

# 当代 军事文选

CONTEMPORARY MILITARY PROSE READER



主 编 薛汉荣



西安交通大学出版社

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
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为适应我军现代化建设和研究现代战争的需要,特编著《当代军事文选》。该书内容覆盖了当代军事热门话题:如“恐怖主义”、“地区冲突”、“美军战略”、“中美关系”、“尖端武器”、“通信卫星”、“侦察卫星”、“情报搜集”、“C4I(指挥、控制、通信、计算机、情报)”、“信息战”、“网络战”、“空间战”等等。

所有课文均选自国外资料,语言规范,风格各异,富有时代气息;其中不乏图文并茂者,更增加了直观的效果。每单元课程由一篇主课文和若干篇相关的阅读材料组成。主课文附有较详细的注释、重要表达方式和句型以及围绕课文内容的理解性和综合性问题,其文章难度和长度适合于课堂分析讲解;阅读材料围绕相关主题展开,涉及面较广,从不同角度观察和分析有关问题,有利于全面理解和掌握相关的知识和信息,巩固所学的语言知识。

本教材可用作高年级英语精、泛读教程,尤其适合于军队院校的高年级英语教学,亦可作为有相当英语水平的自学者学习或研究现代战争的材料。

编者

2004年2月





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# Lesson 1

## Terrorism

Martin Walker

1 "Treason doth never prosper: what's the reason? For if it prosper, none dare call it treason" quipped Sir John Harington four centuries ago. The same can be said for terrorism. One person's terror is another's legitimate tactic in a political struggle. Moreover, terrorism works. It is a tried and tested method by which small and determined groups can impose their political will upon society.

2 The question is to define legitimacy. The German government of 1942 condemned acts of sabotage and murder in its occupied European territories as terrorism. In Britain and the United States these terrorists were hailed as freedom-fighters, the valiant resistance against Nazi oppression. Depending on your viewpoint, terrorists or freedom-fighters were partially or wholly responsible for bringing about Ireland's independence in 1922; for liberating Algeria from the French in 1962; for the independence of Cyprus in 1960; Kenya in 1963; and so on. And should the Palestinians regain their homeland and a conventional government, they will be hailed as fighters in the people's cause.

3 Terrorism is not simply a feature of the modern world. It is as old as governments. The Jewish struggle against the Romans, Henry V at Harfleur<sup>2</sup>, the Thirty Years' War<sup>3</sup> and the Spanish guerrilla war against Napoleon all saw campaigns of terror. St. Thomas Aquinas<sup>4</sup> and John Locke<sup>5</sup> were prepared to condone a terrorist tactic such as assassination of a tyrant.

4 And terrorism is unlikely ever to go away. Indeed it is far more likely to spread beyond its traditional arena of politics and into the spheres of organized crime, commercial competition and economics. Political terrorists and conventional criminals can be interchangeable. Al Capone's<sup>6</sup> protection rackets, like organized crime in the present day, depended on terrorizing people into cooperation. Today's organized crime is a multinational industry with worldwide offices, and its facilities for moving and laundering large sums of money around the globe offer almost perfect cover for terrorists. The first act of what could be called commercial terrorism took place in 1982 when poison was secreted in jars of headache pills, killing consumers across the United States, and provoking an

economic crisis for the manufacturer, the giant Johnson & Johnson Corporation. And in Jamaica in 1980, terrorism was used as an act of economic warfare; gun-battles in the streets drove away the tourists whose foreign exchange had sustained the Jamaican economy.

5 It may just be a matter of time before the first nuclear weapon is exploded by a terrorist. It has been a feature of terrorism throughout history that it keeps up with the latest available technology and puts it to tactical use. In the nineteenth century, the Irish used bombs in London, and the Russians who assassinated Tsar Alexander VI made use of the latest invention, dynamite. A distinctive feature of terrorism in the 1970s was the use it made of the availability of international travel. Aircraft and airports themselves became targets. Sophisticated electronics allowed bombs to be remote-controlled. Nationalist terrorists fighting their liberation campaign in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe shot down airliners with anti-aircraft missiles. If the technology is available, the terrorist will use it. And there is no shortage of nuclear warheads in the modern world. The technology of building an atom bomb is not beyond the capacity of an intelligent science graduate.

6 Direct and Indirect Terrorism. In the last 100 years, terrorism has evolved two quite distinct strategies; there is direct terrorism, striking at the very symbols of government or repression, killing the tsar, the chief of police, the general, the landowner; and there is indirect terrorism, striking not at the leaders but at the society they are charged to protect. Ironically, the more effective a government is at protecting its own leaders, the more attractive does indirect terrorism become. If the tsar is too well guarded, then strike at his relatives, or his innocent subjects to point to his regime's weakness, creating a crisis of security and provoking him into imposing more and more security, which will in itself provoke more unrest among the population.

7 There is nothing new about this ideology of terrorism. Indeed, its intellectual fathers were men of the nineteenth century—Bakunin<sup>7</sup>, Nechayev<sup>8</sup> and Sorel<sup>9</sup>—who glorified violence in a political cause. Bakunin wrote: "The urge to destroy is also the urge to create." Nechayev, in his essay *The Catechism of the Revolutionary*, took the argument further:

The revolutionary is a lost man; he has no interests of his own, no feelings, no habits, and no belongings. Everything in him is absorbed by a single, exclusive idea, one thought, one passion—the Revolution. He will be an implacable enemy of this world; and if he continues to live in it, it must be only in order to destroy it.

It is a striking feature of nineteenth-century terrorism that its intellectual fathers were anarchists, men who did not believe in political parties, or in promoting their ideas through conventional politics. And because they lacked political parties and organization, they had no orthodox levers with which to bring about social change. Terrorism was therefore the

tactic of the politically weak and it was intended to *shock* society into change.

8 The terrorism of the twentieth century is rather different, often seen as one more tactic to bring about a political cause that was already being promoted through a formal political party. Al-Fatah<sup>10</sup> was the military wing of the political movement the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization). Menachem Begin<sup>11</sup>, the terrorist of 1946, was acting as the military arm of a Jewish political movement which wanted the British out of Palestine, to be replaced by the state of Israel. And it is a striking feature of modern terrorist groups such as Baader-Meinhof<sup>12</sup> in Germany or the Japanese Red Army, that they did not follow the ideology of Nechayev and commit acts of terror in their own country solely to shock those societies into change; they also put their members and their skills at the service of the political cause of Palestine, as if they felt they needed the cloak of moral justification that such a cause might bring.

9 While Nechayev was writing, the nations of nineteenth-century Europe were building their colonial empires. And much of the history of our own century has turned on the wars to drive the European colonizers out. Such wars of national liberation, in Algeria, in Ireland or Cyprus or Zimbabwe or Vietnam, gave at least a degree of justification to the tactic of terror. But the language and ideology and glorification of violence of the twentieth-century terrorist thinkers uncannily echoed the style of Nechayev. Frantz Fanon<sup>13</sup>, of Algeria's National Liberation Front, wrote: "Violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect." And this in turn was paralleled by Menachem Begin, writing in his own history of the anti-British campaign: "Out of blood and fire and tears and ashes a new specimen of human being was born, a specimen completely unknown to the world for over 1800 years, the *Fighting Jew*" (his emphasis).

10 Terrorism since the 1970s. The anguish of governments at the wave of terrorism that emerged in the 1970s was caused not only by horror at the violence. It was caused also by governments' fear for their monopoly of violence. There is a tacit acceptance that governments have a special license to run secret services, to engage in acts of assassination and terror, to make war upon enemy civilians, to damage their crops, bomb their bridges and dams and canals, to blockade and starve them. The distinctive feature of the 1970s' terrorism was that non-governmental organizations were muscling in upon the tactics that governments had thought were reserved for themselves. Ironically, without the backing of legitimate governments, terrorists would find it more difficult to flourish. The government of Colonel Gadafy of Libya, for example, has given sanctuary, finance and weapons to terrorists ranging from the IRA, to Carlos the Jackal<sup>14</sup>, to George Habbash's<sup>15</sup> Peoples' Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

11 We can in fact trace back the terrorist wave of the 1970s to a conference held in Havana in 1966 under the auspices of the Cuban government. It was called "The First Conference of

Solidarity of the People of Africa, Asia and Latin America" (or the "Tricontinental" for short). Delegates attended from 82 countries, and the Soviet Union sent a team of 40. Che Guevara<sup>16</sup>, then fighting his doomed guerrilla war in Bolivia, was named President of Honor, and sent to the Tricontinental his celebrated call for "two, three, many Vietnams." The Cuban government set up its training camps for Third World guerrillas, and Carlos the Jackal attended one where he was trained under a system devised and supervised by General Viktor Semyonov of the Soviet KGB; Carlos then went on to Moscow's Lumumba University for further training. Veterans of this conference convened another meeting at Baddawi refugee camp in Lebanon in May 1972.

**12** Some experts on terrorism have argued that every significant terror group of the 1970s can be traced back to Soviet training, funds or support. And Soviet commentators have pointed out that several terrorist groups can also be traced back to the American CIA. Certainly, in 1982, three supporters of the IRA who went on trial in the United States for smuggling guns to Northern Ireland were acquitted by the court after they said that they had worked with the knowledge, approval and assistance of the CIA. And the CIA protestations of innocence in the case of their own former executive, Ed Wilson<sup>17</sup>, who ran a terrorist training school for Colonel Gadafy in Libya, were not altogether convincing. It would be remarkable if the intelligence agencies of the world's two major powers were not keeping in close touch with terrorist groups. The classic way of defeating terrorism is to infiltrate it, to take over its purse strings and supply chain, to dominate it and either snuff it out or point it in another direction. Ed Wilson's defense was that he became Gadafy's supplier and training organizer with CIA approval. Perhaps. This is a clouded world and full of double agents. But it is certain that traces of the CIA, the KGB, the French SDECE<sup>18</sup>, Israel's Mossad<sup>19</sup> and the intelligence agencies of an endless list of countries run through the history of modern terrorism as blue veins run through cheese.

**13** Most vulnerable to terrorism is the open society of a liberal democracy, where the free media permit the deployment of terrorism as theater; even defeats become media spectacles. The police siege of and assault on the Japanese United Red Army<sup>20</sup> group at Karuizawa in February 1972 was watched live on TV by 92.2 per cent of Japanese viewers, the rating recorded. Media publicity lent a glamour, and perhaps a disproportionate credibility, to the terrorist strikes. And the security forces themselves learned to take advantage of a glamour of their own, most notably in the SAS<sup>21</sup> assault on the terrorists holding London's Iranian Embassy hostage in 1980.

**14** Terrorists have skillfully taken advantage of other vulnerabilities in open societies, playing upon the humanitarian nerves of governments that would pay a large ransom, surrender prisoners or give free TV-time to guerrilla groups, rather than risk human lives. Such terrorists set governments a dilemma: if they gave in to demands, the terrorists flourished; if they hardened their hearts, increased their security measures, introduced

detention without trial and special courts (as the British did in Ulster); then the terrorists could make propaganda about the repressive nature of the regime.

15 The Red Brigades<sup>22</sup> of Italy and the Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany were able to provoke the state into stern measures, but they were not then able to mobilize mass support for the state's overthrow. But, in the process, they had dealt a shrewd blow at the legitimacy of the state. The Italian and German and British governments all introduced new legislation in the 1970s that gave the police very much wider powers of surveillance, arrest and detention. These protective measures began an insidious process of driving a wedge between the state and the people it was supposed to represent. Groups who campaign for civil liberties themselves became suspected of subversion. The terrorists had injected a poison into the bloodstream of the state, even in their defeat. And those tough new laws will stay. Searches at airports, searches in the street, phone-tapping and arbitrary arrest had become commonplace tools of democratic government by 1980. The implications are ugly.

16 In a closed society like the Soviet Union, terrorist groups are denied the weapon of publicity. But they, or even milder dissident groups, could provoke the kind of KGB crackdown, the intensification of security measures, which involved a major propaganda defeat for Moscow. Just as Nechayev's disciples provoked tsarist Russia into the kind of authoritarian over-reaction which bred more opposition, so in 1970 the Tupamaros<sup>23</sup> guerrillas of Uruguay launched a terrorist campaign which ended with the collapse of Uruguayan democracy and the introduction of repressive military rule. The process was given an ugly twist in the Argentine, where the AAA<sup>24</sup> death squads of the police and the army became terrorists on their own account, killing many opponents of the regime and provoking street battles and a state of siege which then was used to justify even more repression. It became a vicious spiral of terror and counter-terror, more repression and more discontent, a government without public support, whose only justification was its own security. And in South Africa, in the Philippines and South Korea—and less visibly in communist countries—this kind of vicious spiral has built up a momentum which has carried into the 1980s and probably beyond.

17 The Continuance of Terrorism. There remain a number of obvious candidate causes for terrorism around the world. In 1982, the Vietnamese refugees, the boat people, began to establish and recruit their own liberation groups, aimed at the Vietnamese empire that stretched across South-East Asia. The growing Muslim population of the Soviet Union, and dissident nationalist groups among the Crimean Tartars and the Ukrainians, had their own motives for challenging the Muscovite empire. The growing Spanish-speaking population of the United States, vulnerable to both sides of the long war between Fidel Castro's government and the US-based Cuban exiles, could also prove fertile ground. And in Northern Ireland, the Basque country, the Middle East, South Africa and Latin America,



the wars go on, with terrorism just another tactic.

18 But the evidence of the 1970s, after the Tricontinental meeting and the Baddawi camp conference<sup>25</sup>, was that terrorist groups helped each other, made tactical alliances and provided cross-funding, weapons, identity papers and protection. A terrorist international has a momentum of its own, a bureaucracy and even a tradition.

19 Against this, the defenses that governments can erect are not impressive. The US-Cuban agreement<sup>26</sup> has stopped the spate of hijackings to Havana, and the mutual opening of the French, British and German databanks has made it harder for terrorists to cross the once open frontiers of Europe. But while there are political causes with community support, there will be freedom-fighters, or terrorists, using as targets, as victims, the very people in whose name the terrorists' war is being fought. So they are faced with the old dilemma about whether or not the ends justify the means. There is a broad, if grudging, acceptance of the idea that governments are licensed to use vicious means for decent ends. Measured by results, few wars are worthwhile, but governments continue to fight them and citizens to volunteer. And plainly, the very embrace of vicious means changes the nature of the government or the individual who employs them. The British government is an alarmingly more powerful and potentially repressive system since it began fighting the IRA than it was in the 1960s. And the evidence of the careers of Menachem Begin and Fidel Castro suggests that the men who embrace terror themselves pay a fearsome price when they achieve power. And they exact an even higher price from others. Terrorism pollutes its practitioners, and brutalizes the governments who fight it. And both kill and maim innocent people along the way.

## Notes

### Notes to Text

1. Martin Walker (1947 — ): a journalist, who was born in Durham, England, and educated at Balliol College, Oxford, where he took his M. A. degree with first-class honors. Walker lives in London, where he works as a journalist contributing work to BBC, Encyclopaedia Britannica, the Manchester Guardian, and a number of American newspapers. He is the author of three novels, all of which he says "tell of political machinations I knew to be happening, but could not prove adequately for a newspaper." He has also written *The National Front*, a response to fascist movements in modern Britain, and is working on a study of world's top newspapers, as well as a new novel on modern Russia. "Terrorism" defines a worldwide phenomenon of profound concern to all of us, tracing, in crisp reportorial style, the beginnings and the development of

modern terrorist activity.

2. Henry V at Harfleur: Henry V, King of England landed in France with about 10,000 men in the summer of 1415. His first objective was Harfleur, a port town on northwestern France. The siege lasted for about a month and Henry marched into the town victoriously but with his army severely depleted mainly from illness.
3. The Thirty Years' War: The Thirty Years' War (1618—1648), in European history, was a series of wars fought by various nations for various reasons, including religious, dynastic, territorial, and commercial rivalries. Its destructive campaigns and battles swept across most of Europe.
4. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225—1274): an Italian theologian and medieval philosopher. Thomas's theological writings became regulative of the Catholic Church and his close textual commentaries on Aristotle represent a cultural resource which is now receiving increased recognition.
5. John Locke (1632—1704): an Oxford scholar, medical researcher and physician, political operative, economist as well as a philosopher of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. In this work Locke gives us a theory of natural law and natural rights, which he uses to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate civil governments, and to argue for the legitimacy of revolt against tyrannical governments.
6. Al Capone (1899—1947): America's best known gangster and the single greatest symbol of the collapse of law and order in the United States during the 1920s. Capone had a leading role in the illegal activities that lent Chicago its reputation as a lawless city at that time.
7. Mikhail Bakunin (1814—1876): Russian radical politician, one of the intellectual founding fathers of Anarchism. When Marx headed toward State-run Socialism, Bakunin argued for the abolition of the State as the most fundamental goal for those who want to guarantee freedom.
8. Sergei Nechayev (1847—1882): Russian radical politician, who cowrote *Catechism of a Revolutionist* with Bakunin (1869) that included the famous passage: "The Revolutionist is a doomed man. He has no private interests, no affairs, sentiments, ties, property nor even a name of his own. His entire being is devoured by one purpose, one thought, one passion—the revolution. Heart and soul, not merely by word but by deed, he has severed every link with the social order and with the entire civilized world; with the laws, good manners, conventions, and morality of that world. He is its merciless enemy and continues to inhabit it with only one purpose—to destroy it." His motto was, "Ends justify means".
9. Georges Sorel (1847—1922): French social philosopher. In his best-known work, *Reflections on Violence* (1908, tr. 1912), Sorel expounded his theory of "violence" as the creative power of the proletariat that could overcome "force," the coercive economic

power of the bourgeoisie. Sorel supported at various times such disparate alternatives to the existing order as extreme French monarchism and the Bolshevik Revolution.

10. Al Fatah (Arabic; *Al-fatah*): Exile Palestinian group that was founded in 1957 by Yassir Arafat. Al Fatah was committed to retain full independence for Palestinians. Their aim was direct military confrontation with Israel, in order to win back lost land from the Jews.
11. Menachem Begin (1913 — 1992): son of a Jewish timber merchant, he became a passionate Zionist, and later an underground commander, fighting against the British for the establishment of a Jewish state in what was then Palestine. In 1946, under his leadership, the Zionist fighters blew up a wing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, where the British were headquartered. Some 90 people—Jews and Arabs, as well as British—were killed. After the establishment of the State of Israel, he once served as Minister without Portfolio until 4 August 1970. In 1977, Mr. Menachem Begin, then head of the Likud party, became the sixth Prime Minister of Israel (1977—1983). He died of heart attack in 1992.
12. Baader-Meinhof: During the years of terror in West Germany (1968—1977), close to a hundred Germans became active left-wing terrorists, joining one of three terrorist groups, the Red Army Faction (RAF), Movement 2 June, and the Revolutionary Cells (RZ). Of the three, the Red Army Faction was the most well-known (often called “The Baader-Meinhof Gang”). In the 20 years following 1977, the size of the groups shrank, and some of the groups disappeared, but their actions proved deadlier and more destructive.
13. Frantz Fanon (1925—1961): French psychiatrist and writer, who believed that violent revolution is the only means of ending colonial repression and cultural trauma in the Third World. “Violence,” he argued, “is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect.” In 1954 the Algeria’s National Liberation Front (FLN) started its open warfare against French rule, and Frantz Fanon allied himself with the Algerian liberation movement that sought to throw off French rule.
14. Carlos the Jackal: Carlos the Jackal, whose real name is Ilich Ramírez Sanchez, was linked with attacks that killed more than 80 people. Carlos took part in the 1972 massacre of 11 Israeli athletes by Palestinian commandos at the Munich Olympics. He plotted the 1975 seizure of all 11 oil ministers at a Vienna OPEC meeting, and the 1976 Palestinian hijacking of a French jetliner to Uganda. He was arrested in August 1994 in Sudan. He was sentenced in Paris to life imprisonment and has been held at a maximum-security prison in solitary confinement.
15. George Habbash (1926 — ): former Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The Front’s 1967 inaugural statement declared that “the only

language which the enemy understands is that of revolutionary violence” and that the “historic task” was to open a fierce struggle against the enemy, “turning the occupied territories into an inferno whose fires consume the usurpers.” The Popular Front was among 10 Palestinian groups that rejected the Israel-Arafat Oslo accords.

16. Che Guevara (1928–1967): Argentine revolutionary and guerrilla leader, who fought in the Cuban revolution. At the triumph of the Revolution Guevara became second only to Fidel Castro in the new government of Cuba. Che’s final revolutionary adventure was in Bolivia; he grossly misjudged the revolutionary potential of that country with disastrous consequences. The attempt ended in his being captured by a Bolivian army unit and murdered a day later.
17. Ed. Wilson: a one time career CIA agent, who had also worked for the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Ed Wilson stood accused of shipping 42,000 pounds of the plastic explosive C-4 directly to Libya’s Moammar Qadaffi in 1977, and then hiring US experts—former US Army Green Berets—to teach Qadaffi’s people how to make bombs shaped like lamps, ashtrays and radios.
18. SDECE: *Service de Documentation Extérieur et de Contre-Espionnage*—French Counterintelligence (1958– ).
19. Mossad: [Hebrew for ‘institute’] The Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks, which has responsibility for human intelligence collection, covert action, and counter-terrorism.
20. Japanese Red Army (JRA): also called the Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB)—an international terrorist group formed around 1970. Its goal has been to overthrow the Japanese government and monarchy and to help foment world revolution. During the 1970s, the JRA carried out a series of attacks around the world, including the massacre in 1972 at Lod Airport in Israel, two Japanese airliner hijackings, and an attempted takeover of the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. In April 1988, a suspected JRA operation killed five, including a US servicewoman, in the bombing of a club in Naples. Its longtime leader Shigenobu was arrested in Japan in November 2000 and faces charges of terrorism and passport fraud.
21. SAS: The British SAS (Special Air Service) is a Special Forces team, which was initially created in WW II as a desert raiding force to weaken German North African logistics network as well as hinder aircraft operations. Its most famous antiterrorist operation was the assault of the Iranian Embassy in London in May, 1980. Six Iranian terrorists opposing Kohmeni’s rule seized the Embassy and twenty-six hostages. The SAS started its assault when the gunmen started to kill hostages. It succeeded in killing all six terrorists except one who was captured alive, and rescued 24 hostages.
22. The Red Brigades of Italy: The Red Brigades (BR) was formed in 1969 out of the student movements. Its aim was to separate Italy from the Western Alliance. Its