，这使本课题的研究得以推进，并在此基础上对本书初稿进行修订、出版。

就在我刚刚跨进军事经济学院校门的时候，儿子出生了。这几年来，妻子和岳父母几乎承担了抚育小孩的全部责任，她们是最辛苦的。而我，不仅帮不上什么忙，有时还给家人添加了诸多麻烦和负担。在本文最后完成之际，我相信我的妻子曾大可是最高兴的，我最深厚的谢意是献给她的。

重温写作时的苦与乐，不由深感时光之易逝，犹闻子在川上曰：“逝者如斯夫？”

李辉亿

2004年6月初稿于军事经济学院研究生楼

2005年11月修订于国防科技大学正苑

The Equilibrium and Evolution of Institutions

—On Income Distribution of Chinese Servicemen
(Abstract)

This book is about the equilibrium and evolution of Institutions of income distribution of servicemen. The study mainly aims at officers who earn salary from army, as a new development of New Institution Economics, Comparative Institutional Analysis and Empirical Analysis are the main methods used in this book.

If we take Economical circulation as a game process, institution is the equilibrium of game tactics. Institution can also be viewed as game players and regulations. Comprehending institutions with the viewpoints of game tactics will be helpful for us to understand how the players adapt themselves to the institutions, and how the institutions are perfected with the initiative of the players. An appropriate execution mechanism is the key for institution to play its role, which mainly includes self - execution

mechanism and third - execution mechanism. Self - execution mechanism is the chief mechanism. Third - execution mechanism is good for Self - execution to play its role. To understand this, we must take the diversity, mutuality and conjunction of execution mechanisms into account.

“Relative stabilization” is the basic meaning of equilibrium. According to the reasons, which cause the stabilization, equilibrium has two kinds of meaning: behavior equilibrium and quantity equilibrium. In this book, we take the viewpoint of behavior equilibrium when we discuss the equilibrium of institutions of income distribution of servicemen. Institutions equilibrium means that players are satisfied with the institutions, and players have no intention to change the institutions. Institutions equilibrium also means institutions supply is equal to institutions demand.

We mainly discuss institutions equilibrium of income distribution of Chinese servicemen in this book, by observing the change of officer 's game tactics when there is a little change in their income. If the equilibrium of institutions of income distribution of servicemen exists, officers will be satisfied with their salary; as a result, they will not choose the tactics to go out of army. Otherwise, servicemen maybe change their tactics and run out of army.

How to measure the value of servicemen 's labor and how much salary should be paid servicemen are a very complicated the-

ory. One presupposition is that the income of Servicemen should be a little higher than that of civil residents. We discuss the value of servicemen's labor in a labor - dividing model. In a rivalry world, if there is some defense organization for each other, and if the profits that two sides get from the cooperation are greater than the rivalry, two sides will cooperate for cooperation benefits. Social fortune is made by the cooperation between servicemen and civil residents. There is a reasonable and acceptable distribution proportion when they share the fortune. The basic principle for servicemen to share the cooperation benefits is that their share should not be less than what they get when they work separately. In the army, which produces "Battle Effectiveness", the criterion for each officer is, what one shares must be equal to its marginal battle effectiveness. Only in this way, is army able to maximize its battle effectiveness, and then will the efficiency of national defense expenditure arrive an optimization. Not only the marginal battle effectiveness of one serviceman is different from the other, but also the marginal battle effectiveness of the same serviceman is always changing. But to differentiate the battle effectiveness of one serviceman from others is impossible in technology. In this book, we divide servicemen into five different groups, and the army pays them different salary according to their group belonging. Of course, army pays same salary if they are in the same group. Because there are unconquerable difficul-

ties to make a price for every serviceman by plan, we always do it by market as a reference. Equilibrium price of military manpower is analyzed in chapter 3.

In the labor - dividing model, if not considering the transfer costs and risk reward, the income of servicemen should be equal to civilians. Because the entry into military department is always blocked by all kinds of limitation, the common opinion on the income of servicemen is that they should obtain a little more than civilians. Is it can be approved by the fact of income distribution of Chinese servicemen? Using data from spot check made in 1998 and 2003, we analyzed the income of servicemen and civilians. Empirical research will tell us the actual income of servicemen and civilians.

In this book, the work life of servicemen who can retire from army is divided into two periods: "work stage" (37~60 years) and "retirement stage" (60~80 years). Using data from the spot check and making a statistical analysis, we know that there are different characteristics in the income distribution of servicemen in these two stages.

In "work stage", representative unit (37years) earn 42.4% more in local departments than in army. Before retirement, the income gap between servicemen and civilians is bigger and bigger, at retirement the accumulative gap is the biggest. In "retirement stage", the income of civilians descends sharply (only

90% of wage, no post allowance). The income of servicemen only descends little; so, in "retirement stage", total income of servicemen are more than that of civilians. In our spot check, in "retirement stage", the income of civilians is 31. 5% lower than that of servicemen. In two periods (43 years), not considering discount value of all income, total income of civilians is 12. 4% lower than that of servicemen. If to make a discount for the total income of two stages, the income of civilians is 0. 02% higher than that of servicemen. That is to say, only serviceman lives 80 years old; the total income of servicemen can catch up with that of civilians. So, the equilibrium of income of servicemen is simple and partial. Income distribution is unbalanced between two periods. In "work stage", the income of servicemen is obviously lower than that of civilians. But in "retirement stage", the income of servicemen is obviously higher than that of civilians. Incomes in "retirement stage" not only compensate servicemen for the loss in the "work stage", but also can catch up with the total income (two periods) of civilians, and even exceed the total income of civilians if servicemen live long enough. Current institution of income distribution of servicemen has an obvious characteristic of endowment insurance.

Although, the income of servicemen is obviously lower than that of civilians in "work stage", almost 80% of officers don't want to go out of army. Three explanations are given in this

book. The first is that, without other purchasers, military manpower is "locked" by army for their special use. Officers have to accept the unwilling low price provided by mono-demand (defense department). So the quit of servicemen, which is a feedback mechanism for servicemen's income, is very useful to reduce the supply of military manpower, and with which the decline of income of servicemen may be probably stopped. The second is the compensation effect of income distribution of servicemen in retirement stage. For those who retire from army office, what they can earn in his office is equal to what they should get in a local department. The high wage in "retirement stage" for serviceman compensates them for the loss in "work stage". In this way, a few servicemen change their mind, and don't want to go out of army. The third is the integrated effect of income distribution institutions. Substitutes, complementarities and conjunctions are always the characteristics of Income distribution institutions. With the role of aggregative forces of the institutions, Chinese army is stable. Income distribution is not suited to contribution distribution in two periods. In "work stage", servicemen's contribution is big, but the income is small. In "retirement stage", servicemen's contribution is small, but the income is big. The imbalance between income and contribution not only affect the enthusiasm of on-the-job officers, but also sacrifice the interests of those who have to transfer to civilian work. A majority of